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Radioactive Waste: Gaps in the Regulatory
System
By HELENE LINKER*
ROGER BEERS**
TERRY LASH***

Radioactive wastes are among the most toxic substances
known to man. They are produced throughout the nuclear fuel
"cycle" - the chain of activities associated with the operation
of nuclear power reactors, commencing with the mining of uranium ore and extending through the disposal of the radioactive
waste products inevitably generated by those reactors. The release of radioactive wastes into the environment could cause
immediate death, cancer, or genetic mutations in catastrophic
proportions. Because some of these wastes remain dangerous
for tens, and even hundreds, of thousands of years (depending
on the particular waste product), they must be isolated from
• Helene Linker is a project attorney in the Western Office of the Natural Resources Defense Council, (NRDC), a nationwide, nonprofit environmental law organization. She is currently working on problems of radioactive waste disposal and protection of the California coastline. Before joining NRDC, Ms. Linker clerked for Judge
William Orrick of the U.S. District Court in San Francisco. She graduated from Radcliffe College in 1970, and received an M.A. in Education in 1971 and a J.D. in 1974
from Stanford University.
** Roger Beers received his B.A. (cum laude) from Baylor University in 1965, and
an LL.B. from Harvard Law School in 1968 (magna cum laude). He was an associate
with the San Francisco firm of Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliffe from 1969 to 1973.
Since then, he has been a staff attorney in the Western Office of the Natural Resources
Defense Council. At NRDC, Mr. Beers works on a variety of matters, including energy,
coastal, land use, and forestry issues.
*** Terry R. Lash has been a staff scientist with the Natural Resources Defense
Council for the last six years, specializing in radioactive waste management and other
energy-related issues. In addition to providing scientific expertise in the preparation
of lawsuits and participation in administrative hearings, Dr. Lash serves on many
committees and advisory boards, including the Technical Advisory Committee to the
President's Interagency Review Group on Nuclear Waste Management. He received his
Ph.D. from Yale University.
This article was prepared with the generous assistance of Kathy Oliver and Dan
Goodman.
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the biosphere for unprecedented periods of time to avoid harmful exposure to humans.
The need for stringent regulation of these hazardous waste
products by an independent agency with technical expertise
has been well recognized by Congress. The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC), the federal agency with primary regulatory responsibility over radioactive wastes generated by commercial (as opposed to military) nuclear operations, was created for this explicit purpose.' Congress delegated broad authority to the NRC, applicable at every facet of the commercial
nuclear fuel cycle, to ensure that the generation, management,
and disposal of these radioactive wastes do not jeopardize public health and safety. The comprehensive regulatory scheme
was established by both the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA),
as amended by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (ERA)'
and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).'
Despite the need for stringent control and the NRC's statutory obligation to exercise that control, at each of the major
steps in the nuclear fuel cycle - the mining and milling of
uranium, the use of the fuels in nuclear reactors, and the stor1. Initially, responsibility for both the regulation and development of nuclear
power was vested in the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). However, conflicts arose
when this single agency was responsible for these dual aspects of nuclear power. As a
result, in 1974, pursuant to section 104 of the Energy Reorganization Act (ERA), 42
U.S.C. § 5814 (1976), the AEC was abolished and its functions split between the
Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) and the NRC. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 5814, 5841 (1976). ERDA was given responsibility for research and development
programs related to nuclear activities, as well as for building and operating radioactive
waste repositories. 42 U.S.C. § 5813 (1976). The NRC was given licensing responsibility
over nuclear activities, including licensing of nuclear reactors, 42 U.S.C. § 5843 (1976),
and waste disposal facilities, 42 U.S.C. § 5842 (1976). Pursuant to section 301 of the
Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7151 (Supp. 1977), ERDA's
nuclear waste management development and research functions were transferred to
the Department of Energy (DOE).
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) also has some regulatory responsibilities with regard to radioactive wastes. The EPA is authorized (1) under Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 199, 200 (1970 Compilation), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
app., at 609 (1970) and in 84 Stat. 2086 (1970), to establish "generally applicable
environmental standards for the protection of the general environment from radioactive material," and to provide broad federal guidance for all aspects of radiation
protection; (2) under the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972
(33 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1421 (1976)), to regulate the disposal of radioactive waste in the
oceans; (3) under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7626
(Supp. 1977), to regulate radioactive effluents to the atmosphere.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1976); 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891 (1976).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976).
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age and disposal of wastes generated - there are serious regulatory gaps for dealing with the radioactive wastes. The end
result is the creation of a substantial risk to public health and
safety and the undermining of the objectives of the AEA and
NEPA to protect the public from the radiological hazards of
radioactive wastes.
This article discusses a number of the most serious of these
regulatory failings.4 Specifically, it addresses the major, past
and existing, inadequacies in the system for the licensing of
uranium milling operations and nuclear reactors which generate the wastes, as well as flaws in the regulatory structure for
the licensing of a permanent waste disposal facility.
These regulatory issues are currently of critical importance. As public attention has become more focused on the
problems of radioactive waste, the federal government has increased its efforts to address the waste management and disposal problem. Major decisions, involving statutory, political,
and technical considerations, are now being made with respect
to the regulatory requirements to be applied at each of the
phases of the commercial fuel cycle discussed herein.
I. THE WASTES - THEIR ToXIcITY AND MAGNITUDE
The major categories of commercial radioactive wastes
include the "tailings" from uranium mills, spent fuel rods, socalled "high-level" wastes, transuranic contaminated wastes,
and low-level wastes.
A. Uranium Mill Tailings
The first step in producing enriched uranium fuel for nuclear power plants is the milling of the uranium ore. The ore,
which is usually from a nearby mine, is crushed, ground, and
chemically treated in a mill to extract and concentrate the
uranium. The processed ore is then discharged into a tailings
pond as a solids-laden liquid. The water seeps into the ground
or evaporates, eventually leaving a dry pile of sandlike waste.
Uranium tailings contain natural radionuclides that are highly
toxic, and long lived. For example, thorium-230, which is a
highly toxic isotope contained in large amounts within mill
4. This article is not intended as a general survey of all existing regulatory flaws
associated with radioactive wastes. For example, numerous gaps associated in the
regulation of military-generated wastes, with the disposal of commercially generated
low-level waste and with away-from-reactor interim storage of commercial wastes are
not addressed.
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tailings, has a half-life (decay period) of 80,000 years, and,
therefore, it must be isolated from man on the order of a million
years or longer.
Human beings may be exposed to the radionuclide constituents of uranium mill tailings piles through the inhalation of
wind-blown particulates from unstabilized piles, of radon gas
which emanates from the piles, or of decay products from escaped radon. 5 Also, a person may be exposed by direct radiation from the piles, or through ingestion of contaminated water
supplies.' To provide full protection, undue human exposure to
the tailings from any of these possible pathways must be prevented.
In eight Western states, approximately twenty-five million
tons of radioactive mill tailings have already accumulated at
twenty-two mill sites, which are now inactive.' These sites have
been abandoned by the operators, and the piles are largely
unstabilized. While the potential dangers associated with these
existing sites are grave enough, the problems in the coming two
or three decades will be much greater. The annual amount of
natural uranium required to fuel nuclear plants is projected to
increase more than ten-fold by the end of this century As of
August 1978, there were twenty-one mills in active operation
throughout the United States, and the NRC estimates that 109
mills will be needed by the year 2000 to support the United
States' commercial nuclear power industry.' Correspondingly,
the accumulated volume of uranium mill tailings would increase by thirty-fold in that period.' 0
5. Potentially, the most serious health hazard posed by the uranium mill tailings
is the emanation of radon gas from tailings piles for hundreds of thousands of years.
The escaped radon and its decay products would expose millions of people to low levels
of radiation that probably would increase the rate of lung cancer. Some scientists have
estimated that the radon released from uranium mill tailings resulting from fueling one
large power reactor for a year would cause ultimately on the order of 400 lung cancer
deaths. See Pohl, Health Effects of Radon-222 From Uranium Mining, 7 SEARCH 345,
346-348 (1976).
6. U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, SUMMARY REPORT: PHASE I STUDY OF INACTIVE
URANIUM MINE SITEs AND TILmNG PnFS, 9-10 (October 1974).

7. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, URANIUM MIL TAILINGS CLEANUP: FEDERAL
LEADERSHIP AT LAST? 1 (June 20, 1978) [hereinafter G.A.O. MILL TAILINGS REPORT].
8. U.S. AToMic ENERGY COMMISSION, NUCLEAR POWER GROWTH 1974-2000, WASH1139 at 29 (February 1974).
9. G.A.O. MILL TAILNGS REPORT, supra note 7, at 1.
10. J. BLOMCKE, C. KEE, & J. NICHOLS, PROJECTIONS OF
GENERATED BY THE

1974).

U.S.

NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY,

RADIOACTIVE WASTES TO BE

ORNL-TM 3965 at 97 (February
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B. Reactor Generated Wastes
Once the uranium is removed from the ore and fabricated
into fuel, it is utilized in nuclear power plants. These plants
generate electricity through the fissioning, i.e., splitting, of
uranium and plutonium atoms in the core of nuclear reactors."
This fission process produces heat which converts water into
steam which in turn powers electric generators. As the fissionable isotopes in the fuel are depleted, the resulting waste product, the "spent fuel rods," are then withdrawn from the nuclear
reactor cores.
Until recently, the federal government and the nuclear
power industry had planned on chemically treating, or
"reprocessing," spent fuel in order to remove the un-fissioned
isotopes of plutonium and uranium for use in fresh fuel. When
reprocessing occurs, so-called "high-level radioactive wastes"
are produced.'" However, in April 1977, President Carter announced that reprocessing would be deferred indefinitely, because of the additional risks to public health and safety arising
from the separation and wide-spread utilization of plutonium
that could be used to fabricate nuclear explosive devices. 3
Under this new policy, spent fuel is the final form of high-level
waste for ultimate disposal.
Other wastes created as by-products of the nuclear fuel
cycle include "transuranic" wastes and "low-level" wastes.
These wastes are comprised of materials such as clothing,
glass, and metal that become contaminated with radioactivity.
Transuranic wastes (so-called because the atomic numbers of
some of the radionuclides in the waste are higher than uranium
on the periodic table of elements) are produced primarily at
reprocessing plants and facilities where plutonium is incorporated into fresh fuel. Thus, if there is no commercial reprocessing, no significant additional commercial transuranic wastes
11. Plutonium is absent in "fresh" fuel, but it builds up in the reactor core during
the operation of power plants. Some of the plutonium eventually fissions and contributes to the release of energy.
12. 10 C.F.R. § 50 app. F (1978), provides in pertinent part: "'[Huigh-level liquid
radioactive wastes' means those aqueous wastes resulting from the operation of the
first cycle solvent extraction system, or equivalent, and the concentrated wastes from
subsequent extraction cycles, or equivalent, in a facility for reprocessing irradiated

reactor fuels."
13. ExEcUTIvE OFFICE OF THE PRESmIDENT,
TIONAL ENERGY PLAN 70 (April 29, 1977).

ENERGY POLCY AND PLANNING,

THE

NA-
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will be generated. Low-level wastes, on the other hand, are
produced at nuclear reactor sites themselves. While there is
much overlap in the general types of materials constituting
low-level and transuranic wastes, the low-level wastes do not
include the "heavier" radionuclides with atomic numbers
higher than uranium.
Like the uranium mill tailings, the wastes produced by
power plants are highly toxic, and their management and disposal represents one of the most difficult problems of the nuclear era. For example, one of the most dangerous of the radionuclides generated by nuclear reactors, plutonium-239, is so
toxic that as little as three micrograms -

a "speck" -

can

cause lung cancer in animals." Moreover, because of its exceedingly long half-life of 24,000 years, the large quantities of plutonium produced in reactors will remain potentially harmful to
mankind for at least several hundred thousand years.
Significant quantities of extremely toxic radioactive
wastes have already been produced by the operation of commercial nuclear reactors and sizeable increases in quantity are
projected. At present, about seventy commercial nuclear power
reactors are operating within this country," and by the year
2000, the NRC has projected that over 500 such reactors may
be operating." Over 600,000 gallons of commercial liquid highlevel wastes" and about 4,000 metric tons of commercial waste
in spent fuel rods already exist. Is When measured by long-lived

radioactivity (an indicator of potential hazard), the current
inventory of these radioactive wastes is expected to double
within three or four years, and will be twenty times greater by
the end of the century."9
14. Bair & Thompson, Plutonium: Biomedical Research, 183 SCIENCE 715, 720
(1974).
15. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, NUCLEAR GENERATING UNITS IN THE UNITED
STATES AS OF JUNE 30, 1978 (August 9, 1978).
16. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, FINAL GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT ON THE USE OF RECYCLED PLUTONIUM IN MIXED OXIDE FUEL IN LIGHT WATER COOLED
REACTORS, NUREG-0002, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, at S-12 (August 1976).
17. M. WILLRICH AND R.K. LESTER, RADIOACTIVE WASTE, MANAGEMENT AND
REGULATION 14 (1977).
18. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, REPORT OF TASK FORCE FOR REVIEW OF NUCLEAR
WASTE MANAGEMENT (Draft), DOEER-0004/D 66 (February 1978) [hereinafter DEUTCH

REPORT].
19. U.S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, PUBLIC COMMENTS AND TASK FORCE

RESPONSES REGARDING THE ENVIRONMENTAL SURVEY OF THE REPROCESSING AND WASTE
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THE UNSATISFACTORY HISTORY OF WASTE MANAGEMENT

The history of the management of these various radioactive waste products has been checkered with missteps, changes
in direction, and aborted planning, which serve to underscore
the need for an improved regulatory apparatus. For example,
in 1952 through 1966, mill tailings were used extensively as
construction fill in houses, schools, businesses, sidewalks and
highways in Grand Junction, Colorado. The serious threat to
public health from this material was not recognized until later.
A remedial program was commenced in 1972, and it is estimated that hazardous tailings fill must be removed from about
700 locations.20 Yet, six years later, the remedial program is
only half completed. It remains entirely voluntary and apparently few local contractors are interested in performing the
remedial work." No regulatory action was ever undertaken by
the federal government to prevent this occurrence or to compel
an effective cleanup.
Elsewhere, uranium milling operations have contaminated
public water supplies. As early as 1958, investigators discovered that the drinking water in two towns along the Animas
River below Durango, Colorado - Aztec and Farmington, New
Mexico - contained concentrations of radioactivity exceeding
federal standards.22 Furthermore, as a result of the sequestration of minerals in the river food chains, radium concentrations
in the river flora and fauna were 100 to 10,000 times the concentrations found in the river water itself.? Indeed, grasses and
alfalfa irrigated with the water and consumed by livestock,
contained concentrations of radium 100 times greater than the
river water.2 '
The contamination of ground water near active mill sites
continues to be a problem. In 1974 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) surveyed water discharges from uranium
milling and mining complexes in the Grants Mineral Belt in
New Mexico. EPA found that ground water in the vicinity of
the uranium mills exceeded EPA limits for certain poisonous
MANAGEMENT PORTIONS OF THE

LWR

FuEL CYCLE,

NUREG-0216 (Supp. 2 to WASH-

1248) 3-113 (March 1977).

20. G.A.O. MILL
21.
22.
23.
24.

TAILINGS REPORT, supra note 7, at 21.

Id. at 22-25.
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, THE NucLE

Id.
Id.

FUEL CYCLE 47 (1975).
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chemicals by as much as 7,300 percent. 5 The study also found
that radioactive contamination of the drinking water near some
of the mills grossly exceeded drinking water standards and
posed a health hazard to the employees and their families. 21
The wastes generated by the operation of commercial nuclear reactors have also been seriously mismanaged in a number of instances. For example, all of the commercial high-level
liquid wastes resulting from previous reprocessing of spent fuel
are currently stored at West Valley, New York. The initial
plans contemplated that these wastes would be stored indefinitely in liquid form in near-surface storage tanks. It was envisioned that repeated transfers of these wastes to new tanks
would be made as the old storage tanks deteriorated.
The West Valley program, however, was marked from the
beginning by inadequate study and unforeseen safety problems. First, no plan was established in advance to ensure that
the wastes could be safely removed from the older tanks when
it came time to transfer them to new ones. Then, in 1970, the
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) promulgated new regulations requiring all high-level wastes generated in the future to
be solidified within five years of their generation, thus belatedly recognizing that the practice it had licensed at West Valley was inadequate.2 The new policy also provided that a specific proceeding on the future of West Valley wastes would be
initiated, because of the particular problems in solidifying the
existing wastes there.2 Nonetheless, eight years later, no such
proceeding has been commenced. Even worse, no satisfactory,
safe method of removing the wastes from existing tanks has
been developed, and additional special research must now be
conducted to rectify past errors in decisionmaking.
The cost of remedying the waste disposal problem at West
Valley has been estimated as high as $600 million, and implementation of an effective cleanup operation may take as long
as fourteen years." Among the unresolved questions is who will
25. U.S.

ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION AGENCY,

WATER QUALITY IMPACTS OF URA-

NIUM MING AND MILLING ACrmEs IN THE GRANTs MINERAL BELT, NEW MEXICO,

No

6/9/75/002 58 (September 1975).
26. Id. at 60.
27. 10 C.F.R. § 50 app. F (1978).
28. Id.

29. HousE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, WEST VALLEY AND THE NucizA
DILEMMA, H.R. REP. No. 755, 95th Cong., lt Sess. 16 (1977).
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pay for and carry out this operation, the commercial site operator, the state of New York, or the federal government.
To date, governmental efforts to establish a permanent
repository for commercial radioactive wastes have also been
unsatisfactory. Twenty-five years after Congress authorized
the commercial development of nuclear power, no permanent
waste repository has been built, and there is no approved plan
for such a facility. Instead, one proposal after another has been
explored and abandoned.0 Indeed, the NRC admits that up to
about 1970, whatever waste management policy existed "had
been more or less ad hoc. ,,31
Shortly after passage of the AEA, the AEC and its advisors
focused on bedded salt deposits as the most likely underground
geological formation for disposal of the long-lived commercial
wastes.2 In the late 1960's, the government finally selected an
abandoned salt mine near Lyons, Kansas, as the location for a
pilot repository for the wastes. However, later investigation
disclosed, among other things, that water from adjacent mining operations might seep into the repository and dissolve the
salt containing the waste. In early 1972, the Lyons, Kansas, site
was abandoned.1
Next, in May 1972, the AEC announced its plan to build
a so-called "retrievable surface storage facility" or "RSSF" an engineered facility constructed near the surface of the earth
to store the commercial wastes for an indeterminate period
of time, while the prolonged search for an acceptable, safe geological site continued. Three years later, however, the waste
program changed direction once again. In the spring of 1975,
the Energy Research and Development Administration
(ERDA) withdrew the request for congressional appropriations
for the RSSF, although it was purportedly retained as a backup
system in case "other repository plans failed."'
30. NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE COMM., CALIFORNIA ENERGY REOURCES CONSERVATION AND
DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION, STATUS OF NUCLEAR FUE. REPROCESSING, SPENT FUEL STOR-

AGE AND HIGH-LEVEL WASTE DISPOSAL (Draft) 117-118 (January 11, 1978).
31. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, ENVIRONMENTAL SURVEY OF THE REPROCESSING AND WASTE MANAGEMENT PORTIONS OF THE LWR FUEL CYCLE - A TASK FORCE

REPORT,
32.
33.
34.

NUREG-0116 (Supp. 1 to WASH-1248) at D-3 (October 1976).
Id. at D-2.
Id. at D-3.
Id. at D-4.
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With a resurrected near-term emphasis on the development of a deep geologic repository, ERDA expanded its efforts
to locate a potential geologic formation for commercial wastes
and in 1976 focused on a salt formation in the state of Michigan
for investigation. However, in June 1977, after residents of
northern Michigan had voted overwhelmingly to prohibit the
siting of a waste repository within their state, the federal government abandoned its efforts to locate the repository in the
state of Michigan.
The draft report of a recent Department of Energy (DOE)
task force on radioactive waste management" makes clear how
much uncertainty surrounds the government's current efforts
to establish a repository for the permanent storage of radioactive wastes. At the outset, the task force report notes that the
"federal government, as an entity, has not formally reached a
conclusion on ultimate disposal of high level wastes."" The
report then highlights the uncertainties surrounding this endeavor. First, the report concludes that the federal government's previous target deadline of 1985 for the establishment
of a waste repository will now be delayed until 1988, at "the
earliest date. ' ' Second, it is apparent from the report that
fundamental questions continue to exist about the threshold
determination of what geologic medium is appropriate for
waste disposal. The report now questions the government's
almost exclusive focus upon bedded salt deposits and recommends that a variety of other geologic media be considered
more seriously. 3' Finally, the report recognizes that several
important technical issues remain unresolved. In general, the
report calls for additional efforts in "developing scientific data,
safety analysis and systems models to improve the scientific
bases for specific media choice, site selection and repository
designs. '"40
Important unresolved scientific and technical problems
concerning waste disposal have been highlighted recently in
35.

U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING

OFFICE,

REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, THE UNITED

STATES NUCLEAR ENERGY DILEMMA: DISPOSING OF HAZARDOUS RADIOACTIVE WASTES

SAFELY 15 (September 9, 1977).
36. See DEUTCH REPORT, supra

37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

7.
12.
9, 52.
3, 9, 26.

note 18.
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other government studies as well." Most recently an interagency review group'" (IRG) prepared a comprehensive report
reviewing the nuclear waste disposal issue and recommending
changes to improve the existing program. The draft report acknowledges that management of radioactive wastes for the past
three decades can be characterized by "inadequate integration
of waste management R&D (research and development) efforts
• . .caused in part by inadequate perceptions of the additional
technological and scientific capabilities needed to develop an
acceptable disposal capability . . . ,,'i
Among other things,
the report calls for legislative change to increase the federal
government's regulatory powers over various nuclear waste
forms," and for adherence to a comprehensive work schedule
directed towards completion of a high-level waste repository by
1995.'" Following public comment, the report will be forwarded
to the President for his consideration and guidance in further
action." If adopted and implemented, it appears the IRG recommendations will improve the nuclear waste management
program, but it will not resolve the problem. The IRG report
is incomplete and, in some instances, recommends policies inconsistent with full protection of the public and the environment. The IRG report, for instance, does not make the link
between continued operation of nuclear power plants and the
lack of progress in developing a permanent waste disposal facility for the wastes created by the plants. The IRG report also
recommends against comprehensive regulation of the government's own wastes by the NRC. Moreover, significant doubt
remains about the ability to implement the program recommended by the IRG report. Thus, although the IRG effort may
be an important advance in federal decisionmaking, substantial uncertainty still remains about the adequacy of the waste
management and disposal program.
41. Carter, Nuclear Wastes: The Science of Geologic Disposal Seen as Weak, 200
SCIENCE 1135 (1978).

42.

INTERAGENCY

REVIEW GROUP, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE INTERAGENCY

REVIEW GROUP ON NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT

43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. iv.
Id. x, xiv.
Id. xxi-xxiii.
Id. iii.

TID-28817 (Draft) (October 1978).
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DEFICIENCIES IN THE REGULATORY SYSTEM

A.

Uranium Mill Tailings
In the past, inconsistent state and federal licensing programs over uranium mill tailings have created a major flaw in
the regulation of this radioactive waste product. A number of
states' programs have failed to adequately protect the public
health and safety. In an effort to rectify this regulatory deficiency, on November 8, 1978, President Carter signed into law
the Uranium Mill Tailings Control Act of 1978.17 This new
legislation makes more explicit the states' obligation to develop
regulatory programs over uranium mill tailings that are more

consistent with that of the federal government. This legislation, if fully implemented, will mark a substantial advance in
the management and control of uranium mill tailings.
The NRC is empowered by section 63 of the AEA1" to issue
source material licenses for possession of uranium. This license
is necessary for the operation of a uranium mill. Pursuant to
section 274 of the AEA,11 however, the NRC may delegate this
and certain other licensing responsibilties to the states under
the so-called Agreement State Program.5 Twenty-five states
have become agreement states." As of August 1978, eleven of
the twenty-one active uranium mills in the United States were
located in the agreement states of New Mexico, Colorado,
Texas, and Washington, and were licensed directly by those
states. The other ten active mills were in non-agreement states
and were licensed by the federal government.
The licensing system administered by an agreement state
is supposed to provide the same level of protection for public
health and safety as the NRC would require. At the federal
level, however, the procedures mandated by the National Environmental Policy Act are an integral part of NRC licensing of
47. Pub. L. No. 95-604.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2093 (1976).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1976).
50. The NRC is empowered to delegate regulatory responsibility to the state for
the regulation of by-product material, source materials and special nuclear materials
in quantities not sufficient to form a critical mass. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (1976). A
definition of these materials is contained in 42 U.S.C. § 2014 (1976).
51. Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas and Washington.
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mills in non-agreement states. NEPA imposes strict responsibilities on federal agencies to ensure that environmental values
are considered.
Section 102 of the Act requires that each agency shall "to
the fullest extent possible" prepare an environmental impact
statement (EIS) which discloses, inter alia, the full range of
impacts and alternatives to a proposed action on all "major
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment."" Thus, if a mill is licensed directly by the NRC,
an EIS is always prepared.53 The EIS provides an independent
assessment of the impacts of the proposed mill upon the environment, alternative disposal methods and mill sitings, as well
as potential accidents and problems posed by decommissioning
the mill site once milling operations have been discontinued.
It is through this independent environmental analysis that the
most appropriate health and safety requirements to be applied
to milling operations can be determined.
On the other hand, in the agreement of states, no EIS is
prepared by the federal government under NEPA. While some
agreement states have enacted state laws that parallel NEPA
and require the preparation of environmental analyses, the
agreement states of Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas,5" where
nine of the active mills are located, have lacked any state law
counterpart to NEPA. The licensing of uranium mills in these
states has been subject to far less stringent reviews and procedures than would have applied if the mills had been licensed
directly by the federal government. Thus, the three states
which have not required an EIS lacked an essential vehicle for
ensuring that important environmental considerations were
fully reviewed and incorporated into the decisionmaking process. The end result has been that these states have imposed
less stringent substantive standards than those imposed by the
52. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1976).
53. 10 C.F.R. § 51.5(a)(5) (1978). Although the NRC requires an applicant for a
uranium mill license in a non-agreement state to submit an environmental report, 10
C.F.R. §§ 51.20, 51.21 (1978), the agency is required to conduct its own independent
evaluation of environmental factors and independently prepare the draft and final
EIS's. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.7(c) (1978).
54. The State of Washington has a state law, similar to NEPA, which requires the
preparation of state environmental impact statements and makes the state program
more analogous to that administered by the federal government. State Environmentai
Policy Act of 1971, WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C (1971).
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federal government, and less stringent standards than the
states themselves might have demanded were the mill licensing
decisions subject to a thorough and independent environmental review.
Moreover, the procedures employed by these states to facilitate public participation in the licensing process have been
sorely inadequate and widely divergent from those utilized by
the NRC. None of the states has had specific provisions for
public hearings to assess the far-ranging and long-term environmental impacts of a proposed mill. 5 Public notice of the
receipt of licensing applications is often perfunctory. In New
Mexico, for example, notices of receipt of applications have
been published only in certain local newspapers at unspecific
times.
In contrast, NRC regulations require public hearings on
each application for a mill license in non-agreement states, at
the request of the applicant or any affected party or on its own
motion. 6 Notice of receipt of all applications, as well as notice
of the public hearing, must be published in the Federal
7 Public participation is also solicited in the comRegister."
menting process on the draft environmental impact statement
prepared by the NRC on a proposed mill, and the availability
58
of the draft is announced in the FederalRegister.
Finally, the regulatory programs of these three agreement
states have not prohibited the construction of a mill prior to the
completion of the licensing process (even of the perfunctory
environmental analysis of the project that was conducted). In
contrast, the NRC regulations provide that the commencement
of any mill construction activities while the licensing process
is underway may result in the denial of the license.5 ' Clearly,
this restriction is necessary to avoid a premature commitment
of resources and the creation of inappropriate momentum towards a particular mill site or disposal methodology.
The inconsistencies between the uranium mill licensing
55. U.S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION,

REGULATION OF URANIUM MILLS

WORKSHOP ON THE FEDERAL-STATE

NUREG/CR-0029 at 2 (February 1978).

56. 42 U.S.C. § 2239 (1976); 10 C.F.R. § 2.105 (1978); 10 C.F.R. § 2.714(a) (1978);
10 C.F.R. § 2.103(b)(2) (1978).
57. 10 C.F.R. § 2.105 (1978); 10 C.F.R. § 2.104 (1978).
58. 10 C.F.R. § 51.50(c) (1978); 10 C.F.R. § 51.24(f) (1978).
59. 10 C.F.R. § 40.32(e) (1978).
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programs of the federal government and the agreement states
arguably violated the requirement of the AEA, even before it
was amended and strengthened by the Uranium Mill Tailings
Control Act of 1978. The unamended AEA required that the
two programs be "compatible," and established two prongs to
this requirement. Under section 274(d)(2), the NRC had to find
prior to a delegation of authority to the state "that the State
program is compatible with the Commission's program for the
regulation of such materials, and that the State program is
adequate to protect public health and safety with respect to the
materials covered by the proposed agreement." 0 And, in section 274(g), the Commission was directed "to assure that State
and Commission programs for protection against hazards of
radiation will be coordinated and compatible."'"
As the language suggests, the purpose of these provisions
is to ensure that the delegation of authority from the Commission to the State does not result in a relaxation of the Act's
mandate to protect the public health and safety from the hazards of radioactive materials. The decided shortcomings in the
procedures utilized by the agreement states, as enumerated
above, appear to handicap the fulfillment of this mandate and
render these state programs incompatible with the Commission's program.
Apart from the requirements of the AEA, NEPA itself appears to require that the agreement states at least prepare environmental impact statements or their equivalent, in licensing
uranium mills. Despite the delegation of licensing authority to
the agreement states, the federal government remains substantially involved in the process for licensing uranium mills in
those states. For example, the NRC: (1) retains the right to
reassert its own licensing authority; (2) conducts annual reviews of the overall operations of the agreement state pro60. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(d)(2) (1976). Section 204(b) of the Uranium Mill Tailings
Control Act, Pub. L. No. 95-604, has strengthened this provision of the AEA by inserting the phrase "in accordance with the requirements of subsection o and in all other
respects" before the word "compatible." Subsection "o" of section 204 of the new
legislation in turn makes more explicit the state's obligation, prior to issuance of a
uranium mill license, to provide a number of important procedural safeguards and to
ensure that state substantive standards are at least equivalent to those of the federal
government.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(g) (1976). This provision of the AEA was not amended by
the Uranium Mill Tailings Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-604.
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grams, including the states' licensing decisions and environmental programs; (3) provides training, technical assistance
and inspection of the state program; (4) reviews and comments
upon all license applications filed with these states; and (5)
expends sizeable federal funds in administering the agreement
state program. In some cases, this level of ongoing federal involvement has sufficed to compel the preparation of an EIS
under NEPA, although state or private parties were vested
2
with substantial responsibilities for the action in question.
The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), the federal
agency primarily charged with administering and interpreting
NEPA, has expressed informally its view that EIS's are required in agreement states under both the compatibility provisions of the AEA and under NEPA."3 CEQ concluded that
NEPA's policies must be taken into account in interpreting the
requirement of compatibility. It further noted that delegation
of authority to a state does not remove the Commission from
the process for purposes of NEPA, and that the disparity in the
implementation of NEPA between agreement and nonagreement states was "anomalous."
These deficiencies in the Agreement State Program were
challenged in an action now pending in the Federal District
court in New Mexico, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
v. NRC.11 In particular, the suit challenges New Mexico's issuance of a license for a specific uranium mill without preparing
62. See, e.g., Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d
1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972); Named Individual Members of the San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Tex. Highway Dep't, 446
F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972).
63. Letter from Charles Warren, Chairman, CEQ, to Joseph Hendrie, Chairman,
NRC (September 6, 1977).
In draft regulations CEQ also made clear its view that in all instances, a delegation
of licensing authority does not relieve the federal government of responsibility to insure
that an EIS is prepared, if otherwise required. 43 Fed. Reg, 25,230, 25,245 (1978).
However, in response to public comments suggesting that "application of NEPA
in such circumstances is a highly complicated issue; that its proper resolution depends
on a variety of factors that may differ significantly from one program to the next and
should be weighed on a case-by-case basis ......
43 Fed. Reg. 55, 978, 55,989 (1978),
CEQ in its final regulations determined not to address this issue. While CEQ has thus
declined to express an official opinion on NEPA's application across the board when
licensing authority is delegated to a state, it has opted for a case-by-case approach for
the time being. With respect to delegation of licensing authority over uranium mills,
through its opinion letter from Charles Warren to Joseph Hendrie, CEQ has indicated
its view that NEPA clearly applies.
64. No. 77-240(B), filed May 3, 1977.
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an EIS or providing adequate public participation, and requests that an EIS be prepared, accompanied by all the procedural safeguards enumerated above for the mill in question. In
the alternative, the suit asks that the Agreement State Program with New Mexico be terminated, and that the NRC resume direct licensing and EIS responsibility over the mill. The
claims are asserted both under the "compatibility provisions"
of the AEA and under NEPA.
In part in response to this litigation, Congress passed the
Uranium Mill Tailings Control Act of 1978.5 The legislation
addresses, among other issues," many of the specific inadequacies challenged in the litigation and makes explicit the
states' obligation, prior to the issuance of licenses for uranium
mills, to require the preparation of environmental analyses
analogous to EIS's, to conduct public hearings, based on a
record subject to judicial review, and to prohibit the construction of a uranium mill until an adequate environmental analysis has been completed. 7 The legislation further makes more
explicit the states' obligation to impose substantive standards
for uranium mill licenses that are equivalent to or more stringent than those imposed by the federal government in its licensing process. 8 If the states fail to bring their regulatory
65. Pub. L. No. 95-604.
66. The new legislation also rectifies a number of other serious problems in the
regulation of mill tailings that existed with respect to regulation of inactive mill sites.
In the past the NRC has not exercised regulatory control over tailings piles at these
sites. By narrowly defining the term "source material" to exclude any material which
contains less than 0.05 percent of uranium and/or thorium by weight, the NRC has
excluded the tailings piles themselves. 10 C.F.R. § 40.4(h) (1978). At active mill sites
the NRC has taken the position that the tailings piles can be regulated under the
source material license issued for the mill. However, once a mill is closed, and its source
material license has been terminated, the NRC has maintained that its regulatory
involvement is concluded. The new legislation, however, resolves the problem by
amending the AEA definition of the term "by-product" material to include specifically
uranium mill tailings and thereby make explicit continuing NRC jurisdiction over the
tailings piles at inactive sites. Pub. L. No. 95-604 § 201.
The Uranium Mill Tailings Control Act of 1978 also rectifies another problem
related to long term control over tailings piles that has arisen under past land ownership practices which permitted private mill operators to own the tailings disposal sites.
Since the mill tailings must be isolated for tens of thousands of years, it is essential to
have assurance that the entity owning the land will have long term viability. The new
legislation recognizes there is no such assurance with a private operator and requires
federal or state ownership of the disposal site unless the NRC makes a specific determination that private ownership poses no threat to the public health and safety. Id. §
83a.
67. Id. § 204 o(3).
68. Id. § 204 0(2).
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programs into line with the new legislation the NRC can revoke
the states' licensing authority over uranium mills in order to
protect the public health and safety."9
The extent to which the states will be willing and able to
comply with the requirements of the Uranium Mill Tailings
Control Act of 1978 is still an open issue. There is, however, no
question that this new legislation is a tremendous advance towards remedying a number of the regulatory deficiencies described above and a tremendous step towards reducing a serious potential health consequence.
B. The Reactor Licensing Process
Radioactive wastes with higher levels of toxicity are generated by the nuclear power plants which utilize the fuel rods
fabricated after the uranium milling process. These wastes are
the inevitable by-products of the licensing of additional power
reactors. Any commitment to responsible decisionmaking,
therefore, would seem to dictate that the environmental impact of these wastes and the feasibility of their safe permanent
storage be given the fullest consideration in the licensing of the
reactors which generate these wastes. Without these kinds of
analyses, the wastes generated by new plants will greatly add
to the dimension of a problem which may prove intractable.
In any reactor licensing proceeding, the NRC must make
an environmental analysis pursuant to NEPA, disclosing the
full range of the impacts of the proposed project. The NRC
must also make an explicit finding pursuant to the AEA that
the decision to license the reactor will not jeopardize the public
health and safety. Unfortunately, the NRC's review of the
radioactive waste problem in both the NEPA and the AEA
contexts is sorely deficient.
The Reactor NEPA Review
It is now well settled that the environmental analysis conducted pursuant to NEPA during reactor licensing must extend to an evaluation of the environmental impacts of the
radioactive wastes generated by the reactor. Only through a
C.

69. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(y) as amended by the Uranium Mill Tailings Control Act,
Pub. L. No. 95-604, § 204(d).
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consideration of these impacts can the true costs of an individual reactor be assessed. Particularly in instances where
projected demand for the energy is uncertain or acceptable
alternative technologies are available to meet demand, the
NRC hearing board's weighing of the impacts of the radioactive wastes may tip the balance against the issuance of a
reactor license. While the logic of this approach seems clear,
it has yet to be implemented adequately by the NRC.
Initially, this issue was excluded from consideration in reactor licensing. In a hearing on the license application for the
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, the Appeals Board
held that the NEPA review of radioactive wastes when they
leave the reactor should be limited to the environmental effects
of the transportation of the wastes .from the reactor to reprocessing plants and that the impact of the reprocessing plants
or the disposal of wastes need not be evaluated."'
Shortly thereafter, the AEC instituted a rulemaking proceeding to reconsider whether the environmental effects of all
stages of the nuclear fuel cycle should be included in the NEPA
cost-benefit analysis for licensing individual reactors.7 ' The
AEC concluded that although the waste disposal impacts were
"relatively insignificant,"7" it was desirable to consider them in
this forum. The AEC then promulgated a rule - the so-called
Table S-3 - to be factored into the cost-benefit analysis for
3
individual nuclear reactors.
Table S-3 is a numerical tabulation of the postulated impacts of the radioactive wastes resulting from the operation of
a single nuclear reactor. The Table attempts to identify the
adverse impacts of the nuclear fuel cycle by listing the amount
of radioactive effluents that will be released to the environment, as well as the land and water resources that will be
committed to waste management and disposal efforts at all
phases of the fuel cycle. The rulemaking envisioned that Table
S-3 would be incorporated into individual environmental impact statements prepared on light water reactors considered for
70.
71.
72.
73.

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., ALAB 56, 4 A.E.C. 930 (June 6, 1972).
37 Fed. Reg. 24191 (1972) (codified in 10 C.F.R. § 50 (1978)).
39 Fed. Reg. 14188,. 14190 (1974) (codified in 10 C.F.R. § 51.20(e) (1978)).
Id. at 14191.
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licensing, and that it would suffice as the sole discussion of
these matters within the EIS.7 '
The adequacy of the rulemaking was challenged in
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC.7 5 The court
of appeals found that the evidence presented by the AEC in the
proceeding left important questions unresolved and that credibility of the rule was not adequately tested. The court held that
more extensive procedures than traditional notice and comment rulemaking should have been afforded participants in the
proceeding. The court ordered a remand of the matter to the
NRC for a more thorough review of these issues. In dictum, the
court also identified a number of deficiencies in the format of
the Table S-3.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the decision
of the court of appeals. The Court's opinion focused exclusively
on the question of the adequacy of the procedures used by the
NRC in conducting the generic rulemaking. The Court determined that the agency's utilization of traditional notice and
comment rulemaking procedures was sufficient to permit an
adequate review of the waste impact issue. In remanding the
matter, the Supreme Court specifically left open the question
of whether the particular record developed by the agency in
support of Table S-3 was adequate in fact to sustain the rule."
The Supreme Court did not consider whether the format of
Table S-3 was adequate.
As to the adequacy of Table S-3, the court of appeals had
suggested that the approach taken was misleading and tended
to minimize the environmental impacts. Specifically, it observed that "the toxic life of the wastes under discussion far
exceeds the life of the plant being licensed," and it suggested
that Table S-3 improperly abbreviated consideration of the
environmental impacts of radioactive wastes generated by a
nuclear reactor to the operating life of any given reactor (some
74. Id.
75. 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev 'd and remanded on other grounds sub noma.
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 98 S.Ct.
1197 (1978).
76. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
98 S.Ct. 1197, 1207 n.14 (1978). The question of the adequacy of the record to sustain
the initial S-3 rule is currently pending before the court of appeals. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, No. 74-1385 (D.C. Cir.) remanded April 3, 1978.
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40 years).77 The court of appeals stated that the "full detoxification period" for these wastes would.provide a more appropriate time period for the environmental assessment."'
The court also concluded that Table S-3's "focus on only
the incremental impact of waste generated by an additional
reactor," rather than the prospective cumulative effects of all
operating light water reactors, was misleading." Finally, the
court stated that meaningful assessment of the potential environmental impacts of waste disposal might include a discussion of the feasibility and availability of the technology underlying the environmental predictions.")
After the decision of the court of appeals"' and while the
matter was still pending in the Supreme Court, the NRC reopened the S-3 rulemaking proceedings in May 1977, to develop the final S-3 rule.82 The reopened administrative proceeding was conducted over the course of some thirteen
months, and the evidentiary record was closed June 26, 1978.si
In its existing format, Table S-3 would appear to violate
the most rudimentary requirements of NEPA - including the
deficiencies which the court of appeals identified. The current
S-3 rule lacks any narrative accompanying the Table which
would describe in clear and understandable terms the many
uncertainties and non-quantifiable factors inherent in the calculations underlying the numbers in the Table. It fails to disclose the actual adverse health impacts on man in terms of
genetic mutations and cancers, relying instead upon a quantification of the curies of radioactive waste released. The Table
limits its impact analysis to a fifty year cut-off point, rather
77. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 639 n.12 (D.C.
Cir. 1976).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 640 n.13.
81. Immediately following the court of appeals decision, the NRC staff drafted an
interim S-3 rule. This interim S-3 rule was modeled on a numerical chart identical to
the initial Table S-3 with revisions limited to a few of the numbers contained in the
chart. This interim S-3 rule was seen as a temporary measure that would be utilized
in EIS's in individual reactor licensing proceedings pending completion of the generic
proceeding to develop a final S-3 rule. 42 Fed. Reg. 13,803, 13,806 (1977). A challenge
to this interim rule is also currently pending before the court of appeals. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, No. 77-1448 (D.C. Cir., filed May 13, 1977).
82. 42 Fed. Reg. 26,987 (1977).
83. Memorandum and Order from the Hearing Board, Docket No. RM 50-3 (May
4, 1978); as amended by the Memorandum and Order of May 10, 1978.
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than calculating adverse health impacts over the entire time
period the radionuclides remain toxic. And finally, it lacks any
assessment of the cumulative impacts of all operating reactors
throughout the country, evaluating instead only the impacts of
one year's operation of a single reactor.
It is axiomatic under NEPA that an EIS must be written
in a form "understandable to nontechnical minds and yet contain enough scientific reasoning to alert specialists to particular problems within the field of their expertise.""4 An EIS must
identify limitations upon the ability to assess fully environmental impacts," and must also discuss the "history of success
and failure of similar projects."" NEPA also requires that an
EIS disclose "to the fullest extent possible" the environmental
effects of a proposed action"7 and the cumulative effects of a
8
series of actions or projects.1
Measured against these standards, the Table appears seriously deficient. A chart of numbers such as Table S-3 affords
little opportunity for critical evaluation by the lay public, as
required by the full disclosure objectives of NEPA. Indeed,
without an accompanying narrative explaining how the figures
were derived, and translating numerical values into understandable concepts, Table S-3 is meaningless to the public at
large. Nor can a chart of numbers disclose the numerous uncertainties and the wide diversity of scientific opinions that exist
concerning the true environmental impacts of the waste disposal system postulated in Table S-3 and the validity of the
Table's calculations. Similarly, a numerical chart cannot convey the long history of waste management problems and unsuc84. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 348 F. Supp. 916,
933 (N.D. Miss. 1972), aff'd, 492 F.2d 1123 (1974); See also Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Grant, 355 F.Supp. 280, 286 (E.D.N.C. 1973); Sierra Club v. Morton,
510 F.2d 813, 820 (5th Cir. 1975); Guidelines of the Council on Environmental Quality,
40 C.F.R. § 1500.8(b) (1977).
85. Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. A.E.C., 481 F.2d 1079, 1092
(D.C. Cir. 1973). See also Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers,
325 F.Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
86. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 355 F.Supp. 280, 288
(E.D.N.C. 1973); See also Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 824 (5th Cir. 1975).
87. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114
(D.C. Cir. 1971). See also Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. A.E.C.,
481 F.2d 1079, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC,
547 F.2d 633, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
88. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 409-10 (1976); Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 88 (2d Cir. 1975).
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cessful waste disposal efforts that have characterized waste
management activities in this country to date."y Finally, the
chart's truncation of the time period for the evaluation of adverse health effects to only one year's operation of a single
nuclear reactor, rather than its full operating life, appears to
violate the NEPA principles as described above.
As yet, no final NRC action has been taken with respect
to the modifications necessary to establish an adequate final
rule." Unless substantial modifications in the rule are made,
no doubt the final rule will be legally deficient and will be
subject to challenge. Uncertainty resulting from the lack of a
final rule will continue to surround nuclear licensing, and the
public and decisionmakers will continue to be deprived of adequate information on which to base their reactor licensing decisions.
D. The Atomic Energy Act Reactor Safety Review
As part of the pervasive concern for public safety in the
AEA,1' the NRC is required to undertake a safety review of
89. See text accompanying notes 7-13 supra.
90. The administrative hearing board in charge of this rulemaking proceeding has,
however, recommended to the NRC Commissioners (1) that a table of numbers, revised
only to the most limited extent, be adopted as a "final" rule, (2) that an extremely
brief accompanying narrative be developed at some unspecified time and (3) that
various additional modifications (such as inclusion of cumulative impacts and adverse
impacts in terms of man-reins of radiation) be made in a future S-3 update proceeding.
Conclusions and Recommendations of the Hearing Board, NRC Docket No. RM 50-3
(October 26, 1978). These recommendations appear to fall far short of NEPA's requirements both because they fail to encompass the wide range of modifications necessary
in the S-3 rule and because they defer indefinitely and unnecessarily the limited
modifications that are proposed.
91. In section 2 of the AEA, Congress specifically found that the "processing and
utilization" of nuclear materials "must be regulated . . . to protect the health and
safety of the public," and that "regulation by the United States of the production and
utilization of atomic energy and of the facilities used in connection therewith is necessary . . . to protect the health and safety of the public." 42 U.S.C. § 2102(d), (e)
(1976). Numerous provisions in the Act mandate consideration of public health and
safety in the exercise of regulatory responsibilities. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2014(v)
(production facility defined in terms of impact on public health and safety); § 2014(cc)
(utilization facility defined in terms of impact on public health and safety); § 2021(d)
(licensing authority delegated to the states contingent upon protection of the public
health and safety); § 2039 (reactor safeguard committee established to report on potential hazards of reactor safety); § 2051(a)(5) (research program shall be directed, inter
alia, to protect the public health and safety); § 2073(e)(7) (licenses for special nuclear
material issued pursuant to standards to protect public health and safety); § 2099
(licenses to handle source material issued only if they will not be inimical to public
health and safety); § 2111 (nuclear by-product material exempt from licensing only if
there will be no unreasonable risk to the public health and safety); § 2134(a) (medical

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 56

proposed reactor licenses and to make an explicit, definitive
finding that the activities authorized by the license can be
conducted safely. 2 Section 103(b) of the AEA directs the NRC
to issue reactor licenses to only those persons who will observe
"such safety standards to protect health and to minimize danger to life or property as the Commission may by rule establish."9 Section 103(d) precludes the issuance of a license for the
production or utilization of nuclear materials if it "would be
inimical to . . . the health and safety of the public."" Section
182 requires the Commission to make explicit findings in reactor licensing proceedings that the utilization and production of
special nuclear material "will provide adequate protection to
the health and safety of the public," and authorizes the Commission to obtain whatever information it deems necessary to
make such a finding. 5
The NRC's safety review in reactor licensing encompasses
a full range of risks and hazards associated with reactors with the important exception of the feasibility of permanently
disposing of the radioactive wastes generated by the reactor.
The NRC considers only the adequacy of interim storage of
radioactive wastes at the reactor site. 6 The agency maintains
that it has no statutory obligation to consider explicitly ultimate waste disposal in the reactor licensing context. The NRC
thus avoids making any regulatory link between the continued
licensing of reactors and the problem of disposing of their output of radioactive waste. The agency does contend that it
makes an "implicit finding" of confidence that a waste disposal
facility will be available when needed. It asserts that this informal judgment of confidence provides ample justification for the
therapy utilization facilities subject to regulation necessary to protect health and
safety); § 2134(c) (licenses for utilization facilities used in research subject to regulations to protect public health and safety); § 2164 (international cooperation and disclosure of data on health and safety issues authorized).
92. Power Reactor Development Co. v. International Union, 367 U.S. 396, 406-407
(1961).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 2133(b) (1976).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 2133(d) (1976).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 2232(a) (1976).
96. The NRC's regulations require each applicant to submit information concerning the production, onsite storage, onsite packaging and shipment offsite of radioactive waste. 10 C.F.R. 88 50.34(b)(2)(i) (1978); 50.34(b)(3) (1978); 50.34a(a) (1978);
50.34a(c)(1) (1978). No information concerning ultimate disposal is solicited or considered.
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continued licensing of nuclear reactors. 7
On its face, the NRC's refusal to make an explicit public
finding of the safety of waste disposal would appear to violate
the requirement of the AEA that a definitive, unqualified finding of safety be made in licensing reactors. Moreover, the
agency's reliance on an "implicit" finding of safety runs
counter to basic precepts of adninistrative law requiring explicit findings on all issues material to the agency's decision."
Finally, by analogy, the principles of agency decisionmaking
established in judicial interpretations of other environmental
protection laws would appear to require public consideration of
permanent waste disposal in reactor licensing. For example, it
has been firmly established under NEPA that an agency must
consider the indirect or second order effects of the immediate
projects proposed, and must abjure any limitation of perspective to the immediate boundaries or site of a project. 9 Also, in
several cases decided under NEPA, the courts have held the
effects of radioactive wastes or the use of potentially hazardous
nuclear technologies must be assessed fully before facilities
employing these technologies are licensed by the NRC."5 The
reasoning of these cases would logically dictate that the safety
of ultimate waste disposal be fully considered within the reactor licensing process.
There is no express enactment of Congress to support the
asserted exemption of this matter from the broad directive in
the AEA to protect public health and safety. The NRC's interpretation of its mandate rests almost entirely on its belief that
Congress has given tacit approval to the agency's contrary
practice, subsequent to the passage of the AEA.'11 The agency
points to statements made by its officials in Congressional sub97. 42 Fed. Reg. 34,391 (1977).
98. International Union v. Marshall, 584 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir. 1978); International
Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 651-652 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, J.,
concurring); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. F.C.C., 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
99. Greene County Planning Bd. v. F.P.C., 455 F.2d 412, 424 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972); Sierra Club v. Coleman, 421 F.Supp. 63,67 (D.D.C. 1976).
100. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 641 (D.C. Cir.
1978); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, 539 F.2d 824, 841 (2d Cir.
1976); Scientists' Institute for Public Information v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1089 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).
101. 42 Fed. Reg. 34,391, 34,392-34,393 (1977).
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committee hearings that no solution to ultimate waste disposal
had been found yet and that no permanent waste repository
was available yet. From Congress' failure to halt nuclear reactor licensing in the face of such representations, the NRC deduces a Congressional sanction of its practice of exempting the
question of safe waste disposal from its reactor safety review.",'
In cases which have previously considered similar arguments, however, the courts have consistently refused to find
tacit legislative approval of an agency's interpretation or practice, absent a showing of explicit Congressional knowledge of
particular agency interpretation or practice.": In this instance,
the NRC is unable to point to any evidence that Congress was
ever made aware that the NRC had dispensed with any written, express determination of the feasibility of safe, permanent
waste storage in licensing the reactors which generate that
waste.
The NRC further justifies the exclusion of waste disposal
safety from its reactor safety review on the grounds that the
agency in licensing a permanent waste repository pursuant to
section 202 of the ERA' will make such a finding. In the
NRC's view, the requisite safety review merely has been deferred, not eliminated. It appears, however, that due to the
timing and the scope of the section 202 safety finding, the
character of such a review will be markedly different from a
safety review undertaken in the reactor licensing context. The
section 202 finding will be made after wastes requiring disposal
have been generated and will focus on the adequacy of a specific disposal site. This review will insure that no license will
issue for an inadequate repository, but will give no assurance
that a safe disposal site will ever be developed.
The NRC denied a petition filed by the Natural Resources
Defense Council to obtain such a definitive safety finding, and
a petition for review of that decision was filed in the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. The suit asked that the NRC
be required to hold an administrative proceeding to determine,
prior to the issuance of reactor licenses, whether a reasonable
assurance exists that radioactive wastes can be disposed of
102.
103.
98 S. Ct.
104.

Id.
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 98S. Ct. 2279, 2300 (1978); SEC v. Sloan,
1702, 1712 (1978); Thompson v. Clifford, 408 F.2d 154, 167 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
42 U.S.C. § 5842 (1976).
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safely. The briefs filed in the case emphasized that such a
finding would not necessitate a showing that a permanent
waste facility was in actual operation. Rather, reasonable assurance could be based on a definitive finding that at a minimum: (1) technology exists for safe permanent disposal although it need not be in place now; (2) the appropriate technology will be fully implemented; and (3) reactor licenses are conditioned on the establishment of and compliance with appropriate deadlines for the development of safe waste disposal
facilities. The court of appeals accepted the NRC's argument
and denied the petition. 05 The court's decision thus allows the
NRC to avoid a formal, focused review of this technical safety
question, and fosters a major regulatory flaw in the licensing
of nuclear power reactors.
E. The Licensing of a Permanent Waste Repository
The urgency for the development of a permanent waste
repository increases as interim storage facilities fill to capacity,
but the licensing process to be applied to such a facility is
clouded with uncertainty. Section 202 of the ERA provides the
only explicit statutory authority for the NRC to license a DOE
waste management facility. 06 Subsection (3) of section 202
deals specifically with commercially generated wastes and requires an NRC license for waste facilities used primarily "for
the receipt and storage of high-level radioactive wastes resulting from activities licensed under such Act [AEA]."' '
A narrow construction of section 202 would leave a major
loophole in the NRC's licensing jurisdiction over an ultimate
waste repository for commercial waste. 0 The statute speaks in
105. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, No. 77-4157 (2d Cir. July
5, 1978), petition for rehearing denied (September 26, 1978).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 5842 (1976).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 5842(3) (1976).
108. There are also serious gaps in the regulatory system for licensing a repository
for military wastes. Subsection (4) of section 202 of the ERA requires an NRC license
for "facilities authorized for the express purpose of subsequent long-term storage of
high-level radioactive waste generated" by the DOE which are not part of "research
and development activities." 42 U.S.C. § 5842(4) (1976). In the past, the NRC has
taken the position that storage of more than twenty years is long-term. Oversight
Hearing Before'he Subcomm. on Energy and the Environment, Comm. on Interior
and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 208 (May 16, 17, & 20, 1977) (testimony of
Dr. Clifford V. Smith, Jr.). Since current plans call for emplacement of militarygenerated wastes on a retrievable basis, it may be argued that Water Isolation Pilot
Plant (WIPP) would not constitute a long-term storage facility pending a decision to
leave the wastes there permanently. Moreover, since WIPP is to be the first actual
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terms of "high-level" radioactive waste. If this term is construed according to the "official" definition of "high-level"
wastes, 109 spent fuel rods and transuranic contaminated wastes,
which do not fall under this narrow definition, would be excluded from the licensing requirements.10 This sort of restrictive interpretation of the NRC's licensing authority makes no
practical sense. At the time the definition of "high-level" waste
was developed, federal policy contemplated the reprocessing of
spent fuel so that the fission products, along with transuranic
nuclides, would be separated from usable uranium and plutonium. NRC regulations therefore defined "high-level" waste as
those highly radioactive liquids resulting from the separation
process, or their equivalent. The regulations further required
that such high-level wastes be solidified and sent to a federal
repository. Now, however, with the indefinite deferral of commercial reprocessing,"' spent fuel will be the ultimate waste
form requiring disposal.
As a practical matter it no longer makes sense to differentiate the regulatory treatment of high-level wastes, spent fuel
rods, and transuranic contaminated wastes. These wastes have
similar properties and pose similar hazards, and thus require
similar levels of public protection. Moreover, it is the NRC's
responsibility under the AEA and the ERA to ensure that potentially hazardous products resulting from the continued development of nuclear energy should be subject to the separate
scrutiny of an independent regulatory agency. A narrow approach to the NRC's licensing authority over permanent waste
repositories, therefore, would undercut the fundamental purposes of the regulatory structure established by those acts.
The NRC has recognized the desirability of subjecting a
commercial waste repository to the licensing process and has
taken the position that section 202 of the ERA as currently
operating repository and DOE will be "experimenting" with the waste disposal techniques, it may be argued that the "research and development" exemption is available.
109. 10 C.F.R. § 50 app. F (1978).
110. Indeed, certain electric utilities raised this very question in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, No. 77-4157 (2d Cir. July 5, 1978), petition for
rehearingfiled, denied (September 26, 1978), the case which soughta definitive safety
finding on waste disposal from the NRC. See text accompanying notes 104-105 supra,
Brief for Intervenors Power Authority of the State of New York, et al. at 4 (January
13, 1978).
111. See text accompanying notes 12-13 supra.
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drafted can be read appropriately to vest the agency with the
authority to license the receipt of both high-level waste and
spent fuel in such a facility."' Both the NRC and DOE have
recognized, however, that NRC licensing jurisdiction over ultimate disposal of commercial transuranic wastes under the existing legislation is uncertain. The recent special DOE task
force urged that legislative changes be sought to close this regulatory failing.13 In response, several bills have been introduced
in Congress to remove the potential licensing gaps in section
202 of the ERA as currently drafted and to make explicit NRC
licensing jurisdiction over commercial repositories for highlevel wastes, spent fuel rods, and transuranic wastes."'
Because plans to develop a facility to house commercial
wastes exclusively have lagged seriously behind schedule,"1 5 the
DOE is now considering combining military-generated wastes
and some commercial wastes in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
(WIPP), the most recent proposal by the federal government
for a deep salt bed geologic repository. This project is slated for
development near Carlsbad, New Mexico. Although the facility
was planned initially for the disposal of military transuranic
wastes only, the most recently announced WIPP "mission"
envisions that the facility will provide for: (1) the permanent
disposal of defense-generated transuranic waste; (2) experimental studies conducted with military high-level wastes; and
(3) possibly up to 1,000 commercial spent fuel assemblies.
Under current plans, all of these various types of wastes would
be stored in a retrievable manner, until it is determined that
they may be allowed to remain safely in WIPP in perpetuity. I"
If DOE holds true to this agenda and to the position that
existing NRC licensing authority applies to spent fuel rods as
well as high-level wastes, at a minimum that portion of the
facility engineered for commercial waste disposal would be
subjected to NRC review. The narrow wording of the NRC's
statutory jurisdiction over waste repositories, however, raises
doubts about the breadth of the NRC's mandate. For instance,
112. Testimony of Dr. Clifford V. Smith, Jr., supra note 108 at 212.
113. See DEUTCH REPORT, supra note 18, at 6.
114. H.R. 9190, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). S. 2804,95th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1978).
S. 3146, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1978).
115. See text accompanying notes 30-41 supra.
116. 43 Fed. Reg. 30,331 (1978).
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licensing consideration of the disposal of spent fuel may be
avoided. There is uncertainty, furthermore, whether commercial transuranic wastes buried at WIPP (if the scope of that
facility is expanded) or at another repository for commercial
wastes would come under licensing review. Despite their tremendous importance, permanent waste disposal facilities may
slide through a regulatory gap and be subject to inadequate
licensing review unless these uncertainties in the regulatory
structure are removed.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Serious flaws pervade the regulatory system for the management and disposal of radioactive waste. These deficiencies
are due in part to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's failure
to exercise fully its clear statutory authority and in part to
uncertainty concerning the scope of that authority. Initial advances have been made recently in rectifying deficiencies in the
regulation of uranium mill tailings. The closing of remaining
regulatory loopholes through more vigorous agency action, perhaps accompanied by more explicit authorizing legislation, is
essential to ensure adequate protection of public health and
safety against the hazards of the nuclear industry.

May Regulated Utilities Monopolize The Sun?
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INTRODUCTION

Increased interest in alternative energy forms was stimulated by concern over the steady depletion of nonrenewable
energy resources such as natural gas, oil, and coal. Solar energy, as a supplement to the nation's energy supply, is a feasible alternative energy source when one considers the increasing
costs of fossil fuels, the environmental problems associated
with high-sulfur coal, and the safety and environmental impacts of nuclear energy. The use of solar energy is also consistent with this nation's interest in resource conservation and
eventual energy independence. Solar energy is available everywhere, essentially inexhaustible, environmentally clean, and'
capable of reducing fossil fuel consumption.'
Approximately 25% of the national total energy consumption consists of space heating, water heaqting, and air conditioning.' Decentralized or onsite solar technologies (those designed
to be located on or near the buildings to which heat or electricity is provided) have the greatest potential in serving residential and commercial heating and cooling demands. :' Large* B.A., 1968, Yale University; J.D., 1971, University of Colorado; S.J.D., 1975,
University of Wisconsin. Jan Laitos is an assistant professor of law at the University
of Denver Law School and a consultant to the Solar Energy Research Institute.
** B.S. E.E., 1975, University of Colorado. Randall J. Feuerstein is a second-year
student at the University of Denver Law School and in 1978 was a summer law intern
at the Solar Energy Research Institute.
1. See R.G. JONES, H.M. SRAMEK, & J.M. PELSTER, ANALYSIS OF STATE SOLAR
ENERGY POLICY OPTIONS 3-4 (June 1976) (prepared by the Energy Policy Project of the
National Conference of State Legislatures for the Federal Energy Administration, FEA
Contract No. CO-12-60496-00) [hereinafter cited as SOLAR POLICY OPTIONSl. This
report contains analyses of solar market economics, tax incentives, the relationship
between solar energy and electric utilities, and the implications for state policies.
2. See id. at 3; 1 OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, APPLICATION OF SOLAR TECH. TO
TODAY'S ENERGY NEEDS 19 (June 1978) [hereinafter cited as OTA REP.]. Residential
and commercial energy uses, i.e., hot water, space heating, air conditioning, electricity
for lighting and other miscellaneous uses, and gas for cooking, accounted for approximately 36% of the total U.S. energy demand in 1975. Transportation accounted for 26%
with the remaining 38% demanded by the industrial sector. Id.
3. See H. RAu, SOLAR ENERGY 59 (1964); OTA REP., supra note 2, at 18. It has been
claimed that (1) onsite solar hot water systems are economically competitive with
electric hot water systems in most parts of the United States today; (2) onsite solar
space heating is, or soon should be, marginally competitive with heat pump and
electric resistance heating systems in many areas of the United States; (3) decentral-
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scale, centralized generation of electricity by solar technologies
seems promising by the 1990's.1 Both decentralized and centralized applications of solar technologies are discussed below.
A. Onsite Solar Technologies
Onsite solar technologies generally include both passive
solar energy systems and active solar systems consisting of
solar collectors and solar electric systems. Passive solar energy
systems are the result of skillful architectural designs of buildings and landscaping (1) to maximize the amount of solar
energy incident upon and absorbed by a building during winter
months and (2) to maximize natural convective cooling and
minimize solar heat absorbed during the summer months.'
Passive solar designs for the maximum utilization of solar energy are achieved through orientation of the building, the location of trees, the use of awnings, overhangs, or shutters, optimum window size and location, wall thickness, and the use of
movable insulation.
Active solar energy systems generally consist of (1) a solar
collector exposed directly to the sun that converts sunlight into
a heated fluid or gas, or, in the case of solar cells (photovoltaics), that convert light directly into electricity, (2) an energy
storage system, e.g., a large water tank or underground rock
bed, that stores excess energy for use during periods when direct sunlight is unavailable, and (3) an energy-conversion system that converts a heated fluid or gas into mechanical energy
or electricity.' Solar energy collectors can either be nontracking
or of the type that follows the sun during the day. The costs
for flat plate collectors range between $32 and $145 per square
meter (sq. m.) of surface area. For tracking collectors, costs can
run as high as $1,800 per sq. m. for two axis tracking.7
ized solar space heating and hot water systems may be competitive with oil or gas fired
applications by the mid-1980s; and (4) onsite solar air conditioning devices will apear
economically attractive in the 1980s. See id. at 3-4, 19.
4. See Bradley, Designing and Siting Solar Power Plants, 48 CONSULTING
ENGINEER, March 1977, at 80, 83 (issue no. 3).
5. See OTA REP., supra note 2, at 36.
6. See id. at 36-37. Not all active solar systems make use of an energy storage
system. Fewer yet employ an energy conversion system.
7. See id. at 286-89. One axis tracking collectors move along one axis to track the
sun's movement during the day whereas two axis tracking collectors move independently about two axes to follow the sun. Flat plate collectors can provide temperatures
generally ranging between 570 C and 97 0 C. Where higher temperatures are required
for industrial processes, or to operate heat engines, concentrating or tracking collectors
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During periods when direct solar energy is not available,
solar users can either burn fuel for energy at an onsite facility,
purchase auxiliary energy service from a utility company, or
store energy collected during high solar radiation periods in
onsite storage devices.8 The most common energy storage devices for thermal solar applications are hot water tanks or bins
of heated rocks. Electricity producing solar technologies use
batteries for the storage of electrical energy. Current costs of
low temperature (below 250°F) thermal storage facilities range
from $.50 to $5 per kilowatt-hour (KWH) of capacity of the
storage unit.' Costs rise significantly where it is desired to store
energy in a medium at higher temperatures."'
B. Electricity ProducingSolar Technologies
Compared to onsite solar technologies, solar and wind applications for the large scale generation of electricity are more
likely to find practical application in the long term. Sunlight
can be used directly to generate electricity in two ways: (1) by
heating fluids or gases to operate a heat engine" to turn an
electric generator and (2) by using photovoltaic or solar cells,
i.e., solid-state devices which use the sun's energy to produce
electricity directly. 2 Wind applications for the generation of
electricity make use of the wind's energy through a horizontal
or vertical axis propellor to turn an electric generator.
1. Solar Thermal Power Plants
Solar thermal technologies for the generation of electricity
collect concentrated solar energy and convert it to thermal energy which in turn is transferred to a working fluid. The fluid
is then used to drive a Rankine-cycle turbine or gas turbine
would be required. For an extensive analysis of collector designs, environmental impacts, collector costs, and collector performance, see id. at 243-326.
8. For a detailed feasibility and cost analysis of energy storage technologies including thermal, mechanical, and chemical forms, see id. at 427-503.
9. See id. at 40.
10. The average costs of battery storage for storing electricity in chemical form
range from $63 to $93 per kilowatt-hour. See id. at 470. The prices stated above apply
to lead-acid batteries lasting 500-1000 charge/discharge cycles and capable of storing
5 megawatt-hours of energy with a 10-hour discharge. Automobile type batteries are
unsuitable for power applications since repeated full discharge will result in damage
to the batteries. Industrial traction batteries used in forklifts and similar equipment
have lifetimes of 2000 cycles and are available for $80 per kilowatt hour. Id.
11. For a technical discussion of the costs and performance of a variety of heat
engine devices, see id. at 327-89.
12. See id. at 37.
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that turns a conventional electric generator. Electric power
production by solar thermal applications is thus similar to that
of fossil fuel and nuclear power plants. Two designs of solar
thermal generating systems are being considered (1) the solar
power tower concept and (2) energy collection through distributed receivers. 3 The solar power tower concept features a central boiler or receiver located atop a tower of specified height.
The tower is surrounded by mirrors (heliostats) that track the
sun throughout the day and focus sunlight on the central receiver. The distributed receiver concept uses distributed collector systems and receivers through which the heated working
fluid is piped from each receiver unit to the turbine generator.
This design avoids the cost of a tower but has added costs due
to an extensive network of insulated piping.
A solar thermal power plant of the power tower design with
a capacity of 5 megawatts (MW) 4 has been constructed for the
United States Department of Energy (DOE) at Sandia Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Field evaluation of the
array of 222 heliostats focused upon a 200 ft. tower at Sandia
began in 1978.' 5 DOE's solar thermal program also includes the
construction of a $120 million 10 MW pilot plant in the Mohave
Desert near Barstow, California." The pilot plant is to be built
before 1981 and will require about 100 acres of land to accommodate the heliostats. It is estimated that approximately 2000
heliostats, each with about 40 sq. m. of reflective surface area,
will be utilized to focus sunlight upon a 328-459 foot tower.
DOE's solar thermal program plan envisions solar thermal
demonstration plants ranging in capacity from 50 MW to 100
13. See Bradley, supra note 4, at 80-84;

ELECTRIC

PowER

RESEARCH INSTITTuE,

Spinning a Turbine with Sunlight, 3 EPRI JouRNAL, March 1978, at 14-19 (issue no.
2) [hereinafter cited as EPRI Solar-Thermal]. See generally D. SPENCER, SOLAR ENERGY: A VIEw FROM AN ELECTRIC UTILrry STANDPOINT 13-21 (prepared by the Electric
Power Research Institute for the American Power Conference in Chicago, Ill., April 2123, 1975).
14. A watt is a unit of power equal to one joule per second. A kilowatt (KW) is
1,000 watts and a megawatt represents 1,000,000 watts. One horsepower is equivalent
to 746 watts. Energy can generally be expressed as the product of power and time.
Thus, a 1,000 watt light bulb burning for one hour consumes one kilowatt-hour (KWH)
of energy.
15. The cost of the Sandia test facility was approximately $21 million. See EPRI
Solar-Thermal, supra note 13, at 17.
16. See Bradley, supra note 4, at 81-82; EPRI Solar-Thermal, supra note 13, at
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MW to be operational by 1985. Commercial plants of 100 MW
to 300 MW capacity are expected to be operational after 1985.11
The greatest hindrance to the development of solar thermal electric generating plants is their cost. The federal program goal cost of the heliostat component of a solar thermal
power plant is $70 per sq. m. of mirror surface area. Designs
for the heliostats to be tested at Albuquerque are estimated to
cost between $500 and $750 per sq. m.18 Using the $750 cost
figure, the heliostat array for the 10 MW Barstow plant would
cost $60 million or 50% of the project's total estimated cost.
This figure equals $6000 per Kilowatt (KW) of plant capacity,
only for the heliostats. By comparison, costs of conventional
power plants range between $200 and $1,000 per KW of rated
generating capacity. Liquid metal fast breeder reactor nuclear
power plant costs are expected to be as high as $2,500 per KW, 11
but this figure is still low compared with the costs of a solar
thermal power plant.
2. Photovoltaic Power Plants
Photovoltaic devices, similar to the solar cells used to provide power for spacecraft, convert sunlight directly into electric
energy.20 With the absence of mechanical moving parts, photovoltaic devices can operate reliably and quietly with essentially
no adverse environmental impacts. Photovoltaic devices have
been used as power sources for spacecraft, remote railroad signal stations, microwave repeater stations and agricultural applications (including an irrigation pump and fans for drying
grain).21 A large array of photovoltaic cells would be required
for a central electrical generating power source, but tracking
heliostats could be used to focus sunlight upon the cells and
thereby reduce the area of the arrays. 22 However, the current
17. See Bradley, supra note 4, at 83.
18. See EPRI Solar-Thermal, supra note 13, at 17.
19. See Brancato, New Approaches to Current Problems in Electric Utility Rate
Design, 2 COLUM. J. ENVr'L L. 40, 47-49 (1975).
20. For a general discussion of the operation, costs, and applications of photovoltaic energy conversion systems, see ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE, The Sun
on a Semiconductor, 3 EPRI JOURNAL, March 1978, at 20-25 (issue no. 2) [hereinafter
cited as EPRI Solar-Photovoltaics];OTA REP., supra note 2, at 391-426; D. Spencer,
supra note 13, at 21-28.
21. See EPRI Solar-Photovoltaics,supra note 20, at 23.
22. See D. Spencer, supra note 13, at 24.
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market for photovoltaics is essentially confined to decentralized or onsite applications."
From a utility perspective, photovoltaic plants have a high
energy value, 24 but as with solar thermal power plant aplications, photovoltaic costs are very high. Current photovoltaic
costs range from $11,000 per KW to $15,000 per KW of output."
Electricity from currently available photovoltaic systems cost
from $1.50 to $2.00 per KWH, 21 compared with electricity
prices from conventional electric utilities averaging between
$.02 and $.07 per KWH for residential service.
3. Wind Power Plants
Us6 of the wind as a power source is not a new concept.
Windmills were used extensively in Europe for milling grain.
An electric power generating windmill, the Smith-Putnam
machine, was located atop Grandpa's Knob in Vermont and
supplied power to the Central Vermont Public Service Corporation's system intermittently from 1941 through 1945.27 The
Smith-Putnam machine utilized a 175 ft. rotor and had a generating capacity of 1.25 MW. A .1 MW wind turbine generator
has been operational since 1975 at NASA's Plumb Brook Station at Sandusky, Ohio.2 The Plumb Brook machine utilizes a
125 ft. diameter twin-bladed single rotor mounted at the downwind end of a streamlined generator housing. The entire unit
is perched atop a 100 ft. tower and is mounted on bearings so
that it may rotate to face the wind at all times. Power is generated when the velocity of the wind exceeds 8 miles per hour.
The 100 KW rated output is achieved when the wind velocity
reaches 18 miles per hour. A .2 MW machine similar to the
Plumb Brook machine was completed early in 1978 at Clayton,
New Mexico. Two machines identical to the Clayton machine
are under construction at Culebra Island and Block Island and
23. See EPRI Solar-Photovoltaics,supra note 20, at 24-25.
24. See id. at 22, 24.
25. See id. at 21; OTA REP., supra note 2, at 393-94.
26. See OTA REP., supra note 2, at 393. DOE's present goals are to cut photovoltaic costs (1) to $7,000 per peak KW in fiscal year 1979, (2) to between $1,000 and
$2,000 per KW by the end of fiscal year 1982, (3) to $500 per KW by the end of fiscal
year 1986, and (4) to between $100 and $300 per KW by the end of fiscal year 1990.
See id. at 394.
27. See ELECTIc POWER RESEARCH INSTIUTE, The Earth as a Solar Heat Engine,
3 EPRI JOURNAL, March 1978, at 43, 43-44 (issue no. 2).
28. See id. at 44.
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are expected to be operational by the end of 1978.29 Federal
contracts have been let for the construction of larger wind turbine generators having rotor diameters as large as 300 ft. and
with generating capacities as high as 3 MW.
As large scale generation of electricity by wind turbine
generators is still basically in the development stage, capital
costs are high. The capital cost of the .1 MW Plumb Brook
machine was $5,500 per KW of rated capacity.3 It is anticipated that these costs can be reduced through the federal wind
energy program, which has as its goals the development and
commercialization of economically viable wind energy sys3
tems . 1
C. The Relationship Between Solar Energy Development and
Utility Companies
The roles assumed by six institutional actors will have a
significant impact upon the development, economic viability,
and commercialization of both onsite and centralized solar
technologies. These primary actors include (1) investor-owned
and publicly-owned (municipal) utility companies, (2)
federally-owned utility agencies, (3) state public utilities commissions (PUCs), (4) federal and state governments, (5) the
solar industry, and (6) solar consumers.
The extent to which both investor- and publicly-owned
utilities are allowed to enter the solar market and own, lease,
or sell onsite technologies will affect the allocation of costs
between either the utilities or the solar consumers. Manufacturers of solar equipment are concerned that utility policies
could foster only a chosen few of the industry while effectively
eliminating other solar manufacturers from a substantial share
of the market. As onsite solar technologies require conventionally fueled auxiliary systems to assure continuous service during periods of adverse weather, solar users will be concerned
about the rates utilities charge for this backup service. Moreover, since investor- and publicly-owned utilities enjoy a mo29. See id. at 45.
30. See id.
31. The structure of the program encompasses five areas: (1) program development; technology; applications of wind energy; legal, social, and environmental issues;
and wind characteristics, (2) small machines (less than 100 KW capacity), (3) 100 KWscale systems, (4) megawatt-scale systems, and (5) large multiunit systems or "wind
farms." See id.
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nopoly in the energy supply market, competition by solar utilities may be foreclosed.
Federal regulation of the solar industry may govern the
extent to which utilities are allowed to own, lease, or sell onsite
solar devices. While federal power agencies are primarily involved with the wholesale sales of electric energy, it is conceivable that federal agencies could distribute onsite solar devices
or manage solar utilities that compete with existing conventional utilities. Since state public utilities commissions regulate the entry of utilities into the energy supply market as well
as the rates charged for utility services, commission policies
could also affect a utility's ability to market onsite solar devices and a solar utility's ability to compete with existing conventional utilities. A state legislature could statutorily govern
the roles of utilities in solar energy development and commercialization.
Three major issues thus emerge involving the relationship
between solar energy development and utility companies.
There exists the possibility that utility companies will seek to
own, lease, or sell solar devices. It is also possible that a solar
company would seek to enter the energy supply market in competition with existing regulated electric utilities. Third, it is
likely that existing utilities may establish a rate structure that
would penalize decentralized use of solar technologies. This
article will address the first two of these issues.
The article will first consider the legal issues associated
with public utility ownership of decentralized or onsite solar
heating and cooling (SHAC) devices that may be placed on
individual homes, shopping centers, apartment complexes, or
may be used by other small scale consumers of solar power.
Second, it will evaluate the legal issues that may arise should
a solar power company (both privately- and publicly-owned)
compete in providing electric service with existing regulated
electric utilities. Both situations are considered in light of applicable existing and proposed federal and Colorado law.
II.

UTILITY OWNERSHIP OF DECENTRALIZED

SHAC

DEVICES

Although many of the SHAC-related issues also pertain to
utility ownership of non-SHAC devices, the implications of
utility ownership of non-SHAC decentralized solar technologies, e.g., small-scale wind or photovoltaic energy conversion
systems, will not be addressed below. The following legal

REGULATED UTILITIES AND THE SUN

issues confined solely to utility ownership of non-SHAC devices
are therefore not discussed: (1) the rates to be charged for
electric energy generated onsite and sold to customers, (2) in
the case of wind systems, the acquisition of an all direction
wind easement, and (3) the legal control of decentralized generating devices.
To what extent, then, may utility companies, whether
investor- or publicly-owned, own decentralized SHAC devices
and thereby market them on a selling or leasing basis? The two
decentralized non-generating solar technologies that will be
particularly affected by utility ownership policies are solar
thermal space conditioning and solar thermal water heating.
Recall that these two technologies generally utilize both flat
plate collectors to capture solar radiation and a working medium of water or air to store the resulting heat.
A. Utility Interest in the Marketing of Solar Devices
A Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
investigation of solar marketing and market acceptance concluded that: "[u]tility policies . . . have the potential to act
32 Among
as barriers to the market acceptance of solar housing. ,,
the utilities surveyed by HUD were gas and electric companies
that (1) supplied utility service for backup purposes to HUD
solar grant homes, and (2) did not provide auxiliary service to
HUD solar homes but possibly did to other solar buildings.
Over 50% of the second category of the utilities stated that
they were providing either heating, ventilating, or air conditioning service to a solar assisted building.3 3 Approximately one
fourth (24%) of all utilities surveyed expressed an intention to
lease SHAC devices and to the question of whether they would
become involved in the servicing of solar equipment, 27% replied yes. The utilities were further asked if they foresaw some
alternative utility involvement in the form of marketing, providing technical assistance or public relations advice, or monitoring solar homes. A majority of the utilities replied yes (59%)
while only 27% replied no.3 4 Many utilities (45%) also believed
32. 1 DEP'T. OF HOUSING AND URB. DEV., WORKING PAPERS ON MARKETING AND
MARKET ACCEPTANCE, ch. 6 at 14 (Spring 1978) (Preliminary Findings and Analysis,
prepared for the Solar Demonstration Program, Division of Energy, Building Technology and Standards, Office of Policy Development and Research, U.S. Dept. of Housing
and Urban Development).
33. See id.
34. See id. at 20.
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there was a greater need for solar energy in their regions,"5 while
40% viewed solar energy as a practical alternative to conven36
tional fossil fuel.
The results of the HUD investigation revealed that many
utilities believed there was a greater need for and likelihood of
solar energy commercialization within their regions. A significant number considered solar energy to be a practical alternative to traditional energy sources, and further suggested that
they may become involved in the leasing of solar devices. Even
more utilities stated that they were likely to become involved
in the servicing of solar equipment, and a majority contemplated at least some form of involvement with residential applications in the development of solar energy. In short, it appears that utilities expect to play a substantial role in the
development and commercialization of solar power.
B. Alternative Utility Ownership Policies
If utilities seek to enter the SHAC market, what policies
should be considered concerning utility ownership of SHAC
devices? The four utility ownership policies most frequently
advanced are: (1) utilities, being classified as regulated monopolies, are given exclusive monopoly franchises to own, sell,
lease, or market SHAC systems, (2) utilities are allowed to
enter the solar market, but without exclusive franchises (i.e.,
they may be regulated in their solar activities and will be in
competition with private solar companies), (3) nonregulated
utility subsidiary companies are allowed to enter the solar market but would face competition from private SHAC system
suppliers, and (4) utilities are prohibited from owning, for lease
3
or sale, SHAC systems located upon a customer's premises.
35. See id. at 18.
36. See id. at 19.
37. See S. FELDMAN & B. ANDERSON, THE PUBLIC UTILITY AND SOLAR ENERGY INTERFACE: AN ASSESSMENT OF POLICY OPTIONS 178-79 (Dec. 31, 1976) (prepared for the
Energy Research and Development Administration-Division of Solar Energy, ERDA

Contract No. E(49-18)-2523) [hereinafter cited as UTILITY AND SOLAR INTERFACEK. A
variation of the same analysis appears in R. BEZDEK, J. MARGOLIN, T. SPARROW, G.
SPONSLER,

A EZRA, R.

SPONGBERG,

A. MILLER, F. MEEKER, E.

ROSEMAN,

& M. MISCH,

ANALYSIS OF POLICY OPTIONS FOR ACCELERATING COMMERCIALIZATION OF SOLAR HEATING

AND COOLING SYSTEMS 220-22 (Feb. 1978) (prepared by the Behavioral Studies
Group, Program of Policy Studies in Science and Technology, The George Washington
University, for the Department of Energy, Assistant Secretary for Conservation and
Solar Applications-Division of Solar Applications, Contract No. EX-76-G-01-2534)
[hereinafter cited as SHAC POLICY OPTIONS]. See also R. Noll, Maintaining Competi-
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These four ownership policies have been implemented in
connection with the operation of other regulated industries."
Prior to the FCC's Carterfone3 decision, telephone companies
had exclusive control over the interconnection devices that
were used in the telephone system-a situation reflected above
in the first policy option. Under this scheme, a customer was
required to purchase the internal interconnection system from
the local telephone company. If this ownership policy applied
to solar, a customer who desired to install a SHAC device,
designed to receive backup energy from a utility company,
would be required to purchase or lease the system from the
utility having exclusive rights to serve that area.
Since Carterfone, the telephone industry has been doing
business under a scheme like the second policy option. Telephone companies are allowed to sell terminal devices, but they
no longer have an exclusive monopoly to do so. Telephone customers have the option of (1) obtaining their telephones and
other terminal devices from the telephone company at a regulated rental price, or (2) purchasing this equipment from an
unregulated competitive supplier. Under a similar scheme, a
solar customer could lease the SHAC system from a utility at
a regulated rental rate, or, at his option, purchase the system
from an unregulated supplier.
Policy option three is found when regulated gas and electric utilities control unregulated subsidiary companies that
engage in such activities as mining, energy resource exploration, and the selling of appliances. If this third policy option
tion in Solar Energy Technology in FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, THE SOLAR MARKET:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SYMPOSIUM ON COMPETITION IN THE SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRY 179, 181
(June 1978) (presented at the Dec. 15-16, 1977 Solar Energy Symposium sponsored by
the Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of Competition).
38. See R. Noll, supra note 37, at 182; SHAC POLICY OPTIONS, supra note 37, at
222-24; UTILITY AND SOLAR INTERFACE, supra note 37, at 180-81.
39. In re Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, 13
F.C.C.2d 420 (1968). In this case, the telephone companies sought to apply penalties
contained in a tariff to customers who used the Carterfone interconnection device.
According to the tariff, use of such equipment conferred a right upon the telephone
company to remove or disconnect the device or to suspend or terminate service. Id. at
427 (app. A). The FCC agreed with and adopted the examiner's findings that the
Carterfone filled a need and did not adversely affect the telephone system. It was held
that "application of the tariff to bar the Carterfone in the future would be unreasonable and unduly discriminatory." Id. at 423. The FCC further concluded that "the tariff
has been unreasonable, discriminatory, and unlawful in the past, and that the provisions prohibiting the use of customer-provided interconnecting devices should accordingly be stricken." Id.
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were applied to the solar industry, an unregulated utility subsidiary would be in competition with other solar suppliers in
the marketing of SHAC devices. The extent of direct utility
involvement with SHAC system marketing through the subsidiary would be governed by the nature of PUC jurisdiction over
the utility."0 This means that, depending upon the scope and
interpretation of a state's public utility law, there may be no
PUC jurisdiction over a utility's marketing of SHAC devices.
The American Telephone and Telegraph Company is
faced with the fourth ownership policy, i.e., prohibition from
engaging in a certain business activity. AT&T is prohibited
from engaging in unregulated business, except to a limited degree, in the sale of certain communications equipment. Following a 1956 consent decree that settled an antitrust complaint
against the Bell System," AT&T cannot enter businesses such
as data processing. For example, computer time sharing services that utilize telephone lines for connecting remote data
terminals to central computers can be offered by telephone
utilities not affiliated with the Bell System, but cannot be
offered by Bell affiliates. Under a similar policy, the solar industry would not be faced with competition from utilities or
their unregulated subsidiaries.
1. Regulated Utility Ownership of SHAC Devices
The legal issues associated with utility ownership of SHAC
systems located upon a customer's property are evaluated
below under policies representing (1) a regulated monopoly
situation guaranteed the utility within its service area, (2) a
regulated business operation by the utility in competition with
unregulated solar suppliers, and (3) utility involvement only
through unregulated subsidiary companies of the utility. This
discussion is followed by arguments for and against such utility
participation and involvement in the solar market.
40. The text accompanying notes 42-55 infra addresses whether a utility in Colorado that is somehow involved in the ownership of SHAC devices located upon a
customer's premises would be subject to PUC regulation of such activity.
41. United States v. Western Electric Co., [1956] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 68,
246. According to the decree, AT&T is enjoined from engaging in the manufacture of
any equipment of a type not sold or leased to companies of the Bell System for use in
furnishing common carrier communications service, except equipment used in the
manufacture or installation of equipment of a type so sold. The decree also provides
that AT&T is enjoined from engaging in any business other than the furnishing of
common carrier communications services. Id.
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a. Regulation by Public Utilities Law
In Colorado, the Public Utilities Law 2 provides for public
utility commission (PUC) regulation controlling (1) entry into
the public service market, (2) the rates and charges for utility
services, and (3) the standards and conditions of service. In
addition, a Colorado constitutional provision vests all power to
regulate the facilities, service, rates, and charges of every corporation, individual, or association operating within the state
as a public utility in the PUC.13 "Public Utility" is statutorily
defined to include every gas corporation, electrical corporation,
person, or municipality operating for the purpose of supplying
the public for domestic, mechanical, or public uses and every
corporation or person declared by law to be affected with a
public interest." The statute further provides that such public
utilities are subject to the jurisdiction, control, and regulation
5
of the PUC and to the provisions of the Public Utilities Law.1
Under the statutory definition, an investor-owned electric
or gas utility is subject to the PUC regulation in accordance
with the Public Utilities Law. However, the state's jurisdictional provisions provide little indication as to whether a regulated utility supplying SHAC devices would be subject to such
regulation. An argument could be made that a utility company, in supplying SHAC devices to the public, is engaging in
an activity affected with a public interest and therefore subject
to the general jurisdiction of the PUC. Indeed, the Supreme
Court of Colorado, in Western Colorado Power Co. v. Public
Utilities Commission, has held that any business or activity
that is affected with a public interest may be regulated under
the police power of the state."6 Should utility ownership of
SHAC devices be declared to be "affected with a public interest," then such activity would be subject to the general jurisdiction of the PUC.
What legal significance attaches to utility status and PUC
jurisdiction thereover? In order for a utility to enjoy monopoly
status in the ownership of SHAC devices consistent with policy
42. COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-1-101 to 111 (1973).
43. COLO. CONST. art. XXV.
44. CoO. REV. STAT. § 40-1-103(1).
45. Id.
46. 159 Colo. 262, 279, 411 P.2d 785, 794, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 385
U.S. 22, rehearing denied, 385 U.S. 984 (1966).
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one, PUC control of entry into the business of supplying SHAC
systems would be required. Before a utility begins the construction of a new facility, plant, system or an extension thereto, it
must first obtain from the PUC a certificate that the present
or future public convenience and necessity will require such
construction. 7 The installation of SHAC devices upon a customer's premises could be considered the construction of a new
system or a new extension to the utility's existing system. If so,
a means exists for conferring monopoly status upon a utility for
its activity in supplying the public with SHAC devices as it has
been held by the Colorado Supreme Court that the purpose of
the certification process is to avoid duplication of facilities and
competition between utilities.48 The certification process would
be absent under policy two as competition from other regulated
entities as well as unregulated solar manufacturers is allowed
under that policy.
The Public Utilities Law requires that all charges demanded or received by any public utility for any product or
commodity furnished, or any service rendered, shall be just and
reasonable. The law further provides that every unjust or unreasonable charge is prohibited."9 The rental rates charged by
a utility for the leasing of SHAC devices would be subject to
the statutory "reasonableness" test as administered by the
PUC. Rate regulation would therefore be applicable under the
first and second policy options.5
Adequacy of solar service would seem to be governed by a
Colorado statute requiring every public utility to provide adequate, just, and reasonable service as will promote the safety,
health, and convenience of its patrons." All utilities leasing
47. COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-5-101.
48. Western Colo. Power Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 159 Colo. 262, 273, 411 P.2d
785, 791, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 385 U.S. 22, rehearing denied, 385 U.S.

984 (1966).
49. COLO. REv. STAT. § 40-3-101(1).
50. For a detailed presentation of public utility rate regulation as one aspect of
the regulatory process, see J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTnILT RATEs 147-283
(1961); P. GARFIELD & W. LovEjoy, PUBLIC UTtrIry ECONOMics 27-189 (1964); 1 A.
PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 45-226 (1969). See also Huntington,

The Rapid Emergence of Marginal Cost Pricing in the Regulation of Electric Utility
Rate Structures, 55 B.U.L. REV. 689, 698-718 (1975); R. Feuerstein, Utility Rates and
Service Policies as Potential Barriers to the Market Penetration of Decentralized Solar
Technologies (1978) (unpublished paper, prepared for the Solar Energy Research Institute, on file with the authors).
51. COLO. REv. STAT. § 40-3-101(2).
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solar devices to customers would have to abide by the principle
that serving some but not all customers within a utility's service area constitutes a practice that is discriminatory and illegal. 52 In an analogous case the Colorado PUC held that a water
utility's actions in providing service to some but not all patrons
located in the area covered by its certificate not only constitutes prejudice and discrimination, 53 but also that the issuance
of a certificate by the commission and its acceptance by a
utility obligates it to furnish service to all the inhabitants of the
territory covered by the certificate. 4 Any utility that receives
a certificate to supply SHAC devices within its service area is
therefore under an obligation to provide solar service to those
customers who make such a demand.
With respect to adequacy of service, the Colorado PUC has
held that a public utility is under a duty to provide reasonably
satisfactory and efficient service, and that it cannot perform
negligently, carelessly, inefficiently, or in any other unsatisfactory manner. 5 Thus, any solar service furnished by a utility
under the first or second policy options would be subject to the
adequacy and efficiency standards of service.
Another matter needing consideration should a utility provide SHAC devices under policies one and two is whether the
equipment used to provide solar service can be included in the
rate base. The rate base of a utility is generally defined as the
actual legitimate cost of plant and equipment used in providing the public service, with reasonable allowances for working
capital less accumulated depreciation. 6 The amount of revenue utilities are allowed to recover from the rates they charge
is proportional to the rate base. Therefore, it would be imperative that utility-owned solar devices be included into the rate
base in order for the utility to provide solar service. The Supreme Court of Colorado, in an early case dealing with the issue
52. See LaBate v. North Fed. Water Sys., 62 P.U.R. (n.s.) 92, 102 (Colo. Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1945).
53. In re LaBate, 64 P.U.R. (n.s.) 411, 413 (Colo. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1946).
54. Id.
55. Farmers Elec. & Power Co. v. Town of Ault, P.U.R. 1920 D, 214, 225 (Colo.
Pub. Util. Comm'n 1920).
56. See generally J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 50, at 159-237; P. GARFIELD & W.
Lov joy, supra note 50, at 56-83; 1 A. PRIEST, supra note 50, at 139-90.
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of property included in the rate base, held that the test is
whether such property is used and useful in supplying the service that the utility has undertaken to furnish. 7 Under this principle, it seems likely that a utility's investment in SHAC devices would be included in the rate base as being property
useful in providing solar service.
If Colorado were to adopt the third policy option, it would
appear from a review of Colorado's Public Utilities Law that
the PUC would have no direct regulatory authority over a utility's wholly owned subsidiary. The extent of the regulation, if
any, would appear to be indirect. For example, in People's
Natural Gas Division of Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Public
Utilities Commission, a recent decision of the Colorado Supreme Court, it was held that the PUC has authority to include
only that portion of the capital structure of a diversified entity
that (1) accurately reflects the actual capitalization of the utility operation or (2) finances the rate base thereof in the calculation of rates.5 8 The court concluded that the PUC had authority
to pierce the corporate structures of corporations that operate
utility divisions to separate the utility capital structure from
that of nonutility operations and subsidiaries of the corporation. 9 Under this principle, the investment associated with
ownership of SHAC devices by a utility subsidiary could not
be imputed to the utility as part of its rate base. Utility operations and the regulation thereof would be totally separate from
the subsidiary's activities to the extent that the utility's customers would not be financing the solar operation. Such a conclusion would be favorable to nonsolar utility customers under
policy option three who might otherwise be faced with the possibility of subsidizing a utility subsidiary's solar operations.
Two other issues should be mentioned that are relevant to
SHAC system ownership by utilities that involve PUC regulation. First, since SHAC systems are not perfect substitutes for
conventional heating and air conditioning systems, a solar user
requires a certain amount of auxiliary energy. It is likely that
this demand for conventional service from an electric or gas
utility for backup purposes will occur during periods of extended cloudy weather or extreme cold conditions. The rele57.
55 P.2d
58.
59.

Glenwood Light and Water Co. v. City of Glenwood Springs, 98 Colo. 340, 343,
1339, 1340 (1936).
567 P.2d 377, 380 (1977).
Id. at 380-81.
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vant issue, which is beyond the scope of this article, is whether
a utility may charge different than traditional rates for service
provided to solar users for backup purposes. In other words,
may a utility discriminate for or against solar users in its ratemaking practices? 0
In addition, it is important to note that the optimum balance of regulation and competition shifts with time and can
affect the market penetration rate of solar devices. Where regulation tends to be overly conservative, it can supplant rather
than supplement free competition." As an example, cable television grew rapidly from about 1950 to the early 1960s as an
unregulated industry. After the early 1960s, the FCC assumed
regulatory jurisdiction and stunted the industry's growth for
the four-year period from 1968 to 1972. The period was characterized by intense political bargaining between the industry,
broadcasters, and other parties where the government acted as
an arbitrator. Such bargaining resulted in a retardation of the
growth of the new technology both during the four-year period
and thereafter. 2 A similar result is possible should SHAC system marketing be overly regulated, either by PUCs or the federal government.
b. Arguments Against Utility Ownership of Decentralized SHAC Devices
A common argument of those opposed to utility ownership
of SHAC devices is that through unfair competition utilities
may foreclose other solar manufacturers from the market."s It
60. This issue and others pertaining to utility rate and service policies toward
solar users are given extensive treatment in R. Feuerstein, supra note 50.
61. See 2 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 1
(1971).
62. The cable television discussion was adapted from H. Peterson, Resource Allocation Under Alternative Regulatory Scenarios (Sept. 21, 1976) (Utah State University, unpublished paper, on file with the authors). The paper presents a microeconomic
and mathematical analysis of various situations that may occur in the development
of the solar industry. The three regulatory and organizational arrangements considered
are: (1) no regulation of solar or conventional energy supplies, (2) regulated monopoly
providing both solar and conventional energy, and (3) regulated monopoly providing
conventional energy and an unregulated industry providing solar.
63. See K. Bossong, The Case Against Private Utility Involvement in
Solar/Insulation Programs, SOLAR AGE, January 1978 at 23, 24; GEORGE WASHINGTON
UNIVERSITY, SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS OF SOLAR HEATING AND COOLING COMMERCIALIZATION WORKSHOP 14, 22 (May 1977) (hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGSI; A. HIRSCHBERG, SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRIES WORKSHOP: SUMMARY PAPER 12 (April 20, 1978) (pre-

pared for the Department of Energy's Solar Energy/Utility Conference held on March
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is possible that this result could occur by three means. First,
[riegulated utilities can use solar technology strategically as a
means to create internal subsidies within their price structures
and, thereby, to recapture some of the monopoly profits that
regulation takes away as well as to foreclose competition in the
solar energy business. For example, a joint solar/gas utility would
have to work out a method of allocating its costs between solarassisted and gas-only services. If it could effect an allocation that,
in fact, attributed too much cost to gas, it would succeed in
taking advantage of its monopoly in the gas business to subsidize
its solar energy business."

Such subsidization could occur when conventional utility operations contribute to the utility's or the subsidiary's solar activities. A strict regulatory policy by PUCs would be required to
prevent the utility's conventional service ratepayers from lowering solar costs for the solar operation. One effect of this subsidization would be lower costs of SHAC devices, which in turn
would result in a utility or subsidiary being able to charge lower
than market prices for its SHAC systems. Such a price differential could potentially force unregulated solar competitors
from the market.
A second means by which unregulated solar suppliers
could be foreclosed from the solar market is where utilities or
their subsidiaries do not themselves manufacture SHAC devices, but instead give "just a few companies the lion's share
of the business, [through their purchasing policies] rather
than spreading around their purchases . . . . [Such a policy
would allow utilities to] effectively decide which solar companies will be allowed to continue in business. 6 5 Those unregulated companies not enjoying the business from utility purchases would likely be forced to discontinue operations.
Utilities may also find it economic to acquire the solar
manufacturing company rather than to continue purchasing
28-29, 1978, at George Washington University); SHAC POLICY OPTIONS, supra note 37,
at 225-26; G. SWETNAM, F. ELDRIDGE, & D. JARDINE, ENERGY RATE INITIATIVES STUDY OF
THE INTERFACE BETWEEN SOLAR AND WIND ENERGY SYSTEMS AND ELECrRIC UTILITIES 82

(March 31, 1977) (prepared by the Mitre Corp. for the Federal Energy Administration,
Office of Synfuels, Solar, and Geothermal Energy, Contract No. P05-77-4242-0)
[hereinafter cited as ENERGY RATE INITIATIVES]; UTILITY AND SOLAR INTERFACE, supra
note 37, at 183-84.
64. R. Noll, supra note 37, at 184.
65. K. Bossong, supra note 63, at 24. See also A. HIRSCHBERG, supra note 63, at
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SHAC devices from it. Utilities would thus become vertically
integrated in much the same way as the nation's large oil companies are. Such practices suppress competition, allow price
maneuvering within the different levels of the industry and
chill innovative research and development.
It has been argued that since utility profits are proportional to the value of property included in the rate base, utilities have a tendency to overcapitalize, i.e., to invest in overly
durable equipment so as to increase the value of the rate base."6
Overcapitalization under regulation for the purpose of expanding the rate base and hence utility profits is known as the
Averch-Johnson, and Wellisz (A-J-W) effect." If the first and
second policy options were implemented, the A-J-W effect
could lead to utilities investing in solar technology that was
excessively efficient in converting sunlight to heating or cooling
energy, and that required inefficiently little maintenance. If
PUCs allowed such "gold plating" of the rate base from utilityowned SHAC devices, excessive solar costs and prices, as well
as a possible slowdown in the adoption of innovative SHAC
technologies, might result.
There also seems to be a lack of evidence that utility ownership of SHAC devices is justified under a natural monopoly
theory. 8 The natural monopoly concept arises from the theory
that it is better to have a fewer utilities providing a certain
service within a given area than to allow any number of entities
to compete for business under a competitive market structure."
Natural monopolies are recognized and legitimated in special
cases since the unit cost of providing service is lower under a
regulated monopoly than under competition. This fact arises
because of (1) the elimination of costly duplication of facilities, (2) decreasing average unit costs as output increases, and
(3) economies of scale resulting from the purchases of large
66. See A. HIRSCHBERG, supra note 63, at 15; R. Noll, supra note 37, at 183; SHAC
supra note 37, at 224-25; UTILITY AND SOLAR INTERFACE, supra note 37,
at 182-83.
67. See H. Averch & L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory
POLICY OPTIONS,

Constraint,52 AMER. ECON. REV. 105 (Dec. 1962).
68. See R. Noll, supra note 37, at 183; SHAC POLICY OPTIONS, supra note 37, at
224; UTILITY AND SOLAR INTERFACE, supra note 37, at 181-82.
69. In re Application of the Long Acre Elec. Light & Power Co., 1 P.S.C.R. 226,
249-50 (1st Dist. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comrn'n 1908). See also J. BONBRIGrr, supra note
50, at 10-13; P. GARFIELD & W. Lovgjoy, supra note 50, at 15-19; 1 A. PRIEST, supra
note 50, at 361-65. But see id. at 321-24.
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quantities. Utility ownership of individual self-contained
SHAC devices does not exhibit the same economies of scale as
those present in utility ownership of a large electric power
plant.
It has been contended that utilities, which are generally
state regulated, are not really accountable to the public.70 Customers of the utility are essentially a captive market with no
choices since a particular service within a given area is generally provided by only one company. Should policy one be implemented, the resultant lack of competition could lead to slow
development of advanced technologies and provide no incentive to the utilities to be responsive to the wishes of the public.
The main existing means of accountability, PUC proceedings,
are costly and time consuming. Lack of accountability by a
utility to its solar customers might therefore prove detrimental
to rapid solar development.
Finally, a significant policy argument against utility ownership of SHAC devices is that utilities should not be given the
authority to "own the sun" by owning and marketing SHAC
devices. 7' Such control would seemingly allow too much discretion in utilities as to the rate of solar commercialization and
the development of more innovative technologies. If utilities or
their subsidiaries were to vary the rate of solar commercialization based on its profit yeilding characteristics, the use of
solar energy could invariably be slowed while more emphasis
was being placed on conventional energy supply.
c. Arguments for Utility Ownership of Decentralized SHAC Devices
Utility advocates list several advantages of utility participation in the marketing of SHAC devices.
First, although solar energy utilities the "free" energy from the
sun, it requires additional first or capital cost. Since the construction industry is highly "first-cost intensive," we expect
that solar energy will have some difficulty finding early, rapid
acceptance. A utility company is used to high first-cost (capital
intensive) business ventures. Utility company sponsorship in the
"lease to the user" mode will do a lot to reduce this barrier . ...
70. See K. Bossong, supra note 63, at 25.
71. See id. at 26. See also Utilities and Solar Energy: Will They Own the Sun?,
PEOPLE & ENERGY, Oct. 1976, at 2; Northcross, Who Will Own the Sun?, THE
PROGRESSIVE, April 1976, at 14-16.
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Second, the sponsorship of a utility company may help to
overcome market "fragmentation." If the utility company buys
the equipment and leases it in a large-scale fashion, the solar
industry will face at least one aggregated market (to the gas
company). This may provide a large enough incentive to actively
stimulate a solar energy system fabrication industry.
Third, because a utility company already has a
sales/distribution/service network which operates within the
housing industry, the Utility Company scenario provides a way
of "product fitting" solar energy systems.
Finally, because of the traditional anti-innovation bias
within the industry (a bias which is quite understandable given
the industry environment), utility company sponsorship will help
overcome some of the traditional "institutional-cultural biases"
against solar energy which exist within the housing industry."

In addition, since SHAC devices have the potential to adversely affect electric utility system load factors,7" utility ownership might insure that the devices are designed to be used
as an effective load management tool, i.e., designed to mini72. Dean & Miller, Utilities at the Dawn of a Solar Age, 53 N.D. L. REV. 329, 35051 (1977) (quoting Hirshberg & Schoen, Barriersto the Widespread Utilizationof Residential Solar Energy: The Prospects for Solar Energy in the U.S. Housing Industry, 5
POL'Y Sci. 453, 468 (1974)). For a variation of the Dean and Miller article see N. Dean
& A. Miller, Plugging Solar Power Into the Utility Grid, 7 ENVT'L L. REP. 50069 (1977);
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, LEGAL BARRIERS TO SOLAR HEATING AND COOLING OF

BUILDINGS 86 (March 1978) (prepared for the Department of Energy, Assistant Secre-

tary for Conservation and Solar Applications, Division of Solar Applications, Contract
No. EX-76-C-01-2528); SHAC POLICY OPTIONS, supra note 37, at 358.
73. See, e.g., H. LORSCH, IMPLICATIONS OF RESIDENTIAL SOLAR SPACE CONDITIONING
ON ELECTRIC UTILIES ch. 1 at 3 (Dec. 1976) (prepared by The Franklin Institute
Research Laboratories for the National Science Foundation, Contract No. NSFC1033(AER-75-18270)). But see S. FELDMAN & B. ANDERSON, UTILITY PRICING AND
SOLAR ENERGY DESIGN (Sept. 1976) (prepared for the National Science Foundation,
Grant No. APR-75-18006).
Feldman and Anderson found that SHAC devices, depending on climatic regions,
collector sizing, and the utility's system, do not necessarily adversely affect an electric
utility's load factor and concluded that:

[n]o general statement can be made regarding the impact of SHAC upon
the load curve of the electric utility industry. This analysis must be
performed on an individual utility basis, since variations in the ambient
weather conditions, load curves and generation mixes of utilities will be
the prime determinants in the magnitude of the impact.

Id. at 117.
Load factor is a measure of an electric utility's average use of its capacity as a
percentage of the maximum capacity, or the ratio of average power to peak power for
a given period. Utilities strive to operate at high load factors to achieve the optimum
and most efficient use of facilities for a given generating capacity, thereby improving
profits and ensuring relative reductions in electricity price. SOLAR POLICY OPIONS,
supra note 1, ch. IV, at 4.
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mize any adverse impact upon the system load factor. 74 For
example, SHAC designs that are currently potentially beneficial to the utility's system load factor use auxiliary energy only
during offpeak periods. Such systems may also be capable of
recharging their storage devices by offpeak auxiliary energy to
be used during periods of adverse weather. Under utility ownership, the SHAC devices could be controlled by the utility to
assure that auxiliary demand did not occur coincidentally with
the system's peak.
Utility ownership and leasing is also "an option which can
potentially bring solar energy to the public at attractive cost
levels, with the solar system cost incorporated in a monthly
utility bill. Utilities could potentially derive substantial economic benefits from controlling the utilization patterns of solar
systems."7 5 In other words, utility ownership is a means of circumventing the barrier of high first cost through utility purchasing in a climate attendant to the energy business. Moreover, utilities have existing service, maintenance, and administrative operations (e.g., billing procedures which could easily
be adapted to include the providing of solar service) that might
easily be adaptable to a solar leasing scheme.
Utility ownership of solar devices might even help assure
solar users of product quality. 6 Utilities, having technical competence and expertise, could insure that the product leased to
a consumer not possessing such knowledge meets certain reliability, safety, and performance criteria. Utility ownership,
however, is only one solution to the product quality problem.
The imposition of federal and/or state quality standards could
instead solve the product quality problem. Solar warranties, be
they state- or industry-initiated, may offer another solution to
quality control.
Contrary to one of the arguments advanced against utility
ownership of SHAC devices, utilities can seemingly achieve
74. See SHAC POLICY OPTIONS, supra note 37, at 227-28; UTILrY AND SOLAR INTERsupra note 37, at 186.
75. BOoz-ALLEN & HAMILTON, INC., THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SOLAR ENERGY INCENTIVES AT THE STATE AND LOCAL LEVEL, ch. I at 6 (March 1976) (prepared for the Federal
Energy Administration, Office of Synfuels, Solar and Geothermal Energy, Contract
No. CO-05-50272-00).
76. See SHAC POLICY OPTIONS, supra note 37, at 228-29; UTILrrY AND SOLAR INTERFACE., supra note 37, at 187-88. See also PROCEEDINGS, supra note 63, at 21.
FACE,
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economies of scale in providing solar service to the public.17 It
is possible that economies of scale can be realized through (1)
large-volume purchases of the equipment and (2) designs incorporating the use of centralized collector and storage systems.
Under the latter configuration a number of individual homes
or apartments would receive heat or air conditioning from one
collector/storage facility.
A final argument for utility ownership of SHAC systems
takes into account the nature of the energy supply business and
its policies of operation. It has been stated that utilities are the
only organizations at present that face the proper incentives for
optimizing the choice among energy alternatives. Since most
consumers are not charged the marginal costs of providing conventional energy service, they are not faced with sufficient incentives to change to solar energy. Utilities can better weigh all
factors contributing to the costs of various conventional and
so as to reach the most economic alloauxiliary energy sources
78
resources.
of
cation
2. Federal and State Limitations on Utility Ownership of
SHAC Devices
a. Utility and Utility Subsidiary Ownership of
SHAC Devices and the FederalAntitrust Laws
Any discriminatory practice against either a solar user or
the solar industry by utilities or subsidiaries having substantial
control of solar development through their ownership policies
may give rise to an action based on the antitrust laws.79 The
earliest and most authoritative antitrust statute is the Sherman Act of 1890,80 of which section two prohibits monopolization or attempts by persons or corporations to monopolize.
77. See ENERGY RATE INITIATIVES, supra note 63, at 81.
78. See SHAC POLICY OPTIONS, supra note 37, at 229; UTILITY AND SOLAR INTERFACE, supra note 37, at 188. See also ENERGY RATE INITIATIVES, supra note 63, at 81;
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 63, at 21-22.
79. See Dean & Miller, supra note 72, at 336-37. See also D. Zillman, Solar
Energy, Public Utilities,and the Competitive Economy, THE SOLAR MARKET: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SYMPOSIUM ON COMPETITION IN THE SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRY 214, 217-22
(June 1978) (presented at the Dec. 15-16, 1977, Solar Energy Symposium sponsored
by the Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of Competition). For a more in depth
discussion of federal antitrust laws and their impact on solar energy commercialization, see J. Gross, Impact of the Antitrust Laws on the Commercialization of Solar
Energy (1978) (unpublished paper, prepared for the Solar Energy Research Institute,
on file with the authors).
80. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
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Over the years, however, a huge body of antitrust law has
grown through an accumulation of statutes, regulations, case
law decisions, and policies28
Of particular relevance to solar power and utilities is Otter
Tail Power Co. v. United States, 2 where the Supreme Court
ruled upon a section two13 monopoly charge against an electric
utility. Otter Tail, a major investor-owned electric utility, refused to sell wholesale power and declined to wheel power from
another source to small communities seeking to establish municipal electric distribution systems. Otter Tail contended that
the Federal Power Commission (FPC) regulation of wholesale
sales, wheeling, and interconnection shielded them from application of the antitrust laws and therefore barred antitrust action. The Supreme Court held that Otter Tail, by reason of its
regulation by the FPC, was not immune to application of antitrust regulation as the Federal Power Act does not exempt
electric utilities from the antitrust laws."' Of more importance
is the Court's holding that the actions of Otter Tail in refusing
to sell at wholesale to or to wheel power for the municipalities
constituted anticompetitive and monopolistic practices in violation of section two of the Sherman Act."' After Otter Tail, a
utility company's refusal under the first policy option to lease
SHAC devices to certain consumers, or to purchase SHAC devices from certain solar manufacturers, (grounded on a desire
to protect its monopoly position) may be deemed anticompetitive and in violation of the Sherman Act. Utilities operating
under the first and second policy options, by virtue of their
81. Many treatises are available that provide helpful discussions of the antitrust
laws. See E. GELLHORN, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS (1976); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS (1975); R. POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976); P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS
(1974). The basic antitrust statutes begin at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
82. 410 U.S. 366, rehearingdenied, 411 U.S. 910 (1973).
83. Section two of the Sherman Act provides that:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof,
shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the
discretion of the court.

15 U.S.C. § 2.
84. 410 U.S. at 372-75.
85. Id. at 377-79.
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regulation, would not be immune from application of the antitrust laws. Moreover, under the second and third policy options, the acquisition of a competitor that has the effect of
substantially lessening competition in the sale or purchase of
SHAC devices may violate the antitrust laws."
Another decision of relevance to solar energy and utilities
is Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 7 where the Supreme Court
examined the relation between state regulatory authority and
the antitrust laws. For severalyears, Detroit Edison followed a
policy of supplying free light bulbs to its residential customers-a marketing practice approved as part of its rate structure
by the Michigan Public Service Commission. A retail druggist
and seller of light bulbs challenged the practice by arguing that
Edison used its monopoly status to restrain competition in the
sale of light bulbs in violation of the Sherman Act. Edison
maintained that the state action exemption to application of
the antitrust laws applied and was triggered by the state commission's approval of the marketing practice. The lower federal
courts held, on the authority of Parker v. Brown,"' that the
commission's approval of the practice constituted state action
and exempted the practice from federal antitrust laws." The
Supreme Court reversed, stating that "state authorization,
approval, encouragement, or participation in restrictive conduct confers no antitrust immunity."911 The Court concluded
that "neither Michigan's approval of the tariff filed by respondent, nor the fact that the lamp-exchange program may not be
terminated until a new tariff is filed, is a sufficient basis for
implying an exemption from the federal antitrust laws for that
program." 9 ' After Cantor, a commission-approved utility practice regarding solar ownership under the first or second policy
options would not exempt the practice from the antitrust laws.
The state action exemption as applied to municipallyowned utilities was recently considered by the Supreme Court
86. See, e.g., United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106,175-84 (1911).
87. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
88. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
89. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 392 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D. Mich. 1974), aff'd, 513
F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1976) (affirmed without published opinion), rev'd, 428 U.S. 579
(1976).
90. 428 U.S. at 592-93.
91. Id. at 598.
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in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. "' Cities
owning municipal electric utilities brought an action against a
privately-owned utility (LP&L) on the basis of violation of federal antitrust laws, and LP&L counterclaimed on the same
basis. The case involved claims by the cities that LP&L had
conspired to restrain trade and attempted to monopolize by
preventing the construction and operation of competing electric systems and by foreclosing supplies from markets served
by the company. In the counterclaim, LP&L alleged that the
cities had conspired to displace LP&L in certain areas by requiring customers thereof to purchase electricity from the cities
as a condition of continued water and gas service.
A decision by the district court dismissing the counterclaim was reversed and remanded by the court of appeals.':'
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals by rejecting an automatic immunity from federal antitrust laws for municipally-owned utilities. The Court concluded that actions of state agencies or subdivisions are exempt
only to the extent that such actions are "engaged in as an act
of government by the State as sovereign, or, by its subdivisions,
pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service." 9 Under the City of Lafayette
principle, a municipality adopting discriminatory practices in
the purchasing or selling of SHAC devices under the first or
second policy option may be subject to federal antitrust laws.
Only where it appears that a municipality has acted pursuant
to the state's command would the state action exemption
apply.
Another portion of the federal antitrust laws, the
Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, prohibits price
discrimination in goods of like grade and quantity where the
effect of such conduct is to substantially lessen competition or
to tend to create a monopoly." One case decided by the Su92. 98 S. Ct. 1123 (1978). The special case of municipal utility ownership of
decentralized SHAC devices is considered in the text accompanying notes 120-34 infra.
93. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1976),
aff'd, 98 S.Ct. 1123 (1978).
94. 98 S.Ct. at 1137.
95. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
96. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a, 13b, 21a (1976). The Act provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the
course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in

1979

REGULATED UTILITIES AND THE SUN

preme Court under the Robinson-Patman Act may be applicable to utilities who own and lease SHAC devices. In Federal
Trade Commission v. Morton Salt Co., the practice of selling
salt transported in interstate commerce at quantity discounts
constituted a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act when only
9 7
some purchasers were able to take advantage of the discount.
The Court stated that:
[tihe Robinson-Patman Act was passed to deprive a large buyer
of such advantages except to the extent that a lower price could
be justified by reason of a seller's diminished costs due to quantity manufacture, delivery or sale, or by reason of the seller's good
faith effort to meet a competitor's equally low price.18

Furthermore, the Court reiterated previous holdings to the effect that harm in fact need not necessarily result to competition; only a reasonable "possibility" of such harm would be
sufficient to base a cause of action." Where a utility or a subsidiary receives quantity discounts in the purchase of SHAC
devices as an instrument of favor from certain solar suppliers,
such a transaction will be a possible violation of the RobinsonPatman Act.
A Clayton Act violation may occur if a utility or a subsidiary enters into an agreement with its SHAC system supplier to
exclusively deal in the supplier's products rather than those of
price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination
are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption,
or resale within the United States . . . where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the
benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them:
Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials
which make only due allowance for difference in the cost of manufacture,
sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in
which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered . . .
And provided further, That nothing herein contained shall prevent persons engaged in selling goods, wares, or merchandise in commerce from

selecting their own customers in bona fide transactions and not in restraint of trade: And provided further, That nothing herein contained
shall prevent price changes from time to time where in response to changing conditions affecting the market for or the marketability of the goods
concerned . ...

Id. at § 13(a).
97. 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
98. Id. at 43.
99. Id. at 46.
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a competitor. Under this federal statute, a company may not
sell goods on the condition that the recipient not buy the goods
of a competitor if the effect of such a transaction may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.""' For
example, in Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC,"" Atlantic had
agreed, in return for a certain commission, to assist Goodyear
in promoting the sales of products to the oil company's retail
service station dealers and wholesale outlets. Noting Atlantic's
economic power in inducing its outlets to buy Goodyear products, the Court found the practice to be anticompetitive under
the Clayton Act and therefore unlawful." 2 A similar result is
likely should utilities prevent buyers of utility-owned SHAC
devices from purchasing such devices from competitors.
b. Utility and Utility Subsidiary Ownership of
SHA C Devices and Colorado Trade Law
The legislative declaration of the Colorado Unfair Practices Act10 3 is "to safeguard the public against the creation or
perpetuation of monopolies and to foster and encourage competition by prohibiting unfair and discriminatory practices by
which fair and honest competition is destroyed or prevented."' 14 One significant section of the statute declares that
it is unlawful for any corporation engaged in the sale of any
product or service to discriminate between different locations
by selling the product or service at lower rates in different
100. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976):
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the
course of such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of
goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities,
whether patented or unpatented, for use, consumption, or resale within
the United States or any territory thereof or the District of Columbia or
any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United
States, or fix a price charged therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon,
such price, on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee
or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or
contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be
to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any
line of commerce.
101. 381 U.S. 357, rehearing denied, 382 U.S. 873 (1965).
102. Id. at 371.
103. COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-2-101-117 (1973). For a detailed analysis of Colorado
trade regulation laws, see Ducker, Antitrust and the Lay Lawyer, 44 DEN. L.J. 558
(1967).
104. COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-2-102.
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locations.' 05 However, the statute provides an exception for any
service or product sold or furnished by a public utility subject
to regulation by the PUC or by any municipal regulatory
body.'M Where utility ownership of SHAC devices under the
first or second policy option is regulated by the PUC, rental
prices will not be subject to scrutiny under this statute. However, the rental charged by a subsidiary under policy three, as
well as the prices charged by solar manufacturers who supply
SHAC devices to either utilities or subsidiaries, would be subject to scrutiny under the Colorado Act.
The Act would further require that the prices that would
be charged by SHAC device suppliers to utilities or subsidiaries
be no less than the cost to the manufacturer."'" Cost is defined
to be the sum of the cost of raw materials, labor, and all overhead expenses of the producer. 08 The Colorado Supreme Court
has held that where a merchant was selling below cost (as
defined within the statute) with an intent to destroy competition, such a practice was in violation of the statute."'"
Moreover, every agreement or contract intended to prevent competition is an illegal restraint of trade in Colorado.""
Corporations engaging in any combination, conspiracy, or
agreement restraining trade, or combining or conspiring to
monopolize any part of the trade in Colorado are guilty of an
unlawful conspiracy."' Unlike the price discrimination section
discussed above, no exemption from application of these stat105. Id. at § 6-2-103(1).
106. Id. at § 6-2-103(2).
107. Id.at § 6-2-105(1).
108. Id.at § 6-2-105(2).
109. Dikeou v. Food Distributors Ass'n, 107 Colo. 38, 47-49, 108 P.2d 529, 533-34
(1940).
110. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 6-4-101 (1976 Cum. Supp.):
Every contract or combination in the nature of a trust or conspiracy in
restraint of trade or commerce is declared illegal. Every combination,
conspiracy, trust, pool, agreement, or contract intended to restrain or
prevent competition in the supply or price of any article or commodity
constituting a subject of trade or commerce in this state, or every combination, conspiracy, trust, pool, agreement, or contract which controls in
any manner the price of any such article or commodity, fixes the price
thereof, or limits or fixes the amount or quantity thereof to be manufactured, produced, or sold in this state, or monopolizes or attempts to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce in this state, is declared
an illegal restraint of trade.
111. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 6-4-102 (1973).
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utes is afforded to investor- or municipally-owned public utilities." 2 Therefore, contracts, combinations, or conspiracies between a SHAC system supplier and a utility or subsidiary
would be suspect as being illegal where the effect of such an
arrangement is to restrain trade, to attempt to monopolize, or
to prevent competition from other SHAC system suppliers. '
3. Prohibition of Utility Ownership of SHAC Devices
If the fourth policy option were implemented, utilities and
their subsidiaries would be prohibited from owning decentralized SHAC devices located upon their customer's premises.
Such a prohibition would result in a competitive supply market
consisting of large and small businesses engaged in the manufacture, installation, leasing or sale of SHAC devices. The state
would regulate these businesses the same as it does any other
entities doing business in Colorado.
The creation of this competitive market structure could be
achieved by either of two methods. First, to the extent that the
PUC has jurisdiction over the ownership of SHAC devices by
a utility, the PUC could prohibit such activity in either its rules
and regulations or its general policy positions." ' Before the
PUC could prohibit a utility from owning SHAC devices it
must be shown that such ownership "affects" or "could affect"
the utility's regulated business."' It is likely that this affection
test could be satisfied when one considers (1) the utility's desire
to include the capital cost of SHAC ownership in its rate base,
and (2) the possibility of interservice rate subsidization between the utility's solar service and conventional energy service. In light of these two factors, the PUC would have a legal
basis for prohibiting utility ownership of SHAC devices if it
chose to do so.
A second possible means of preventing utilities from entering the solar market is by state statute. Under a state's police
power to adopt regulations promoting the health, safety, general welfare, and morals of its citizens,"' a state could pass
112.
113.
Fleming
114.

See id. at § 6-4-103.
For a recent federal case interpreting section 101 see Q-T Markets, Inc. v.
Companies, 394 F. Supp. 1102, 1106-07 (D. Colo. 1975).
See Dean & Miller, supra note 72, at 355-56.

115. See id. at 355 (citing G.

TURNER, TRENDS AND

ToPIcs

IN UTILITY REGULATION

20 (1969)).
116. See Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911). Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court, said: "the police power extends to all the great public needs [citation
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legislation that either prohibited utility participation in the
ownership of SHAC devices or prescribed the extent to which
a utility or its subsidiary could become involved in the solar
market. Legislation governing the extent of solar participation
by investor-owned utilities or their subsidiaries does not exist
in Colorado. However, precedent exists elsewhere for such a
law. Legislation has been passed in California that requires the
authorization of the PUC in the event that an electric utility,
gas utility, or a subsidiary thereof desires to manufacture,
lease, sell, or otherwise own or control any solar energy sys7
tem."1
The basic disadvantage in completely prohibiting utility
involvement in the ownership of SHAC systems lies in the
possibility that solar designs might not be optimized for utility
load management programs. The greatest concern is that
SHAC devices would not be designed so as to utilize only offpeak auxiliary energy. There is a more remote possibility that
SHAC devices would be of poor quality without some controls
imposed by utilities.
A summary of the implications of utility ownership of
SHAC devices under the previously discussed four alternative
ownership policies is presented below.""
Ownership Policy

Potential Negative
Implications

Potential Positive
Implications

1.

Regulated but
Monopolistic
Ownership of
SHAC by
Utilities

1.

Absence of Regulated
Monopoly Justifications
2. Regulatory Issues
3. Antitrust Issues

1.

Regulated but
Competitive
Ownership of
SHAC by
Utilities

1.
2.

1.
2.

2.

Regulatory Issues
Antitrust Issues

2.

Optimized SHAC
Design for
Utility System
Operation
High Quality of
SHAC Device and
Service
Same as Above
Advantages of
Competition

omitted] . . . .It may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by
the prevailing morality or the strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and
immediately necessary to the public welfare." Id. at 111.
117. Cal. A.B. No. 2984 (Sept. 1978) (adds § 2775.5 to the CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE).
This legislation and the events leading to its passage are considered more fully in the
text accompanying notes 140-63 infra.
118. Derived in part from SHAC POLICY OPTIONS, supra note 37, at 234; UTILrrY
AND SOLAR INTERFACE, supra note 37, at 198.
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3.

Unregulated
Competitive
Ownership of
SHAC by Utility
Subsidiaries

I. Internal Subsidization
2. Antitrust Issues

1.

4.

Utilities and
Subsidiaries
Prohibited from
Owning SHAC

1.

1. Avoidance of
Regulatory
Issues

2.

Inferior Product
Quality
Nonoptimized SHAC
Design from Utility
Perspective
Regulation may
Develop if Competitive
Market Functions
Improperly

Same as Above

C. The Special Case of SHAC Device Ownership by Municipal Utilities
A unique situation arises if municipally-owned utilities are
permitted to own SHAC devices under the first and second
policy options. In Colorado, an exemption for municipallyowned utilities from regulation by the PUC is provided in the
Colorado constitution" 9 and is also recognized in the PUC jurisdiction section of the Public Utilities Law. 2 0 The Colorado
Supreme Court has held that the PUC has no jurisdiction to
regulate a municipally-owned utility operating wholly within
the territorial boundaries of a home rule city.'2 ' In another decision the Colorado Supreme Court held that a state constitutional provision prohibiting the PUC from regulating utilities
operated by a municipality within its boundaries did not prohibit the PUC from regulating municipally-owned utilities to
the extent of their operations outside city boundaries.'22 Therefore, the extent of PUC regulation of SHAC device ownership
activities by a municipally-owned utility in Colorado would be
confined to solar service provided outside municipal boundaries.
If a municipality were to furnish solar service to its citizens
within the municipal limits, the city itself, through its proper
officers, would possess the sole power of fixing general rental
119. COLO. CONST. art. XXV.
120. COLO. REv. STAT. § 40-1-103(1).
121. City and County of Denver v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 181 Colo. 38, 45-46, 507
P.2d, 871, 874-75 (1973).
122. City of Loveland v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 580 P.2d 381, 383-85 (Colo. 1978).
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rates or regulation. 113 The extent of utility regulation by a municipality's legislative body is generally provided in the city
charter. For example, the municipal charter for one Colorado
city (Colorado Springs) provides that the city council shall "by
ordinance or resolution establish rates, rules and regulations
and extension policies for the services provided by the Department of Utilities."'2 4 The city council of Colorado Springs
maintains a policy of approving and applying the same utility
rates within municipal boundaries that the PUC has approved
for service outside the municipality. 25 It is possible, then, that
in similar cities charges for solar service provided by a municipality outside municipal limits would also apply to solar service provided within municipal limits if such charges were approved by the PUC.
Since municipally-owned utilities may be regulated only
in part either by the PUC or the municipality, it is important
to discuss whether such utilities should or may own SHAC
devices. It has been suggested that utility ownership of SHAC
devices, if confined to municipally-owned utilities, is preferable to ownership by investor- or privately-owned utilities. 2
This preference arises from the fact that a municipal utility is
(in theory at least) significantly more accountable to the public
because (1) it is a public entity, (2) it is subject to direct
control by publicly-elected officials, and (3) it does not have a
profit motive and thus would be unlikely to charge solar consumers heavy add-ons to retail cost. 7 This argument has merit
in Colorado when one considers that PUC commissioners are
not directly elected officials, but rather are appointed by the
Governor with the consent of the state senate. 2 1 On the other
hand, should a municipal utility seek to displace competition
in the solar market by taking advantage of its monopoly status,
such action would be state policy and therefore its anticompetitive SHAC system ownership activities would qualify for the
state action exemption from application of federal antitrust
laws. 121 It appears, however, that a municipal utility's relation123. See City of Lamar v.Town of Wiley, 80 Colo. 18, 23,248 P. 1009, 1010 (1926).
124. COLORADO SPRINGS, COLO., CHARTER art. VI § 34.1 (1977).
125. See Colorado Springs, Colo., Ordinance 77-144 (Sept. 27, 1977).
126. See K. Bossong, supra note 63, at 6.
127. See id.
128. COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-101(1).
129. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 98 S.Ct. 1123, 1137
(1978) and the text accompanying notes 92-95 supra.
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ships with SHAC device manufacturers or distributors would
3
be subject to Colorado's restraint of trade laws.
Existing Colorado statutes seem to authorize ownership
and control of SHAC devices by municipally-owned utilities.
The governing body of each municipality in Colorado has the
power:
(a)(I) To acquire waterworks, gasworks, and gas distribution
systems for the distribution of gas of any kind or electric light and
power works and distribution systems, including geothermal and
solar systems, and all appurtenances necessary to any of said
works or systems or to authorize the erection, ownership, operation, and maintenance of such works and systems by others.
(d) To assess from time to time, when constructing such
water, gas, geothermal, solar, or electric light works and in such
manner as it deems equitable, upon each tenement or other place
supplied with water, gas, heat, cooling, or electric light, such
water, gas, heat, cooling, or electric light rent as may be agreed
upon by the governing body.
(3) To condemn and appropriate so much private property
as is necessary for the construction and operation of water, gas,
geothermal, solar, or electric light works in such manner as may
be prescribed by law; and to condemn and appropriate any water,
gas, geothermal, solar, or electric light works not owned by such
municipality in such manner 3as may be prescribed by law for the
condemnation of real estate.' '

It is not particularly clear whether the "solar works" referred to in this statute consist of decentralized SHAC devices
or centralized systems such as solar power towers. Conceivably,
the broad solar language could be interpreted to include both
decentralized and centralized solar technologies since the services specifically referred to include heat, cooling, and electric
light, all of which can be produced by both types of solar technologies. If this interpretation is correct, the law would seem
not only to authorize municipal utilities to engage in SHAC
ownership, but also to lease SHAC devices and assess rent in
a manner agreeable to the governing body.
Municipal utility ownership of SHAC devices moved from
theory to reality in 1973 in the City of Santa Clara, Califor130. See COLO. Rav. STAT. §§ 6-4-101-109. See also the text accompanying notes
103-13 supra.
131. COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-15-707 (emphasis added).

REGULATED UTILITIES AND THE SUN

nia.'" The city-owned Santa Clara utility currently leases
SHAC devices for heating swimming pools to approximately
100 customers. In addition, the city has installed, on a trial
basis, SHAC devices for space heating in five homes. The city's
program is now part of a California Energy Commission proposal to extend the role of local government entities in the
development and commercialization of solar energy. The California municipal solar utility proposal states in part that:
[miunicipally-operated utilities are ideally suited to introduce
solar energy to consumers who are reluctant to assume the full
financial and technical risks of a solar investment. Whether the
utility leases or sells solar systems, the consumer is assured that
his equipment will be effectively maintained and repaired. When
a utility leases solar equipment or leases it with the option to buy,
the consumer avoids the problems and risks of selecting, purchasing, and installing a system.)"

The proposal is designed to result in a joint California
Energy Commission-DOE funding effort that will provide local
government entities with the information and assistance necessary to initiate their roles in solar commercialization. Among
the goals of the proposal are to (1) develop and initiate marketing efforts to establish 50 to 100 operating municipal solar utilities by 1981, (2) initiate three to four large-scale pilot solar
retrofit projects for domestic water heating in various housing
applications (e.g., low/fixed income, high-rise residential units;
low/middle income apartments; single family tracts), and (3)
establish municipal financing options that are independent of
state and local tax support. 13 Should this effort succeed, and
be duplicated elsewhere, it will thrust municipal utilities to the
forefront of SHAC system commercialization.
D. Alternative Utility Ownership Policies
One alternative to the four previously discussed SHAC
device ownership policies is to permit utilities to finance or
insure solar systems.'35 This alternative appears legally feasible
when one considers that several PUCs have expressly authorized programs by utilities to finance the installation of insulation to conserve natural gas.' 31 Such an option would directly
132. See CALIFORNIA STATE ENERGY COMMISSION, PROPOSAL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT

SOLAR UTILIMEs 8 (June 14, 1978, revised July 8, 1978) (submitted by the
California Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission to the Department of Energy).
OF MUNICIPAL

133. Id. at 1.
134. See id. at 2.
135. See Dean & Miller, supra note 72, at 356.
136. E.g., Re Pacific Power & Light Co., 69 P.U.R.3d 367 (Idaho Pub. Util.
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help resolve the high "first cost" problem now plaguing solar
consumers as well as indirectly assure solar consumers of the
product's quality. Additionally, this alternative could result in
SHAC system designs more favorable to the operation of the
utility's system, i.e., solar systems requiring auxiliary energy
only during periods other than peak. Since the Colorado PUC
has the authority to investigate the practices of any utility and
to establish new practices in lieu thereof, 3 ' it could establish a
solar financing program for any utility within its jurisdiction.
Unfortunately, utilities are not likely to favor this option because they would be required to assume all the risks without
the financial benefits that would follow from including solar
financing in the rate base. In addition, solar financing would
require the utility to expend additional capital beyond that
already expended in its conventional energy service operations.
Other alternatives have been suggested by those opposed
to utility involvement in the ownership of SHAC devices.' 3
First, local governments could establish community cooperatives that could purchase large quantities of SHAC devices and
thereby take advantage of these economies of scale and assure
product quality. The devices could then be sold at a price
equivalent to cost plus administrative expenses. Second, the
unregulated solar industries themselves could establish leasing
or financing programs. A leasing program of this nature is underway in Florida. A third alternative is to limit utility participation in the solar market to servicing or maintenance programs. In conjunction with such programs, utilities could be
used as a means for collecting and distributing solar and other
energy conserving consumer information. The National Energy
Act envisions such a role for utilities.'3 9 While these alternaComm'n 1967); Re Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 1 P.U.R. 4th 229 (Mich. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1973).
137. COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-3-111(2).
138. The following alternatives were obtained primarily from K. Bossong, supra
note 63, at 6.
139. The National Energy Act is comprised of five separate acts: Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Publ. L. No. 95-617 (1978); Energy Tax Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-618 (1978); National Energy Conservation Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95619 (1978); Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620'(1978);
Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621 (1978). For a general summary of
the five acts, See OmcE oF PUBuc AFwAn, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, INFORMATION: THE
NATIONAL ENERGY ACT (Nov.
ERGY ACT FACT SHEET (1978).

1978);

ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY CONFERENCE, NATIONAL EN-

1979

REGULATED UTILITIES AND THE SUN

tives have the benefit of preventing utilities from foreclosing
competition in the solar market, the rate of solar commercialization and development may be less than under a program
encouraging active involvement by utilities.
E. A Case Study of the Implications of SHAC System Ownership by Utilities in California
1. Investigation by the California PUC Energy Conservation Team
The California experience with utility involvement in ownership of SHAC devices is instructive to other states considering some degree of utility participation in the solar market.
In 1976, the California PUC Energy Conservation Team
investigated the role of solar energy in supplying the state's
energy needs. The investigation culminated in the preparation
of a report that generally concluded that California should promote the accelerated use of solar energy. This conclusion was
reached because of (1) the rising costs of fossil fuels, (2) the
uncertainty regarding the availability of fossil fuel resources,
(3) the abundance of solar energy, (4) the soon cost-effective
uses of solar energy for space conditioning and water heating,
and (5) the fact that government incentives can facilitate the
transition to the use of renewable and more abundant energy
resources. 40 The report also concluded that the role of utilities
should be to (1) provide their customers with SHAC device
information, e.g., brand names of SHAC systems meeting interim specifications and the names of reputable solar contractors, (2) provide their customers with assistance in maintaining
their SHAC devices, (3) assist their customers in financing
SHAC devices until a significant sales level of solar systems
Under the National Energy Conservation Policy Act, governors and nonregulated
utilities will submit to Department of Energy energy conservation plans requiring
utilities to inform residential customers of suggested energy conservation measures
including devices to utilize solar energy or wind power. As part of this informational
requirement, utilities must make public lists of installers and lenders who might install
and finance these energy conservation measures. For each residential customer, utilities are required to offer to inspect his residence and inform him of the estimated cost
of purchasing and installing the suggested measures as well as the expected energy
savings that are likely to result. In addition, utilities are required to offer to arrange
for the installation and financing of the suggested measures. Pub. L. No. 95-619, at
§§ 213-15.

140. See

CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILmES COMMISSION ENERGY CONSERVATION TEAM,

STUDY OF THE VIABILITY AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS

A

OF SOLAR ENERGY APPLICATION FOR

ESSENTIAL USES IN THE RESIDENTIAL SECTOR IN CALIFORNIA ch. 1 at 1-2 (Oct. 7, 1977).
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business is established, and (4) develop incentive offpeak rates
for backup energy service to solar equipped buildings.'4 ' The
informational, maintenance, and financing services were estimated not to require significant additional utility expenditures. Where subsidies from other nonsolar ratepayers were
considered, such subsidies seemed best limited to the development of domestic water heating and passive space conditioning
systems. 142
Of great significance was the Team's determination that
utilities have a potential advantage over private enterprise in
the marketing of SHAC devices. Utilities, if they were in the
solar business today, were estimated to be able to cut costs over
any competitor by about $200 on each system.' The California
Team found that volume purchasing by a utility could reduce
unit costs on all SHAC device components by as much as 40%
to 50%, and that the utility could reduce the cost of installation
by $100 or more on a typical water heating system.'" And with
a customer service and maintenance department already established, a utility could easily expand into the solar market.
The Team concluded that utility involvement in the direct
sales of SHAC systems was a policy question," 5 and recommended that the legislature prescribe the degree to which utilities should be allowed to manufacture, sell, or lease solar
equipment." 6 One unanimous policy recommendation was to
prohibit utility companies or their subsidiaries from manufacturing, selling, installing, and leasing SHAC equipment unless
the legislature declared that solar service was a utility service
subject to regulatoryjurisdiction."7 Noting that a utility subsidiary engaged in the marketing of SHAC devices may not fall
within PUC jurisdiction, the Team recommended that the regulated utility be precluded from using utility personnel, financial resources, and vehicles to promote the subsidiary's activities.14s
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. ch. III at 1-3.
id. at 5.
id. at 9.
id. at 8-9.
id. at 9.
id. at 11.
id.
id. at 9.
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2. The "Sunflower" Opinion
While this report by the California PUC Energy Conservation Team was being prepared, the Southern California Gas
Co. (SoCal) applied to the California PUC for authority to
engage in a solar demonstration project. The demonstration
project, called "Operation Sunflower," was to include construction and operation of approximately 315 solar systems in
various residential, commercial, and industrial structures at a
cost over the five-year life of the project of nearly $11 million.
SoCal also applied for authority to include in its rates the
amounts necessary to fund the solar energy program. SoCal
alleged in its application that the goals of the project included
(1) the investigation and determination of system costs, performance characteristics, feasibility, building and other code
revisions, safety hazards, and the scope of the utility's role in
the commercialization of solar assisted appliances, (2) analysis
of legal problems associated with solar energy, and (3) the testing of demonstration units to accelerate development of existing technologies.14 9
Seven days of public hearings were held during which interested parties representing consumers' organizations, local
governments, gas consumers, the PUC, and the State Energy
Commission presented testimony. The reaction to the SoCal
proposal was overwhelmingly negative. In the words of the
eventual PUC opinion, "[t]o say that [the consumer organizations] . . .did not support SoCal's application would be an
understatement."'' 50 The other interested parties also opposed
the project on three grounds. First, it was thought that additional solar expense should be borne by the utility's shareholders and not the utility's ratepayers. Second, the question of
utility involvement in the solar industry seemed an issue that
would be more properly resolved after an investigation by the
PUC and the Energy Commission. Third, many opposed the
thought of spending $11 million of ratepayer funds to accomplish SoCal's goals. 5 ' It is probable that the response would be
149. The solar law issues included those related to sun rights and ownership of
solar installations. Application of Southern California Gas Co. for Authority to (a)
Engage in a Solar Demonstration Project and (b) to Include in its Rates the Amounts
Necessary to Fund a Solar Energy Program, Decision No. 88224, at 2 (Cal. Pub. Util.
Comm'n, Dec. 13, 1977).
150. Id. at 3.
151. Id. at 4-5.
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the same should a Colorado utility make a similar proposal.
Not surprisingly, the California PUC denied the application by SoCal to increase rates. The basis of the decision was
that "at this time it is not in the public interest to have SoCal's
ratepayers fund this 'demonstration project.""" The PUC further pointed out that the proposal may have been premature
in that the state Energy Commission was legislatively charged
with carrying out studies assessing the nature of solar energy
resources to meet the needs of the state. 5 3 Since such studies
were not complete, proposals such as SoCal's would not be
favorably received.
3. 'Legislation Regarding Utility and Subsidiary Manufacture, Leasing, Sales and Ownership of Solar Energy Systems
California's interest in regulating utility involvement with
solar matters did not end with the PUC Energy Conservation
Team investigation and the Sunflower opinion. A joint investigation by the PUC and the Energy Commission was instituted
in 1976 to determine whether solar technologies might supply
a significant part of the state's future energy needs. The initial
phase of the proceeding encompassed twenty-two days of hearings and resulted in proposed joint findings and conclusions
from both staffs. 5 On the issue of direct utility involvement in
152. Id. at 5.
153. Id. at 5 n.1. The particular legislation cited in the opinion charging the
Energy Commission to carry out research into alternative sources of energy is CAL. PUB.
RES. CODE §§ 25401, 25216(c) (West 1977).
154. Joint Investigation by the Pub. Util. Comm'n and the Energy Resources
Conservation and Development Comm'n into the Availability and Potential Use of
Solar Energy in California, CPUC Case No. 10150, ERCDC No. 76-R&D-1 (April 14,
1978) (proposed joint findings and conclusions of the staffs). The California PUC
ordered that:
an investigation is instituted by the California Public Utilities Commission to determine and evaluate the proposed programs for the sales, leasing, installation and related servicing of solar devices by public utilities
subject to this Commission's jurisdiction. This investigation is for the
purpose of adopting rules or appropriate orders to insure that such programs preserve the competitive nature of the solar industry and protect
the interests of individual solar product consumers, while placing no
undue burden on the utilities' ratepayers.
* . . no utility under the jurisdiction of this Commission may proceed, in a manner which utilizes ratepayer funds, with the implementation of a program for the direct sales, leasing, installation and related
servicing of solar devices without authorization from this Commission.
. . .any utility under the jurisdiction of this Commission which now
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sales, leasing, and ownership of SHAC devices it was found
that (1) utilities appeared to have a distinct and potentially
unfair marketing advantage over others seeking to sell or lease
SHAC devices, (2) California utilities were interested in entering the solar energy field, and (3) representatives of the solar
industry and various consumer groups opposed utility ownership, sales, or leasing of SHAC equipment. 55 From these findings it was concluded that utilities should be allowed to enter
the solar market on a limited basis only when such entrance
was approved and monitored by the PUC. The extent to which
utilities may be able to own, sell, or lease SHAC devices was
left unsettled. However, it was thought that since utilities
could be used as a means of accelerating the commercialization
of solar energy, they should be able to finance, service, and
collect data on SHAC systems. 5'
As a follow up to this investigation, California enacted a
statute in late 1978 which provided the state with a mechanism
for regulating privately-owned utilities desiring to enter the
solar market through the manufacture, sale, leasing, ownership
or control of solar systems. 57 The legislative findings and declarations are significant. They acknowledge the need for and desirability of a truly competitive solar market, and seek to guarantee such a market by PUC regulation of utilities. The legislature deduced that:
it is in the best interest of the state to ensure competition in the
solar energy industry [and to ensure that] . . . the solar energy
industry... has the potential to be a truly competitive energy
industry.
...the current uncertainty with regard to the role of electrical and gas public utilities with regard to solar energy developor in the future intends to proceed with a program for the direct sales,
leasing, installation and related servicing of solar devices, notwithstanding the above order, must file with this Commission a full description and
report on present and proposed programs for the sale, leasing, installation
and related servicing of solar energy systems by each respondent utility,
discussing [various enumerated concerns] ....

within 30 days from

the effective date of this order.
Order Instituting Investigation by the Public Utilities Commission into Intended Programs for the Sales, Leasing, Installation and Related Servicing of Solar Devices by
Public Utilities, 0.1.1. No. 13, at 2-3 (April 4, 1978).
155. CPUC Case No. 10150 at 27-28.
156. Id. at 28-29.
157. Cal. A.B. No. 2984 (Sept. 1978) (adds § 2775.5 to the CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE).
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ment hinders the full-scale development of the solar energy industry, and therefore requires legislative clarification.
' . . there may be an inherent conflict for a public utility
which furnishes gas and electricity on the one hand and develops
solar energy on the other hand, and. . . it would be detrimental
to the solar energy industry and to the state if privately owned
public utilities used their status as monopolies to dominate the
solar energy industry or exercise unfair market power.
' . . the basis for regulation of public utilities extends to
their participation in solar energy development as well as in the
production and delivery of energy from conventional sources.
It is, therefore, the intent of the Legislature that the Public
Utility Commission be given a clear and explicit mandate to
regulate the involvement of privately owned public utilities in
solar energy development, and to ensure that the solar energy
industry develops in a manner which is competitive and free from
the potential dominance of regulated electrical and gas corporations.'1'

Under this statute when an electrical or gas corporation or
any subsidiary thereof desires to manufacture, sell, lease or
otherwise own or control any "solar energy system," it must
first obtain the authorization of the PUC. 5° "Solar energy system" means equipment that uses solar energy to provide heating, cooling, or electricity and which has a useful life of at least
three years. An electric plant is expressly excluded from the
definition.'" PUC authorization is not required where a utility
decides to own or control any solar system for "experimental
or demonstration purposes," or where the utility engages in a
limited program of installation or use whose sole purpose is to
investigate the cost-effectiveness of a solar application.'"'
Once the utility has formally described its proposed solar
program, the PUC is directed to grant authorization for the
program if it finds that (1) the program will neither restrict
competition nor restrict growth in the solar energy industry, (2)
the program will not unfairly employ any financial, marketing,
distributing, or generating advantage the company may exercise by virtue of its public utility status, and (3) the program
will accelerate the development and use of solar energy systems
158. Id.at § 1.
159. Id.at § 2(a).

160. Id. at § 2(d).
161. Id.at § 2(a).
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for the duration of the program.' The PUC also has the authority to suspend or terminate any authorization whenever it
finds the solar program no longer meets the above requirements.

3

Of course, the California statute must be implemented by
the state PUC before its impact can be known. It seems,
though, that California policy reflects the tension that exists
regarding the marketing of SHAC devices. On the one hand,
the state will not tolerate utilities using their inherent advantages to foreclose or discourage competition by industries manufacturing or selling SHAC devices. On the other hand, the
state wishes to speed the market acceptance of solar technologies and seeks to rely on utilities (and their marketing
strengths) to be a primary instrument in this accelerated commercialization effort. The state's PUC is responsible for reconciling these competing policies and it remains to be seen how
it will do so.
F. Utility Ownership, Sale, and Leasing of SHAC Devices
and the National Energy Act.
In 1977, President Carter submitted to Congress a draft of
proposed legislation to establish a comprehensive national energy policy."' After a year of modification by the House and
Senate, the Congress passed a National Energy Act (NEA)
which was signed by the President in 1978.165 Under the NEA,
162. Id. at § 2(b).
163. Id. at § 2(c).

164. The President of the United States, National Energy Act: A Draft of Proposed Legislation to Establish a Comprehensive National Energy Policy, H.R. Doc.
No. 95-138, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
165. The House version of the National Energy Act was passed by that body on
Aug. 5, 1977. H.R. 8444, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). As with the President's proposal, the House version contained provisions requiring each state regulatory authority
and nonregulated utility to submit a residential energy conservation plan to the federal
government. These plans were to include utility programs consisting of, inter alia,

procedures whereby a utility will offer to install or finance certain conservation measures provided that the program adequately prevented unfair, deceptive, or anticompetitive acts. Within the Act, residential energy conservation measureswere defined to
include "devices to utilize solar energy or windpower for any residential energy conservation purpose, including (but not limited to) heating of water, space heating or
cooling." H.R. 8444 at 101(10)(I). After two years from the date of enactment of the
proposed House bill, utilities would be required to offer to install suggested energy
conservation measures included in the utility programs. Utilities would have been
prohibited from installing residential energy conservation measures under the House
proposal if (1) it was determined by the PUC or FEA that a sufficient number of
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utilities are prohibited from supplying or installing any energy
conservation measures except for (1) clock thermostats, (2)
devices to increase the efficiency of furnaces (e.g., flue constrictors), and (3) load management devices (e.g., equipment that
allows utilities to control a customer's load). This prohibition
does not apply to energy conservation measures that were required or permitted by a law or regulation in effect on or before
the date of enactment of the NEA, or to measures that were
being installed or supplied by a utility on or before the enactment date. Moreover, the Secretary of Energy is authorized to
waive the prohibition upon petition of a utility and if it is found
that (1), fair and reasonable prices would be charged and (2)
such activity would not be inconsistent with the prevention of
unfair or deceptive practices.' Therefore, utilities appear to be
prohibited from "installing" or "supplying" SHAC devices,
although the legislation is silent as to whether utilities may
own such devices. Utilities are allowed to make small loans of
no more than $300 for the purchase or installation of specified
conservation measures, including solar and windpower equipment for water heating, space heating, and space cooling."s7
National concern regarding the role of utilities in solar
commercialization was expressed in ways other than in the
NEA. In 1978 the White House initiated a Domestic Policy
Review of solar energy which concluded that the federal govsuppliers of suggested measures existed within the area served by the utility, (2) the
PUC, FEA, or FTC determined that supplying or installing such measures by a utility
would have a substantial anticompetitive effect, or (3) the PUC or FEA determined
that prohibiting utilities from engaging in such activities would not substantially
reduce the number of residential customers likely to have such measures installed. In
effect, both regulated and nonregulated utilities would have been permitted to install,
supply, or finance SHAC devices under the House's National Energy Act proposal.
The Senate's proposal, passed by that body on Sept. 13, 1977, would have
allowed the governor of each state and each nonregulated utility to submit residential
energy conservation plans to the FEA. H.R. 5037, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). As with
the House proposal, these plans were to include utility programs which allowed utilities to offer to install or finance suggested measures as prescribed by the Administrator
of the FEA. Utilities would have been prohibited from installing residential energy
conservation measures or making a loan to finance the purchaser installation of such
measures. Therefore, under the Senate's version, the extent to which a utility could
become involved in the installation or financing of SHAC devices would have been left
to the discretion of the Administrator of the FEA (now the Department of Energy).
166. National Energy Conservation Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-619 § 216 (1978).
See also Conference Report: National Energy Conservation Policy Act, S. Rep. No. 951294, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. at 99-100 (1978).
167. Pub. L. No. 95-619 at § 216.
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ernment should establish a role for utilities that will accelerate
solar implementation without threatening competition, product innovation, small solar businesses, or the opportunity of
firms and citizens to enjoy the benefits of privately-owned
SHAC systems.' 8 The Domestic Policy report suggested federal
action to (1) encourage utility programs leading to increased
solar system installations, (2) encourage utility supply planning consideration of decentralized and centralized solar applications, (3) explore the feasibility of using utilities or cooperatives to provide solar-derived heat, gas, or electricity on a community scale, and (4) support research and development to
insure the availability of future systems for utility applications.'

It is significant to note that the Domestic Policy report
specifically recommended that the federal government encourage utilities to finance, sell, lease, install, and service onsite
solar equipment. It also thought it appropriate for federal agencies to support PUCs that consider solar technologies in their
supply planning and decisionmaking processes. 0 Thus, while
the NEA may be silent as to utility roles regarding the sale,
leasing, and servicing of SHAC devices, the federal government
is not unaware of the issues and in fact is considering strategies
that promote solar commercialization and at the same time
maintain competition in the solar energy industry.
III.

SOLAR UTILITY COMPETITION WITH EXISTING REGULATED
ELECTRIC UTILITIES

To what extent may a solar utility legally compete with
existing regulated utilities in providing electric service? To
answer this question requires an understanding of the nature
of a solar utility. A solar utility produces electricity by means
of some centralized electricity-producing solar technology. The
three technologies that may be used by such a utility are conversion of sunlight to heat (solar thermal), direct conversion of
wind to electricity (WECS), and direct conversion of sunlight
to electricity (photovoltaics). Solar utilities, like existing electric utilities, may be investor-owned, municipally-owned, or
federally-owned.
168. See STATUS REPORT ON SoLAR ENERGY DOMESTIC Poucy REVIEW ch. VI at 8
(Aug. 28, 1978) (Public Review Copy, Draft).

169. See id. at 9-11.
170. See id.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 56

The discussion that follows addresses the legal barriers
that may be presented to a solar utility that seeks to compete
with an existing electric utility for electric service customers.
Significant legal issues arise once a solar utility is able to compete for service, but such issues are beyond the scope of this
article. Some of these issues include (1) power plant siting, (2)
securing access to sunlight and/or wind easements, (3) securing
easements on or over those of another public utility, (4) financing capital expenditures, (5) environmental issues, (6) adequacy of service regulations, and (7) ratemaking and other regulatory concerns.
A. Competition by Investor- or Privately-Owned Solar
Utilities
1. PUC Jurisdiction
Article XXV of the Colorado constitution 7 ' recognizes the
broad authority of the PUC to regulate the facilities, service,
rates, and charges of any public utility within Colorado. In
Colorado, suppliers of electrical energy, including cooperative
electric associations or nonprofit electric corporations, are classified as public utilities and are therefore subject to PUC jurisdiction, control, and regulation and to the Public Utilities
Law. 12 The Supreme Court of Colorado has interpreted the

Colorado Constitution and the Public Utilities Law to mean
that jurisdiction over the adequacy, installation, and extension
of power services, as well as jurisdiction over the facilities nec171. The Colorado constitutional provision provides that:
In addition to the powers now vested in the General Assembly of the
State of Colorado, all power to regulate the facilities, service and rates
and charges therefor, including facilities and service and rates and
charges therefor within home rule cities and home rule towns, of every
corporation, individual, or association of individuals, wheresoever situate

or operating within the State of Colorado, whether within or without a
home rule city or home rule town, as a public utility, as presently or as
may hereafter be defined as a public utility by the laws of the State of
Colorado, is hereby vested in such agency of the State of Colorado as the
General Assembly shall by law designate.
Until such time as the General Assembly may otherwise designate,
said authority shall be vested in the Public Utilities Commission of the
State of Colorado; provided however, nothing herein shall affect the
power of municipalities to exercise reasonable police and licensing powers, nor their power to grant franchises; and provided, further, that nothing herein shall be construed to apply to municipally owned utilities.
172. CoLO. Rev. STAT. § 40-1-103(2) (1973).
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essary to supply, extend,
and connect the service, is exclusively
3
vested in the PUC.17
Under these principles, a solar company that desired to
supply electric energy to the public or to members of an association formed by the company would be subject to PUC jurisdiction. So too, if a group of home, condominium, or apartment
owners forms an association and erects facilities to provide solar generated electricity to themselves, the association may be
classified as a public utility and find itself subject to PUC
jurisdiction. Conceivably, a shopping center, research park, or
other facility operating a solar powered generating system for
its own use may also be classified as a public utility if its
tenants are considered to be "members" of an association.
The majority court rule confirms these conclusions. Most
courts hold that public utility status is accorded to a company
if it has "dedicated its property to public use."' 74 In Munn v.
Illinois,'7 5 the Supreme Court established the principle that
when one devotes his property to a use in which the public has
an interest, i.e., when used in a manner to affect the community at large, he must submit to be regulated. The owner
may then have to face the prospect of having the property and
its operations controlled by the public for the common good.
The Colorado Supreme Court has agreed that:
to fall into the class of a public utility, a business or enterprise
must be impressed with a public interest and ... those engaged
in the conduct thereof must hold themselves out as serving or
ready to serve all members of the public, who may require it, to
the extent of their capacity. "'

Any organization that so holds itself out as serving some of the
public's power needs through solar technologies may be considered a utility.
Under the minority rule, certain activities that do not involve a dedication of property to the public use may nonetheless be "so affected with the public interest" as to give rise to
PUC jurisdiction. This rule was applied in Cottonwood Mall
173. Intermountain Rural Electric Ass'n v. District Court, 160 Colo. 128, 134, 414
P.2d 911, 914 (1966). See also City and County of Denver v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 181
Colo. 38, 43-44, 507 P.2d 871, 873 (1973).
174. E.g., Allen v. R. R. Comm'n of California, 179 Cal. 68, 175 P. 466 (1918).
175. 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1877).

176. City of Englewood v. City and County of Denver, 123 Colo. 290, 300, 229 P.2d
667, 672-73 (1951).
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Shopping Center, Inc. v. Utah Power & Light Co.,' 77 where a
shopping center constructed an electric generating plant designed to supply power to its tenants. The court held that since
both the shopping center tenants and the public at large would
benefit from the supply of power, the activity conferred public
utility status upon the shopping center. The shopping center
was then subject to PUC regulation." 8 Under either rule, it
seems certain that a private solar company desiring to generate
electricity for public distribution both within a municipality
and in other areas would qualify as a public utility and be
subject to PUC jurisdiction.
2. Consequences of PUC Jurisdiction
Colorado public utilities law has a key impact on the ability of solar utilities to compete with existing regulated utilities.
By Colorado statute, the construction of either a new facility
or an extension of an existing system by a public utility cannot
begin until the utility first obtains a certificate stating that the
present or future public convenience and necessity requires the
construction.' 79 In Western Colorado Power Co. v. Public Utilities Commission,80 the Colorado Supreme Court held that this
certification statute is the foundation of the regulated monopoly principle and was designed to prevent the duplication of
facilities and competition between utilities. Therefore, the
statute subjects proposals for the construction of new or expanded facilities to the judgment of the PUC.
A further provision provides that when the PUC finds that
there is or will be a duplication of service by public utilities in
any area, the PUC shall in its discretion (1) issue a certificate
assigning specific territories to one or each of the utilities, or
177. 440 F.2d 36 (10th Cir. 1971).
178. Id. at 42.
179. COLO. Rv. STAT. § 40-5-101(1). Certain exemptions from application of the
statute are provided for extensions of facilities necessary in the ordinary course of
business (1) within any city, county, or town within which a utility is already lawfully
operating, (2) into territory either within or without a city, county, or town contiguous
to the utility's facilities and not already served by a public utility providing the same
service, and (3) within or to territory already served by the utility. In Western Colo.
Power v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 163 Colo. 61, 428 P.2d 922 (1967) the Supreme Court of
Colorado stated that these exceptions are for "housekeeping" purposes, allowing the
legislature to permit extensions necessary in the ordinary course of business without
further application for a certificate. Id. at 71, 428 P.2d at 927.
180. 159 Colo. 262, 273, 411 P.2d 785, 791, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 385
U.S. 22, rehearing denied, 385 U.S. 984 (1966).

REGULATED UTILITIES AND THE SUN

otherwise define the conditions of rendering service and (2)
order the elimination of the duplication upon "just and reasonable terms."' 8 ' Under the statute, it is mandatory that the applicant, prior to the construction of any new plant or system,
prove that the public convenience and necessity requires such
construction.'8 2 Where a utility has not expanded service into
an uncertified area, that area remains open for certification by
the usual procedures." 3 However, an intruding utility may not
claim service in an area already adequately served by an existing utility.' 4
A solar company desiring to construct a solar electric generating plant, as well as the necessary facilities for distribution,
would therefore be required to seek and obtain a certificate. It
is the certificate that will prove the major obstacle to a solar
utility participating in the power generation market. At present, the likelihood of a solar utility being able to acquire a
certificate is extremely limited because, except for a few uninhabited areas, the entire state is certified to existing utilities
for electricity.8 5 There are only two ways for a solar utility to
acquire a certificate-(1) if existing utilities were found to be
inadequate, or (2) if solar generated electricity were considered
to be a "new" utility service. Unfortunately, the PUC has
rarely determined that utility service is inadequate. 6 Nor is
there historical basis for the PUC to distinguish between electricity supplied by fossil fuel plants and that generated by
other means-hydroelectric, nuclear, or solar.1"1
Even assuming solar generated electricity constitutes a
new utility service, the ability of a solar utility to acquire a
certificate would depend on whether the proposed solar service
181. COLO. REv. STAT. § 40-5-101(2).
182. Western Colo. Power Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 159 Colo. 262, 273, 411 P.
2d 785, 791, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 385 U.S. 22, rehearing denied, 385 U.S.
984 (1966).
183. See Western Colo. Power Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 163 Colo. 61, 71-72, 428
P.2d 922, 927-28 (1967).
184. Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Home Light & Power Co., 163 Colo. 72, 83, 428 P.2d
928, 934 (1967).
185. See K. HILLHOUSE, LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECrIVES ON SOLAR ENERGY
IN COLORADO 65, 73 (Nov.1977) (prepared for the National Science Foundation, Grant
No. APR-75-18247).
186. See Town of Fountain v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 167 Colo. 302, 447 P.2d 527
(1968).
187. See K. HILLHOUSE, supra note 185, at 65.
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area is certified to an existing utility for electric service. If the
area is already certified, the solar utility would be required, in
addition to establishing the necessity and public convenience
of the solar electric service, to show that the existing utility is
either unwilling or unable to satisfy the demand for solar electric service.' 88 The likelihood of such a showing is diminished
by the fact that the existing utility's right to provide utility
service under its certificate within its defined area constitutes
a property right that cannot be taken without due process of
89
law. 1
In Town of Fountainv. Public Utilities Commission,'l the
Colorado Supreme Court indicated the conditions that must be
present before a utility (e.g. a solar utility) may apply for and
properly receive a certificate from the PUC to provide utility
service in an area previously certified to another utility. Fountain received a certificate to supply electricity to the area surrounding the town. The eastern one-half of this area contained
no lines or distribution facilities from which to provide service.
Another utility, Mountain View Electric Association, Inc., was
certified in areas adjacent to Fountain's area and subsequently
received authorization from the PUC to extend operations into
Fountain's certified but unserved area. The reason for the decision was that the public convenience and necessity required
Mountain View's service. Fountain objected to the PUC's determination but the court affirmed, holding that "[a] utility
may apply for a certificate to serve in a certified area if it
appears that the certified utility is either unwilling or unable
to serve any existing or newly developing load within its certified territory . . . ."I' After Fountain, if a solar utility desires
to acquire a certificate to serve an area already certified to
another utility, the former must show that the latter is unwilling or unable to adequately provide the service. In Fountain,
an absence of facilities appeared to be the key fact indicating
an inability to serve the area. A similar showing would probably be necessary before a solar utility could be certified.
188. See text accompanying notes 190-94 infra.
189. Western Colo. Power Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 163 Colo. 61, 69, 428 P.2d
922, 926-27 (1967). See also K. HILLHOUSE, supra note 185, at 73.
190. 167 Colo. 302, 447 P.2d 527 (1968).
191. Id. at 307, 447 P.2d at 529. See also Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Home Light and
Power Co., 163 Colo. 72, 428 P.2d 928 (1967).
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It is conceivable that other factors could be used to prove
an unwillingness or inability to provide service. For example,
economic infeasibility' or fuel shortages might constitute the
existence of an inadequate existing service.9 3 A legislative or
PUC declaration that solar generated electricity is a "new"
utility service may also lessen the burden on a solar electric
utility seeking to establish an unwillingness to serveparticularly where an existing certified utility chooses not to
generate by means of solar. However, it has been held that
the first utility certified should be given the opportunity to
supply any needed service before any other utility is allowed
to compete with it."'
No guidelines exist as the PUC criteria regarding approval
of a certificate of public convenience and necessity to construct
a public utility facility.9 5 With such broad discretion in making
its decision on a certificate, the PUC could consider the economic interests of the utility's customers or even the economic
feasibility of constructing a solar power plant over one fueled
by conventional energy sources. There is at present no requirement that the PUC take into account such social costs as environmental degradation and depletion of nonrenewable resources, but should the PUC consider economic factors in its
decisionmaking deliberations, such costs must be included.
The Colorado Supreme Court has in one instance sanctioned an economic feasibility analysis that suggested the usefulness of decisions that factor in costs of a social nature. In
International Union, UMW of America v. Public Utilities
Commission,' it was implied that a PUC decison granting a
certificate could be questioned where another type of power
192. See text accompanying notes 196-97 infra.
193. See Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 142 Colo. 135, 350 P.2d
543, cert. denied, Union Rural Elec. Ass'n v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 364 U.S.
820 (1960). In this case, the Colorado Supreme Court recognized the authority of the
PUC to grant extension rights to utilities for service to areas certified to other utilities

if adequate service is not being provided and the public convenience and necessity so
requires. Id. at 151, 350 P.2d at 551. See also Western Colo. Power Co. v. Pub. Util.
Comm'n, 159 Colo. 262, 411 P.2d 785, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 385
U.S. 22, rehearingdenied, 385 U.S. 984 (1966).
194. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 142 Colo. 135, 149, 350 P.2d
543, 550, cert. denied, Union Rural Elec. Ass'n v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 364 U.S.
820 (1960) (quoting South Suburban Motor Coach Co. v. Levin 269 Ill.
App. 323
(1934)).
195. See K. HILLHOUSE, supra note 185, at 72.
196. 170 Colo. 556, 560; 463 P.2d 465, 467 (1970).
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plant had a distinct and measurable economic advantage over
the type certified.'9 7 Thus, when the solar thermal power plant
alternative becomes economically competitive, a solar utility
could argue that present economic and technical conditions
support certification of a solar plant over one conventionally
fueled. As times change and future social costs become more
of a factor in policy considerations, the PUC might begin consideration of these costs as part of an economic feasibility analysis. When this change occurs, a solar utility would be in a good
position to point out the social and environmental advantages
of solar thermal generation over conventional power generation.
Another method by which a solar utility can gain entry
into the electric service market is to purchase an existing utility's certificate of public convenience and necessity. A Colorado statute provides that:
any certificate of public convenience and necessity or rights obtained under any such certificate held, owned, or obtained by any
public utility, may be sold, assigned, or leased as any other property other than in the normal course of business but only upon

authorizationby the Commission and upon such terms and conditions as the Commission may prescribe.18

The ability of a solar utility to purchase a certificate from
an existing utility thus rests in the discretion of the PUC. This
discretion would nevertheless be substantially limited by the
bargaining position of the existing utility. The authority of the
PUC to exercise discretion relating to the sale of a certificate
does not give the PUC the power to order the sale, for to do so
might constitute a taking of property without just compensation."19
197. In the UMW case, Public Service Co. of Colorado applied for a certificate to
construct the nuclear generating station at Ft. St. Vrain. The UMW contested the
issuance of the certificate on the grounds that (1) there was a lack of evidence upon
which the economic feasibility of the project could be determined and (2) the nuclear
plant would constitute an undue risk to the health and safety of the general public.
The court stated that changes in technology, pollution regulations, and the cost of fuel
may in the future make fossil fueled plants economically unfeasible. The court further
stated that sufficient evidence existed in the record to support the PUC's finding that
neither a fossil-fueled plant nor a nuclear plant had a measurable economic advantage
over the other and that the proposed project was therefore economically feasible. Id.
at 560-61, 463 P.2d at 467.
198. CoLo. Ray. STAT. § 40-5-105 (1973) (emphasis added).
199. Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Home Light & Power Co., 163 Colo. 72, 85, 428 P.2d
928, 935 (1967).
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An additional disincentive awaits solar utilities wishing to
provide service within a municipality. As with other utilities,
a privately-owned solar utility desiring to operate exclusively
within a municipality would be subject to the certification process.m In addition, either local laws might require a private
utility serving the customers in a municipality to obtain a fran"
chise, or a utility might seek a franchise on its own initiative.',
However, in attempting to compete for service within a municipality, a solar utility may be in violation of an earlier franchise
granted to an existing utility. Whether a violation would in fact
occur by the competing solar utility depends on the specific
provisions of the franchise. Nevertheless, since the municipal
franchises are analogous to the monopoly status that is conferred by a certificate, such franchise could represent yet another barrier to a private solar utility's ability to compete with
existing utilities.
3. Suggested Alternatives
There are several means by which the aforementioned barriers to electric service competition by a privately-owned solar
utility may be removed. It has been suggested that PUCs could
simply declare that they will choose not to exercise jurisdiction
over solar electric generating facilities. Such a policy could be
beneficial to solar development and electric customers if the
policy was confined to certification procedures. Otherwise consumers of solar generated electricity would not be accorded the
protection that rate202 and service20 3 regulation normally provides. Utilities threatened by competition would also likely
respond that under the PUC jurisdictional statute, 2114 the PUC
is compelled to exercise jurisdiction over any entity declared as
a matter of law to be affected with a public interest. Solar
utilities would fall within this definition and would therefore
be subject to PUC jurisdiction.
Another possible means of allowing competition by a solar
utility is to permit competition legislatively. A statute could
200. See note 171 supra.
201. See K. HILLHOUSE, supra note 185 at 80.
202. See CoLO. REV. STAT. § 40-3-101(1) requiring that all charges received by any
public utility for any service rendered be just and reasonable.
203. See id. at § 40-3-101(2) wherein it is provided that utility service shall promote the public safety and in all respects be just and reasonable.
204. CoO. Rav. STAT. § 40-1-103.
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simply state that the public interest demands that a utility
providing solar generated electricity be permitted to compete
with existing utilities. Such a law would either remove the
certification requirement or could be drafted to exempt solar
utilities from PUC jurisdiction. Once competition is allowed,
electric consumers could not be compelled to take service from
one utility, but rather would be able to select service from the
20 5
utility of their own choice.
Since a certificate in Colorado grants a utility a right to
serve the public within its certified area, such a right constitutes a legally protected property right.2 0 6 Therefore, either of
the two above alternatives would be contested by the certified
utility as amounting to a taking of property without due process.207 It is true that the Constitution's protection against the
taking of private property for a public use without just compensation is limited by a state's ability to regulate pursuant to the
police power. However, when the regulation goes too far it may
be recognized as a taking without just compensation.205 A law
that voids an existing utility's certificate which results in a
significant loss of customers may be an example of regulation
going too far.
California law offers a final example of how one state has
approached the issue of solar utility competition with existing,
regulated electrical utilities. In 1976, the California legislature
enacted legislation encouraging the development of new
sources of natural gas and electricity. 0 9 Private energy producers are broadly defined within the legislation to include persons or entities generating electricity from other than conventional sources for their own use and not for sale to others..2 The
statute to a certain extent exempts privately-owned solar utilities from PUC jurisdiction as it provides that: "[a] private
energy producer shall not be found to be an electrical corporation . . .as defined in this code solely because the electricity
205. See, e.g., Blue Ridge Elec. Membership Corp. v. Duke Power Co., 258 N.C.
278, 128 S.E.2d 405 (1962); Cass County Elec. Coop. v. Otter Tail Power Co., 93
N.W.2d 47 (N.D. 1958).
206. Western Colo. Power Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 163 Colo. 61, 69, 428 P. 2d
922, 926-27 (1967).
207. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
208. See id. at 415.
209. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 2801-16 (West Supp. 1978).
210. Id. at § 2802.
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• . . is being transmitted in part through facilities owned by a
public utility."'2"1 Another section of the statute allows such
utilities to use existing public utility transmission facilities
where it is necessary to transmit the electricity from the generating source to the point of end use.212 The statute provides an
incentive for solar utilities in that it allows such utilities to use
existing utility facilities without sanction of PUC regulations.
Such strategies should be considered in other states seeking to
promote solar power.
B. Competition by Municipally-Owned Solar Utilities
Municipally-owned utilities, to the extent of their operations within municipal boundaries, are not subject to the jurisdiction of the PUC in Colorado. And under article XX of the
Colorado constitution, home rule cities are empowered to manage local and municipal matters, including the construction,
acquisition, and operation of municipal utilities. 1 3 Since statutory and home rule cities are not subject to PUC jurisdiction,
utilities owned by municipalities have broad potential for experimenting with, developing, and operating solar facilities. In
partial recognition of this potential the Colorado legislature in
1975 granted municipalities the power to acquire or erect solar
systems." 4 The statute provides that the governing body of
each municipality has the power to acquire electric light and
power works, including "solar systems and all appurtenances
necessary to the operation of such works." The somewhat ambiguous language would seem to include solar systems designed
to generate electricity.
The statute further provides that the municipality has the
right to purchase or condemn the facilities of an existing franchise at their fair market value. Under this statute, and a Colorado Supreme Court case interpreting it,"' existing franchises
within a municipality would not present a barrier to a municipality desiring to establish a solar municipal utility. A municipality could therefore condemn for purchase the electric works
of any electric utility operating within municipal limits and
211.
212.
213.
214.
supra.
215.

Id.
Id. at § 2812.5
COLO. CONST. art. XX §§ 1, 6.
COLO. Rav. STAT. § 31-15-707 (1973). See also text accompanying note 131
Public Service Co. v. City of Loveland, 79 Colo. 216, 245 P. 493 (1926).
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subsequently construct a solar generating facility to establish
a solar municipal utility." 6 To the extent of solar electric service provided withih municipal boundaries, the municipallyowned solar utility would not be subject to PUC jurisdiction
and hence the certification procedures.
The Colorado Supreme Court has confirmed that a municipality seeking to provide a public service is not barred by the
existence of a certified privately-owned utility company providing a similar service. In United States Disposal Systems
(USDS), Inc. v. City of Northglenn,1 7 the city passed an ordinance authorizing it to provide trash removal services. USDS
argued that since it held a certificate granted by the PUC, the
ordinance constituted an invalid exercise of the police power
and a taking of private property without compensation. The
court concluded that the ordinance had a fair relation to the
protection of the public health, and held that the municipality's actions constituted a reasonable exercise of the police
power."1 ' More importantly, the court stated that under the
Colorado constitution the PUC (1) cannot interfere with municipalities in the exercise of their police power and (2) has no
jurisdiction over municipally-owned utilities."9 The acquisition by a municipality of electric power works for the purpose
of establishing a solar electric utility would probably be construed as a valid exercise of the police power, and the existence
of a PUC certificate granted to an existing utility would therefore constitute no legal barrier to this action.
In the absence of statutory and judicial law such as that
found in Colorado, common law and constitutional provisions
would govern the extent to which a municipality seeking to
compete with an existing utility could ignore a previously issued franchise. A municipality that wishes to compete with an
existing utility would be subject to scrutiny under the contract
216. A municipality could not purchase generating plants constructed for private
use, or use outside the municipality. See Pikes Peak Power Co. v. City of Colorado
Springs, 105 F. 1 (8th Cir. 1900). Moreover, where a franchise has been granted to a
private company to provide electric service within a municipality, the electric power
works cannot be condemned or purchased within twenty years after the granting of the
franchise without the consent of the owner of the franchise. CoLo. RFv. STAT. § 31-15707(a)(IV).
217. 567 P.2d 365 (Colo. 1977).
218. Id. at 367.
219. Id. at 368.
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clause and fourteenth amendment of the Constitution. 2 ' The
contract clause guarantees that no state shall impair the obligations of contract 22' and the fourteenth amendment protects
against takings by a state of private property without due pro222
cess of law.

Inasmuch as a municipal franchise to an existing utility is
recognized as a binding contract, 223 it is possible to argue that
the municipality has contracted to give the utility the exclusive
right to provide service. Impairment of such an agreement
would be actionable under the contract clause. 224 However, it

has been held that the grant of a franchise carries with it no
implied contract which would foreclose competition by the
municipality. 225 In addition, the Supreme Court has stated that

the contract clause is not only:
qualified by the measure of control which the State retains over
remedial processes, but the State also continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people. It does not
matter that legislation appropriate to that end "has the result of
modifying or abrogating contracts already in effect." [citation
omitted] .

.

. Not only are existing laws read into contracts in

order to fix obligations as between the parties, but the reservation
of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order . ..

.

Therefore, a franchise granted to a utility by a municipality
must be construed in accordance with the municipality's authority to exercise its police power. Since the establishing of a
municipally-owned solar utility would promote the health,
safety, and welfare of the public, such an action would be considered a valid exercise of the police power.
An existing utility would have a stronger defense against
competition from a municipally-owned solar utility where the
220. WILSON, JONES, MORTON, & LYNCH, THE SUN: A MUNICIPAL UTILITY ENERGY
SOURCE 3 (1976) (prepared for the city of Santa Clara, California with the support of

the Energy Research and Development Administration, Contract No. E(04-3)-1083)
(hereinafter cited as MUNIcIPAL ENERGY SOURCEI.
221. U.S. CONST. art. I § 10, cl. 1.
222. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
223. Larson v. South Dakota, 278 U.S. 429, 432 (1929).
224. Walla Walla City v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U.S. 1 (1898).
225. Madera Waterworks v. City of Madera, 228 U.S. 454,456 (1913); Skaneateles
Waterworks Co. v. Village of Skaneateles, 184 U.S. 354, 363 (1902).
226. City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 508, rehearing denied, 380
U.S. 926 (1965), (citing and quoting from Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,
290 U.S. 398, 434-35 (1934)).
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express terms of the franchise provide that the company is to
provide service free of competition from any other entities, including the municipality. Where a private utility holds a franchise that explicitly precludes the municipality from operating
a similar facility, the former will find protection under the
contract clause. 2 7 If solar electric service were considered to
be a "new" utility service, though, an exclusive franchise for a
given type of service would not protect the holder from solar
utility competition. 22 And if the power of a municipality to
operate a utility is granted by the state constitution,2 9 the
municipality will be allowed to compete even if the terms of the
franchise to the private utility expressly prohibit solar competition by the municipality. Such a result is due to the fact that
a franchise granted pursuant to state statute cannot abrogate
the power constitutionally vested in a municipality. 30 The
Contract Clause will thus pose only a minor limitation on a
municipal solar utility seeking to compete with a franchised,
existing electrical utility.
If a private utility cannot use the contract clause to defeat municipal competition, it will claim that such municipal
involvement in the franchised area amounts to a "taking" of
private property under the fourteenth amendment.2' Such an
argument is likely to be unsuccessful. In New Orleans GasLight Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., it was held that when a
private utility has been granted a franchise which precludes
competition, the authorization by the municipality of a similar
venture does not constitute a taking when such authorization
is an exercise of the police power. 2 To the argument that the
municipality's competition would deprive the private utility of
its property without due process, the Court in another case
replied that: "the decisions of this Court leave no doubt that a
state [or a municipality by delegated authority] may, in the
public interest, constitutionally engage in a business commonly carried on by a private enterprise, . . . [citations omit227. New Orleans Gas-Light Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U.S. 650 (1885).
228. See Larson v. South Dakota, 278 U.S. 429 (1929).
229. See COLO.CONST. art. XX, §§ 1, 6.
230. See MUNICIPAL ENERGY SOURcE, supra note 220 at 4.
231. The rights granted in a municipal franchise have been held to constitute
property rights entitled to protection by the fourteenth amendment. City of Los
Angeles v. Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Corp., 251 U.S. 32, 39 (1919).
232. 115 U.S. 650, 671-72 (1885).
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ted] and compete with private interests engaged in a like activity. ' ' 33 It seems, then, that regardless of whether the private
utility asserts contract clause or takings claims, the question
of whether a solar municipal utility may compete with a franchised utility will be determined according to whether the
municipality is acting within the scope of the police power.23
The final possible limitation on municipal solar utility
competition with existing private utilities is the array of federal
antitrust laws. Municipalities are not likely to be subject to the
antitrust laws after the Supreme Court announced in Parker v.
Brown that the Sherman Act's coverage does not extend "to
restrain state action or official action directed by a state. 23 .
The Parkerstate action exemption as applied to a municipallyowned utility was more recently considered in City of Lafayette
v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., where the Supreme Court held
that actions of municipalities are exempt by the Parker doctrine when such actions are "engaged in as an act of government by the State as sovereign, or, by its subdivisions, pursuant to state policy . . . ."2 The constitutional or statutory
authority that a municipality in Colorado exerts to acquire or
operate a municipal solar utility should easily qualify the action for the state action exemption from the antitrust laws.
C. Competition by Federally-OwnedSolar Utilities
To what extent may solar utilities owned by the federal
government compete with private, electric utilities? Existing
federal power agencies such as the Bonneville Power Administration and the Tennessee Valley Authority are basically generating and marketing agencies permitted to enter into contracts
for the wholesale distribution of electric energy.2 7 With the
exception of the Rural Electrification Administration, the federal power authorities do not generally market electric energy
directly to individual consumers on a retail basis23
233.
234.
(1913).
235.
236.

Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 619, 624 (1934).
See Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co. v. City of South Bend, 227 U.S. 544

317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
98 S.Ct. 1123, 1137 (1978).
237. See E. BERLIN, C. CICcHrMr, & W. GILL N, PERSPECTIVE ON POWER 157-63
(1974) (Appendix C). Appendix C of the publication provides an excellent summary
of federal power agencies.
238. Under the Rural Electrification Program, the REA finances qualified cooperative associations for the purpose of providing generation, transmission, and distribution of electric power to rural residents not receiving central station service. See id.
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If Congress or federal agencies were to establish solar electric utilities for the purpose of competing with existing utilities
for business at the retail level, it is highly likely that these
entities would be subject to PUC jurisdiction in Colorado. The
applicable statute provides that every cooperative electric association and "every other supplier of electricity" are subject
to the jurisdiction, control, and regulation of the PUC and to
the provisions of the Public Utilities Law.2 9 The Colorado Supreme Court has held that this statute makes no exceptions,
and that every cooperative electric association, as well as every
other supplier of electricity, is a public utility and therefore
subject to PUC jurisdiction. 40 Thus, the certification procedures applicable to privately-owned solar facilities discussed
above would equally be applicable to federally-owned solar
utilities.
The tenth amendment is another potential limitation on
the ability of federally-owned solar utilities to compete with
existing utilities on a retail basis. Under the tenth amendment "[tihe powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people. '2 In Fry v. United
States, the Supreme Court recognized that under this amendment Congress may not exercise power in a manner that im22
pairs a state's integrity or its ability to function effectively.
In National League of Cities v. Usery, another tenth amendment case, the Supreme Court recognized that the states have
attributes of sovereignty which may not be impaired by Congress..2 3 The Court in Usery held that Congress may not exercise the commerce power so as to limit state decisions regarding
the conduct of integral governmental functions.2 4 After Fry
and Usery it could be argued that a congressionally authorized
solar utility so interferes with the states' regulation of public
utilities, an integral governmental function traditionally of a
239. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 40-1-103(2).
240. Western Colo. Power Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 159 Colo. 262, 280, 411 P.2d
785, 794-95, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 385 U.S. 22, rehearing denied,
3 5 U.S. 984 (1966).
241. U.S. CONST., amend. X.
242. 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975).
243. 426 U.S. 833, 842, 845 (1976).
244. Id. at 855.

REGULATED UTILITIES AND THE SUN

local nature, that a tenth amendment violation has occurred."2 '
D. Regulated Competition as an Alternative to the Regulated
Monopoly Structure
Competition among regulated solar and nonsolar utilities
is an alternative to the regulated monopoly energy supply market structure. The regulated competition model is currently in
effect in Colorado for transportation utilities as a result of a
1967 amendment to the applicable Colorado certification statute. This law might serve as an example for states that wish
to allow the consumer to choose between solar and fossil fuelgenerated power. Because of this amendment a certificate of
public convenience and necessity to operate a motor vehicle for
hire for the transportation of property no longer constitutes an
exclusive grant or monopoly. Instead, the PUC is authorized to
grant more than one certificate for the transportation of property when it finds that public convenience and necessity require the competing service.
In Miller Bros., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, the Colorado
Supreme Court held that the 1967 amendment eliminated the
requirement that existing service must be shown to be inadequate before a competing carrier may be certified. 27 After
Miller Bros. the new controlling factor is the "public interest."
The Court validated the statute despite the lack of definition
of "regulated competition," and despite the fact that no standards were included under which the PUC might issue additional certificates.2 " This and other cases establish guidelines
that may be used by the PUC in determining whether to issue
a certificate to a common carrier wishing to compete with a
245. But see Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), where state
regulation by the PUC of a privately-owned utility was not considered to be an attribute of state sovereignty.
246. See COLO. Rxv. STAT. § 40-10-105 (1973) which provides in part that:
The granting of any certificate of public convenience and necessity
to operate a motor vehicle for hire for the transportation of property shall
not be deemed to be an exclusive grant or monopoly, and the doctrine of
regulated competition shall prevail. The Commission has authority to
grant more than one certificate of public convenience and necessity to
operate motor vehicles for the transportation of property over the same
route or a part thereof or within the same territory or a part thereof if the
commission finds that the present or future public convenience and necessity requires or will require such operation.
247. 185 Colo. 414, 431-32, 525 P.2d 443, 451-52 (1974).
248. Id. at 430-31, 525 P.2d at 451.
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certified carrier. These guidelines include determinations of
whether (1) there is a public need for the service," 9 (2) the
economic feasibility of existing certified carriers would be

lost, 2 0 (3) there is a need for competition in providing the service, 25 ' (4) the new carrier is willing and able to provide the
service, 252 (5) the competitor's service is unique in any way253

and (6) the competitor's service is better in any way than existing service.5'
Guidelines similar to these could be applied in the event
that existing electric public utilities are required to operate
with solar utilities under a regulated competition model. An
extension of the regulated competition model could promote
the development of solar energy both by existing utilities and
by privately-owned companies desiring to establish solar electric utilities. And under this model a solar utility could compete with an existing utility in providing electric service, but
the PUC could still, through continuing vigilance, assure that
wasteful duplication of facilities and excessive rates do not
occur.
IV.

CONCLUSION

As solar technologies become more workable and marketable, the likelihood of utility involvement in the development of
solar power increases. Such involvement is suspect for many
reasons, the most important of which is the regulated monopoly status of most public utilities. Should such existing public
utilities play a large role in the marketing of SHAC devices,
and should the utility's certificate of convenience and public
necessity foreclose competition by solar utilities, existing utilities will be able to determine the rate, the quality, and the
success of the commercialization of solar technologies. It is
important for law and policy makers to consider the implications of this degree of utility control over the new but growing
solar market. Alternatives to utility involvement in the solar
energy field should be explored, and strategies that limit or at
249. Wells Fargo Armored Service Corp. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 545 P.2d 707, 709

(1976).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 709-10.
252. Id. at 710.
253. See Miller Bros., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 185 Colo. 414, 435, 525 P.2d 443,
453 (1974).
254. Id.
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least regulate utility decisions regarding solar technologies
should be understood. Utilities may be one means of accelerating the speed with which solar energy is accepted by the public.
Nevertheless, the consequences of and alternatives to using
utilities in this manner should be fully examined before utilities assume such a critical role in the solar commercialization
effort.

Electric Utility Regulation: New Directions in
Environmental and Energy Law
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KUBICHEK**

INTRODUCTION

The electric utility industry, since it is generally comprised of systems which have a governmentally approved monopoly with respect to their own service areas, has been traditionally accustomed to a certain amount of state and federal
regulation. Historically, this regulation has been primarily exercised by the state public utility commissions,' and, on the
Federal level, by the Federal Power Commission' and the Securities and Exchange Commission.' The scope of prior federal
regulation has been largely confined to financial matters, either
with respect to methods of raising capital, utility company
formation or wholesale pricing.'
* Special Assistant to the Director, Oregon Department of Energy, Member of the
Bars of the District of Columbia and the State of Washington, J.D. New York University 1972, B.A. Gonzaga University 1969.
** Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Nebraska, Member of the
Bar of the State of Nebraska, J.D. Creighton University 1977, B.A. Colorado State
University, 1974.
The opinions and views contained in this article are those of the authors alone,
and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of their respective agencies.
1. For a useful summary of state activity in the field of utility regulation, see THE
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE STATES AND ELECTRIC UTILITY REGULATION (February 1977) (Lexington, Kentucky 40511).
2. The Federal Power Commission exercised broad jurisdiction over wholesale
rates and interstate transactions of electric utilities under the authority of the Federal
Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-793, 795-818, 820-825 (1976). In addition, the Commission imposed reporting and accounting requirements for interstate companies, established system reliability standards, and directed the interconnection of electric utility
systems. The Federal Power Commission was merged into the U.S. Department of
Energy on October 1, 1977, and the functions previously exercised by the Commission
are now exercised within the U.S. Department of Energy by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. See Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91,
91 Stat. 565 (1977).
3. Under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1935),
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission sets requirements and limitations on
the ability of electric utility systems to utilize the holding company mechanism to
consolidate their systems. This statute was the result of an investigation by the Federal
Trade Commission in 1928 of the power and influence of large holding companieS. By
1929 seven holding companies controlled 82% of the nation's total generation of electricity. See THE STATES AND ELECTRIC UTILrY REGULATION, supra note 1, at 4.
4. One significant area of prior federal regulation in non-financial areas involved
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However, since the late 1960's there has been a quantum
jump in the amount of federal regulation that the electric utility industry has encountered. The increased activity of the
federal government has resulted from a convergence of different events, largely unrelated to each other except in the timing
of their occurrence and in the additional regulatory requirements imposed upon the utility industry.
Specifically, this article will focus on two major sources of
new federal regulation. The first is the energy crisis, the seeds
of which were planted in the late 1960's as the nation became
more and more dependent on foreign sources for oil and petroleum products. The energy crisis became a national concern
with the advent of the Arab Oil Embargo in 1974 and brought
with it the formation first of the Federal Energy Administration' and subsequently the U. S. Department of Energy. The
second event is the passage of the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 as well as corollary legislation7 entrusted to
the Environmental Protection Agency. As a result of these
events and decisions, two new federal agencies, in the course
of properly implementing their respective statutory charters,
have become involved in regulatory activities that were traditionally within the discretion of the electric utility or were the
subject of state regulation.
This article will provide a description of the impact these
two developments have had on the regulation of the electric
utility industry, as well as some observations by the authors on
how future federal regulation can best be harmonized with the
competing demands of state regulation and the private sector.
II.

ELECTRIC UTILITY REGULATION:

THE ENERGY

CRISIS

RESPONSE

Prior to the early 1970's, the federal regulation of the enapproval by the Army Corps of Engineers for dredging of rivers and harbors related to
the construction of a power station or related facility.
5. The Federal Energy Administration was established by the Federal Administration Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-275, 88 Stat. 97 (1974), and was subsequently
incorporated into the Department of Energy, Pub. L. No. 95-91, supra note 2.
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976).
7. The most significant legislation that the Environmental Protection Agency
implements includes the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,
33 U.S.C. 1251-1376 (1976); the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. 1977);
the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-10 (1976); and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976).
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ergy industry generally and the electric utility industry was
highly fragmented among a variety of agencies with equally
varied purposes. Federal regulation tended to exist on an ad
hoc basis with Congress responding to a particular problem
with a particular piece of legislation which impacted the electric utility industry in different ways. There were times when
congressional goals were harmonious with prior legislation as
well as instances where policies conflicted with past practices.
Some of these conflicts were resolved legislatively but some
were simply ignored or allowed to fester.'
While the Federal Power Commission and the Securities
and Exchange Commission were the primary federal regulators
in the energy field, they were by no means the only ones. In
1973 more than 40 federal agencies, bureaus, and commissions
had some role in energy regulation. 0 These agencies exercised
either direct jurisdiction over electric utilities or affected them
indirectly by regulating the supply, availability, and price of
fuel used to generate electricity. Beginning in 1973, Congress
passed a series of bills relating to energy supply, pricing, allocation, and conservation which profoundly altered the federal
role in energy and utility planning. One may have to go back
to the New Deal to find a parallel degree of legislative activity
in the economic regulatory sphere. The most significant pieces
of legislation were the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of
1973," the Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974,12 the
8. A recent example of conflicting energy policies is that relating to the use of oil
or coal in electric generating stations. During the period 1969-1973 the Environmental
Protection Agency issued standards under the Clean Air Act which resulted in the
conversion from coal to oil and natural gas for environmental reasons. See, 40 C.F.R.
§§ 15, 60.40 (1977). However, the Federal Energy Administration encouraged the use
of coal rather than oil or natural gas because of energy supply considerations, and
issued regulations under the Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of
1974, which require all new fossil plants to be capable of burning coal. See, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 791-798 (1976); 10 C.F.R. § 307.3 (1977).
9. For a useful description of the status of federal regulation of the electric utility
at the time Congress was beginning to enact comprehensive energy statutes in 197374, see Hunton, Williams, Gay & Gibson, The Development and Structure of the
Electric Utility Industry and the Impact of Government Policies, (August 15, 1973)
(Richmond, Virginia, National Economic Research Associates, Inc., reprinted in
SENATE COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, ELECTRIC UTILITY POLICY ISSUES

(Comm. Print 1974)).
10. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATION STUDY TEAM, FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATION: AN
ORGANIZATIONAL STUDY, at 9 (1974).
11. Pub. L. No. 93-159, 87 Stat. 627 (1973).
12. Pub. L. No. 93-275, 88 Stat. 96 (1974).
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Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974,13
the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975,' 4 the Energy
Conservation and Production Act, 5 and the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1975.6
Under these statutes authority was provided to the Federal
Energy Administration as well as to other existing federal agencies (particularly the Energy Research and Development Administration) with the ability to make decisions on supply,
allocation, and use of fuels which the federal government had
not previously made except in emergency situations. While the
Emergency Petroleum Act of 1973, the Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974, and the Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974 were initially reactions to an emergency situation created by the oil shortage of 1973-74, subsequent congressional legislative action, as well as the President's
National Energy Plan'7 indicate that, at least for the foreseeable future, the federal role in energy and electric utility regulation will be an expanding one.
As a result of the flurry of legislative activity which occurred in the 1973-1976 period, federal agencies have issued
comprehensive regulations on the allocation procedures for oil
imports, have required extensive reporting requirements, and
have the authority to establish a mandatory allocation and
13. Pub. L. No. 93-319, 88 Stat. 246 (1974).
14. Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (1975).
15. Pub. L. No. 94-385, 90 Stat. 1125 (1976).
16. Pub. L. No. 94-99, 89 Stat. 481 (1975).
17. The National Energy Act was passed by Congress on October 15, 1978 and
signed by President Carter on November 9, 1978. The Act is actually composed of five
separate bills: (1) The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 - H.R. 5289; (2) The Energy
Tax Act - H.R. 5263; (3) Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 - H.R.
5146; (4) Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act of 1977 - H.R. 4018; and (5) National
Energy Conservation Policy Act - H.R. 5037, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). These bills
vary in significant provisions from the original National Energy Act offered to Congress
by President Carter in April 1977. See S. 1469, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) - The
National Energy Act. See also The National Energy Plan, Executive Office of the
President, Energy Policy and Planning, Washington, D.C. (April 29, 1977). For example, the President's proposal included a series of substantial taxes on petroleum which
Congress did not enact and his natural gas pricing scheme differed significantly from
the Congressional formula which results in the decontrol of new natural gas by 1985.
Whereas the National Energy Act was originally estimated to result in savings of 4.5
to 6 million barrels of oil per day, the enacted legislation is expected to save only 2.5
million barrels per day. For a useful description of the major provisions of the Act, see
OFFICE OF PuBLIc AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, THE NATIONAL ENERGY ACT.
REFERENCE INFORMATION FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, 20585 (November, 1978).
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pricing system of petroleum and petroleum products. Similarly, a wide range of energy conservation goals have been established, both with respect to direct energy output and end
use totals, through a combination of voluntary and mandatory
measures. While these statutes have affected all segments of
the energy industry, the electric utility industry has received
special attention both as a supplier of electric power and as a
consumer of other energy sources to generate that power.
One of the most direct impacts on the electric utilities has
been the question of federal price regulation to intentionally
reduce demand and conserve energy. In particular, the traditional use of the declining block rate structure, where users of
large quantities of electricity pay less per unit than users of
lesser amounts, has been questioned as providing an incentive
to overuse electrical energy.
The use of rate structures to affect demand is the subject
of intensive study both within the industry itself and by governmental and private groups as well. 18 The Energy Conservation and Production Act authorized the Federal Energy Administration to develop and fund proposals to improve electric
utility rate design for the purpose of conserving energy. t The
Federal Energy Administration could intervene in state rate
proceedings at the request of the state or of other participants
in the state proceedings to present its views on the effect of the
proposed rate schedule on national energy conservation goals.2
The National Energy Plan would take this program one
step further. As originally proposed, the bill would allow the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to require state public
utility commissions to follow federal conservation guidelines
and standards in making rate decisions. In particular, the bill
would have required the state public utility commissions to
observe a series of provisions involving utility rate structures
2
and rate practices intended to depress peak electric demand .
18. See, e.g., ELECTRIC UTILITY RATE DESIGN STny, RATE DESIGN AND LOAD CONISSUES AND DIRECTIONS, (Nov. 1977) (Palo Alto, California 94032); NoRTHwEsT
ENERGY POLICY PROJECT, ENERGY FUTURES NORTHWEST (May, 1978) (1096 Lloyd Building, 700 N.E. Multnomah Street, Portland, Oregon, 97232).
19. Compare S. 1469, Part E, Public Utility Regulatory Policies, §§ 511-517 with
H.R. 4018, Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, Title I, Retail Regulatory Policies
for Electric Utilities §§ 111-117, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
20. Id. § 204.
21. See The National Energy Act, at J, 91-417-1, Part E, Public Utility Regulatory
Policies (Comm. Print 1977).
TROL
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Because of diverse objections from a number of sources,
the Senate amended the measure to require the state public
utility commission merely to consider these criteria in its ratemaking decisions. The U.S. Department of Energy would be
able to intervene on its own motion in state proceedings in
support of these criteria. The requirement that such intervention could only occur at the request of the state or other participants in the state proceeding is eliminated. Even with the
amended provisions of the National Energy Plan, electric utility retail rates will be under closer scrutiny at the federal level.
The establishment of the Department of Energy attempts
for the first time in a meaningful way to consolidate and coordinate the federal regulatory effort. The Department of Energy
was activated on October 1, 1977 and became the first cabinet
agency to be formed since the Department of Transportation
was formed in 19 66 .2 The importance which the Carter Administration placed upon the. need for a coherent energy policy was
reflected in making the Department of Energy only the twelfth
cabinet position in the nation's history. Similarly, Congress
underscored the importance and responsibility the Department
of Energy signified in its declaration of findings in the Department of Energy Organization Act. 3
The Department of Energy is entrusted with a staggeringly
wide array of goals and purposes relating to an effective energy
policy.u These include implementation of a coordinated national energy policy, creation and implementation of a comprehensive energy conservation strategy, major emphasis on the
development of solar, geothermal, and other renewable resources, and to assure an adequate and reliable supply of energy at the lowest reasonable cost.
The diversity of the Department's functions is a reflection
of the number of agencies and agency functions the Department has assimilated. The Department has replaced in their
entirety the Energy Research and Development Administration, the Federal Energy Administration, and the Federal
Power Commission. The Department's Federal Energy Regulatory Commission will perform the traditional regulatory func22. Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, § 101, 91 Stat.
565 (1977).
23. Id. § 101.
24. Id. § 102.
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tions of the Federal Power Commission,5 and the Economic
Regulatory Administration wtll assume many functions of the
Federal Energy Administration." The functions of the Energy
Research and Development Administration are largely assumed by various sections of the Office of the Secretary." In
addition, the various power marketing agencies and the Bureau of Reclamation, which previously reported to the Secretary of the Interior will now report to the Department of Energy.2 The Department of Energy also assumes certain energy
functions previously exercised by six other agencies and cabinet departments. 30
The establishment of the Department of Energy, regardless of the final success of its mission, signifies that the emergency energy legislation passed in 1973-1976 period will be with
us for the foreseeable future. This means that the electric utility industry will continue to experience federal regulation in
areas it has not previously experienced. Moreover, with the
passage of the National Energy Act, it is clear that federal
regulation will expand even further.
III.

ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION

Prior to the passage in 1969 of the National Environmental
Policy Act, 31 the federal government's role in the environmental
regulation of electric utilities was a limited one. Only the Federal Power Commission (FPC), pursuant to its authority under
the Federal Power Act,32 had a direct charge to take environmental values into account in the context of its licensing activities.3
25. Id. §§ 301(a), 204, 401-407.
26. Id. §§ 301(a), 101.
27. Id.
28. Id. § 302(a)(1). These agencies include the Southeastern Power Administration, the Southwestern Power Administration, the Alaska Power Administration, and
the Bonneville Power Administration.
29. Id.
30. Id. §§ 301-310. The organizations affected include the Departments of the
Interior, Housing and Urban Development, Transportation, Navy, Commerce, and the
Interstate Commerce Commission.
31. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4327 (1970).
32. 16 U.S.C. § 792 (1970).
33. 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1970). See also Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428 (1967); Hudson
v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428 (1967); Hudson River Fisherman's Ass'n v. FPC, 498 F.2d
827 (2d Cir. 1974); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
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Section 10(a) of the Act provides that before a particular
power project is licensed, the Commission must be satisfied
that it "will be best adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or developing a waterway or waterways for the use or
benefit of interstate or foreign commerce, for the improvement
and utilization of water-power development, and for other beneficial public uses, including recreationalpurposes . . .' .",
This charge has been viewed as requiring the Commission
to actively explore the impacts of a proposed project on the
conservation of natural resources,3 the maintenance of natural
beauty,36 the preservation of fish and wildlife resources, 37 and
the preservation of historic sites.38 In addition, the Commission
was required to forcefully consider all reasonable and available
alternatives to a project, 39 including the alternative of denying
a license in order to protect especially important environmental values. 0 However, while the FPC thus had fairly expansive
environmental authority under the terms of the Federal Power
Act, the Commission was jurisdictionally limited to regulating
only hydroelectric facilities;" generating facilities relying on
fossil fuels or nuclear fission were by and large completely ex34. 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
35. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 614 (2d Cir.
1965); Hudson River Fisherman's Ass'n v. FPC, 498 F.2d 827, 833 (2d Cir. 1974).
36. See Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428 (1967); Hudson River Fisherman's Ass'n v.
FPC, 498 F.2d 827 (2d Cir. 1974); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354
F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965); Namekagon Hydro Co. v. FPC, 216 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1954).
37. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 614 (2d Cir.
1965).
38. Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428, 437-451 (1967); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 617-624 (2d Cir. 1965). See also Michigan Consolidated
Gas Co. v. FPC, 283 F.2d 204 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 913 (1960); City of
Pittsburgh v. FPC, 237 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
39. In Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428, 437 (1967), Justice Douglas noted that:
The objective of protecting "recreational purposes" means more than the
reservoir created by the dam will be the best one possible or practical
from a recreational viewpoint. . . .The importance of salmon and steelhead in our outdoor life as well as in commerce is so great that there
certainly comes a time when their destruction might necessitate a halt
in so-called "improvement" or "development" of waterways.
40. Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. FPC, 420 U.S. 395 (1975).
41. The Supreme Court expressly held that thermal electric (or steam electric)
power facilities were not projects within the licensing (and thus environmental) jurisdiction of the FPC. Id. at 412. Similarly, with respect to nuclear power facilities, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the Atomic Energy Commission
correctly refused to consider the environmental impacts of thermal pollution to result
from operation of a proposed nuclear plant. The Court agreed with the Commission
that its regulatory jurisdiction was "confined to scrutiny of and protection against
hazards from radiation." New Hampshire v. AEC, 406 F.2d 170, 175 (1st Cir. 1969).
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cluded from any comprehensive federal environmental oversight."2
In the remainder of this section, the authors describe how
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, and the Clean Air Act
Amendments have contributed to the present scheme of federal
regulation of electric utilities.
A. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
The major piece of legislation inaugurating what has been
called the "decade of the environment" was the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). Against a history of at
best spotty federal environmental regulation, NEPA was perceived as a sort of Sherman Act of environmental law, 3 a
"seminal enactment that introduces the federal courts to environmental questions comprehensively for the first time, ...
[and] injects new discipline and values into administrative
decisionmaking." 4
The Act's opening provisions enunciate broad policy requirements calling for the "harmonious co-existence of man
and his environment."" In order to insure that these policies
are fully respected and accounted for in agency decisionmaking, the Act incorporates a strict regimen of procedural steps
that must be fulfilled prior to the initiation of any environmentally significant federal action.
Section 102(2)(C)I" serves as the primary action-forcing
tool in this scheme, and requires, prior to the taking of any
environmentally significant federal action, that the responsible
official prepare a detailed statement "covering the impact of
particular actions on the environment, the environmental costs
which might be avoided, and alternative measures [including,
but not limited to, doing nothing] which might alter the costbenefit equation."'" In addition, prior to its publication in final
form, an impact statement must be circulated for comment to
42. Ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121 (1899).
43. W. RoDGRs, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAw (1977).
44. Id. at 697.
45. Macbeth, The National Environmental Policy Act After Five Years, 2 COLUM.
J. ENVT'L L. 1, 2 (1975).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976).
47. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
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any other agency which has either jurisdiction by law or special
expertise with respect to any of the environmental issues involved." Upon receiving comments from participating agencies, the responsible official should include those comments,
along with "his" responses, in the final environmental impact
statement (E.I.S.) prior to his making a final decision on a
project."
Unlike the broad policy prescriptions of section 101 of
NEPA, these procedural requirements leave little room for
agency exercise of discretion, and must be complied with, to
the fullest extent possible, unless there exists a clear conflict
of statutory authority. 0 Agencies are thus held accountable to
the procedural requirements of the Act, and judicial review of
agency compliance has been consistently rigorous."
Nor are agencies immune to substantive review by the
courts under NEPA. Though continually wary of substituting
judicial decisionmaking for that of an agency, the courts have,
nevertheless, made it clear that NEPA requires a systematic
and finely tuned balancing analysis,52 and that they will not
hesitate to reverse an agency decision where, according to the
standards set by sections 101(b) and 102(1), "the actual balance of costs and benefits as struck was arbitrary or clearly
5' 3
gave insufficient weight to environmental values.
The requirements of NEPA have affected the electric utility industry in a persuasive manner. Whereas before only the
construction of a hydroelectric facility triggered any kind of
searching environmental decisionmaking, 5 ' the advent of
NEPA brought within federal environmental regulation nuclear power facilities,55 natural gas pipeline, 5 and potentially
48. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976). See also Council on Environmental Quality
guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 1500 (1977).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976). See Comm. for Nuclear Responsibility v.
Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1971); W. RoDGoms, supra note 43, at 730.
50. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
51. See W. RoDGERs, supra note 43, at 725-738.
52. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1113 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
53. Id. at 1115. See also Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers,
479 F.2d 289, 300 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1972).
54. See text accompanying notes 33-34 supra.
55. 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.1-.56 (1977).
56. 18 C.F.R. §§ 2.80, 2.82 (1977).
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at least, some fossil fueled steam electric plants. 57 Similarly,
whereas only the FPC had significant environmental authority
with respect to the utility industry prior to NEPA, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission,5 8 the Army Corps of Engineers, 5 and
the Environmental Protection Agency 0 presently exercise, to a
greater or lesser extent, NEPA responsibility in this area. Indeed, in the course of licensing a commercial steam electric
power plant, a utility would probably have to acquire permits
from two, or even three, of these agecies, each having independent and significant NEPA duties.
As an example, in order to construct and put into operation a large commercial nuclear power facility, a utility would
have to run the following regulatory maze:
(1) In order to obtain the necessary construction permit from
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the utility must
submit a detailed environmental report, which serves as a basis
for the NRC staff's draft and final environmental statements" on
the project. The latter of these must eventually pass muster
under NEPA, as determined by a panel of the Atomic Safety and
2
Licensing Board after a hearing.
(2) Since the proposed reactor would be considered a new
source under the terms of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972, section 306, the Environmental Protection Agency's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permit and approval of the facility intake and discharge structures would constitute a major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment; thus trig3
gering EPA's NEPA duties;
(3) In addition, assuming that the facility design called for either the impoundment of a navigable stream (to construct a cooling lake) or the construction of intake and discharge structures
57. Under 33 U.S.C.A. 1371(c)(1) (Supp. 1977) issuance of a new source NPDES
permit by the Administrator to a utility proposing the construction of a fossil-fired
steam electric generating station could be a major federal action significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment for purposes of NEPA. Similarly, issuance by
the Secretary of the Army of a dredge and fill permit, pursuant to 33 U.S.C.A. § 1344
(Supp. 1977) could constitute an action requiring the Corps of Engineers to prepare
an environmental impact statement. See, e.g., Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc.
v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1975). But see Rucker v. Willis, 358 F. Supp. 425
(E.D.N.C.). aff'd 484 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1973).
58. 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.1-.56 (1977).

59. See note 57 supra.
60. See note 57 supra.
61. 10 C.F.R. § 51.20 (1977).
62. 10 C.F.R. § 51.52 (1977).

63. See note 57 supra.
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in a navigable water, the Corps of Engineers could have NEPA
obligations in the context of granting a permit under either section 10 of the Rivers and Harbor Act or section 404 of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972."

While it may be argued that, in situations such as hypothetically suggested, each agency should comply with the requirements of NEPA independently 5 (a solution which, in contested licensing proceedings at least, could result in virtually
interminable protractions), the present clear preference has
been to utilize a "lead agency approach"."6 Under this sytem,
the principal sponsoring agency - the NRC in this case assumes the major supervisory responsibility for preparation of
the statbment.6 7 Those agencies more peripherally involved such as EPA or the Corps of Engineers here - participate
through consultation on those matters implicating each
agency's particular area of expertise. 8 The result of the process,
ideally, is one comprehensive environmental impact statement
legally sufficient to meet the NEPA obligations of each of those
federal agencies involved.19
An example of this kind of interagency cooperation can be
found in the memorandum of understanding currently in force
between EPA and NRC10 In keeping with the above-stated
ideals, the purpose of this joint agreement is to facilitate a more
streamlined, less duplicative, and more rational licensing process for utilities seeking authorization to construct nuclear generating facilities."
64. Id. See also Sierra Club v. Morton, 400 F. Supp. 610 (1975), as to how 33
U.S.C. § 403 (1976) relates to NEPA.
65. See W. RoDGERs, supra note 43 at 784. See also Anderson, The National
EnvironmentalPolicy Act, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 238, 374-375 (E.L. Dolgin and

G.P. Guilbert, eds. 1974).
66. W. RODGES, supra note 43 at 784.
67. See Council on Environmental Quality Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 1500.7(b)
(1977).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 40 Fed. Reg. 60,115 (1975). The NRC has executed a similar agreement with
the Army Corps of Engineers. See 40 Fed. Reg. 37,110 (1975).
71. An example of what can happen when interagency cooperation is not fully
realized may be found in the NRC proceedings on the proposed Seabrook nuclear
generating station. See, e.g., Public Service Company of New Hampshire, (Seabrook
Station, Units 1 and 2), Slip Op. at 4-6a (January 6, 1978). In Seabrook, the utility
involved received a construction permit in June of 1976, Seabrook, LBP-76-26, 3 NRC
857. At that time, a Regional Administrator of EPA had tentatively approved the oncethrough cooling system proposed for the facility. Because of NRC's "immediate effec-
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Under the terms of the "Memorandum," upon receiving
an application for a permit to construct a nuclear facility, NRC
assumes the lead agency role in supervising the drafting of the
required environmental statement. However, because EPA also
has NEPA responsibilities in issuing new source NPDES permits, EPA works closely with NRC from the outset to identify
and consolidate the environmental information required for an
early evaluation of water quality issues. In the course of actually preparing the draft statement, EPA is to prepare, or
extensively participate in the preparation of, the water quality
sections of the statement.
Once the draft statement is completed, it is circulated for
comment. During the comment period, EPA offers its comtiveness" rule, see 10 C.F.R. § 2.764 (1977), and in the absence of any intervenor
obtaining a stay of the construction permit, the utility was privileged to begin construction at the Seabrook site. See Seabrook, ALAB-471, Slip Op. at 3-6 (April 28,
1978).
Subsequently, the Regional Administrator withdrew his earlier tentative approval
of the Seabrook cooling system, and the NRC subsequently suspended the utilities'
construction permit, Id. See also Seabrook, ALAB-366, 5 NRC 39 (1977). This last
decision, by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board, was approved by the
Commission, the result being an order to the NRC Staff to conduct an alternative site
inquiry comparing the Seabrook site - with cooling towers - to several alternative
sites in New Hampshire and Maine - assuming cooling towers and also comparing
the Seabrook site without cooling towers to several southern New England sites. See
Seabrook, CLI-77-8, 5 NRC 503 (March 31, 1977).
On June 17, 1977, the National Administrator reversed the Regional Administrator's withdrawal of approval of the Seabrook cooling system. Following that decision,
and a decision by a panel of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that Seabrook
was indeed the best site for construction of Seabrook with once through cooling,
Seabrook, LBP-77-43, 6 NRC 134 (July 7, 1977), the Seabrook Construction Permits
were reinstated, Seabrook, ALAB-423, 6 NRC 115. This was appealed by intervenors
to the Commission, and affirmed, CLI-78-1, 7 NRC (January 6, 1978).
Then, on February 15, 1978, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit overturned the National Administrator's decision as to the acceptability of once-through
cooling at Seabrook, and remanded it to him for further consideration, Seacoast AntiPollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872 (1978). In response to this decision and to the
appeals of intervenors, the Commission once again, on June 30, 1978, ordered construction halted. Sea Seabrook, Memorandum and Order of the Commission, Slip Op.
8-13 (June 30, 1978). Moreover, the NRC proceedings have been remanded once
again, for additional alternate site inquiry comparing Seabrook, with cooling towers,
to other alternative sites.
Thus, at least partly as a result of lack of coordination between the NRC and EPA,
Public Service Co. of New Hampshire has completed nearly 20% of the proposed 2
billion dollar power plant, and yet EPA has yet to finally conclude its proceedings.
Moreover, should EPA decide that Seabrook may not use open cycle cooling, there
remains substantial doubt with respect to whether the Seabrook site will finally pass
muster at all. Seabrook, ALAB-471, Slip Op. 80-88 (April 28, 1978) (Dissenting
Opinion of Mr. Farrar).
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ments on the statements pursuant to the authority under section 309 of the Clean Air Act 7 and section 1500(7)(b) of the
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) guidelines. 73 Addi-

tionally, following the close of the comment period, EPA is to
participate with NRC in reviewing and responding to those
comments received. To the extent that there are areas of disagreement between the two agencies that cannot be resolved,
the Memorandum requires that these be fully set forth in the
final environmental statement. Moreover, if EPA's disagreements persist after the issuance of the final statement, EPA
has the right to intervene in the NRC hearing on the application, pursuant 7to section 2.714 of the NRC Rules of Practice
and Procedure.

It should also be noted that NRC and EPA each retains
fully its own independent statutory decisionmaking responsibility. Thus, the NRC retains the right to make a final environmental cost-benefit decision with respect to the environmental
impact of the facility as a whole; and, the NRC will not consider alternative cooling systems for a plant once EPA has
made a final decision under the provisions of section 402 of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972
(FWPCA) .7
Finally, and potentially of greatest significance, EPA and
NRC have committed to cooperating in every way possible to
facilitate the completion of EPA's sections 402, 316(a), and
316(b) determinations prior to the issuance of the final environmental statement.
Early and final resolution of issues relating to the kind of
cooling system required for a facility at a specific site, especially if completed prior to the final completion of the NRC
licensing review, would go far toward insuring that the philosophies underlying NEPA and the FWPCA are actualized in the
context of environmentally significant administrative decisionmaking. And, potentially of even greater significance for utilities, agreements such as the "Memorandum" executed between EPA and NRC, if carefully and comprehensively given
effect, can go far to avoid the "paradigm of fragmented and
72.
73.
74.
75.

42
40
10
40

U.S.C.A. § 7609 (Supp. 1977).
C.F.R. § 1500.7(b) (1977).
C.F.R. § 2.714 (1977).
Fed. Reg. at 60119 app. A. (1976).
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uncoordinated government decisionmaking . . ."' that has,
for example, characterized the licensing history of the
Seabrook proceedings currently before the NRC.
B. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972
The second major piece of environmental legislation to
play a significant role in the regulation of electric utilities was
enacted in 1972. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 197271 adopted as their raison de etre the total
elimination of discharges of pollutants to the nation's navigable waterways by 1985.78 To achieve this end, the Act contemplates a regulatory structure based upon effluent limitations on
discharges from industrial point sources;7" the Act retains the
use of ambient water quality criteria primarily as a measure of
program effectiveness and industrial performance."'
Section 301 of the FWPCA specifies that discharges of
pollutants into the waters of the United States is unlawful,
unless a permit has been secured to do so under the provisions
of the Act.8 In addition, section 301(b) requires that existing
76. See note 71 supra. The authors would note here that, while lack of coordination between NRC and EPA made a significant contribution to the regulatory nightmare that has resulted in the Seabrook proceeding, that factor does not stand alone.
Equally significant, in the authors' view, is the Commission's continued reliance on
its rule giving immediate effect to construction permits for nuclear facilities, coupled
with a very strict "stay" rule, see 10 C.F.R. § 2.788(a) (1978), which together "often
operate to assure that Commission-level review [of a licensing decision under NEPA
will not take place until such time as construction [of a power plant] is well underway." Seabrook, CLI-78-1, 7 NRC -, Slip Op. 6 (January 6, 1978).
Until this process is streamlined, and modified to a considerable degree, the words
of the First Circuit Court of Appeals will, regrettably, continue to ring true:
We are unable to identify any other field of publicly regulated private
activity where momentous decisions to commit funds are made on the
strength of preliminary decisions by several agencies which are open to
re-evaluation and re-determination. The risk of loss to the private investors is necessarily always a real and always a present one. Perhaps more
important to the public, the risk of public agencies and courts accepting
less desirable and limited options or, worse, countenancing a fait accompli, are foreboding.
Seabrook, CLI-78-1, Slip Op. at 4 (January 6, 1978) (quoting from Audubon Society
v. United States, No. 76-1347 (Unpublished Order denying a stay of construction at
Seabrook) (1st Cir. Dec. 17, 1976)) (emphasis supplied).
77. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976), as amended by Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub.
L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566.
78. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1976).
79. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1976).
80. S. REP. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1971).
81. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1976).
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industrial sources, such as power plants, achieve by 1977 that
level of pollution reduction attainable through implementation
2
of the best practicable control technology currently available.
By 1983, classes and categories of point sources were required
to achieve a level of reduction attainable via application of the
best available control technology economically achievable
which will result in reasonable further progress toward the national goal of eliminating the discharge of all pollutants.13 Pursuant to section 304(b) of the FWPCA, the Administrator is
charged with the duty of establishing guidelines for effluent
limitations in order to flush out the above-noted standards."
For new sources, section 306 requires the Administrator to
publish national standards of performance reflecting the best
available demonstrated control technology including, when
practicable, application of that level of technology permitting
zero discharge. 5 New sources are thus presumed to be models
of pollution control, and the standards governing them are expected to reach further and require more in terms of "extending
the frontiers of technology," and to "accord less sympathy to
cost considerations" than do those governing existing sources."
The FWPCA accords individualized treatment to one variety of pollution that is especially significant for utilities. Under
section 502(b), heated discharges fall within the definition of
pollutant."7 Heated water is routinely discharged from the condenser cooling systems of steam electric power plants, and, if
returned directly to a river or lake, can have profound effects
on a habitat's aquatic ecology.88
82. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A) (1976).
83. The 1983 date no longer stands because of the Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub.
L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2) (1976) establishes 1984 as the
major compliance deadline. The Amendments result in a somewhat more finely tuned
set of compliance schedules, discriminating both among types of point sources (1983)
with respect to publicly owned treatment works complying with 33 U.S.C. §
1311(b)(2)(A) (1976), as amended by Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91
Stat. 1566, and among kinds of pollutants (note different standards for toxic pollutants
in subsection (2)(C) and (2)(D), for "conventional" pollutants in subsection (2)(E),
and for all "other" pollutants, in subsection (2)(F)).
84. 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (1976) as amended by Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No.
95-217, 91 Stat. 1566.
85. 33 U.S.C. § 1316 (1976).
86. W. RODGERS, supra note 43, at 468.
87. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(b) (1976), as amended by Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L.
No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566.
88. See, e.g., New Jersey Dept. of Environ. Protect. v. Jersey Central Power and
Light Co., 69 N.J. 102, 351 A.2d 337 (1976); W. RoGEs, supra note 43, at 525.
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In most respects, the FWPCA treats heated effluent no
differently from other kinds of discharges. For instance, the
technology based standards of sections 301 and 306 apply.
However, superimposed on those conventional requirements is
a special variance procedure specifically tailored to the peculiarities of thermal pollution. Section 316(a) 9 provides a mechanism whereby a utility may demonstrate to the satisfaction of
the Administrator that the effluent limits established for the
termal constituent of any discharge from a power plant are
"more stringent than necessary to assure the protection and
propagation of a balanced, indigenous population of shellfish,
fish, and wildlife in and on the body of water into which the
discharge is to be made ... ."90 The burden in such cases lies
with the permit applicant, and relates not to the costs of certain control technologies (such as off stream cooling systems),
but rather to the necessity for them.
Additionally, under section 316, EPA must approve the
"location, design, construction, and capacity of cooling water
intake structure[s]," and insure that they "reflect the best
technology available for minimizing adverse environmental
impact."'" Thus, both the technology for minimizing the impacts from heated water discharges and the methods of extracting condenser cooling water must satisfy the "best technology"

standard

92

These effluent limitations and standards of performance
are implemented through the granting of permits to discharge
under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
established by section 402.11 That provision authorizes the
Administrator, after opportunity for public hearing, to issue a
permit for the discharge of a pollutant, so long as the source
meets the "best technology"94 and related effluent limitations
established by the Administrator to sections 304 (existing
sources), 306 (new source standards), and 307 (toxic sub89. 33 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (1976).
90. Id.
91. 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (1976).
92. See generally W. RODGERS, supra note 43, at 531-34.
93. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976), as amended by Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No.
95-217, 91 Stat. 1566.
94. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a), (b) (1970), as amended by Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub.
L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 56

stances).95 Because steam electric power plants are point source
dischargers within the meaning of the FWPCA,9" an electric
utility is required to secure a section 402 permit prior to the
construction and/or operation of a steam electric power plant.
In addition, utilities are required under section 401 to secure, prior to receiving a federal license or permit to conduct
activities potentially resulting in water discharges, a certification from the state where the activity is conducted that the
discharge will comply with all applicable state and federal
water quality limits. 7 Section 401 thus confers a veto power on
states with water quality related concerns about the licensing
activities of federal agencies such as EPA, the NRC, the FPC,
and the Army Corps of Engineers. A denial of a certification
could totally call a halt to a proposed power plant, and where
a certification contains special limits or conditions, those limits
or conditions must be written into the federal license or per9
mit. 8
Finally, of significance under the FWPCA is section 404,
dealing with the discharge of dredge and fill materials into the
navigable waters. This section erects a separate permit system
for these discharges to be administered by the Army Corps of
Engineers. 9 That section 404 also has significance for electric
utilities can be discerned immediately from the definitions of
a discharge of dredge or fill material. For example, "dredged"
95. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976), as amended by Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No.
95-217, 91 Stat. 1566. See also, E.I. dePont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112
(1977).
96. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(A) (1976). Of significance with respect to this
section is the provision allowing, under certain specified conditions, the assumption
of the NPDES Permit System by the States. See also note 99 infra with respect to new
provisions under section 404, and note 103 infra with respect to the author's opinion
as to the efficacy of this scheme of regulation.
97. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (1976). See Power Auth. of the State of N.Y. v. Dept. of
Environ. Conser. of N.Y., 327 F. Supp. 243 (N.D.N.Y. 1974) and de Rham v. Diamond,
32 N.Y. 2d 34, 295 N.E. 2d 763, 343 N.Y.S. 2d 84 (1973).
98. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1976), as amended by Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No.
95-217, 91 Stat. 1566.
99. As a result of the recent 1977 Amendments, section 404 has been expanded
enormously. Most significant with respect to this article is that part providing for state
assumption of the Corps' permit authority. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(g) (1976), as amended
by Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566. However, the Amendments have as yet not dealt with the Corps of Engineers' responsibilities under 33
U.S.C. § 403 (1976). That provision remains unaffected by the FWPCA, and the 1977
Amendments. See 33 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (1976), as amended by Clean Water Act of 1977,
Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566.
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material is that which is excavated or dredged from navigable
waters;100 "fill" is "any pollutant used to create fill in the traditional sense of replacing an aquatic area with dry land or
changing the bottom elevation of a water body for any purpose";' 0 and, most significantly, a discharge of "fill" includes:
placement of fill that is necessary to the construction of any
structure in a navigable water; the building of any structure or
impoundment requiring rock, sand, dirt or other pollutants for its
construction; . . .dams and dikes; . . .[and] fill for structures
such as sewage treatment facilities, intake and outfall pipes associates power plants, and subaqueous utility lines .... ,02

Thus, to the extent that the design for a generating facility
contemplated the construction of a cooling lake, an intake or
outfall structure, a spillway, or a hydroelectric dam on a navigable waterway, as that term is defined by the FWPCA, the
responsible utility would be required to procure a section 404
permit. 13
Additionally, navigable waters is defined very broadly.
Section 502(7) defines them as, "the waters of the United
Sates, including the seas."'' 0 Accordingly, the Corps' jurisdic0
tion has been extended to include non-navigable streams,'1
0
°
non-navigable man-made mosquito canals, and coastal and
freshwater wetlands and swamps that are contiguous to traditional navigable water.' 7
100. See 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(4) (1977).
101. Id. § 209.120(d)(6).
102. Id. § 209.120(d)(7).

103. We refer here to acts that would, by and large, result in discharge of dredge
or fill into the navigable waters. However, it should be noted that whenever a party
does any act either altering a channel or in any way obstructing navigation, he falls
within the Corps of Engineers jurisdiction and would require a permit under the Rivers
and Harbors Act of 1899, Ch. 425, § 10, 30 Stat. 1121. Taken together, it would appear
virtually impossible for a utility to construct a large, conventional steam electric unit
without having to acquire a permit under one of these provisions.
It should also be noted that while section 10 differs somewhat in coverage from
section 404, the permit system administering it is identical to that for section 404
permits.
See generally Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 127
(2d Cir. 1974); W. RODGESS, supra note 43, at 399.
104. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7)-(8) (1976).
105. United States v. Ashland Oil and Transportation Co., 364 F. Supp. 349
(W.D. Ky. 1973), aff'd 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974).
106. United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
107. See 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(1)-(2). See generally United States v. GAF Corp.,
389 F. Supp. 1379 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
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In determining whether to grant a section 404 permit to
discharge, dredge, or fill, the Corps undertakes a balancing of
those benefits reasonably expected to accrue from the project
against the reasonably foreseeable detriments. 08 This process
closely parallels the decisionmaking process mandated by
NEPA, and ultimate decisions to grant or deny a permit derive
from consideration of similar issues.
C. Clean Air Act Amendments
Equally as significant as the FWPCA to electric utility
regulation is the regulatory scheme exerted under the Clean Air
Act Amendments. 09 Particularly to utilities depending upon
coal as a fuel source, implementation of the Clean Air Act
Amendments by EPA has in some cases resulted in considerable frustration and enormous expense." 0
Generally, the Clean Air Act Amendments, as they relate
to electric utilities, contain three major regulatory mechanisms
to protect air quality. First, they authorize the Administrator
to establish primary and secondary ambient air quality standards for certain criteria of pollutants to protect the public
health and welfare, respectively."' Second, the Administrator
is charged with establishing national standards of performance
for newly constructed sources of pollutions."' Finally, the Administrator is required to establish emission limits for
"hazardous air pollutants.""' 3
The standards developed pursuant to these directives are
designed to be technology-forcing; they are not to be limited
simply to those levels of emission economically or technologi108. See W. RODGERS, supra note 43, at 407; and 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(f)(1) (1977).
109. As a result of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91
Stat. 685 (1977), the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858a has been recodified as 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. 1977). Hereinafter, citation to the Clean Air Act will
refer to the 1977 Amendments, unless otherwise noted.

110. See, e.g., Carroll, Some Fundamental Problems Involved in Stationary
Source Compliance Under the Clean Air Act, 14 DUQUESNE L. REv. 639 (1976); and
Union Electric Co.v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 269 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
111. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7409(b)(1)-(2) (Supp. 1977). "Ambient Air" is defined at 40
C.F.R. § 50.1(c) (1977). See also, Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60, 65 (1975) (Ambient Air
is "outdoor air used by the general public").
112. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7411(b)(1)(A) (Supp. 1977). Specifically, the Administrator is
to establish such standards for each category of sources that "causes, or contributes
significantly to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger the
public health or welfare." Id.
113. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(b) (Supp. 1977).
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cally feasible, but are intended to force industry to develop
technology adequate to achieve the health and welfare goals
reflected in the standards."'
Responsibility for implementation of the standards promulgated by the Administrator is to lie primarily with the
states. Within nine months of the promulgation of national
primary and secondary ambient air quality standards, each
state is required to submit to the Administrator a plan "which
provides for implementation, maintenance, and enforcement"
of such standards. 1 5 In addition, states may submit plans to
concurrently implement and enforce the national standards of
performance (for new sources) and the hazardous air pollutant
standards."' Moreover, pursuant to section 116 of the Clean Air
Act Amendments, states are free to promulgate their own standards where no federal standards exist, and to promulgate
stricter standards or requirements even where federal standards already exist." 7
One example of how implementation of the Clean Air Act
Amendments has affected utilities can be found in the new
source standards of performance for sulfur dioxide." 8 In 1971,
the Administrator determined that flue gas desulfurization
(FGD) equipment had been adequately demonstrated for application on large new coal-fired steam generators;"' the associated sulfur dioxide emission limit was set at 1.2 pounds of
sulphur dioxide per million BTU of heat imput.' 20 Although the
new source standards of performance on sulphur dioxide have
been judicially affirmed,' 2' considerable debate continues over
the validity of the substantive basis for those limits.'2 Addi114. H.R. REP. No. 728, 90th CONG., 1st SESs., (1967), reprinted in U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 1938, 1953. See also Bonine, The Evolution of Technology Forcing
in the Clean Air Act, Monograph No. 21, ENVIRONMENTAL REPORTER (1975).
115. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410(a)(1) (Supp. 1977). Note that this provision is mandatory, and states are, under the Act, required to submit such plans. Should a state fail
to comply with this requirement, the Administrator himself is required to implement
the standards through promulgation of regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c) (1977).
116. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7411-7412 (Supp. 1977). Note here that, contrary to section
7410, states may, but are not required, to submit plans implementing these sections.
117. 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (1977).
118. See 40 C.F.R. § 60.43 (1977).
119. Id. See also 36 Fed. Reg. 15,704, 15,706 (1971).
120. 40 C.F.R. § 60.43(a)(2) (1977).
121. Essex Chemical Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
122. See, e.g. Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 522 F.2d 1186 (3d Cir. 1975) (The
implementation plan at issue here was twice as strict as the standards set in 40 C.F.R.
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tionally, a number of states have adopted implementation
plans for the primary and secondary ambient air quality standards requiring utilities to either install FGD systems or close
down. EPA approval of such plans, even where utility compliance was arguably both technologically and economically unfeasible, was sustained by the Supreme Court of the United
23
States in Union Electric Corp. v. E.P.A.
IV. FEDERAL-STATE COORDINATION
The growth of federal regulation in the electric utility field
has been substantial. While further federal regulation is probably inevitable, it is important that the pattern of federal regulation not become so complex and all-encompassing that state
interests and the electric industry itself are overwhelmed by an
unworkable system. Federal regulation of the electric utility
industry has largely proceeded on an ad hoc basis, with specific
congressional and executive responses to particular problems
that required federal attention. As such, the focus of federal
legislation was usually only on the particular problem of concern and not necessarily on the questions of how the new legislation would interact either with other existing federal regulation or state policies.
The states, both traditionally and as a result of the same
forces which have resulted in increased federal regulation, 2,
have developed a comprehensive system of regulation. Given
the experience of the states in electric utility regulation, every
effort should be made to harmonize new federal legislation with
state interests and existing state legislation, rather than to
simply preempt or overwhelm the state regulatory framework.
The record of federal responsiveness to the need to coordinate
with and to complement state agencies has been mixed, and
the views expressed by the states'2 of federal motives and sen§ 60.43 (1977); Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 270-71 (1976) (Describing the
utilities plight vis a vis the Missouri implementation plan as "being required either to
embark upon the task of installing allegedly unreliable and prohibitively expensive
equipment or to shut down.").
123. 427 U.S. 246 (1976).
124. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE STATES AND ELECTRIC UTILITY
RFCU.ATION, (February 1977) (Lexington, Kentucky 40511).
125. The discussion that follows simply focuses on the statutory relationship or
lack thereof established between the federal government and the states, and does not
focus on conflicts over individual applications which may occur between state and
federal agencies under any statutory structure.
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sitivities to state concerns have also been correspondingly
mixed.
Of the two areas of federal involvement in electric utility
regulation discussed in this article, the statutes administered
by the Environmental Protection Agency represent perhaps the
better blend of federal and state interests into a coherent and
complementary policy of regulation.2" These statutes have accomplished this by: (1) relying heavily on state agencies for
implementation of federal programs, (2) incorporating the
state standards on air and water pollution into the federal program in each state, and (3) allowing the states to impose standards different from, and stricter than, federal standards so
long as certain minimum federal requirements are included.
For example, section 401 of the FWPCA requires any applicant for a federal license to construct or operate a facility
which may result in any discharge into the navigable waters to
obtain from the state in which the discharge originates a certification that any such discharge will comply with certain other
provisions of that Act' relating to effluent limitations and to
national standards of performance for various industries and
toxic substances. Water quality standards and implementation
plans, in turn, are developed by the states subject to EPA
approval. " "
Section 402 of the FWPCA establishes the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System which requires any discharger of pollutants into the navigable waters to obtain from the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency a discharge permit, appropriately conditioned, so that such discharge will meet the limitations contained in the Act.2 9 Section
402 also provides for states willing to administer the section 402
permit programs once their programs have been approved by
the Administrator.'30 To date, thirty-one states have qualified
under this program.'
126. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (1976).
127. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317 (1976).
128. 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1976).
129. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1976).
130. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1976).
131. Telephone conversation with Dr. Harry L. Allen, Water Quality Standards
Coordinator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region II, New York, New York
(July 20, 1978).
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Under the programs established by sections 401 and 402 of
the FWPCA, the federal government's interest in controlling
pollutants in the nation's navigable rivers 32 is integrated with
the states in a manner that allows the states the initial review
of any application under the certification requirements of section 401(a). The states also have the ability to issue or deny
permits under section 402 once their permit programs meet
EPA approval. In addition, once a state's permit program has
been established with EPA guidelines, the program is basically
an independent state program. Appeals from the granting or
denial by the state of a permit do not lie with EPA -but lie
directly with a court of competent jurisdiction. The Administrator of EPA may, however, periodically review the state's
program to assure that it is in compliance with the requirements of the FWPCA.
Two other aspects of the FWPCA provide for significant
state involvement. First, section 510 provides for the authority
of the states to adopt and enforce standards and limitations of
any category and kind that are stricter than those required
under the FWPCA.'3 3 This provides the states with the ability
to set stricter standards in those areas or categories where individual state interests might be especially strong and where
regional concerns may vary. Second, the FWPCA provides
strong provisions for legal actions by the states'34 (as well as by
other parties, although such parties are under more restricto adopt and enforce the
tions)'3 to compel the Administrator
3
FWPCA.'1
the
of
requirements
The legislative framework of federal state cooperation established by the FWPCA is essentially repeated with relatively
minor variations in the Clean Air Act,' 37 the Toxic Substances
Control Act,' 3 and the Safe Drinking Water Act.'3 9 Given the
132. United States v. Ashland Oil and Transp. Co., 509 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974).
Congress' power to regulate the nation's "navigable waters" generally falls within its
constitutional authority to regulate interstate commerce. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
133. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1976).
134. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(h) (1976).
135. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1976).
136. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1976).
137. 42, U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7418, 7521-7525, 7541-7547, 7550, 7571-7574, 7601-7616,
7641, 7642 (Supp. 1977).
138. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976).
139. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-10 (1976).
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different interests and inevitable tension that exist in areas
where both the federal and state government have legitimate
interests, the statutes administered by the Environmental Protection Agency provide an equitable balance and a workable
structure.
The philosophy of the federal-state relationship in the regulation of nuclear power differs from that underlying the federal environmental laws. In contrast with the environmental
laws where the intent was to involve the states as much as
possible, Congress provided a more limited framework of state
participation in the federal regulatory program. This reflected
the congressional concern when the Atomic Energy Act 40 was
first enacted, for an effective, uniform system of regulation,
given the safety implications of nuclear power.
While this attitude may have been appropriate when the
Atomic Energy Act was passed in 1954, the states have sufficiently expanded their own interests and expertise to play a
more significant role in the regulation of nuclear power. As in
the areas of clean water and clean air, the states have a public
health and safety interest which should be accommodated in
the regulatory framework. Congress, perhaps recognizing this
trend, enacted significant amendments in 1977 to the Clean Air
Act which establish the framework for more significant state
involvement in the regulation of radioactive gaseous releases
from nuclear power plants.
The 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments include radioactive
emissions in the broad regulatory scheme already existing
under the Clean Air Act. Under the 1977 Amendments the
Administrator of EPA must determine whether radioactive air
pollutants (including emissions from commercial nuclear
power plants) will "cause, or contribute to, air pollution which
1
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health.''

If the Administrator determines that any radioactive substance meets this criterion, the radioactive substance is classified in one of three lists of pollutants and, depending upon the
classification, either air quality criteria, national ambient air
quality standards, emission standards, or standards of performance must be established.' Under the Clean Air Act, the
140. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1976).
141. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7422(a) (Supp. 1977).
142. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7408, 7411, 7412, 7422 (Supp. 1977).
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states may implement the EPA regulatory responsibilities." '
Once a state's program is approved by EPA, the state may
implement the programs necessary to assure compliance with
federal air pollution programs.'" This includes the authority to
qualify as a permit issuing state for airborne releases, which is
the prime mechanism under the Act for controlling the amount
of pollutant discharges, including radioactive discharges." '
More significantly, the Clean Air Act provides that the Act
does not prohibit the states from adopting stricter air pollution
standards or limitations than those required by the federal
government.'" The Supreme Court has interpreted this allocation of authority to the states broadly, holding that the states
have the authority to promulgate standards where no federal
standards exist and to promulgate stricter standards where federal requirements already exist." 7 By including radioactive gaseous releases under the umbrella of the Clean Air Act, Congress
has effectively reversed the ruling in Northern States Power
Co. v. Minnesota"' and the opportunity now exists for more
substantial state regulation of radioactive airborne pollutants
within the context of the federal regulatory scheme. Congress
has not yet, however, extended similar authority over radioactive liquid releases under the FWPCA."19 The authors believe
that the same policy considerations which led Congress to include the states in the regulation of radioactive gasses applies
to liquid pollutants as well.
In the energy field, the record of federal regulation has
been mixed. The energy laws have been especially prone to the
problems of ad hoc legislation, particularly with respect to coordination between federal and state regulatory agencies and
between the requirements of different federal programs. This
is due in part to the speed and emergency conditions under
which the initial energy legislation was passed. The recent legislation has begun to set a more permanent energy policy structure, but further problems remain and have been aggravated
143. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7409, 7410 (Supp. 1977).
144. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7411 (Supp. 1977).
145. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412 (Supp. 1977).
146. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7416 (Supp. 1977).
147. Union Electrical Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, reh. denied 429 U.S. 873
(1976).
148. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), af('d, 403 U.S. 1035 (1972).
149. Train v. Colo. Pub. Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1 (1976).
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by the National Energy Act being stalled in Congress. Without
the National Energy Act, there has been no effective coordination of federal energy policy, but only a patchwork collection
of emergency statutes responding to urgent situations. Given
the fact that the energy legislation was a quick response to serious problems, the coordination between federal and state agencies is fairly good. The state conservation plans established by
the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 5" and the Energy Conservation and Production Act of 1976's5 represent a
good mixture of federal supervisory guidelines, state implementation, and considerable latitude in variations from state
to state.
For example, the Energy Policy and Conservation Act establishes a program for the development and implementation
of energy conservation programs by the states subject to federal
guidelines. Qualifying state programs receive federal financial
and technical assistance.' In order to qualify, a state's program must reduce by five percent or more by 1980 the total
projected energy which would have been consumed in the state
without the program. The state is free to develop any measures
it wishes to reach the five percent goal, so long as certain mandatory provisions relating to energy usage in buildings and in
transportation are included. 5 ' The Energy Conservation and
Production Act expands the state conservation programs by
150. Pub. L. No. 94-163 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 10, 15, 30 and 42

U.S.C.).
151. Pub. L. No. 94-385 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 12, 15, 29, 40 and 42

U.S.C.).
152. 42 U.S.C. § 6322(b) (1976).
153. 42 U.S.C. § 6322(c) (1976) requires that every state plan must include the
following:
(1) mandatory lighting efficiency standards for public buildings (except
public buildings owned or leased by the United States);
(2) programs to promote the availability and use of carpools, vanpools,
and public transportation (except that no Federal funds provided under
this part shall be used for subsidizing fares for public transportation);
(3) mandatory standards and policies relating to energy efficiency to
govern the procurement practices of such state and its political subdivisions;
(4) mandatory thermal efficiency standards and insulation requirements for new and renovated buildings (except buildings owned or leased
by the United States); and
(5) a traffic law or regulation which, to the maximum extent practicable
consistent with safety, permits the operator of a motor vehicle to turn
right at a red stop light after stopping.
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providing a Weatherization Assistance Program for low income
persons to be administered by the states with federal money
subject to federal guidelines.' '4 This statute also expands and
extends federal funding for the state energy conservation programs established by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act
and also requires supplemental state plans in which the emphasis is on developing public awareness of the value of energy
55
conservation and renewable energy resource measures.'
Two facets of federal regulation, however, have caused
particular concern in the quest for a coordinated state-federal
regulatory scheme. The first difficulty is the fact that the National Energy Act had been stalled for over one year in Congress. While the energy statutes already enacted establish a
framework for federal-state coordination and regulation, the
heart of the substantive federal energy program is contained in
the National Energy Act. Both the states and the regulated
industries have been left uncertain as to what final federal
requirements and programs will be operational.
For example, it is the intent of the existing federal statutes
which authorized the state energy conservation programs to
encourage conservation and renewable resource development
wherever possible. Yet the substantive federal incentives in154. Pub. L. No. 94-385, Tit. IV, Pt. A (codified in scattered sections of 29 and
42 U.S.C.).
155. 42 U.S.C. § 6327(b)(1) (1976) requires that in order for supplemental state
energy conservation plans to be eligible for federal aid they must include the following:
(A) Procedures for carrying out a continuing public education effort to
increase significantly public awareness of(i) the energy and cost savings which are likely to result from the
implementation (including implementation through group efforts)
of energy conservation measures and renewable-resource energy
measures; and
(ii) information and other assistance (including information as to
available technical assistance) which is or may be available with
respect to the planning, financing, installing, and with respect to
monitoring the effectiveness of measures likely to conserve, or improve efficiency in the use of energy, including energy conservation
measures and renewable-resource energy measures;
(B) Procedures for insuring that effective coordination exists among
various local, State, and Federal energy conservation programs within
and affecting such State, including any energy extension service program
administered by the Energy Research and Development Administration;
(C) Procedures for encouraging and for carrying out energy audits with
respect to buildings and industrial plants within such State; and
(D) Any procedures, programs, or other actions required by the Administrator pursuant to paragraph (2).
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cluding tax credits and loans for these programs were all pending in the National Energy Act. This has deprived these programs of a significant impetus and leaves the states in an uncertain position as to whether their own incentive programs will
complement or frustrate the federal package finally enacted by
Congress. With the recent passage of the National Energy Act,
it is hoped that this problem will be cured and that the U.S.
Department of Energy will be able to provide the guidance and
leadership in formulating energy policy that was envisioned
when the Department was established.
Second, the federal involvement in state retail rate regulation is a source of potential difficulty between competing federal and state interests if a balanced regulatory scheme is not
established. The states have traditionally been the exclusive
regulators of retail rates. The Energy Conservation and Production Act established a limited mechanism for federal input
into retail rate cases. That statute authorizes the federal government (initially through the Federal Energy Administration
and then subsequently by its successor agency) to develop and
fund proposals to improve electric utility rate design in order
to conserve energy. Particular areas to be studied include:
1. load management techniques which are cost effective;
2. rates which reflect marginal cost of service, or time of use of
service or both;
3. ratemaking policies which discourage inefficient use of fuel
and encourage economical purchases of fuel; and
4. rates or other regulatory policies which encourage electric
utility system reliability and reliability of major electric utility
equipment.'

The Act also authorizes intervention in state rate proceedings before public utility commissions to present the agency's
views on the effect of the proposed rate schedule upon national
energy conservation goals at the request of a state, utility regulatory commission, or any participant in the proceeding. The
agency has no authority to intervene on its own motion." 7
In order to strengthen this provision, the National Energy
Act as originally proposed would have empowered the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission to establish mandatory guide156. Energy Conservation and Production Act, Pub. L. No. 94-385 § 203(a), 90
Stat. 1125, 1143 (1976).

157. Id. § 204.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 56

lines which state public utility commissions would be required
to follow. The purpose of the federal standards was to depress
peak electric demand through retail rate structures. 5" The proposal drew considerable oppostion from Congress, particularly
with respect to the implications of federal regulation of an area
traditionally governed by the states. The Senate amended this
provision so that the standards are voluntary and the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission is authorized to intervene at
any time to support its standards in state proceedings.
V.

CONCLUSION

The shape that future federal regulation will take is unclear, but the menu is likely to include more, not less, federal
legislation. The time has come, however, to examine future
legislation, both federal and state, in the context of the entire
electric utility picture. Proposed legislation should not only be
examined in terms of its intended impact, but also in terms of
how it relates to and coordinates with existing federal and state
legislation. Careful examination is essential to guarantee that
the regulation of the utility industry is strong and effective,
rather than a confused tangle of inconsistent and incoherent
requirements.
Two new patterns are beginning to emerge in the regulatory field which have the potential to simplify and better coordinate the regulatory pattern. The first is the review by regulatory agencies at much earlier stages than is currently done of
electric utility plans for constructing future generating facilities. This early site review represents an opportunity for the
regulatory agencies to make their decisions on siting and need
for the facilities at a time when utility decisions are in a more
158. See the National Energy Act, Part E, Public Utility Regulfatory Policies
(Comm. Print 1977). This provision would provide the following requirements:
1. Electric and gas utilities would be required to phase out promotional,
declining block and other rates that encourage energy usage;
2. Electric utilities would be required to offer daily off-peak rates to
customers willing to pay metering costs, or to provide a direct load management system;
3. Electric utilities would be required to offer lower rates to
"interruptible service" customers;
4. "Master metering"-the use of a single meter for a multi-unit building-would be prohibited in new structures; meters recording each individual unit would be required;
5. Electric utilities would be prohibited from discriminating against
solar and other renewable energy sources.
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fluid stage and when a change in the utility's plans will not
result in a catastrophic loss of ratepayers dollars. Under the
current licensing review structure, the federal agencies especially, and to a lesser extent the state agencies, must make
their decisions of approval or disapproval of a project five to ten
years after the utility has made its own decision and begun
making necessary contractual and other expenditures.
For example, the utilities applying for a construction permit for the Seabrook Nuclear Station in Seabrook, New Hampshire, had spent $86 million and had contractual commitments
of $585 million as of July 1976, even though permission to begin
construction was only received from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission on July 7, 1976.15 Expenditures of this size
are not uncommon for large thermal generating stations prior
to federal or state approval. Given expenditures of this magnitude, the decisionmaking process by regulators who must approve or disapprove such projects often occurs in a highly polarized atmosphere. The early siting process attempts to eliminate this element by having important regulatory decisions
made before major financial or institutional commitments
have been made.6 0
The second new development is the growing consensus of
the need for regulation on a regional level. As more electric
utilities have interconnected their systems, regional systems
involving a number of states are becoming more significant.
Regional commissions have been proposed to fill the gaps between federal and state legislation which multistate electric
utility systems cause. Regional commissions have been advocated to solve specific problems of system planning, energy
allocation, and conservation on a regional basis' 6' and have also
159. Exhibit One of Affidavit of G.F. Cole, filed before the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Appeal Board, in the Matter of Public Service Company of New
Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) Docket Nos. 50-443, 50-444 (December
13, 1976).
160. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 196.491(2) (West); Ch. ill WiscoNsm ADMINIlSTRATIVE CODE. The system established by these provisions requires the utilities to file
every two years with the State Public Service Commission the long-range demand
forecast and utility system expansion plans for the next ten years based upon these
forecasts. The utilities' plans are subject to approval or modification by the Public
Service Commission after public hearings are held.
161. Testimony of Oregon Governor Robert W. Straub, before the U.S. Senate
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, April 15, 1978 and before the U.S. House
Water and Power Resources Subcommittee of the House Interior and Insular Affairs
Committee, December 7, 1977.
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been suggested for regional consideration of all electrical regulatory functions. 62 The emergence of regional regulatory bodies in the electrical field represents a potentially significant
development. It represents a significant contribution to the
need for harmonious and systematic regulation. Regional planning can make such a contribution provided that it does not
unnecessarily preempt state and federal regulation that is currently effective, and provided also that regional regulation does
not simply duplicate and complicate on a third level the work
that is already being carried out by state and federal regulatory
programs.
The task of assuring a cohesive regulatory program for the
electric utility industry will not be an easy one, given the competing demands of regulatory interests at all levels and given
the complex interaction between the electric utility industry
and the nation's economy. However, the growing interagency
and intergovernmental conferences at all levels are laying the
foundations for a good beginning. This dialogue should continue, hopefully drawing upon the prior experiences, both effective and not so effective, of electric utility regulation which has
been outlined in this article.
162. E. BERLIN, C. CicCHE'r & W. GILLFN, P SPEcTME ON PoWER 87-102 (1974).

Oil and Gas Taxation: A Study in Reform
By SANFORD M. GUERIN*
INTRODUCTION

Although all citizens are guaranteed equality under the
law, the exigencies of economic and political realities often
require a certain amount of compromise in the equitable apportionment of the tax burden between respective taxpayers. Because the tax laws, in addition to their purely revenueproducing function, are often utilized to regulate and promote
a wide spectrum of economic, social, and political policies, the
laws frequently encourage a conflict between competing policy
considerations. One by-product of this problem has been the
tendency toward increased complexity of the tax laws, with a
proportional increase in difficulty of interpretation and administration. Nowhere is this more evident than in the field of oil
and gas taxation.
Since the inception of the federal income tax, concerned
taxpayers and legislators have voiced considerable criticism of
the federal tax provisions which promote preferential or special
treatment for certain groups. This criticism has become undeniably stronger in recent years. Reform-minded taxpayers have
been most vocal over the existence of loopholes and "tax shelter" provisions that, even when not intending to do so, allow
high income taxpayers to avoid paying their "fair share" of the
tax burden. Responding to this criticism, Congress has enacted
amendments to existing provisions and created new and more
restrictive provisions under the various tax reform acts. The
principal target has been the oil and gas provisions.
While presenting a general overview in oil and gas taxation, this article will emphasize the relative merits and drawbacks of recently enacted provisions and trends in the field of
oil and gas taxation. But first, a discussion of the intrinsic
nature of oil and gas is necessary to aid understanding of the
congressional intent underlying the oil and gas tax provisions.
Although sharing a number of the general concepts with
*
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other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code (hereinafter referred to as the Code), oil and gas taxation differs conceptually in certain key aspects. The reasons for the differences in
concept, with corresponding differences in terminology, can be
reduced to a basic trio of physical, economic, and political
considerations. The fact-that oil and gas deposits are nonrenewable, are found at often considerable depths beneath the
surface of the earth or ocean floor, and are extractable only
through various exploration, drilling, pumping, and recoveryenhancement operations constitutes a part of the unique physical factors inherent in oil and gas activities. The economic
factors include those of burgeoning demand, finite supply, foreign oil, inflation, cost effectiveness of recovery techniques, and
alternative energy sources. The political considerations involve
dealing with the problems inherent in attempting to allocate
and regulate a relatively scarce commodity among competing
consumer and producer groups, both internally on the national
level and externally on a global scale.
At present, there appears to be two competing schools of
thought regarding the preferential tax treatment historically
afforded the oil and gas industry. The one school concerned
with the unfair tax advantage designed to benefit the oil and
gas taxpayers contends that certain oil and gas provisions, not
truly serving to promote or stimulate domestic exploration,
create a "tax shelter industry" in themselves. As such, these
provisions are counterproductive to the broad national policy
favoring energy self-sufficiency and efficiency. The opposite
school of thought is entertained by critics who charge that recently, enacted provisions vitiate the national policy favoring
increased incentives for domestic oil and gas exploration. Congress is presently giving with one hand and taking with the
other. These critics contend, for example, that the availability
of the percentage depletion allowance, a major incentive for the
drilling and development of domestic oil and gas deposits,
should have been expanded, not restricted, as was the case in
recent legislation. The tension created by these two divergent
views is no better reflected than in the tax reform provisions
that modify the basic tenets of oil and gas taxation as discussed
in this article.
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I.

INTANGIBLE DRILLING COSTS

A.

The Significance of Intangibles
Because intangible drilling costs (hereinafter referred to as
IDC) are a major part of the total cost of an oil and gas venture
and are afforded preferential tax treatment, a thorough understanding of IDC is of great importance to those interested in the
taxation of oil and gas. The IDC provisions play a vital role in
the national policy favoring incentives for exploration and development of oil and gas reserves by granting the taxpayer the
option of deducting IDC as an expense in the year paid or
incurred rather than capitalizing and recovering these costs,
like other capital expenditures, through depreciation or depletion.'
During the past decade, several factors presented new
challenges of statutory interpretation for the courts and serious
policy and administrative considerations for the Congress involving the deduction of IDC. These factors are as follows: 1)
the insatiable worldwide appetite for oil and gas; 2) the increasing difficulty of locating accessible oil and gas deposits; 3) the
rapidly increasing expense of drilling and developing producing
wells; 4) the advancement of drilling technology; and 5) the
increasing fervor over the tax-sheltering potential of an investment in an oil and gas venture. Due to the legislative, administrative, and judicial responses to these considerations, the subject of IDC has become increasingly complex and controversial.
B. Historical Development of IDC Provisions
The option to deduct IDC was created by an administrative
ruling' incident to the Revenue Act of 1916. The lack of statutory authority and the clearly capital nature of intangible drilling expenditures invited attack.
The first attack occurred in 1931 in the case of Sterling Oil
and Gas Company v. Lucas.3 The district court found that,
although IDC were classified properly as capital expenditures,
the long acceptance and the unmodified reenactment of the
IDC provisions gave the regulation the force and effect of law.4
1.
2.
3.
4.

Treas. Reg.
Treas. Reg.
51 F.2d 413
51 F.2d 413

§ 1.612-4(b)(1),(2) (1965).
45, Article 223.
(W.D. Ky.), aff'd on other grounds, 62 F.2d 951 (6th Cir. 1933).
(W.D. Ky.) at 416.
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Two years later the circuit court reached the same conclusion. "
However, in the second attack in 1945 the court held the
IDC regulations to be invalid in the case of F.H.E. Oil Company v. Commissioner.' The court reasoned as follows: 1) the
allowance of a deduction for capital expenditures would be
improper under the Code, 2) no specific authority could be
inferred from the depletion provisions in the Code, and 3) the
lack of specific authority could not be cured by a regulation
promulgated without statutory authority and congressional
acquiescence. 7 The industry fought back and obtained a resolution from the 79th Congress8 to indicate previous congressional
recognition of the IDC regulations. Unswayed, the court in
F.H.E. Oil denied a second request for rehearing?
Finally, the matter of deductibility of IDC was codified in
1954 and regulations were authorized to be prescribed." '
Subsection 263(c) created a specific exemption for IDC from
the general rule of subsection 263(a) prohibiting deduction of
capital expenditures.
C. IDC Defined
The regulations define IDC as "expenditures made by an
operator for wages, fuel, repairs, hauling, supplies, etc., incident to and necessary . . . for the production of oil and gas." ' "
These expenditures must be incurred in the following three
areas:
1) In the drilling, shooting, and cleaning of wells;
2) In such clearing of ground, draining, road making, surveying,
and geological works as are necessary in preparation for the drilling of wells; and
5. Ramsey v. Commissioner, 66 F.2d 316 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 673
(1933).
6. 147 F.2d 1002, 1005, rehearing denied, 149 F.2d 238, second rehearing denied,
150 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1945), aff'g 3 T.C. 13 (1944), nonacq. 1944 C.B. 37, nonacq.
withdrawn and acq. 1960-1 C.B. 4.
7. Id.
8.59 Stat. 44 (1945).
9. 150 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1945).
10. I.R.C. § 263(c). This subsection provides as follows:
Notwithstanding subsection (a), regulations shall be prescribed by the
Secretary under this subtitle corresponding to the regulations, which
granted the option to deduct as expenses intangible drilling and development costs in the case of oil and gas wells and which were recognized and
approved by the Congress in House Concurrent Resolution 50, Seventyninth Congress.
11. Tress. Reg. § 1.612-4(a) (1965).
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3) In the construction of such derricks, tanks, pipelines, and
other physical structures as are necessary for the drilling of wells
12
and the preparation of wells for the production of oil and gas.

The regulations further provide that only those costs incurred which have no salvage value can be classified as intangible. 3 Thus, tangible assets such as equipment, facilities, or
structures which have salvage value do not qualify as IDC
whether or not they are incident to the drilling of wells or in
preparing the wells for production." However, the classification of costs such as wages, fuel, repairs, and hauling supplies
connected with tangible assets depends on whether these structures or equipment are incident to or necessary for the drilling
of wells. If so, these expenditures are deemed to have no salvage
5
value and would qualify as IDC.
The focus of the regulations is upon the drilling and preparation of wells for production. Since expenditures for reconnaissance and detailed surveys, commonly known as G and G
costs, represent capital expenditures not incident or necessary
for the drilling of wells, they cannot be deducted as IDC; instead, they must be capitalized and added to the basis of the
property.' Furthermore, the Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter referred to as the Service) considers the drilling and preparation of wells for production as complete when the well casing
and the "christmas tree" are installed. 7 After this point, costs
without salvage value are costs incident to production and are
therefore treated as currently deductible operating expenses,
not IDC.
D. Who May Deduct IDC?
IDC are capital expenditures in nature, but as stated
above, they are specifically exempted from the general rule of
subsection 263(a) forbidding current deduction of capital expenditures. However, there are two prerequisites to IDC deductibility. First, only an "operator" may elect to deduct,
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See id.
15. Id. On the other hand, costs such as wages, fuel, and repairs that are connected with equipment or facilities not incident to the drilling of wells do not qualify
for the IDC option. Tress. Reg. § 1.612-4(c)(1) (1965).
16. Rev. Rul. 77-188, 1977-1 C.B. 76. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
17. See Tress. Reg. § 1.612(c)(2) (1965).
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rather than capitalize, IDC. Second, the election must be
proper.
1. Operator Defined
An "operator," as defined by the regulations, is a party
holding an operating or working interest in the property." The
owner of a working interest assumes the burden of developing
and operating the property. Consequently, the working interest
must bear all costs in connection with finding oil and gas, as
well as those attributable to lifting the oil and gas from the
reservoir. The working interest looks to the production of the
oil and gas to recoup his drilling and operating costs and make
a profit: The working interest may be acquired by purchase,
lease, or any other form of contractual arrangement." The actual drilling of the well may be done by the operator himself,
a contractor engaged on a per-foot cost basis, or on a turnkey
basis. 20
The operator with a fractionalized working interest is allowed a deduction only for the IDC attributable to his fraction
of the working interest. 21 Additionally, the working interest, or
fraction thereof, must be held throughout the "complete payout period" in order to qualify the interest for the IDC election.Y
2. Method and Effect of the Election
The operator electing to deduct the IDC must do so on his
return for the first taxable year in which the costs are paid or
incurred.1 A formal statement is not necessary, but a failure
to deduct the costs in the first year is deemed an election to
capitalize these expenditures. An amended return for the first
taxable year IDC are paid or incurred reflecting the election
will not cure the original return's oversight of capitalizing IDC
unless the amended return is filed before the due date of the
original return.2
18. Treas. Reg. § 1.612(a) (1965).

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See Rev. Rul. 71-207, 1971-1 C.B. 160; Rev. Rul. 71-206, 1971-1 C.B. 105; Rev.
Rul. 70-336, 1970-1 C.B. 45; Rev. Rul. 69-332, 1969-2 C.B. 87.
23. Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(d) (1965).
24. Id.
25. Commissioner v. Titus Oil and Inv. Co., 132 F.2d 969, 970 (10th Cir. 1949).
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The effect of the election to either capitalize or deduct
IDC is clear-the election is binding for all subsequent years."
Moreover, costs deducted under the election may not be included in the basis of the property for depreciation or depletion
purposes. 7
However, all is not lost where an operator failed to deduct
his IDC in the first taxable year. In the case of nonproductive
wells, the regulations provide the operator a second option:
If the operator has elected to capitalize intangible drilling costs,
then . . . such costs incurred in drilling a nonproductive well
may be deducted by the taxpayer as an ordinary loss provided a
proper election is made in the return for the first taxable year
...in which such well is completed.28

E. Areas of Uncertainty or Controversy
1. Deepening Wells and Secondary Recovery
Although the regulations provide a broad description of
items qualifying as IDC, examination of applicable revenue
rulings and case law reveals certain expenditures which,
though not appearing to be directly connected with drilling and
development for production, can indeed qualify for the IDC
election. For example, an operator may decide to deepen, perhaps with an eye towards dual completion," a well already
in production at a certain depth. Although the costs of operating a well are clearly not IDC, the costs for intangible items
connected with the deepening of such a well qualify for IDC
treatment as costs incurred in preparing for production. 30
Secondary recovery expenditures provide another example
of IDC that are not immediately obvious from a reading of
Regulation section 1.612-431 which defines IDC. Frequently,
additional wells will be drilled adjacent to production wells for
the purpose of injecting water, gas, chemicals, steam, or combustible materials, into a reservoir in an effort to repressurize
26. Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(e) (1965).
27. Ramsey v. Commissioner, 66 F.2d 316, 379 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S.
673 (1933).

28. Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(b)(4) (1965).
29. Dual completion is a term describing a single well which penetrates two separate deposits, one atop the other, both of which are capable of producing commercial
quantities of oil and gas. In practice, production may be limited to one deposit at a
time, or may occur simultaneously upon both.
30. See Moniovia Oil Co., 28 B.T.A. 335, 347 (1933), aff'd on other grounds, 83
F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1936).
31. (1965).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL.. 56

the wells to enable further recovery of the oil and gas in place.12
Although these injection wells are not capable of producing oil
and gas themselves, the intangible costs incurred in drilling
them qualify as IDC because they are paid or incurred for the
purpose of enabling the existing wells to resume or increase
production .3 Also, costs for the fracturing of rock or sand structures surrounding existing wells in production can qualify as
3
IDC incurred in development for production4.
Although it is apparent that those costs incident to drilling
and development of wells qualify for the IDC election, a problem arises in classifying those costs incurred in connection with
5
the workover of wells as either IDC or operating expenses.3
Regulation section 1.612-4(a)(1), 3 1 which provides that the intangible costs incurred in the cleaning of wells qualify as IDC,
implies that IDC are not limited to preproduction expenses.
While one case has held that pulling rods and tubing and cleaning out a well constituted operating expenses,3 7 it may be reasonable to assume that a broader reading of the regulations
might overturn this precedent.
What about workover costs incurred in connection with
the maintenance of production? Although the Service has ruled
that the costs incurred for wells drilled to dispose of salt water
encroaching upon petroleum deposits must be capitalized as
costs related to improvements for operations, 3 one authority
has suggested that a salt water well drilled for the dual purpose
of disposal and injection for pressurization might qualify for
IDC treatment if the principal purpose was repressurizing for
32. This is one of many methods of secondary and tertiary recovery of oil and gas.
33. Rev. Rul. 69-583, 1969-2 C.B. 41; see also Page Oil Co., 41 B.T.A. 952, nonacq.
1940-2 C.B. 13.
34. Producers Chemical Co. v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 940 (1968), acq. 1969-1 C.B.
21.
35. The importance of distinguishing IDC from operating expenses remains
whether the operator has opted current deduction or capitalization for intangibles.
Should capitalization be elected, perhaps due to circumstances favoring cost depletion
being taken, the operator is concerned with maximizing his depletable basis. Should
current deduction be elected, the operator must take into account the possibility of
recapture (see text accompanying note 90 infra) and tax preference item treatment for
(see text accompanying note 93 infra) those expenditures qualifying for IDC treatment.
36. (1965).
37. P-M-K Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 24 B.T.A. 360,365 (1931), acq. on this
issue, X1-2 C.B. 8.
38. Rev. Rul. 70-414, 1970-2 C.B. 132.
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production. At present, however, it seems likely that the drilling or development for production versus expenditures incident
to operation concept would remain applicable for determining
IDC qualification.
2. Offshore Drilling
Because of rapid technological growth and obvious adverse
physical limitations, offshore drilling programs have presented
numerous novel tax issues. Perplexing questions have arisen
over classification of costs incident to exploratory drilling operations, platform construction and hauling, and permanent
platform anchoring and erection. Satisfactory answers may
only be achieved by innovative theories.
The case of Exxon Corporationv. United States'" is a classic confrontation between the Service and the oil industry over
a new issue emanating from offshore drilling. The primary
issue before the court involved the expenditures to fabricate
and construct drilling platform prior to the time the components were lifted from the transport barge at the drill site.
a. The Position of the Service
The Service argued that the construction on land and fabrication activities during transportation constituted acquisition costs that were not subject to the IDC election.' In other
words, these expenditures for construction of the platform before installment of the structure at the drill site constituted
tangible assets with salvage value so as to preclude current
deductibility as IDC. The Service cited 2 as authority Revenue
Ruling 70-596,11 which was a response to the changing methodologies of offshore drilling. The ruling determined that expenditures relating to
any offshore platform that, although used in connection with
drilling operations, are not incident to or necessary for the drilling of wells, or any platform component necessary for the production activity, including service facilities for personnel, incorporated into the platform structure, or the installation of the production equipment . ..
39. R. BOWHAY & F. BURKE, JR., BREEDING & BURTON INcOME TAXATON OF OIL AND
GAS PRODUCTMON, 14.14 (1978).
40.
41.
42.
43.

547 F.2d 548 (Ct. C1. 1976), 77-1 T.C. 1 9114.
Id. at 557, 77-1 T.C. 9114, at 86,056.
Id. at 549, 77-1 T.C. 9114, at 86.054.
1970-2 C.B. 68.

44. Id. at 69.
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must be capitalized as a depreciable investment. This ruling
concluded that the costs of building platform components on
land did not fall within the purview of subsection 263(c) and,
therefore, represented nondeductible acquisition costs. 5
b. The Position of the Court of Claims
Noting that the primary issue rested on the differing interpretations of the regulations, the court overruled Revenue Ruling 70-596." The court responded to the Service's argument
favoring a limited reading of the IDC provisions by disapproving of the Service's contention that only those expenditures
incurred in the course of installing constructed property at the
well site were properly deductible as IDC.47 The court, which
refused to sustain an interpretation that excluded from the
option all expenditures relating to construction of physical
property at a place other than the actual well site, stressed the
necessity of such preconstruction on land for the later drilling
and preparation of the well at sea.4 s
The court also disapproved of the Service's argument that
the intangible expenditures were so linked to tangible assets as
to have salvage values49 of their own, thereby precluding applicability of subsection 263(c).10 Under this line of reasoning,
total salvage of the entire platform would occur at the moment
the reservoir was reached by the string of oil casing. The court
reasoned that, although only certain costs of drilling and preparation for production are enumerated in Regulation section
1.612-4,11 the Service's conclusion regarding salvage would preclude any cost related to a drill platform from being deductible
52
for having a salvage value as a production facility.
Finally, in holding in favor of Exxon, the court supported
its decision on national policy considerations. It stated that the
Service's position was contrary to congressional intention of
45. Id.
46. 547 F.2d 548, 558, (Ct. Cl. 1976), 77-1 T.C. 9114, at 86,062.
47. Id. at 556, 77-1 T.C. 9114, at 86,060.
48. Id. at 553, 77-1 T.C. 9114, at 96,058.
49. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-1(c) provides that salvage occurs only "upon sale or
other disposition of an asset when it is no longer useful in the taxpayer's trade or
business or in the production of his income and is to be retired from service by the
taxpayer.
50. 547 F.2d 548, (Ct. Cl. 1976), 77-1 T.C. 9114, at 86,060.
51. (1965).
52. 547 F.2d 548, (Ct. Cl. 1976), 77-1 T.C. 9114, at 86,061.
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favoring oil and gas prospecting, and, if followed, would result
in the proliferation of ambiguities and categorization problems.5
c. The Risk Theory of IDC Classification
Since Exxon represents judicial disapproval of the Service's increasingly restrictive position regarding qualification
of expenditures for IDC treatment, it is an extremely significant pro-taxpayer case in the IDC series. But the Court of
Claims has created a measure of uncertainty in Exxon. Until
new guidelines are established, the operator seeking to qualify
expenditures as IDC incurred in expanding technologies may
have to resort to broader theoretical considerations behind IDC
provisions.
In an excellent article on IDC and offshore drilling programs,54 one commentator has documented a growing judicial
trend to examine IDC election qualification as a function of the
level of risk inherent in the IDC activity and the nature of the
taxpayer's interest in the oil and gas property. 5 Citing directly
to that article,56 subsequent case law5 7 has preferred the "risk"
test over the Service's proposed "purpose" (intent to produce)
test.
The "risk" theory is an after-the-fact attempt to provide
a cohesive theoretical framework within which those expenditures which merit IDC treatment may be distinguished from
others. Although "risk" has never been an overt consideration
in the IDC provisions, no other theory appears to be as broadly
applicable and theoretically coherent to determinations involving IDC qualification. Briefly summarized, the risk test theory
states that economic risk can be equated with the degree of risk
per dollar spent, and comparisons between any two operations
are proper only if their costs are comparable. The term "risk"
is defined as composite of two probability elements: 1) the
funds expended for the operation will fail to obtain an economic benefit (from ultimate production); and 2) other property or money will be lost because the original expenditure has
53. Id. 558, 77-1 T.C.
OIL

9114, at 86,062.

54. Linden, Review of Offshore Drilling- What Are Intangibles? TWENTY-SIXTH
AND GAS INST. 441 (1975) (hereinafter cited as Linden).
55. Id. at 451-52.

56. Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 325, 351 (1971).
57. Id.
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led to an economic detriment in excess of the loss of the expenditure itself. 8
Application of the risk test analysis for the purpose of distinguishing, for example, G and G items from IDC items, yields
a logical and consistent result. Because the survey covers a very
large area to yield information on potential petroleum deposits,
seismic G and G surveys have a relatively low risk factor when
compared to offshore exploratory drilling. As the area of investigation decreases, the probability of locating oil and gas decreases proportionately. Thus, although the same fixed amount
of money might be spent for both a seismic survey and an
exploratory, the latter has a much higher risk factor because
of the greater chance (dollars spent per area investigated) of
failure. Examples of low risk activities requiring capitalization
include lease bonuses, seismic surveys, tangible equipment
acquisition, and production equipment installation. In contrast, examples of high risk activities include well drilling and
completing and platform hauling and erecting.
Application of the risk test analysis to property interests
also yields logical and consistent results. The working interest
requirement for the IDC election effectively results in potential
economic benefit for the operation solely from future oil and
gas production. 59 Consequently, the working interest holder
bears the full cost risk of discovering oil and gas in paying
quantities. No discovery results in no recoupment of IDC expenditures. In contrast, nonworking interest holders possess a
noncost-bearing interest in the form of production payments or
royalty rights. They share in production but not in costs or
risks. Moreover, nonworking interests may not exist throughout the entire payout period" because they are frequently limited in term or amount.
In conclusion, the Service's position with regard to offshore
drilling activities has been an attempt to limit IDC qualification to only those drilling operations in which the operator has
the intent to produce oil and gas. Not only does this "intent to
produce" test create difficult administrative determinations
based upon an operator's intent, the test cannot adequately
58. Linden, supra note 54, at 454.
59. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
60. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
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explain why injection wells, dry holes, and exploratory wells
which were not originally intended for production but are later
reentered for production purposes qualify for the IDC election.
Although the Tax Court has recognized the fact that "risk
and IDC are inextricably related,"'" it is premature to state
with certainty that the risk test will be unanimously adopted.
Nevertheless, application of a risk test type of analysis should
prove helpful to operations seeking IDC treatment of novel
expenditures.
F. Geological and Geophysical Exploration Costs as IDC
1. Background
The tax treatment of the costs incurred in the geological
and geophysical exploration 2 for oil and gas projects is a somewhat perplexing topic in the field of oil and gas taxation.
Whereas "hard minerals" enjoy a specific deduction for those
expenses connected with predevelopmental prospecting and
exploration, 3 oil and gas exploration costs do not. Also, although the search for petroleum deposits could perhaps be analogized to a research or experimental activity, oil and gas
activities are specifically excluded from the R & E deduction
provisions.6 Finally, an examination of the IDC deduction option provisions reveals that only those geological survey exploration expenses incurred to determine the exact location of the
drill site will qualify for deduction under the section 263(c)
option.e5
How, then, are the preliminary geological and geophysical
costs incurred prior to the selection of the actual drill site to
be treated for tax purposes? The general and long-established
rule is that these costs, not deductible in the year incurred, are
61. Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 325, 350 (1977).
62. Geological and geophysical survey expenses represent the expenses incurred
in the exploration for oil and gas deposits for the purpose of "narrowing down" the area
being searched for an eventual drill site location.
A typical exploration program for previously unexplored areas involves at least
two phases: 1) the reconnaissance survey(s) of the project area(s), and 2) one or more
detailed surveys of areas of interest within the layer project area(s). The ultimate
decision to sink a shaft or to acquire to retain the oil-and gas-bearing property is often
dependent upon the results of the reconnaissance and detailed surveys. The group
providing and generating the survey information may be an independent contractor
rather than a group already existing in the development organization.
63. I.R.C. § 617(a).
64. I.R.C. § 174(d).
65. See Tress. Reg. § 1.612-4(a) (1975).
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to be capitalized and recovered over the producing life of the
well.6 Obviously contrary to the interests of taxpayers concerned with maximizing current deductions in an oil and gas
venture, such treatment, however, may be subject to judicial
change.
2. The Proper Classification of G and G Costs
The law is not specific in its differentiation of G and G
costs from IDC; a reading of only the Code and regulations
would lead one to assume that these costs may be one in the
same. For example, there is no Code section dealing specifically
with preproduction oil and gas expenses other than section
263(c), which exempts IDC from the general rule disallowing a
current deduction for capital expenditures. Further, the regulations lists as an example of IDC as expenditures for "clearing
or ground, draining, road making, surveying, and geological
works as are necessary in preparation for the drilling of wells
. . ,"7Arguably, it would be reasonable to assume that these
expenditures concerning surveying and geological works as
being "necessary" for the preparation of wells, should include
the entirety of the reconnaissance and detailed survey costs
that are initiated to determine the location of the most advantageous drill site. Such is not the case; the Service has characterized these surveys as being capital expenditures incurred
"for the purpose of obtaining and accumulating data which will
serve as a basis for the acquisition or retention of property.""
By characterizing G and G costs as capital expenditures made
in connection with the acquisition or preservation of property,
the Service has attempted to remove them from consideration
as IDC, which, of course, are subject to the option for current
deduction.
One question which arises at this point concerns the possible characterization of G and G costs as ordinary and necessary
business expenses. 9 Certainly, a taxpayer in the business of
producing oil and gas will find it necessary to search for that
upon which his operations depend; until a successful search is
66. Rev. Rul. 77-188, 1977-1 C.B. 76.
67. Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(a)(2) (1965) (emphasis added).
68. Rev. Rul. 77-188, 1977-1 C.B. 76.
69. Hall, Geological and Geophysical Costs, SIXTEENTH OnL AND GAs INsT. 584
(1965). The author suggests that prior to 1938 tax-payees routinely deducted G and G
costs as ordinary and necessary business expenses pursuant to Code section 162.
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made, he cannot undertake production. The main reason G
and G costs are capital expenditures, rather than ordinary and
necessary business expenses, is because the Service has so
ruled.1
The Service's present position on the nondeductibility of
G and G costs can be found in Revenue Ruling 77-188. 1' The
holdings of this ruling can be summarized briefly as follows:
1. Property acquired or retained upon the basis of information
from G and G survey and exploration has its adjusted basis increased by the amount of G and G cost;
2. Oil and gas exploration programs are conducted on the basis
of project areas, with separate project areas being deemed to exist
if they are noncontiguous to one another. Reconnaissance surveys
are typically made of each project area, and areas of interest
subject to detailed surveys are revealed by the larger reconnaissance surveys. If no preliminary reconnaissance survey is made,
the project area and area of interest are deemed to be coextensive. If more than one noncontiguous area of interest is found,
each area of interest is independent of the other.
3. The G and G costs, generally capitalized entirely to the area
of interest found, is apportioned equally, without regard to
acreage of actual proportional cost, between the areas of interest
if more than one exists within the project area.
4. The G and G costs are deductible as a loss under section 165
only where no area of interest is located within a project area.
5. An exception to the above rules exists where a property
within, adjacent to, or nearby an area of interest is acquired;
here, a portion of the reconnaissance survey attributable to the
area of interest, as well as the entire cost of the detailed survey
of the area of interest, is apportioned to the property acquired. If
more than one property within, adjacent to, or nearby, the area
of interest is acquired, the G and G costs are capitalized and
apportioned between them on a per acreage basis.

This revenue ruling cites a series of cases" beginning in
1928 in support of the Service's position. However, close examination of these cases reveals that the Service's position, not
supported by sound judicial reasoning and interpretation, re70. Rev. Rul. 77-188, 1977-1 C.B. 76, at 77.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. The cases cited are: Louisiana Land and Exploration Co. v. Commissioner,
7 T.C. 507 (1946), aff'd on other issues, 161 F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1947); Schermerhorn
Oil Corporation v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 151 (1952); G.E. Cotton v. Commissioner,
25 B.T.A. 866 (1932); C.M. Nusbaum v. Commissioner, 10 B.T.A. 664 (1928); and
Seletha 0. Thompson v. Commissioner, 9 B.T.A. 1342 (1928).
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sults by virtue of certain somewhat dubious interpretations
which have, through long usage, attained the effect of law.
Notwithstanding the lack of sound judicial reasoning and
interpretation, the fact that development and exploration costs
for natural resources, particularly G and G costs for oil and gas,
are capital expenditures cannot be denied. Although the line
of cases relied upon by the Service can be questioned as to
soundness and validity, it seems likely that these long standing
positions by the Service and courts would be virtually impossible to overcome. Akin to leasehold improvements that are beneficial over the term of the lease, G and G costs are undeniably
capital expenditures.
However, in light of the fact that Congress has made a
substantial concession for IDC with section 263(c), the fact
that G and G costs are properly characterized and treated as
capital expenditures should not automatically preclude their
current deductibility. Certainly, those IDC expenditures qualifying for the section 263(c) election are also capital expenditures since they benefit production over the term of the property interest. Isn't it possible that certain G and G costs would
be recharacterized as IDC items? The answer, at present, appears to be in the affirmative, at least to certain costs of development of offshore drilling projects.
3. Exploratory Drilling
Offshore drilling projects involve large areas of the ocean
floor which must be explored and prospected at considerable
expense 4 to determine the possibilities of locating petroleum
deposits in quantities sufficient for commercial exploration.
74. In contrast to land-based explorations, offshore explorations are subject to
additional contraints which serve to "up the ante" for G and G exploration. For
example, because of environmental considerations, these G and G exploration activities, (involving exploratory surveying and drilling by the use of seismic boats, jack up
rigs, submersibles, drilling vessels, and ice islands), have come under increasing governmental administrative agency review and regulation. A partial list of those bodies
having licensing and regulatory powers are: the Department of the Interior, United
States Geological Survey, Environmental Protection Agency, Corps of Engineers
(Army), Coast Guard, Council on Environmental Quality, various state coastal zone
management commissions, and other state environmental regulatory agencies. Among
the applicable laws and acts are: the Outer-Continental Shelf Lands Act, the National
Environmental Policy Act, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972
(as amended), the River and Harbor Act of 1899, the Coastal Zone Management Act
of 1972, and the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act.
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The accumulated data from surveys of project areas serves as
a basis for abandonment or further detailed survey of any areas
of interest. However, since G and G data resulting from undersea surveying is more limited than data resulting from landbased exploration, greater reliance is placed on the results of
exploratory wells for the purpose of determining the location of
permanent production wells and facilities. Because of the extremely high costs of undersea drilling, a common practice is
to install casings and fixtures suitable for production before it
is known whether petroleum deposits will be of production
quality and quantity. In the event a suitable deposit is discovered, other wells must be drilled to determine the boundaries
of the deposit and the placement of production wells.
Because of the uncertainties inherent in exploratory drilling, the Service has maintained that exploratory drilling costs
are to be capitalized and cannot qualify for IDC treatment.7 5
Appearing contrary to the regulations,7" the Service's position
was attacked in the recent Tax Court case of Standard Oil
(Indiana) v. Commissioner." In Standard Oil, the petitioner
drilled twenty-one wells from mobile platforms between 1967
and 1979. Four of the wells were drilled in the offshore waters
of Louisiana, nine wells were drilled in the United Kingdom
portion of the North Sea, and eight wells were drilled off the
coast of Trinidad. All of the wells drilled, except for two off the
coast of Trinidad, found deposits of petroleum in producing
quantities. Pursuant to subsection 263(c), Standard Oil
claimed as current deductions the drilling costs of the successful exploratory wells.
The Service determined deficiencies of over $48,000,000
claiming that the drilling costs represented nondeductible G
and G capital expenditures. In support of its position, the Service contended that Standard Oil had not met the burden of
proof with respect to qualifying the well expenditures as IDC.78
The Service maintained that the wells were an extension of
exploratory work, and therefore, they could not be considered
as incident to development for production until the decision to
install a permanent drilling platform had been made.7 9
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Rev. Rul. 70-596, 1970-2 C.B. 68.
Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4 (1965).
68 T.C. 325 (1977).
Id. at 343.
Id. at 345.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 56

The Tax Court made several observations before discussing the primary issue. First, under F.H.E. Oil Company v.
Commissioner,N the court stated that all expenses incurred in
drilling the wells were capital expenditures under subsection
263(a) and therefore, cases dealing with the question of characterization of expenses as capital expenditures were inapplicable.8 Second, the fact that the wells provided G and G data did
not preclude the deduction of drilling costs as IDC. 2 Third, and
perhaps equally important, the court stated that "Congress
favors a liberal interpretation of the IDC regulation." Finally,
the court, holding that the mere classification of the wells as
being "exploratory" did not preclude them from being a part
of the "development" of the properties for production, stated
"the dividing line between exploratory work which must be
capitalized and development activities coming within the IDC
option is the point at which the preparations for drilling
begin."" The court, finding no express or implied limits in the
regulations stating that the only wells drilled after the decision
to install a permanent drilling platform could qualify for IDC
treatment, held in favor of the taxpayer. It noted that the
Service's theory on IDC qualification would result in the disallowance of not only all "wildcat" wells, but also those wells
which were drilled from mobile drilling rigs and later reentered
from a fixed platform.85 The Service's "decision to install a
permanent drilling platform"8 test, found by the court to be
akin to an "intent to produce" test, was invalidatedapplication of this test would disallow drilling costs clearly
within the ambit of section 1.612-4 of the regulations." The
court concluded by holding that the proper method to restrict
the IDC provisions lay in amending legislation, not judicial
restriction."
In conclusion, the primary importance of the Standard Oil
80. 147 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1945).
81. Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 325, 344 (1977).
82. Id. at 345.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 348.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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case lies in its presentation of the first coherent and wellreasoned analysis distinguishing IDC from G and G costs. Resting solely on the facts of the instant case, the decision as to
deductibility of certain offshore exploratory drilling expenses
will also be applicable to future situations involving neoteric
systems and technologies. However, to claim that the Standard
Oil case has effectively converted certain G and G costs into
IDC would be erroneous; it merely allows more expenditures to
be properly characterized by clarifying the distinctions between IDC and G and G costs.
G. Tax Reform Reduces IDC Benefits
While the Service has endeavored to restrict IDC treatment for expenditures through their strained interpretation of
the statutes and regulations, Congress has pursued a direct
approach to minimize the favorable tax effects of IDC treatment.
1. Recapture of IDC
Aimed at limiting the conversion of ordinary income into
capital gain, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 added section 1254
to the Code. This provision, a progeny of section 1245 and
12509 recapture provisions, requires gains from the disposition
of oil and gas properties, heretofore treated as capital gain, to
be recaptured as ordinary income to the extent of the IDC
deductions taken after December 31, 1975. This recaptured
amount 0 is to be reduced by the amount that would have been
deducted had the IDC been capitalized. In short, upon the
disposition of an oil or gas property the operator now realizes
ordinary income to the extent that his deductions for IDC ex89. Section 1245 prescribes recaptare of capital gain into ordinary income where
the gain is attributable to depreciation deductions claimed on the tangible personal
property sold. Section 1250 prescribes recapture of capital gain into ordinary income
where the gain is attributable to depreciation deductions claimed in excess of straight
line depreciation on the real property sold.
90. Special rules are provided for determining the amount recaptured as ordinary
income where a taxpayer sells a portion of, or an individual interest in, an oil or gas
property. First, in the case of a disposition of a portion of an oil or gas property other
than an undivided interest, Section 1254(a)(2) provides that the entire amount of the
aggregate IDC that have been deducted after December 31, 1975 is allocated to the
portion of the property disposed of first. Any excess of IDC that are not recaptured in
the first disposition of a portion of the property is to be subsequently allocated to the
remaining portion of the property. Such a situation obviously occurs when the IDC
exceed the total amount of gain realized. Second, if an "undivided interest in an oil
or gas property, or a portion thereof, is disposed of, Section 1254(a)(2) provides that a
proportionate part of the IDC attributable to that property is to be allocated to the
undivided interest to the extent of the gain."
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ceed the amount that would have been allowed had the IDC
been capitalized, not deducted, and recovered over the life of
the property. However, the recaptured amount cannot exceed
the gain realized on the sale of the property.9 1
An example is in order to illustrate the effects and mechanics of section 1254. On July 1, 1978, an investor purchases
for $30,000 the mineral estate which contains potential oil and
gas deposits. The investor becomes an operator and incurs
$25,000 in IDC which he deducts on his 1978 return. Without
the election to deduct IDC currently, the operator would have
deducted $5,000 through cost depletion. After discovering oil,
92
the operator holds the property interest for over 12 months
and sells his working interest in the mineral estate for $100,000
on August 1, 1979. Before enactment of section 1254, the operator would have a capital gain computed as follows:
Sales Price
Less Basis
Capital Gain

$100,000
30,000
$ 70,000

After enactment of section 1254, the capital gain is recaptured as ordinary income to the extent IDC were deducted in
excess of the amount that would have been deducted had the
IDC been capitalized and recovered through cost depletion.
The capital gain and ordinary income is computed as follows:
Gain Realized
IDCs Deducted
Cost Depletion Deduction
Ordinary Income
Difference is Capital Gain

$70,000
$25,000
5,000
$20,000
$50,000

As can be readily seen, the new provision converts $20,000
of capital gain into ordinary income.
2. IDC as a Tax Preference Item
By adding "excess" IDC to the list of tax preference
items,93 the Tax Reform Act of 1976 further watered down in91. I.R.C. § 1254 (a)(1)(B).
92. By holding the property over 12 months, the owner satisfies section 1222(c)
which defines the holding period required before capital gain treatment is allowed.
93. Code section 57 delineates 11 items of tax preference: 1) excess itemized deductions; 2) accelerated depreciation of real property; 3) accelerated depreciation on
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centives once present in the tax-deferring IDC election. Newlyenacted paragraph 57(a)(11) serves to penalize certain operators" by classifying a portion of IDC deducted currently as a
tax preference item.
For tax years beginning after 1977, the tax preference portion of the IDC deduction is equal to the actual IDC deduction
minus the amount which would have been deductible had the
IDC been capitalized and recovered via straight line recovery
of intangibles." The phrase "straight line recovery of intangibles" is defined by subsection 57(d) as the greater of:
1. ratable amortization of such costs over the 120-month period
beginning with the month in which production from such well
begins; or
2. any method which would be permitted for purposes of determining cost depletion with respect to such well.

This new tax preference rule does not apply in two cases.
The first case occurs where the operator elects to capitalize,
rather than deduct, IDC. The second case occurs where the well
is nonproductive."
An example of the mechanics of this new provision is appropriate. An operator incurs $48,000 in IDC in November and
December of 1978. The amount of the IDC tax preference item
for 1978 will be $48,000 minus the straight line recovery of
intangibles of $800 computed as follows:
2 months
= $800
o
$48,000 times 120 months
The additional tax liability would be $7,080 computed by
multiplying $47,200 (IDC net of straight line recovery intangibles) by 15% minimum tax rate. 7
leased personal property; 4) amortization of certified pollution control facilities; 5)

amortization of railroad rolling stock; 6) stock options; 7) reserves for losses on bad
debts of financial institutions; 8) depletion (see text accompanying note 221 infra); 9)
capital gains; 10) amortization of on-the-job training and child care facilities; and 11)
intangible drilling costs.
94. Code section 57(a)(11) excludes corporations as an operator who must treat
IDC as a tax preference item.
95. I.R.C. § 57(a)(11).
96. Id.
97. Section 56(a) provides that the minimum tax is equal to 15% of the amount

by which the sum of the tax preference items exceeds the greater of (1) $10,000 or (2)
one-half of the taxpayer's regular tax. After 1978, this 15% add-on tax will no longer
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II. THE AT RISK LIMITATIONS
Tax shelter investments, including those involving oil and
gas, typically involve one or more of the following elements: 1)
deferral of tax; 2) conversion of ordinary income into capital
gain; and 3) leverage of investment power through use of borrowed funds. In the case of oil and gas, two of these common
elements, deferral and conversion, have been limited by enactment of previously discussed provisions: one classifying certain
IDC as tax preference items and the other creating a recapture
of IDC. Leveraging, the third common element, has been restricted by the enactment of section 465, the at risk limitation
provision.
A. The Basic Problem-Tax Deductible Losses
This provision was enacted in response to the executive
and legislative branches' growing preoccupation with the politically expedient issue of tax reform, particularly in regard to
tax shelter activities. In 1973 the Secretary of the Treasury,
George Shulz, observed, "[Tiaxpayers who have large incomes and pay little or no tax do exist in limited, but significant numbers,""8 and "[pireoccupation with tax manipulations-particularly tax deductible 'losses'-too often obscures
the economic realities and can have the effect of discouraging
profitable and efficient enterprise.""
How are these tax deductible losses created? The answer
is simple-leveraging. The role of leveraging in creating these
tax deductible losses has been succintly described as follows:
Without borrowing one can only defer recognition of an amount
of gain not greater than his investment. But by borrowing he can
make his gross investment exceed his net investment, and the
amount he can defer, while limited to his gross investment, may
exceed his net investment several times over. Thus it is that
investors in tax shelters may not only deduct their whole investment, but actually get it back in the form of tax savings within
a short period, and still go on to shelter more income. The tax
apply to the capital gains or the excess itemized deductions preference items. Instead,
these two items become part of the new alternative minimum tax which becomes
effective in 1979. This new alternative tax will apply only if it produces a tax that is

higher than the individual's regular tax liability as increased by the add-on minimum
tax. See section 55 of the Internal Revenue Code enacted into law by section 421 of
the Revenue Act of 1978.
98. Hearings on General Tax Reform Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 6877 (1973).

99. Id. at 6878 (emphasis added).
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cost is a so-called phantom gain to be recognized some years
hence."

The advantages in leveraging are even more apparent
when the borrowing is on a nonrecourse basis. The lack of personal liability for repayment is particularly attractive when the
nonrecourse loan proceeds can be used to increase the gross
investment amount, and thereby increase the sheltered activity's potential for sheltering other income.
The following oil and gas tax shelter arrangement was not
atypical before the Tax Reform Act of 1976. A drilling corporation would obtain an oil and gas lease. In order to obtain financing to develop the lease, the corporation would sell limited
partnership interests to investors and obtain a loan from a
bank. The arrangement can be graphically shown as follows:

Partner
Corporation A - limited
B - limited
C - limited
D - limited

general partner
partner
partner
partner
partner

Percentage
of
Interest
20 %
20%
20%
20%
20%
100 %/(

If the required financing is $1,000,000 and each partner
contributes $20,000, then the bank loan must equal $900,000.
Each limited partner's adjusted basis for determining the extent he can deduct partnership tax shelter losses was $200,000
($20,000 contributed plus $180,000 share of the loan). If the
general partner incurs $500,000 in IDC expense in the first year,
each limited partner's deductible loss would be $100,000 or
one-fifth of the partnerships losses notwithstanding the fact
that as limited partners, they were not personally liable on the
loan. If the partner is in a 50% bracket, the $100,000 deduction
represents a tax savings of $50,000; while the most the partner
can lose is $20,000, his initial contribution. Understandably,
the Service had long been galled by the taxpayer's ability to
100. Lee & Fogg, Secs 465 and 704(d): Invest at Your Own Risk, TAx ADvisOR
8:132 (1977) at 133.
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include the full amount of nonrecourse liability in his depreciable basis or his adjusted partnership's basis. "
2. Limitation of Tax Deductible Losses
Congress reacted to the problem of nonrecourse financing
and artificial tax losses by designing section 465. Enacted in
the Tax Reform Act of 1976, this provision served to limit the
taxpayer's allowable loss deductions 02 to the amount of the
taxpayer's investment which is "at risk" at the close of the
taxable year. Oil and gas exploration was one of four activities
subject to the "at risk" limitation. 01 3 However, with the Revenue Act of 1978 Congress amended section 465 to include all
activities except real property investing'"4 and equipment leasing by closely-held corporations. 05
Applying section 465 to the example of the limited partner
creating a $100,000 IDC tax loss with a $20,000 contribution,
the partner's loss is limited to the amount he has "at risk."
Since he can only lose $20,000, he can only deduct $20,000. The
$80,000 balance may be deducted in succeeding years to the
extent he has "at risk" capital. 0 6
Obviously crucial to the workings of this new provision, the
definition of "at risk" is not as simple as one might hope. For
example, although it is clear that taxpayers are considered to
be "at risk" to the extent of cash and the adjusted basis of their
property contributed to the activity, 0 7 borrowings that are invested will not be considered "at risk" if they are nonrecourse, 0 8 or are protected through "stop-loss" or other liabilitylimiting arrangements.0 9 Furthermore, amounts borrowed
from a person holding an interest in the activity other than a
101. See, e.g., Boger v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 760 (1973); Mayerson v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 340 (1966), acq. 1969-1 C.B. 21.
102. Section 465(d) provides that in computing the loss from an activity, loss is
defined as the deductions allowable for the taxable year determined without regard to
section 465, in excess of the income received or accrued by the taxpayer from the
property.
103. I.R.C. § 465(c)(1)(D). The other three activities were: 1) holding, producing,
or distributing motion picture films; 2) farming; and 3) leasing any section 1245 property.
104. I.R.C. § 465(c)(3)(D)(i).
105. Id. § 465 (c)(3)(D)(ii).
106. Id. § 465(d).
107. Id. § 465(b)(1)(A).
108. Id. § 465(b)(1)(B)(4).
109. Id.
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creditor," 0 amounts borrowed from a related party as defined
by section 267(b), and amounts borrowed secured by property
used in the activity also will not be considered to be "at risk."" 2
Enacted in the Revenue Act of 1978, subsection 465(e)
plugged a loophole generated by section 465 as enacted by the
Tax Reform Act of 1976. Under section 465 as originally enacted, the taxpayer was only required to be at risk at the end
of the taxable year for which losses were claimed." 3 Consequently, subsequent withdrawals of amounts originally placed
at risk could be made without recapture of previously allowed
losses. Therefore, subsection 465(e) requires the recapture of
previously allowed losses when the amount at risk is reduced
below zero."'

III.

THE DEPLETION ALLOWANCE

In the field of oil and gas taxation, the emotionalism engendered by issues of the IDC deduction and the loss limitaton
is only exceeded by the issue of the depletion allowance. The
balance of this article will explore the definition and types of
economic interests, the computation and theory of cost and
statutory depletion, and the legislative restriction on the
amount and availability of statutory depletion.
A. Introduction To Depletion
Oil and gas deposits constitute a form of nonrenewable
wasting asset of finite supply. By diminishing the quantity that
may be recovered, the removal of oil and gas from the reservoir
constitutes a "physical" depletion of the deposit. Since the
value of the oil and gas deposit diminishes proportionately with
the physical depletion, "economic" depletion, described in
terms of diminution in value, can be said to go hand-in-hand
with physical depletion.
110. Id. § 465(b)(3)(A).
111. Id. § 465(b)(3)(B).
112. Id. § 465(b)(2)(B).
113. Id. § 465(a).
114. Id. § 465(e)(1). The House Ways and Means Committee Report states: Mechanically, this rule works by providing that if the amount at risk is reduced below
zero (by distributions to the taxpayer, by changes in the status of indebtedness from
recourse to nonrecourse, by the commencement of a guarantee or other similar arrangement which affects the taxpayer's risk of loss, or otherwise), the taxpayer will recognize
income to the extent that his at risk basis is reduced below zero. However, the amount
recaptured is limited to the excess of the losses previously allowed in that activity over
any amounts previously recaptured.
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However, for tax purposes the term depletion is used to
describe a somewhat different concept of diminution than is set
forth above. Whereas the "physical" and "economic" depletion
concepts are linked to the number (and value) of the units
produced from the deposit, the tax depletion provisions ' 5 are
based on "income derived from production" concept. This concept of income from production, which is vital to a proper
understanding of the theory and application of depletion for oil
and gas, produces annual depletion deductions which serve to
allocate a portion of the cost of the asset to the gross income
generated by the asset during the tax year.
The theory of depletion also includes a "return of capital"
concept. Because a portion of the production of oil and gas
represents a return of the original capital investment, deduction in the form of a depletion deduction is allowed as a recovery of the cost of the mineral deposit as the extracted mineral
is sold.
Treasury regulations provide that income from production
of oil and gas results from the sale of the units (barrels or cubic
feet) produced."' Due to the connection between depletion and
income as opposed to production, only those units produced
which are actually sold can qualify for the depletion deduction.
Thus, units consumed in the operation of the property," 7 or
somehow destroyed prior to sale,"8 cannot qualify for the depletion allowance.
B. Economic Interests
Since only those persons possessing an "economic interest" in the mineral in place are entitled to the oil and gas
depletion allowance, and because not all possessory interests in
the oil and gas property qualify as "economic interest," the
definition of an economic interest should be of vital concern to
all oil and gas taxpayers.
1. Economic Interest Defined
Not defined specifically in the Code, the term "economic
115. I.R.C. § 611-13.
116. Treas. Reg. § 1.611-2(a).
117. Roundup Coal Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 388 (1973) acq. and
nonacq. on other issues, 1954-1 C.B. 6, 8.
118. Pioneer Cooperage Co. v. Commissioner, 53 F.2d 43 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
284 U.S. 686 (1931).
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interest" is a creation of case law"' that was adopted by the
Treasury in Regulation 1.611-1(b)(1). 20 This regulation provides that an economic interest is acquired when "the taxpayer
has acquired by investment any interest in mineral in place
. . .and secures, by any form of legal relationship, income derived from the extraction of the mineral. . . to which he must
look for a return of his capital."'' 2' The regulation further provides that "[a] person who has no capital investment . . .
does not possess an economic interest merely because through
a contractual relation he possesses a mere economic or pecuniary advantage from production.'2
This regulation and subsequent case law make it clear that
economic interest exists only where there has been a capital
investment in mineral in place and the right to income exists
as a recovery of capital from extraction and production of the
mineral. The capital investment need not, however, be a direct
investment in the sense of "dollars for minerals in place"; it is
an indispossible to acquire an economic interest by making
23'
pensable contribution in a form other than cash.'
The critical distinction in determining the existence of a
capital investment is the connection between the investment
and the minerals in place. As long as the investment is necessary for the extraction of the mineral, the capital investment
element should be satisfied. The "right to income from production" element requires that the taxpayer's right to receive income is dependent solely upon the extraction and production
of the mineral. Again, the critical factor is the absolute
relationship of the right to receive income with the mineral
deposit. In Anderson v. Helvering,'1' the Supreme Court held
that the right to receive oil payments out of both production
and proceeds from the sale of land did not constitute an economic interest because the right to receive income was not
solely upon production.12
119. Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1932).
120. (1960).
121. Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(b)(1) (1960).
122. Id.
123. Burton-Sutton Oil Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 328 U.S. 25 (1946).
124. 310 U.S. 404 (1940).
125. In Anderson, the Oklahoma City Co. (O.C.C.) owned fee title, royalty
interests, and oil payment rights in certain oil producing properties. It sold everything
to Prichard for $160,000 payable $50,000 in cash, and $110,000 from 50% of the oil
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In summary, the income from an economic interest may be
measured by a share of the mineral extracted, the gross sales
price of the mineral, or the net profits realized from the extraction of the mineral, so long as there is no obligation to pay from
any source other than the production of the mineral. However,
if payment is made regardless of extraction, or is in any form
guaranteed, the income is not income with respect to an economic interest even though it is actually received from the
production of the mineral.
2. Basic Types of Economic Interests
The four basic types of interests in oil and gas properties
that qualify as economic interests are the following: working
interests, 2 royalty rights,' net profits interest,'28 and all preproduced from the land or, if the land was sold by Prichard, the proceeds of the sale
were to be applied by Prichard to satisfy the balance remaining on the production
payment. The Supreme Court held that O.C.C.'s $110,000 "production payment" did
not qualify as an "economic interest" in the oil in place. The Court held that although
payment might be and, in fact, was satisfied from oil production, it also could have
been satisfied from the proceeds of the sale of real property. As a result of the Court's
holding, Prichard was required to include in his income the 50% he paid to O.C.C.,
O.C.C. was not entitled to a depletion deduction on the amounts received, and O.CC.
was required to report as a capital gain any amounts received in excess of its basis in
the production.
126. The term "operating interest" is defined by Regs. 1.614-2(b) as "a separate
mineral interest as described in section 615(a), in respect of which the costs of production are required to be taken into account by the taxpayer .... " Because the person
holding this interest is the one who physically operates the extraction and production
process, a working interest is separate and distinct from royalty, production type
interests, and net profits interests. The other three types of economic interest are
"nonoperating" interests in the sense that the holders of those interest do not participate in the production process, but merely receive income from the operations. In
connection with the concept of a working interest to IDC, see text accompanying note
19 supra.
127. A "royalty interest" entitles its holder to a share of the gross production of
the gas and oil from a specific property. The share in production typically lasts as long
as the property interest to which it applies continues to produce. However, in certain
circumstances, it may be limited by local law or be payable at a variable rate or at a
minimum or accelerated rate. A nonproductive royalty, a royalty which applies to a
property not in production, will lapse at the end of a stated term. However, a royalty
interest that is, upon creation, limited to a certain term will continue to exist beyond
the stated term as long as production of the oil and gas actually continues. In this
circumstance, this so called "term royalty" might be more accurately described as a
form of production payment.
128. A "net profits interest" can be briefly described as the right to receive a
specified share of the net profits from production. The method for computation of "net
profit" is not specified statutorily (by the Code or regulation); however, the contract
creating this interest will usually specify those costs and expenditures to be deducted
from gross income to arrive at the net profits figure. Again, a net profits interest,
considered to be a nonoperating interest, is one which lasts throughout the period of

1979

OIL AND GAS REFORM

1969 and certain post-1969 production payments.' 9 Is there a
reason for the conspicuous absence of the "fee interest" in the
list of basic economic interests? Yes, the fact that an individual
holds fee title to land does not automatically mean that he has
any interest in the minerals beneath its surface. Clearly, it is
possible to acquire title to land which has had its mineral rights
severed and conveyed by a prior owner. In addition, it is possible to hold title to land as a form of security device. In this case,
the titleholder has no economic interest in the minerals in
place. 30 Finally, even in those situations where the fee interest
holder does hold title to the mineral rights, he does not necessarily possess an economic interest in the minerals in place
because economic interest exists upon the production of the
mineral deposit. The mere holding of a mineral rights interest,
without taking any other action does not qualify as an
"economic interest."
B.

Production Payments
A common method of obtaining the additional capital or
equipment necessary to bring a property to the producing stage
is to agree to share the mineral in place upon production. Consequently, the taxpayer may either retain an interest in production or transfer an interest in production to the party who
assists in the development of the property. Such a transferred
interest is commonly known as a "production payment."
Defined by Regulation 1.636-3(a)(1),' 3' the term production payment is a right to receive a specified share of the production from a mineral property which is limited by any of the
following: 1) dollar value, 2) amount of oil and gas produced,
or 3) a specified length of time. In order to qualify as a production payment, the interest must have an economic life of
shorter duration than of the mineral property to which it applies.
Production payments may be created in either of two
ways. First, they may be created by one who sells the working
interest in the mineral property and reserves a production payment for himself. This type is called a retained production
production. As with the "term royalty", a "term net profits interest" might be construed as a form of a production payment.
129. See text accompanying note 131 supra.
130. Gap Anthracite Co. v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 924, 931, (1972)
(CCH), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 931 (1973).
131. (1973).
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payment. Second, they may be created by one who keeps his
working interest in the mineral property and creates or "carvesout" a production payment which he sells to a third party. By
virtue of section 636, a provision enacted in the Tax Reform Act
of 1969, retained production payments may be treated as purchase mortgage and carved out production payments may be
treated as mortgages loans. As will be shown hereinafter, the
enactment of section 636 caused these preproduction payments
to lose their status as "economic interests." Thus, the section
substantially impairs the tax planning devices once available
through the use of production payments. The most notable is
32
the device of the ABC transaction.
1. Retained Production Payment
Under law prior to the enactment of section 636, during the
payout period, the holder of the retained production payment
possessed an economic interest in the property. Accordingly,
the income from production paid to the holder of the production payment in satisfaction of the obligation was interpreted
to be depletable income in the hands of the holder of the production payment and excludable from the gross income of the
operator.
For example, assume that in 1967, A, owning a producing
oil property in which he had an adjusted basis of $10,000, sells
his property to B for $15,000 cash plus the retention by A of a
$100,000 production payment, payable from 50% of the oil produced and bearing interest at 5% per annum on the unpaid
balance. Since the $100,000 production payment is not considered when computing A's gain on the sale, A will have a $5,000
taxable gain ($15,000 cash less $10,000 basis) that is subject to
depletion. B will now have a basis in the property of $15,000,
the amount of cash conveyed to A. In 1968 the property produces $50,000 of oil. Abiding by the contract, B pays $25,000
to A and includes in income the balance of the $50,000 of oil.
The $25,000 paid to A is allocated as follows: $2,500 to interest
on the production payment, and $22,500 to reduce the principal
of the production payment to $77,500 (the $100,000 retained
production payment less the $22,500 principal payment).
33
Now, assume this sale transpired in 1970 or later years.
132. See text accompanying note 133 supra.
133. Treasury regulation section 1.636-4(a) provides that section 636 applies to
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Section 636 prescribes that a retained production payment on
the sale of the mineral property is to be treated as if it were a
purchase money mortgage and, contrary to prior law, it does
not qualify as an economic interest to its holder. Consequently,
A realizes a gain of $105,000 (the sales price of $100,000 retained production payment and the $15,000 cash less A's
$20,000 basis in the property). On the other hand, the income
from production used to satisfy the obligation supported by the
production payment is depletable ordinary income in the
hands of the owner of the working interest. Consequently, B,
as the new owner of a working interest in the mineral property
purchased from A includes in gross income the total $50,000 of
oil production and 100% of production income in subsequent
years. The $25,000 payment to B represents merely a payment
on the purchase money mortgage and has no tax effect on either
A or B. B has a basis of $115,000 in the property (the $100,000
"purchase money mortgage" plus the $15,000 cash).
2. The ABC Transaction
The ABC transaction differs from the normal retained production payment in only one aspect; after selling the working
interest, the initial owner of the property sells the retained
production. In the ABC transaction, A, the owner of oil and gas
property, sells it to B, an operator and developer. B, in turn,
secures financing from C, who receives a production payment
for the amount of his advance. In essence, the transaction consists of the sale of A's property to B in return for cash consideration and a retained production payment, with A simultaneously assigning the production payment to C in return for the
remainder of the sale price. Before section 636, A was deemed
to have sold his entire interest in which capital gain treatment
was available. C had a depletable in-oil payment right analogous to a royalty right. B, who possesses a working interest
subject to the in-oil payment to C, was also entitled to a depletion allowance.
The aforementioned tax result is changed by section
636(b) which treats the production payment as purchase
money mortgage loan rather than an "economic interest" in the
mineral property. As the purchaser of the working interest, B
production payments on or after August 7, 1969, other than production payments
created on or after January 1, 1971, pursuant to a binding contract entered into before
August 7, 1969.
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is now required to treat as depletable income the amounts used
to make the production payment. As the purchaser of the production payment, C treats the payments from B as the receipt
of nontaxable return of principal plus taxable interest. As the
seller, A's tax treatment remains unchanged; he realizes a taxable gain on the sale.
For example, assume that A sells his property to B for
$100,000 cash plus a $300,000 retained production payment. If
A sells the retained production payment to C for $300,000, A's
gain on the sale is taxable as it was prior to August 7, 1969.
Holding a mineral property with a $400,000 rather than a
$100,000 basis if prior to 1970 basis, B has a higher cost for
purposes of computing cost depletion. However, this advantage
is more than offset by the fact that B may no longer exclude
from gross income the amounts he pays to C in satisfaction of
C's production payment. The reason for this is that C's production payment, no longer an economic interest, is deemed to be
a loan. Therefore, B is now taxable on the total production of
the property and is entitled to deduct only that portion to C
which represents payment of interest on the indebtedness.
Obviously, after August 6, 1969, the acquisition of oil properties by developers by use of an ABC transaction, a common
practice prior to enactment of section 636, has lost much of its
appeal because of the loss of economic interest status for the
retained production. The developer, B, is no longer able to
purchase the mineral property with before-tax dollars.
3. Carved-Out Production Payment
Section 636(a) provides a general rule that a carved-out
mineral production payment, once treated as an economic interest is now to be treated as a mortgage loan on the mineral
property. However, section 636(a) also provides an exception to
this general rule. A production payment carved out for the
"exploration or development of a mineral property"'' 4 is not
treated as a mortgage loan, and is therefore not affected by the
new law, if gross income is not realized by the person creating
the production payment. For example, A carves out a production payment for $100,000 at a selling price of $90,000 to X. A
agrees also to use the proceeds to drill development wells on his
mineral property. The exception in section 636(a) applies: X
134. I.R.C. § 636(a).
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can continue to treat the $100,000 production payment as an
economic interest subject to depletion while A does not include
the $90,000 in his income.
The tax treatment of all carved-out production payments
created prior to August 7, 1969 and the treatment of those
carved-out production payments created after August 6, 1969
which do not qualify for the section 636(a) exception, is illustrated by the following examples.
Assume that on December 31, 1967, A carves out a
$100,000 production payment bearing interest at 5% of the
productin of his oil property. B purchases the "carve-out" from
A for $95,000. For 1967, A has $95,000 of ordinary income subject to depletion and B owns a $100,000 production payment.
In 1968, assume A has gross income of $50,000 from the property. He excludes $25,000 from his income, paying it to B in
partial satisfaction of the production payment, and claims depletion against the $25,000 he retains. On the other hand, B is
entitled to cost depletion in such an amount that the only net
taxable income he would have to report over the life of the
payment is the interest equivalent which was built into the
production payment.
However, with the enactment of section 636, the treatment
of both A and B has changed. Assume A, the owner of a producing oil property, carves out a production payment on December
31, 1970, in the principal amount of $100,000 bearing interest
at the rate of 5% per year and payable from 75% of the gross
production. A sells this carve-out to B for $75,000. Since under
section 636(a) A is treated as having obtained a loan, this
transaction creates no taxable income for A in 1970. Because
B is treated as making a loan, the transaction does not create
an economic interest which would allow B to claim depletion.
Assume further that in 1971, the property produces
$100,000 of income from oil. A could have $100,000 of ordinary
income subject to depletion. On December 31, 1971 he pays
$75,000 to B in partial satisfaction of the production payment.
The $75,000 is treated as follows: $5,000 as interest (deductible
as an interest expense to A and includible as interest income
to B); $52,500 as a nontaxable return of capital (75% of the
$75,000 payment to B less $5,000 in interest); and $17,500 as
capital gain to B (not subject to depletion). The principal
amount of the production payment is reduced to $48,500
($100,000 less the $52,500 return of capital).
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C.

Depletion- Computation of Allowance
Once it has been ascertained that the taxpayer and his
particular property'3 5 qualify for the depletion allowance, the
computations necessary for the depletion deduction can be
made. The four major considerations inherent in the computation of the depletion allowance are as follows:
1) Depletion must be computed on a "mineral property by mineral property" basis; 1'3
2) The Code provides one method for calculating depletion
known as cost depletion;1
3) The Code provides an alternative method, subject to certain
qualifications, for computing depletion known as percentage depletion;lm
4) Both depletion methods must be computed for each property
on an annual basis because the taxpayer is required to use the
higher of the cost of percentage
amounts to determine the allowa3
ble depletion deduction. '
135. Because depletion must be computed separately for each oil and gas property
owned by the taxpayer (sections 612 and 613), and because the taxpayer cannot compute his allowable depletion deduction until he has determined the number of properties he holds, (section 614(a)) the importance of the term "property" for depletion
purposes, cannot be overstressed. The following example demonstrates the calculation
of the allowable depletion on a per property basis:
Operating
Operating
Aggregation
mineral
mineral
of
interest S
interest T
S and T
Gross Income
Expenses

$1,000

$1,000

$2,000

950

250

1,200

Taxable income
-

-

50

750

800

220
25

220
375

440
400

Cost (assumed)

50

200

250

Allowable (Greater of
percentage and cost
depletion)

50

230

400

(before depletion)

Depletion:
22% of gross income
50% of net income

136.
137.
138.
139.

I.R.C. §§ 612-13.
Id. §§ 611-12.
Id. §§ 611, 613, 613A.
Id. § 613(a).
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1.

Cost Depletion

Because the taxpayer is allowed to recover by way of deduction a proportional amount of his capital investment over
the useful life of the asset, the concept of cost depletion can be
likened, in theory, to the straight line method of depreciation.
The main difference, however, between the two concepts rests
in the definition of the asset's "useful life." In the case of depreciable tangible assets, the useful life is measured in years;
whereas, the depletable asset's useful life is measured in terms
of units produced (and sold) and units remaining in reserve.
The discussion of cost depletion will focus on computing cost
depletion, adjusted basis, and number of units remaining in
the oil and gas deposit.
a. The Calculation of Cost Depletion
Cost depletion is the basic method of depletion. The allowable cost depletion amount is the product of the "depletion
unit" times the "number of units of mineral sold within the
taxable year."' 40 Section 1.611-2(a)(1) of the regulations defines
"depletion unit" as the basis of the mineral property, determined with reference to section 612 and the regulations
thereunder, divided by the "number of units remaining as of
the taxable year." The regulation defines the "number of units
remaining as of the taxable year" as including those units
which have not yet been recovered, those which have been
recovered but not yet sold, and those which have been recovered and sold during the taxable year.' When the regulations are reduced to algorithmic form, the formula for computing cost depletion can be stated as follows:
Dc = (S) (B) where
(U)
Dc = Cost depletion amount

S = Number of units sold during the taxable year
B = Adjusted basis of property at end of the year
U = Number of units remaining at end of year (includes
units in the reservoir, units recovered but not sold,
and units sold within the taxable year).
140. Treas. Reg. § 1.611-2(a)(1) (1967).
141. Treas. Reg. § 1.611-2(a)(3) (1967).
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For example, assume that the oil or gas property has an
adjusted basis of $40,000 as of the end of the taxable year, that
the remaining estimated recoverable units is 30,000 barrels,
and that of the 5,000 barrels produced only 3,000 were sold. The
allowable cost depletion deduction for the property is
Dc

(3,000) (40,000)
30,000

Dc = $4,000
b. Adjusted Basis
The starting point in determining adjusted basis is the
taxpayer's initial cost in the acquired property. 4 However,
since the adjusted basis of the property for depletion purposes
is determined at the end of the taxable year, any capital expenditures made during the year are automatically provided
for in the cost depletion computation.
Although the computation of adjusted basis is relatively
simple in most cases, a problem of allocating costs between
depletable and nondepletable property may arise when, without any differentiation, both types are acquired in a single
conveyance. Examples of such a transaction would be the acquisition, for a lump sum, of an oil and gas (depletable) leasehold interest along with equipment (depreciably) or the acquisition of a fee interest in surface land (nondepletable) and mineral deposit (depletable) without specification of cost breakdown.
In the event that allocation between depletable and nondepletable property is necessary, sections 1.611-1(d)(4)4 3 and
1.167(a)(5)'4 can be cited for the proposition that the relative
fair market values of the properties should be used in determining the proper allocation of cost. In this context, although the
acquisition cost of an oil and gas property usually approximates the fair markets of the assets, it is noteworthy that a
situation can arise wherein the cost and fair market value
amounts differ radically. Such a situation was presented in the
Island Creek Coal Company 5 case. In Island Creek, the peti142.
143.
144.
145.

I.R.C. §§ 1011-12.
(1960).
(1956).
Island Creek Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 540 (1966).
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tioner acquired coal-bearing property including sales contracts,
depreciable assets, and mineral leases. He contended that the
value of the depreciable assets alone was worth more than the
entire purchase price.'" The Service, however, contended that
the mineral leases represented a part of the cost of the acquired
property." 7 On the issue of the valuation of the intangible nondepreciable assets (mineral leases) the Tax Court held: "We
have also concluded from the evidence that the coal leases had
no cost to petitioner over and above the royalties which were
to be paid to the lessors if, as, and when the coal was mined
and that the sales contracts and other intangible assets had no
value.'" 4 Responding to this adverse decision with Revenue
Ruling 69-539,'" the Service stated, "Only in rare and extraordinary circumstances will a taxpayer acquire a going enterprise
in which the mineral leases have no value apart from the royalty that they specify for the lessor."' 50
What happens when land is acquired with the mineral
lease or estate? The old rule provided that allocation of basis
to the mineral interest was only proper when the property was
in a "proven" area.' 5 ' However, the current regulations require
that where surface land is acquired along with a mineral interest in a single transaction, the portion of the cost attributable
to the land, which is nondepletable and nondepreciable, must
be excluded when determining the basis of the mineral inter52
est.
Problems of allocating basis between mineral interests and
surface land acquired in a single transaction can also arise in
gain or loss computations when the property is conveyed in
separate transactions. An illustrative case is American Realty
Company v. Commissioner.'5 3 In this case the taxpayer acquired the surface land and mineral interest in a single transaction. In subsequent years, the taxpayer granted a mineral lease
and claimed percentage depletion on the bonuses received.
146. Id. at 541.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 543.
149. Rev. Rul. 69-539, 1969-2 C.B. 141.
150. Id.
151. XIV-1 C.B. 98 (1935), declared obsolete, Rev. Rul. 68-661, 1968-2 C.B. 607.
152. Treas. Reg. § 1.612-1(b) (1960); see also, Beaver Dam Coal Co. v. United
States, 370 F.2d 414 (6th Cir. 1967).
153. 47 B.T.A. 653 (1942).
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Upon the sale of the entire surface land and mineral interest,
the taxpayer, claiming that there was no independent mineral
cost at the time of acquisition, did not reduce its basis to reflect
the depletion taken. The Board of Tax Appeals required the
taxpayer to reduce its basis in the property for purposes of
computing gains and losses to reflect the depletion taken in
prior years. 5 ' As a result of this decision, even though no cost
allocation is ever made, a taxpayer who claims depletion deductions will have to reduce his basis in the mineral property
at the time of sale.
c. Number of Units Remaining at the End of the
Taxable Year
While the "number of units sold" during the year, determined in accordance with the oil and gas taxpayer's method of
accounting, 5 5 presents no unusual problems of interpretation
or application, the "number of units remaining at the end of
the year" presents a more troublesome problem. The problem
arises because the number of units remaining in the oil and gas
reserves is an estimation of the quantity of units contained
within the deposit. The problem is militated by the fact that
the estimated reserves are based not only upon developed deposits, but also upon those which are "probable" or even
merely "propective". 56 Due to extensions into known deposits,
where there is a "high degree of probability" or "good evidence" that reserves exist,'57 such "probable" or "prospective"
reserves are estimated in conjunction with the track record of
the larger tract or parcel containing the oil or gas property.",,
Since the estimated reserve figure presupposes
154. Id. at 657.
155. Treas. Reg. § 1.611-2(a)(2) (1960). It provides that the phrase "number of
units sold within the taxable year"(i) In the case of a taxpayer reporting income on the cash receipts

and disbursements method, includes units for which payments were received within the taxable year although produced or sold prior to the
taxable year, and excludes units sold but not paid for in the taxable year,
and
(ii) In the case of a taxpayer reporting income on the accrual
method, shall be determined from the taxpayer's inventories kept in
physical quantities and in a manner consistent with his method of inventory accounting under section 471 or 472.
156. Treas. Reg. § 1.61102(c)(1)(ii) (1960).
157. Id.
158. Id. § 1.611-2(c)(1)(ii)(a) (1960).
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"recoverable reserves,"' 5 the estimation of reserves also requires a calculation as to that portion of the overall estimated
deposit that will be recoverable. The regulation on this point
states, "[T]he estimate or determination must be made according to the method current in the industry and in light of
''
the most accurate and reliable information obtainable. 116
Therefore, it appears that an estimation of recoverable reserves
for oil and gas deposits may also take into account the possibility of using secondary or tertiary recovery methods.
When must the taxpayer make his estimation on the basis
of such methods? In the leading case on this point, 6 ' the Tax
Court held that the petitioner's plans for increased recovery by
way of considerable capital expenditure for recovery enhancement was "impractible from a business standpoint.' ' 6 2 It would
appear that an estimation of recoverable reserves should be
based only upon those reserves which can be recovered from a
feasible economic standpoint. Obviously, the "feasibility" due
to our expanding technology of recovery enhancement for recoverable reserves creates a high degree of uncertainty. For
example, whereas "waterflooding" has been used for many
years to stimulate production, more current methods such as
gas recycling, miscible fluid injection, and even "fireloading"
have been gaining favor, although some are still only experimental. Therefore, since extension of the "recoverable reserves" doctrine to the more exotic recovery enhancement techniques seems reasonable, fortunately from the taxpayer's viewpoint, experimental methods will probably not qualify for estimated recoverable reserve revision purposes.
2. Percentage Depletion
a. Background and History
The percentage depletion allowance, also referred to as
statutory depletion, has been one of the preeminent issues in
the field of oil and gas taxation. Most taxpayers have learned
of the existence of the percentage depletion allowance for oil
and gas and have formed a strong opinion on the subject. As a
result, the percentage depletion allowance is one of the most
159. Id. § 1.611-2(c)(1) (1960).

160. Id.
161. Black Gold Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 3 T.C.M. (CCH) 241 (1944).
162. Revenue Act of 1916.
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emotional and bitter facets of the "special treatment" tax dispute.
Statutory provision first enacting percentage depletion
can be found in the Revenue Act of 1926. The first specific
statutory reference to oil and gas depletion provided for a
reasonable allowance for actual reduction in the "settled production" or regular flow from the well. The "reduction in flow"
concept" 4 gave way, in the Revenue Act of 1918, to a "discovery
value depletion" allowance based upon the cost of the property,
or where the fair market value was substantially disproportionate to the cost, "based upon the fair market value of the
property at the date of discovery, or within thirty days thereafter .... "I The Revenue Act of 192166 left the other discov-

ery value provisions intact but added a clause limiting the
depletion allowance to 50% of the net income from the property.

67

Great dissatisfaction was voiced by the oil and gas industry over both the difficulties and uncertainties in establishing
discovery values and the inequalities between competing taxpayers. 66 The search for a simpler and more operationally uniform basis for the depletion allowance led to the "depletion
allowance based on the income" concept codified in the Revenue Act of 1926. While discarding the "discovery value" concept, this act retained the 50% of net income from the property
limitation and provided for a depletion allowance based upon
27 1/2% of the gross income from the property. "9 Although arbitrary, the concept of a 27 1/2% depletion rate based on gross
income from the property provided the necessary uniformity
while retaining the discovery and development incentive fac164. The reduction in flow method of computing depletion was based on measuring the rate of flow at the time it became regular, or "settled", and then again at the
end of the taxable year. Any reduction in the rate of flow was reduced to a ratio which
was applied against, and ultimately limited to, the capital investment in the well to
yield the allowable depletion deduction from income.
165. Revenue Act of 1918, §§ 214(a)(10), 234(a)(9), (Individuals and corporations
respectively).
166. Revenue Act of 1921, §§ 214(a)(10), 234(a)(9), ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227. (Individuals and corporations respectively).
167. This same limitation is located at § 613(a).
168. Although the 1921 Act solved the problem of the taxpayer taking a larger
depletion deduction than the net income from his property, a very broad discretion still
remained in the taxpayer with a newly discovered oil and gas property.
169. Revenue Act of 1926, § 204(c)(2), ch. 27, 44 Stat. 9.
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tors, and ease of administration lacking in the "discovery
value" method.
The evolution of the current version of the percentage depletion allowance involved many refinements and clarifications
upon the original provisions. It was recognized early that only
those taxpayers qualifying for cost depletion could qualify for
percentage depletion. In 1945 the court in the case of Kirby
Petroleum Company v. Commissioner held as follows: "The
allowance of percentage depletion is made only to the persons
who would be entitled to claim cost'depletion on account of
their ownership of a depletable capital asset, the fundamental
theory of the allowance not having been altered by the provisions for percentage depletion."'' 0 Further, although the Service tried to limit allowance of percentage depletion to only
those taxpayers who have a positive basis for their economic
interest, the courts consistently ruled as follows:
The percentage depletion allowance is not conditioned upon the
existence of any basis, and bears no relation thereto. Under the
plain terms of the statute, it is allowable to any taxpayer who
owns an economic interest in oil or gas in place and derives income therefrom during the taxable year.'71

Also, disputes arose over the proper allocation of depletion
and gross income between taxpayers because the percentage
depletion allowance was linked directly to income from production. Numerous clarifications concerning proper allocation of
percentage depletion between economic interest holders were
made in the Twin Bell Oil Syndicate case.7 2 The holding in
Twin Bell was based on the following train of logic: no matter
which method of computing depletion is used, the total allowable deduction must be apportioned between the lessor and lessee.7 3 To allow a 1 royalty holder and the taxpayer, both of
whom receive gross income for the property, to take depletion
on their gross income would result in a total allowance of 271/2 %
of 5/4 of the total production which is inconsistent with the
principal of apportionment between lessor and lessee. The
Court noted further that the concept of "gross income from the
property" as a basis for computing percentage depletion could
not be interpreted to include all uses possible, but only the
170.
171.
172.
173.

148 F.2d 80, 81 (5th Cir. 1945), rev'd. 326 U.S. 599 (1946).
Rowan Drilling Co. v. Commissioner, 130 F.2d 62, 66 (5th Cir. 1942).
Commissioner v. Twin Bell Oil Syndicate, 293 U.S. 312 (1934).
Id. at 320.
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gross income from oil and gas. "4 By restricting the concept of
allowable depletion to a single depletion allowance among economic interest holders, the royalty holder was entitled to percentage depletion on his gross income from the royalty, and the
taxpayer was limited to percentage depletion calculated on the
portion of his gross income from the property he had the right
to retain. 7 '
The importance of the percentage depletion allowance is
due largely to the results of the interplay between percentage
depletion and other oil and gas provisions, such as the IDC
election and the mandatory capitalization of G and G costs.
For example, a taxpayer claiming percentage depletion who
opts to deduct intangible drilling costs, can achieve a greater
total deduction than if the IDC are capitalized, even though
the IDC must be included in the expenses offsetting gross
income to reach the net income figure for purposes of the 50%
net income limitation. "'
The following example illustrates the computations involved in percentage depletion: "7
Gross Income
IDC
Operating Expenses
Total Expense
Net Income
50% of Net Income
22% of Gross Income
Allowable Depletion
IDC Deduction
Total Deductions

$100,000
$30,000
$20,000
$
$
$
$
$
$

50,000
50,000
25,000
22,000
22,000
30,000
$52,000

b. Recent Legislative Enactments
The creation of the percentage depletion allowance
spawned an argument that has flourished for more than fifty
years. While terming the percentage depletion provisions as
"special treatment," many taxpayers and legislators have at174.
175.
176.
177.
§ 263(c);

Id. at 321.
Id.
Treas. Reg. § 1.613-5.
The assumptions are: 1) the taxpayer elects to deduct IDC currently under
and 2) taxpayer has one property as defined by § 614(a).
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tacked the percentage depletion allowance on the grounds that
it provides unwarranted and preferential tax benefits for a single industry and group of elite taxpayers. In rebuttal, oil and
gas taxpayers, citing the importance of domestic energy sufficiency, have argued that, in the face of extreme economic risk
and the requisite large capital investment, the loss of percentage depletion would reduce the incentive to discover and develop new oil and gas deposits. For many years the oil and gas
industry was able to maintain the upper hand in Congress.
Recently, however, the industry suffered a resounding defeat.
By enacting the Tax Reform Act of 1969 and the Tax Reduction
Act of 1975, Congress acknowledged the political influence of
reform-minded taxpayers.
While the Tax Reform Act of 1969171 repealed the 271/2%
depletion rate and instituted a new flat rate of 22% of gross
income from the property, the Tax Reduction Act of 1975'1'
effectively repealed the section 613 percentage depletion allowance provisions for all except four limited groups of taxpayers.1ss The 22% depletion allowance is now granted only to taxpayers with income from production of the following: 1) regulated natural gas;'"' 2) natural gas sold under a fixed contract;18 2 and 3) any geothermal deposit which is determined to
be a gas well.IS3 The fourth group of taxpayers still allowed to
178. § 501, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969).
179. § 501, Pub. L. No. 94-12, 89 Stat. 47 (1975).
180. I.R.C. § 613A(b)(1).
181. Section 613A(b)(2)(B) defines regulated natural gas as:
domestic natural gas produced and sold by the producer, before July 1,
1976, subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission, the
price for which has not been adjusted to reflect to any extent the increase
in liability of the seller for tax under this chapter by reason of the repeal
of percentage depletion for gas. Price increases after February 1, 1975,
shall be presumed to take increases in tax liabilities into account unless
the taxpayer demonstrates the contrary by clear and convincing evidence.
182. Section 613A(b)(2)(a) defines natural gas sold under a fixed contract as the
following:
domestic natural gas sold by the producer under a contract in effect on
February 1, 1975, and at all times thereafter, before such sale, under
which the price for such gas cannot be adjusted to reflect to any extent
the increase in liabilities of the seller for tax under this chapter by reason
of the repeal of percentage depletion for gas. Price increases after February 1, 1975, shall be presumed to take increases in tax liabilities into
account unless the taxpayer demonstrates to the contrary by clear and
convincing evidence.
183. Geothermal deposit is not defined in section 613A. Section 1.613A-7(e), of the
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take percentage depletion are those "independent producers
and royalty owners" who qualify under paragraphs 613A(c)(1)
through (11) as limited by paragraphs 613A(d)(1) through (4).
However, these independent producers and royalty owners are
further restricted in claiming percentage depletion. Not only
are they subject to a new limitation based on taxable income,'8
independent producers and royalty owners are also limited to
a sliding scale in future years on both the applicable percentage'" and the quantity of production." 6 In addition, depletion
is a tax preference item for minimum tax purposes." 7 The exemption afforded the independent producers and royalty owners with their correlative restrictions deserve further analysis.
i. Qualification as Independent Producers on Royalty Owners
Known also as the "small producers" exemption, the independent producers and royalty owners exemption in section
613A(c) is most easily defined by exclusion. Oil and gas taxpayers who are "retailers," "refiners," or are "related" to retailers
or refiners cannot qualify under the section 613A(c) exemption.
A "retailer" is any taxpayer who sells oil or natural gas,
or any product derived therefrom, directly or through a
"related person", either 1) through any retail outlet operated
by the taxpayer or a "related person", or 2) to any person who
is: a) obligated to use a taxpayer's or a related person's trademark or service name in marketing or distributing the oil or
natural gas product, or b) given authority by the taxpayer or a
related person to occupy any retail outlet which is owned,
leased, or otherwise controlled by the taxpayer or a related
person.'
A "refiner" is a taxpayer or related person who refines
crude oil and on any single day during the year refines more
than 50,000 barrels. 89
For purposes of both the retailer and refiner exclusions, a
proposed regulations defines it in terms of a geothermal reservoir of heat, stored in
rocks or aqueous fluid, in the form of liquid or vapor.
184. See text accompanying note 217 infra.
185. See note 203 infra.
186. See note 199 infra.
187. See text accompanying note 221 infra.
188. I.R.C. § 613A(d)(2).
189. Id. § 613A(d)(4).
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related person exists whenever 1) the taxpayer or another person holds a significant ownership interest in the other, or 2) a
third person has significant ownership interest in both the taxpayer and such other person."10 A significant ownership interest
is deemed to exist where the taxpayer, other person, or third
person, owns 5% or more of either 1) the value of the outstanding stock of a corporation, 2) the profits or capital of a partnership, or 3) the beneficial interest in an estate or trust.'
Although the statutory provisions in the 1975 Act excluding retailers, refiners, and related persons were very comprehensive and detailed, it is clear that, in many situations ambiguities can arise over the proper interpretation of the provisions. For example, in an explanation of the Act it was stated:
[Tihe retailer exclusion could have been interpreted to deny the
small producer exemption to a royalty interest holder who also
holds a mere 5 percent interest in a partnership that operates a
comer drugstore which sells petroleum jelly. The Congress believes that the retailer exclusion should apply only where the
taxpayer has substantial retail operations and not to cases where
a taxpayers retail operations are essentially de minimus.1'2

Assuming the taxpayer does not run afoul of the retailer
and refiner exclusions, he faces two more obstacles before he
may begin to compute his percentage depletion allowance.
These obstacles are the advance royalty rule and the transfer
rule. Because the percentage depletion allowance for small
producers is allowed only where there is actual production during the year, under section 1.613A-7(f) of the proposed regulations advanced royalties and lease bonuses no longer qualify for
percentage to the extent actual production during the taxable
year is insufficient to earn such royalties."13 As the second obstacle, transfer of "proven" oil and gas property to an otherwise
small producer transferee precludes the transferee from qualification under the section 613A(c) exemption to take percentage
depletion on income attributable to that property. "' Also, production from that property cannot be taken into account in any
computation.
190. Id. § 613A(d)(3).

191. Id.
192.

JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION,

94th Cong.,

REFORM AcT OF 1976 (CCH) 625 (1976).

193. 42 Fed. Reg. 24, 279, 24,287 (1977).

194. I.R.C. § 613A(c)(9).
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ii. Restriction on the Quantity Subject to Percentage Depletion
The smallproducer exemption allows the taxpayer to compute his percentage allowance only upon his "average daily
production" of oil or natural gas" 5 as limited by his "depletable
' 96
oil quantity" or his "depletable natural gas quantity."'
The Code provides that taxpayers "average daily production" for the taxable year is determined by:
dividing his aggregate production of domestic crude oil or natural
gas, as the case may be, during the taxable year by the number
of days in such taxable year, and (B) in the case of a taxpayer
holding a partial interest in the production from any property
(including an interest held in partnership) such taxpayer's production shall be considered to be that amount of such production
determined by multiplying the total production of such property
by the taxpayer's percentage depletion participation in the revenues from such property.'T

The aggregate production used in the above computation does
not take into account any production resulting from secondary
or tertiary process.""8 Interestingly, the average daily production determination is made on a per-taxpayer basis rather than
a per-property basis.
The taxpayer's depletable oil quantity, which limits the
average daily production, is equal to the tentative "phase-out
table" amount. 9 9 This amount is reduced, but not below zero,
by the taxpayer's average daily secondary or tertiary production for the taxable year.2 "0
The taxpayer's depletable natural gas quantity is an
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. §
Id. §
Id. §
Id. §

613A(c)(1)(A).
613A(c)(1)(B).
613A(c)(2).
613A(c)(2)(B).

199. Id. § 613A(c)(3)(B). The table is reproduced below:
In the case of production
during the calendar year:
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980 and thereafter
200, Id. § 613A(c)(3)(A)(i), (ii).

The tentative quantity
in barrels is:
2,000
1,800
1,600
1,400
1,200
1,000
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amount equal to his phase-out table barrel amount multiplied
by 6,000 cubic feet." ' Thus, if he elected to apply his total
tentative quantity to natural gas, a taxpayer in 1980 would
have a tentative depletable natural gas quantity amount of
6,000,000 cubic feet of natural gas.
Because the section 613A(c)(3)(B) tentative depletable oil
quantity is reduced by the taxpayer's average daily secondary
or tertiary production for the taxable year, percentage depletion computations must be made separately for the taxpayer's
primary and secondary production attributable income. On
this point, section 613A(c)(6) provides that the amount of secondary or tertiary production (computed on an average daily
basis for the taxable year) that does not exceed the taxpayer's
tentative depletable oil quantity or depletable natural gas
quantity, is entitled to the 22% rate of depletion 20 2 notwithstanding the sliding scale applicable percentage rates listed in
subparagraph 5.203 Section 1.613A-7(k) of the proposed regulations"I defines secondary and tertiary production in terms of
increased production of oil or gas from a domestic well following application of a secondary process. "Increased production"
is that marginal increase in actual production during the year
over that which would have been produced absent application
of the "secondary process," and is manifested by an increase
in either the rate or duration of recovery.2 5 A "secondary process" is a process in which liquids or gases are injected in the
201. Id. § 613A(c)(4).
202. See note 199 supra.
203. I.R.C. § 613A(c)(5). The applicable percentage table is reproduced below:
In the case of production
during the calendar year is:

The applicable
percentage

1975
1976
1977

22
22
22

1978
1979
1980

22
22
22

1981
1982
1983
1984 and after

20
19
16
15

204. 42 Fed. Reg. 24,279, 24,287 (1977).
205. Id.
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deposit to increase the internal pressure in order to enhance
recovery o6
One major exception to the secondary process provisions
involves any process which must be introduced early in the
productive life of the property in order to be reasonably effective . ' 7 Cycling of gas in a gas condensate well is specifically
excluded from secondary process status."8 But injection or fireflooding will not be so disqualified if they would still have been
reasonably effective had they been introduced later in the pro2
duction life of the property. 0
It should be noted that the apparent benefit of retention
of the 22% rate for secondary or tertiary production until 1981
may be disadvantageous to taxpayers whose production exceeds the quantity limitations.2 10 Since secondary and tertiary
processes are very expensive and such expenses are subtracted
from gross income for the net income percentage limitation, the
taxpayer who is required to use all his depletable oil and natural gas quantity for such secondary or tertiary production may
have any benefit realized from the 22% rate retention offset by
the lower allowable deduction due to the net income limitation.
Those small producer taxpayers whose average daily production exceeds the quantity limitations must look to special
rules for guidance. Excess production of both oil"' and natural
gas212 requires the taxpayer to compute his allowable depletion
for each property as follows:
1) Divide the applicable depletable oil or natural gas quantity
by the average daily production in barrels or mcf for the taxable
year.
2) Compute the total percentage depletion allowance which
would have been allowable for the property using the applicable
sliding scale percentage rate for the property.
3) Multiply the amounts calculated in 1) and2 2)
to yield the
3
allowable percentage deduction for the property. 1

Also, depending on the taxable year, the applicable per206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See note 203 supra.
I.R.C. § 613A(c)(S)(A).
Id. § 613A(c)(8)(B), (C).
Id. § 613A(c)(7).
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centage rate to be applied against gross income may differ. The
taxpayer taking depletion upon regulated natural gas, fixed
contrast natural gas, or geothermal deposits, is allowed a flat
22%111 rate until 1984.15 On the other hand, the small producer
21
must look to the applicable percentage table.
iii. The Limitation Based on Taxable Income
Section 613A(d)(1) created a new 65% limitation based on
the taxpayer's taxable income. The purpose of the limitation
is to further restrict the allowable percentage depletion deduction for the small producer. The 65% limitation is applied to
taxable income computed without regard to any depletion on
production which is subject to the small producer exemption
rules, any net operating loss carryback, any capital loss carry1 7
back, and certain distributions from a trust to its beneficiary."
Any amount of deduction which is disallowed for the current
taxable year can be carried forward over to the next taxable
year,"' in which case such amount must be allocated back
among the respective properties owned for purposes of determining the higher of cost or percentage depletion."'9
The 65% limitation does not replace the section 613(a) 50%
of taxable income limitation. The distinction between the 65%
and 50% limitations is that they apply to taxable income on a
per-taxpayer basis and per-property basis respectively. The
result is that the small producer taxpayer must apply both
limitations in his computations of allowable percentage depletion deduction. Because of the per-taxpayer and per-property
difference, the provision for carry-over of the amount of percentage depletion disallowed by virtue of the 65% limitation, creates horrendous problems of computational complexity when
combined with the 50% limitation and higher-of-cost or percentage provisions.12
iv. Depletion as a Tax Preference Item
The small producer faces yet another computation which
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id. § 613A(c)(6)(A)(ii).
Id. § 613A(c)(6)(C).
See note 203 supra.
I.R.C. § 613A(d)(1),
Id.
For a detailed discussion of this problem, see Burke, Jr., Tax Reform Act of
Two Years Later, TWENTY-EIGHTH OIL AND GAS INST., 611, 611-14, 622-23,

1975 (1977).
220. See text accompanying note 139 supra.
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will impose additional tax liability. Enacted in 1969, section
57(a)(8) lists depletion deducted which is in excess of the adjusted basis of the property at the end of the taxable year as a
tax preference item subject to the minimum tax provisions.'
V. A COMPREHENSIVE EXAMPLE
The following example illustrates several computations
required when a small producer endeavors to claim depletion.
Assume that in the taxable year 1981 a taxpayer, W, owns
one property which has both primary and secondary production oil income of 255,500 and 109,500 barrels for the year respectively. Gross income of $1,500,000 and expenses of
$1,000,000 are incurred from the producing property. The taxpayers taxable income is $400,000. Assuming his allowable cost
depletion is $240,000, what is the taxpayer's allowable percentage depletion?
Computation of Depletable Oil Quantity
Average daily primary production $225,500 - 365 700 bbl
Average daily secondary production
$109,500 -- 365
300 bbl
Aggregate average daily production
1,000 bbl
Less number of barrels from secondary production 300 bbl
Depletable oil quantity
700 bbl
Apportionment of Gross and Taxable Income to Primary
and Secondary Production
Gross Income
Primary
Secondary

700 bbl X $1,500,000
300 bbl X $1,500,000

-

$1,050,000
$ 450,000

Taxable Income
Primary
Secondary

700 bbl X $400,000
300 bbl X $500,000

$350,000
$150,000

Computation of Tentative Percentage Depletion
Gross Income
Taxable Income

Primary

Secondary

$1,050,000
350,000

$450,000
150,000

221. The 20% is applied against primary production while 22% is applied against
secondary production. See note 203 supra.
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20/22% of Gross Income
50% of Taxable Income Limitation
Amount Allowable

210,000
175,000
175,000

99,000
75,000
75,000

Computation of Total Percentage Depletion Allowable
Combined primary and secondary depletion
The 65% limitation: 65% x 400,000
Lesser of the two

$250,000
$260,000
$250,000

Since the percentage depletion is higher than cost depletion on the property, the taxpayer will deduct $250,000 as percentage depletion.
VI.

CONCLUSION

As witnessed by the favorable percentage depletion and
intangible drilling cost provisions in the Internal Revenue
Code, there has been, and at present there still is, a national
policy favoring the exploration for and exploitation of domestic
oil and gas reserves. However, juxtaposed to the longstanding
preferential Code provisions reflecting this policy favoring oil
and gas exploration and exploitation are the newly enacted
provisions, added in recent years in response to taxpayer criticism and "tax reform" demands.
It has been readily apparent that the aforementioned
"reform" legislations have served to greatly reduce the incentives and preferential tax treatment previously afforded the oil
and gas industry. Although these "reforms" have not been exclusively restrictive, as this article has pointed out, the bulk of
the new provisions limit potential benefits, while the remainder are rather neutral in effect.

Power Plant Siting on Public Lands: A
Proposal for Resolving the EnvironmentalDevelopmental Conflict
By LEE KAPALOSKI*
INTRODUCTION

There is perhaps nothing in the energy development arena
more frustrating, complex, or misunderstood than the mystical
process of energy facility siting on federal or public lands. Endless wasted hours of second-guessing, sidestepping and outrageous amounts of bureaucratic paperwork are the notorious
hallmark of siting today.
This paper does not claim to be a panacea to this dilemma.
However, the procedures proposed do have real potential for
making the siting process at least comprehensible and, more
important, efficient for both the private industrial applicants
and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM).
Simply stated, this article presents' a straight-forward
practical methodology for finding the best sites for energy development on public lands. Further, the procedures suggested
are aimed at minimizing the lost time, manpower, and money
inherent in the currently used siting process-a system which
is realistically ad hoc at best.
The resulting proposal is organized into two separately
considered but clearly overlapping concerns, the legal rationale
and the technical methodology. The legal rationale sets out an
argument that the BLM has a statutory duty to develop some
process for siting large energy developments. The technical
methodology section follows with a suggested solution for meeting that responsibility.
* B.S., 1967, University of Utah; B.S., 1968, University of Utah; M.A., 1972 San
Diego State University; Ph.D., 1978, University of Colorado; J.D., 1978, University of
Utah. The author is in private law practice and is a planning consultant in Salt Lake
City, Utah.
1. This article is a condensation of the author's doctoral dissertation, A Geo-Legal
Methodology for ConsideringEnvironmental Values in Siting of Energy Development
on PublicLands (available through the University of Michigan Microfilm Library, Ann
Arbor). The research for the dissertation was supported by the grant of the National
Environmental Conservation Fellowship, granted by the National Wildlife Federation.
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LEGAL RATIONALE

FLPMA & the BLM
With the passage of the Federal Land Policy and Manage-

ment Act 2 (FLPMA) in 1976, over one-third of the total land

area of the United States was put under the administration of
the BLM and became subject to dramatically expanded land
use planning and management mandates. Beneath, upon, and
above these public lands are a vast and varied array of resource
values, both developmental and environmental, which the
BLM must manage in a manner that on one hand, "recognizes
the Nation's need for domestic sources of minerals, food, timber, and fiber from the public lands

. . ."I

and, on the other

hand, "will protect the quality or scientific, scenic, historical,
ecological, environmental, and atmospheric water resources,
and archaeological values."'
The BLM must develop some management process which
fulfills these two supposedly coequal goals in a fashion wherein
"the national interest will be best realized."5 While any definition of the term, "national interest," is tenuous, the Public
Land Law Review Commission (PLLRC) has developed the
phrase "maximization of net public benefits."6 Inherent in the
goal dichotomy are conflicts where the unrestrained maximizing of a developmental objective will seldom if ever be entirely
compatible with the maximizing of the environmental goal.
This inherent conflict of resource values imposes upon the
BLM as part of its decisionmaking the responsibility to make
the necessary sacrifices favoring one type of value over another.
In order to satisfy the responsibility of maximizing net
social benefits, the procedures of conflict resolution in siting
2. BLM Organic Act, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2773 (codified at 43 U.S.C.A.
§§§ 1701-1782 and in scattered sections of 7, 10, 16, 22, 25, 30, 40, 48, 49 U.S.C.A.
(Supp. 1978)) [hereinafter referred to as the FLPMA].
3. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1701(a)(12) (Supp. 1978).
4. Id. §1701(a)(8).
5. Id. §1701(a)(12).
6. U.S. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND
46 (1970). [Hereinafter referred to as PLLRC or PLLRC REPoiR] The Commission
developed the definition in response to its own mandate that "the public lands . . .
shall be (a) retained and managed or (b) disposed of all in a manner to provide the
maximum benefit for the general public." 43 U.S.C. § 1391 (1970). As stated in one of
the Commission's reports, there was clear recognition that the net maximization would
include both developmental and environmental goals. P. HAGENSTIN, CmRrFslA FOR
PUBLIC LAND DEcIsioNs 10-15 (1970).
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must be applied systematically and, perhaps more importantly, they must be timely relative to the realities of the utility industry's planning and constraints. The procedure must be
one which forces the BLM to affirmatively identify potential
zones for siting energy development prior to any significant
commitment by a utility to a specific site. Intrinsic in the present posture of the BLM is the politically sensitive burden of
challenging as respondent any industrially identified site which
may not be of the best "net public benefit." This political
burden often calcifies the agency's willingness to assert the
necessary value trade-off resolutions in favor of the industry's
predispositions, thus compromising certain very important
public resource values. This section of the paper develops the
argument that under both the Constitution and the FLPMA,
the BLM is compelled to develop a siting process which, among
other things, requires the BLM in cooperation with state and
local governments to nominate or prequalify areas or zones for
energy conversion facility siting prior to any formal applications from utilities.
B. ConstitutionalBasis
The generic governmental authority relative to managing
federally owned public lands comes from the broad powers contained in the Property Clause of the Constitution which allows
Congress to do essentially all that it feels is necessary to properly manage and protect these lands.7 The scope of this power
has been historically expanded by the courts8 to the point of
recent declarations by the Supreme Court in Kleppe v. New
Mexico.9 In Kleppe the power delegated to the Secretary of
Interior to manage wild burros was challenged. 9 The central
issue was "whether Congress exceeded its power under the
Constitution in enacting the Wild Free Roaming Horses and
Burros Act."" The Court, in its interpretation of the scope of
power under the Property Clause, directly discounted any
claims of limited powers on federal lands."
This grant of almost unbridled congressional discretion is
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, §3, cl. 2.
8. See Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96 (1928).
9. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
10. Wild Free Roaming Horses and Burros Act of 1971, 16 U.S.C. §§1331-1340
(1976).
11. 426 U.S. at 531.
12. Id. at 539.
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illustrated by the early statement of the Supreme Court that
"it is not for the courts to say how that trust [in public lands]3
shall be administered. That is for Congress to determine."'
More explicitly, in a case about federal jurisdiction over the
Hetchly Dam in the Yosemite National Park area, the Court
indicates that Congress has plenary power over public property
entrusted to it." More directly related to the power to determine the distribution and allocation of uses on public lands,
the Court in Kleppe cites an earlier statement that Congress
has the power to control land use and to condition rights in
5
land.
Given these cases, there seems to be ample authority for
Congress to authorize by statute the imposition of rules and
regulations necessary to carry out public policies on public
land. Congress' delegation of authority to the Secretary of Interior, then, would seem to be limited primarily by the restrictions Congress imposed in the statutory grant of the FLPMA.
In addition to these Property Clause powers, there are
other constitutional powers held by Congress, as trustee for the
public lands, which strengthen the legal rationale for delegating powers to develop an affirmative siting process. In sum, the
public trust doctrine is based upon the recognition of the government as the trustee of certain natural resources with the
responsibility to manage the trust for the benefit of all the
people.'" Coupling this trust responsibility with the Property
Clause, it is argued here that Congress not only can take positive steps to manage the public lands, but must, as trustee,
take such steps to protect the public interest in these lands."
The Supreme Court clearly states this duty is an affirmative
responsibility rather than merely a power to be used at the
discretion of Congress.' 8 Therefore, Congress, with trustee re13. Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911).
14. United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 30 (1940).
15. Utah Power and Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 405 (1917).
16. See W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW; Sax, The Public Trust
Doctrine in Natural Resource Law, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
17. Cohen, The Constitution, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Environment,
1970 UTAH L. REV. 388 (1970).
18.
The United States holds resources and territory in trust for its citizens in one sense, but not in the sense that a private trustee holds for a
cestui que trust. The responsibility of Congress is to utilize the assets that
come into its hands as sovereign in a way that it decides what is best for
the future of the nation.
Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 277 (1954).
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sponsibility for the BLM administered public lands, is obligated to create a mechanism for protecting present and future
public interests in the land against obtrusive interference by
private parties.'9
C. Delegation to the BLM
It is a generally accepted principle of administrative law
that, absent some inherent constitutional power of office, all
federal administrative authority must be conferred by statute,
either explicitly or implicitly. 0 The most comprehensive direct
delegation of authority to the BLM is contained in the
FLPMA. Although the Supreme Court almost universally allows limitless delegation, it is necessary as a prerequisite to
later arguments favoring mandatory siting requirements to
identify historic delegations by Congress which transfer the
above-mentioned congressional trustee responsibilities to the
Secretary of Interior.'
The first congressional assignment of any true management or planning authority over the public lands to the executive branch occurred as a result of the Taylor Grazing Act of
1935. Prior to that period, all the lands outside the congressionally specified reserve lands were held for ultimate disposal.2
Prior to and throughout this period "supervision of public business relating to . . . public lands, including mines was the
general duty of the Secretary of Interior. ' ' 23 Before 1946 the
19. Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
20. See generally, W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (5th ed. 1970)
ch. 2, §1 [hereinafter cited as GELLHORN & BYSE].
21. The instant question is not whether the BLM's delegated authority was too
broad or invalid but whether the delegation is clear enough to support the argument
that Congress intended to require the BLM to develop for the public lands a land
management mechanism which insures adequate protection of the public trust in that
land. This statement relies upon the conclusion of GELLHORN & BYSE that the court
has only twice limited congressional delegations. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United
States 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
22. P. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIc LAND LAW, ch. 21 (1968); Muys, The Federal
Lands, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 493 (1974).
23. 43 U.S.C. §1457 (1970). This general delegation of authority was apppoved by
the Supreme Court when it determined:
By general statutory provisions the execution of the laws regulating
the acquision of rights in public lands and the general care of these lands
is confided to the land department, as a special tribunal; and the Secretary of Interior, as head of the department, is charged with seeing that
this authority is rightly exercised to the end that . . . the rights of the
public [be] preserved.
Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450, 459 (1920) (emphasis added).
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General Land Office was the agency under the Secretary for
administering all public lands not statutorily transferred to
some preserve or reserve status such as the national forests and
the national parks.2 1 It was in 1946 that the BLM was formally
established by a reorganization plan issued by President Tru-

man

25

Later, in a 1950 executive order, the land management
powers of the Secretary were more specifically stated.26 However, between the Taylor Grazing Act and the FLPMA, land
management was still based on the assumption that the lands
would eventually be disposed? 7 There was no clear guidance to
the BLM as to how it was to manage the lands beyond promotion of grazing and mineral extraction until the passage of the
Classification and Multiple Use Act of 1964.2 This Act required
the Secretary to recommend which federally reserved lands
should be retained and which if any should be disposed. 29
In the period betwen 1964 and 1969 the PLLRC was to
make its recommendations about the disposition of public
lands.10 The final report of the Commission recommended a
dramatic shift in attitude away from favoring disposal to a
24. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1946, §403, 60 Stat. 1097 (1946).
25. Id.
26. There are hereby transferred to the Secretary of Interior all functions of all other officers of the Department of Interior and all functions
of all agencies and employees of such Department . . . . The Secretary
of Interior may from time to time make such provisions as he [deems)
appropriate authorizing the performance by any other officer, or by any
agency . . . of any function of the Secretary.
Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1950, §§1-2, 43 U.S.C. 1451 (1970).
27. Taylor Grazing Act, ch. 865, §1, 48 Stat. 1269 (1934).
28. 43 U.S.C. §1411 (1970).
29. The Secretary of Interior . . . will determine which of the public
lands . . . shall be (a) disposed of because they are (1) required for the
orderly growth and development of a community or (2) are chiefly valuable for residential, commercial, agricultural (exclusive of lands chiefly
valuable for grazing and raising forage crops), industrial, or public uses
or development or (b) retained, at least during this period in Federal
ownership and managed for (1) domestic livestock grazing, (2) fish and
wildlife development and utilization, (3) industrial development, (4)
mineral production, (5) occupancy, (6) outdoor recreation, (7) timber
production, (8) watershed protection, (9) wilderness preservation or (10)
preservation of public values that would be lost if the land passed from
Federal ownership.
Id. at §1411(a).
30. 43 U.S.C. §1391 (1970).
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comprehensive retention policy.3 ' In addition, the Commission
foresaw the vital necessity of comprehensive land planning by
recommending that "[all public land agencies should be required to formulate long range, comprehensive land use plans
was not until the passage of the FLPMA in 1976
. .. .,It
that the BLM finally had direct statutory mandates for this
recommended planning process.3 The shift in policy toward
retention is a crucial prerequisite to applying the public trust
doctrine to the BLM lands.
In summary, it appears that Congress has explicitly delegated to the Secretary of Interior and the BLM certain powers
and responsibilities which Congress constitutionally held over
lands retained in trust for the public.
D. BLM Exercise of Power
For analysis, the duties of the Secretary via the BLM and
the FLPMA are here divided into two classes. The first class is
the policy duties to which the BLM must adhere. The second
is the process duties which are the specific procedures which
the BLM must use to achieve these policies.
The basic policy mandates relevant to planning and management are contained in the Declaration of Policy title of the
FLPMA.3 4 This title contains three requirements imposing certain policy constraints on the actual planning process to be
used by the BLM for managing the lands. While there is no
explicit precedence among these mandates, by implication one
seems to be the framework for achieving the others. This is the
one requiring the implementation of the multiple use and sus31. PLLRC REPorr 1 (1970).
32. Id. at 52.
33. The FLPMA specified the Secretarial powers:
Subject to the discretion granted to him by Reorganization Plan
Number 3 of 1950, the Secretary shall carry out through the Bureau [of
Land Management) all functions, powers, and duties vested in him...
through the Bureau of Land Management ....
43 U.S.C.A. §1731(b) (Supp. 1978). Further, Congress endorsed land retention when
it declared that "the public lands be retained in Federal ownership." Id. §1701(b).
In the original Senate version, the retention philosophy was more explicit.
"[Tihe national interest will be best served by retaining the natural resource lands
in Federal ownership." S. 507, 94th Cong., 1st Seas. §3(a)(4) (1975). See also, letter
from Jack Horton, Assistant Secretary of Interior, to Senator Henry Jackson (March
6, 1975) in Hearings on S. 507 Before the Subcomm. on Environment and Land
Resources, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1975), for a similar endorsement of this policy.
34. 43 U.S.C.A. §1701 (Supp. 1978).
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tained yield principles as the basis for management." ' Within
the framework of the multiple use and sustained yield principles, the actual land use planning and decisionmaking are to
be carried out in a manner which includes equal consideration
of the aforementioned environmental and developmental

goals .31
While the use of the multiple use and sustained yield
framework can be somewhat procedural, policy goals and duties are also contained in the definition of multiple use.3 As a
part of its duties as trustee, the multiple use principle directs
the BLM to manage the lands in a way which somehow
achieves the best combination of land uses over time. Referring
to the Declaration of Policy title again, the combination of a
necessity for legally established goals and objectives as guidelines for public land use planning with the requirement of multiple use as the basis for management can be interpreted to
mean simply that the statements in the multiple use definition
are to be the basic objectives of the management or land planning process.
The analytical limitation of these policy duties is the lack
of specific standards against which the actions of the BLM can
be judicially scrutinized. They are so broad and open-ended
that without more definitive statutory direction, any attempts
to force the BLM to take certain specific actions as a part of
35. Id. §1701(a)(7).
36. Id. §1701(a)(8), (9).
37. The term "multiple use" means the management of the public
lands and their various resource values so that they are utilized in the
combination that will best meet the present and future needs of the
American people; making the most judicious use of the land for some or
all of these resources or related services over areas large enough to provide
sufficient latitude for periodic adjustments in use to conform to changing
needs and conditions; the use of some land for less than all of the resources; a combination of balanced and diverse resource uses that takes
into account the long-term needs of future generations for renewable and
nonrenewable resources, including, but not limited to, recreation, range,
timber, minerals, watershed, wildlife and fish, and natural scenic, scientific and historic values; and harmonious and coordinated management
of the various resources without permanent impairment of the productivity of the land and the quality of the environment with consideration
being given to the relative values of the resources and not necessarily to
the combination of uses that will give the greatest economic return or the
greatest unit output.
Id. § 1702(c). See generally, U.S. House Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Forests
of the House Committee on Agriculture, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). See also, Managing Federal Lands: Replacing the Multiple Use System, 82 YALE L.J. 787 (1973).
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these policies would be very tenuous. Therefore, this specificity
must come from the process duties mentioned above.
The process requirements of the FLPMA are of two general
types. One is the requirement of establishing an overall land
management or planning process. The second is the mandatory
rulemaking requirement which applies to all the BLM activities that are a part of "administering public land statutes and
exercising discretionary authority granted by them .... "3
The rules called for therein are commonly designated informal
rules contemplated under section 553 of the Administrative
Procedures Act.39
The problem is the extent of the BLM planning and land
use activities which must be included in the rulemaking requirement of the FLPMA. In addition to the general policy
mandate for rulemaking, 0 the Act imposes on the Secretary
two more rulemaking requirements." Support for the conclusions that a planning process is subject to the rulemaking requirements appears to come directly from these provisions.
The scope of rulemaking described in the policy section includes activities in which the Secretary is "exercising discretionary authority granted by [the public land statutes] ...."42
In the planning process itself, the Secretary is granted
discretionary authority to "issue mangement decisions to implement land use plans developed or revised under this section
...

."43 Therefore,

it seems evident that the land use planning

which develops into plans to be implemented by secretarial
management decisions are all on a continuum of the exercise
of discretion which is within the scope of the rulemaking requirements. To isolate only the culminating decisions from the
38. 43 U.S.C.A. §1701(a)(5) (Supp. 1978).
39. The public property exemption from the rulemaking requirement in section
553(a)(2) of the Administrative Procedures Act is explicitly eliminated for all activities
and lands covered by the FLPMA. 47 U.S.C.A. §1740 (Supp. 1978). See Verkiul,
Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VIRGINIA L. REv. 185 (1974). See also,
Model Review of Informal Rulemaking: Recommendation 74-4 of the Administrative
Conference of the United States, 1975 DUKE L.J. 479 (1975).
40. 43 U.S.C.A. §1701(a)(5) (Supp. 1978). See note 38 supra and accompanying
text.
41. These separate sections require the Secretary to "issue regulations necessary
to implement the provisions of this Act with respect to the management, use, and
protection of the public lands . . .[and] promulgate rules and regulations to carry
out the purposes of this Act." 43 U.S.C.A. §§1733, 1740 (Supp. 1977).
42. Id. §1701(a)(5).
43. Id. §1712(e).
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basic process on which the management decision is based is an
arbitrary division not consistent with the concept of the whole
decision process which actually occurs under this section.
Further statutory support for integrating planning and
specific decisionmaking comes from the statement that the
planning process is "necessary to implement the provisions
[for] the management, use, and protection of the public lands
.

.

.

.""

Most importantly, the FLPMA imposes an informa-

tional prerequisite to any allocation of uses, withdrawals, or
rights-of-way in the development of some land use plans for the
4
areas involved. 5
44. Id. §1733.
45. The following planning information is required for withdrawals of 5000 acres
or more and is to come from the planning for the affected area. Therefore, the 202
planning must occur prior to the formal withdrawal. The required planning information is:
(1) a clear explanation of the proposed use of the land involved
which led to the withdrawal;
(2) an inventory and evaluation of the current natural resource uses
and values of the site and adjacent public and nonpublic land and how
it appears they will be affected by the proposed use, including particularly aspects of use that might cause degradation of the environment, and
also the economic impact of the change in use on individuals, local communities, and the nation;
(3) an identification of present users of the land involved, and how
they will be affected by the proposed use;
(4) an analysis of the manner in which existing and potential resource uses are incompatible with or in conflict with the proposed use,
together with a statement of the provisions to be made for continuation
of termination of existing uses, including an economic analysis of such
continuation or termination;
(5) an analysis of the manner in which such lands will be used in
relation to the specific requirements for the proposed use;
(6) a statement as to whether any suitable alternative sites are
available (including cost estimates) for the proposed use or for uses such
as withdrawal would displace;
(7) a statement of the consultation which has been or will be had
with other Federal departments and agencies, with regional, State, and
local government bodies, and other appropriate individuals and groups;
(8) a statement indicating the effect of the proposed uses, if any,
on State and local government interests and the regional economy; •
(9) a statement of the expected length of time needed for the withdrawal;
(10) the time and place of hearings and of other public involvement
concerning such withdrawal;
(11) the place where the records on the withdrawal can be examined by interested parties; and
(12) a report prepared by a qualified mining engineer, engineering
geologist, or geologist which shall include but not be limited to informa-
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Given these prerequisites for any formal action involving
withdrawals or rights-of-way, which must of necessity be conditions precedent to action, the planning process, as the source
of such prerequisite information, is intimately tied to the decisions involved. The development of the information for the
planning process itself then is a part of the discretionary activities of the Secretary of Interior and the BLM. Therefore, it
should come within the scope of the rulemaking requirements.
The significance of the rulemaking procedures becoming a
requirement of the planning process is that they impose an
added responsibility on the agency to formally articulate the
decisionmaking framework inherent in the planning process
prior to any actual use of the process. Without such a rulemaking requirement, there is a significantly greater burden on the
agency when any legal challenge is made that the agency's
discretionary actions are not in compliance with the broad
statutory planning requirements. Without what Davis calls
"procedural principles"'" contained in written rules and regulation on: general geology, known mineral deposits, past and present mineral production, mining claims, mineral leases, evaluaion of future mineral potential, present and potential market demands.
Id. §1714(c)(2).
Each right-of-way shall contain(a) terms and conditions which will (i) carry out the purposes of this
Act and rules and regulations issued thereunder; (ii) minimize damage
to scenic and esthetic values and fish and wildlife habitat and otherwise
protect the environment; (iii) require compliance with applicable air and
water quality standards established by or pursuant to applicable Federal
or State law; and (iv) require compliance with State standards for public
health and safety, environmental protection, and siting, construction,
operation, and maintenance of or for rights-of-way for similar purposes
if those standards are more stringent than applicable Federal standards;
and
(b) such terms and conditions as the Secretary concerned deems
necessary to (i) protect Federal property and economic interest; (ii)manage efficiently the lands which are subject to the right-of-way or adjacent
thereto and protect the other lawful users of the lands adjacent to or
traversed by such right-of-way; (iii) protect lives and property; (iv) protect the interests of individuals living in the general area traversed by the
right-of-way who rely on the fish, wildlife, and other biotic resources of
the area for subsistance purposes; (v) require location of the right-of-way
along a route that will cause least damage to the environment, taking into
consideration feasibility and other relevant factors; and (vi) otherwise
protect the public interest in the lands traversed by the right-of-way or
adjacent thereto.
Id. §1765(a), (b).

46. K.

DAVIS, ADMINImTRATIVE LAW TEXT

§4.07 (3rd ed. 1972). Professor Davis, an

authority of note on administrative law, feels very strongly that the potential for abuse
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tions to guide the exercise of administrative discretion, the
BLM very well could avoid certain specific responsibilities of
the FLPMA by claiming that specific responsibilities are undefined.
E. Siting Within the Language of the FLPMA
Siting is the process of allocating various combinations of
land uses to certain parcels of land for various periods of time.
The very act of allocating a use in most instances preempts
certain other potential land uses during the allocation time
period. If it can be shown that the FLPMA specifies certain
mandatory activities which are by the above definition siting
activities, it follows that there is a mandate to the BLM to
develop a siting process as a part of its overall management
responsibility of public lands.
The basis for all the BLM management decisions must be
the required adherence to the multiple use and sustained yield
principles." Throughout the definition of multiple use are requirements for land use allocation decisions between various
potential land uses. The primary thesis upon which the multiple use concept is built is that there is a necessity for some
institutional restriction of certain uses for certain parcels of
public land to protect the total public interest in that land.48
Implied in this thesis is the assumption that there is a greater
aggregate demand for resources than there is an adequate supply for any particular parcel of public lands.49 With a condition
of excessive demands, there is a strong possibility of resulting
overallocation or overuse of certain lands to the detriment of
the overall net public welfare unless there are some institutional constraints which insure that the use levels will not
"substantially impair the public interest in the lands." 0 The
of administrative discretion must be minimized mainly by rulemaking and not simply
statutory guidance. "The chief hope for confining discretionary power does not lie in
statutory enactments but in much more extensive administrative rulemaking." Id. at
94.
47. 43 U.S.C.A. §7101(a)(7) (Supp. 1978).
48. See Senate Hearings, supra note 33.
49. M. CLAWSON, THE FEDERAL LNDs SINCE 1956, 10-21 (1967).
50. In the PLLRC's own study of the multiple use issue the institutional constraint on demand was recognized as a necessity.
The following three propositions give the basis of the multiple use
concept.
First, lands can and do produce many goods and services in many
circumstances they can be produced in various admixtures and combinations on a particular land area.
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multiple use principles specified in the FLPMA as mandatory
guidance for the BLM require the agency decisionmaker to
make "the most judicious use of the land . . . [with] a combination of balanced and diverse resource uses. . .[in a manner
in which there may be a] use of some land for less than all the
resources .... "51
The act of limiting or specifying certain uses for particular
parcels of land is by its very nature an allocation process
wherein the spatial location of the use is a key factor. Allocating or locating that "combination [of uses] that will best meet
the present and future needs .., ." requires some type of comprehensive site analysis for all potential uses of the lands. The
FLPMA specifies what principles or major uses are to be sited
under multiple use. Under the multiple use concept are various
processes which the BLM must use, including land use planning 3 and the rights-of-way processes.Rights-of-way grants specifically include "systems for generation, transmission and distribution of energy."5 5 While these
are the main uses to be located on public lands, the multiple
use management principles applied to this location process
must equally take into account the "various resource values""
and other diverse resource uses such as "but not limited to...
watershed . . .and natural scenic, scientific and historic values." 57 In addition, while the limited list of "principal or major
uses" is separately defined, there is nowhere any statement in
Second, in many situations, total net benefits, however measured,
and not necessarily limited to dollar measurements, can be increased,
and perhaps maximized, through some judicious combination of two or
more uses on a particular area of land as compared to single use of the
land only.
Third, some harmonious and compatible combination of land uses,
with flexibility for change in the future and without significant impairment of the land, is desirable in the public interest.

K.
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E.

GOULD, JR.,

H.

NYGREN,

B.

WHALEY, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND LAWS AND

POLICIES RELATING TO MULTIPLE USE OF PUBLIC LANDS,
LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION 9

A

STUDY PREPARED FOR THE PUBLIC

(1970).

51. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1702(c) (Supp. 1978).
52. Id.
53. Id. §§1711, 1712.
54. Id. §§1702(1), 1763, 1764, 1765.
55. Id. §1761(a)(4).
56. Id. §1702(c).
57. The statutory definition of multiple use equates value and use implying no
distinction in management. Id.
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the FLPMA which requires any distinguishing priority be assigned to them.
The BLM planning process called the Multiple Framework Planning (MFP) system is a beginning, but the integration of large scale rights-of-way applications and environmental analysis and planning is still far from being systematic. The
MFP concept does not focus significant attention on integrating large scale energy development questions which are a part
of the rights-of-way permit process into the MFP system. The
realities are that both the planning and the right-of-way processes are typically occurring concurrently and often unilaterally.
The serious problem with such separate and uncoordinated processes is the potential for right-of-way reviews to ignore or seriously discount the critical environmental values
required to be considered in the land planning. The situation
of inadequate planning to anticipate development plus a long
history of unilateral and very poorly coordinated processes further illustrates the vital necessity for a legally supported imposition upon the BLM to integrate the two processes in order to
adequately consider and protect the environmental values and
create a timely siting process. Fortunately, the FLPMA has
what appears to be more than adequate language to support
such an imposition via a rulemaking demand or mandamus
claim.18 In carrying out his responsibility of granting a right-ofway, the Secretary must identify and specify "terms and conditions which will . . . minimize damage to scenic and esthetic
58. "The district court shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature
of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency
thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." 28 U.S.C. §1361 (1970). See generally,
Byse & Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 and
"Nonstatutory" Judicial Review of FederalAdministrative Action, 81 HAxv. L. Rv.
308 (1967). See also Udall v. Oil Shale Corp., 406 F.2d 759 (10th Cir. 1969), rev'd on
other grounds, 400 U.S. 48 (1970); Ashe v. McNamara, 355 F.2d 277 (1st Cir. 1965);
Coalition for United Community Action v. Romney, 316 F. Supp. 742 (7th Cir. 1970).
The term ministerial is judicially defined as a duty positively commanded, plainly
defined and peremptory. See, e.g., Thomas v. Vinson, 153 F.2d 636, 638-39 (D.C. Cir.
1946). In certain courts the existence of the ministerial duty is prerequisite to any
further proceedings and if the duty is held not to be ministerial but discretionary, no
mandamus will issue. In other courts, an approach which appears much more rational
and realistic, is one which focuses on the administrator's scope of duty, ministerial or
discretionary, and bases the decision of mandamus issuance on whether there was
either an ignoring or exceeding of the duty. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Roughton
v. Ickes, 101 F.2d 248, 252 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
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values and fish and wildlife habitat and otherwise protect the
environment; . . .require compliance with applicable air and
water quality standards . . . , and require compliance with
State standards for . . . environmental protection, and siting

... ," In addition, the Secretary must identify and specify
those terms and conditions which he deems to be "necessary
to

. .

.require location of the right-of-way along a route that

will cause least damage to the environment, taking into consideration feasibility and other relevant factors .

. . ."0

The whole right-of-way section of the FLPMA is prefaced6
with the statement, "[ejach right-of-way shall contain," '
which explicitly imposes a requirement on the agency to come
up with the aforementioned terms and conditions prior to any
granting of a right-of-way. In addition, words such as "least"
and "minimal" are superlative terms which, if these areas
are to in fact be identified, require that all feasible areas must
be assessed. Otherwise, a secretarial conclusion that a particular right-of-way grant does indeed minimize damage will be
based on inadequate information and therefore be arbitrary.
Added to these statutory duties, the Secretary, in awarding
a right-of-way must specify the boundaries in such a way as
to insure the use "will do no unnecessary damage to the environment.""2 If the Secretary is to make a decision as to the
location of the right-of-way which he determines will do no
unnecessary damage, then all feasible rights-of-way (or sites)
must be considered.
Any attempt to plainly and specifically separate the planning duties of the BLM under the FLPMA into ministerial and
discretionary is unrealistic. In reality, the complex nature of
administering federal lands involves an inseparable mix of both
types of duties. Usually, the statutory commands include a
basis ministerial framework outlining broad policies and goals
under which certain degrees of administrative discretion can be
exercised in satisfying the ministerial framework requirements. 13 Using the mixed ministerial/discretionary approach,
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

43 U.S.C.A. §1765(a) (Supp. 1978) (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. §1765 (emphasis added).
Id. §1764(a)(4).
See GELLHORN & BYSE, 127-32 (5th ed. 1970); K. DAVIS, 3 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE §23.11 (1958). Specifically, one critic noted, "As a mode of analysis, the
ministerial-discretionary dichotomy is largely illusory because there are few federal
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the issue is whether the Secretary's inaction or refusal to activate a preapplication right-of-way siting process is outside his
permissible scope of discretion. Concurrent with the consideration of his not developing or implementing a siting process is
the question of whether any issuance of a right-of-way permit
without the siting process existing exceeds the permissive scope
of discretion.
Throughout the cases which utilize this mixed ministerial/discretionary approach are phases setting the limit of
discretion by the use of terms such as action beyond a "rational
exercise of discretion," acts "beyond their discretion," and action "outside the scope" of discretionary authority, arguably
all synonymous with abuse of discretion." The issue is whether
Congress intended to allow the Secretary unbridled discretion
to grant rights-of-way which allow major facilities to be built
without a prerequisite comprehensive land planning process
being implemented. Given the above-mentioned statutory requirements of the FLPMA, there are strong arguments for
courts to compel the Secretary to carry out these requirements
for planning and siting rather than allow the Secretary to take
no action at all. In other words, purposeful inaction is felt by
some courts to be an "action" which is challengeable,15 particularly where complex environmental values are involved."
administrative determinations that do not involve an element of discretion and few
that are wholly discretionary." Byse & Fiocca, supra note 58 at 333.
64. See Davis v. Schultz, 453 F.2d 497 (3d Cir. 1971); Lovallo v. Resor, 443 F.2d
1262 (2d Cir. 1971); Casarino v. United States, 431 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1970); People v.
United States Dep't of Agriculture, 427 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Feliciano v. Laird,
426 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1970); Nixon v. Secretary of Navy, 422 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1970).
See generally, Project, FederalAdministrative Law Developments-1972, 1973 DUKE
L.J. 213 n.42 (1973).
65. In a decision where similar environmental values were involved and the
agency (U.S. Dep't of Agriculture) failed or refused to act regarding cancellation of
registration of the pesticide DDT, the court, characterizing the inaction as somewhat
equivalent to an administrative order, declared, "when administrative inaction has
precisely the same impact on the rights of parties as denial of relief, an agency cannot
preclude judicial review by casting its decisions in the form of inaction." Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, (D.C. Cir. 1970). Being more specific
as to the lack of any rulemaking to implement an agency mandate, the Ninth Circuit
contended that an agency (Bureau of Indian Affairs) does not have within its administrative discretion the power to not issue certain regulations if statutorily ordered.
Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1971).
66. Illustrative of this demand is Chief Judge Bazelon's increasingly strong arguments for the necessity of more explicit formal agency guidelines especially when
environmental values are in question. Implying that the lack of such a framework may
be an abuse of discretion he states,
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Under the force of these arguments, it appears very possible that the BLM, via the Secretary of Interior, can be compelled to in fact develop and implement some procedures by
informal rulemaking to insure that the siting requirements or
duties may be fulfilled in the granting of rights-of-way for energy developments. Under the FLPMA, the procedure by which
the BLM may be compelled to implement this process by informal rulemaking is contained in the general policy title. The Act
states that "[iun administering public land statutes and exercising discretionary authority granted by them, the Secretary
[shall] be required to establish compehensive rules and regulations .
,,*"67
The issuance of a right-of-way is clearly a discretionary action coming within the scope of this mandatory
rulemaking requirement. Further, the Act requires that,
"[tihe Secretary shall issue regulations necessary to implement the provisions of this Act with respect to the manageIn anment, use, and protection of the public lands .... ,,68
other section entitled "Rules and regulations," the statute
again requires that "[t]he Secretary . . . shall promulgate
"...
61 In sum, there is a very strong
rules and regulations .
legal rationale to compel the Secretary of Interior to implement, by rulemaking procedures as outlined in section 553 of
the Administrative Procedures Act, rules and regulations for
review of potential energy development rights-of-way. These
rules and regulations should insure the identification of the site
or sites which will be the most compatible with and do no
unnecessary harm to the protected environmental values.
F. Exercise of Power by the BLM-Cases
Once rules and regulations are adopted, the agency is legally bound to administer their activities and decisionmaking
within the principled framework specified in these rules and
[The "new era" in administrative law] means . . . that courts will go
further in requiring the agency to establish a decision-making process
adequate to protect the interests of all "consumers" of the natural environment . . . . [Tin cases of great technological complexity, the best
way for courts to guard against unreasonable or erroneous administrative
decisions . . . is to establish a decisionmaking process which assures a
reasoned decision that can be held up to the scrutiny of the scientific
community and the public.
International Harvester v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 651-52.
67. 43 U.S.C.A. §1701(a)(5) (Supp. 1978).
68. Id. §1733(a) (emphasis added).
69. Id. §1740. See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
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regulations. 0 Courts which require the principled framework of
decisionmaking see as a necessary element of this framework
the existence of some systematic process by which the agency
administrator can exercise a good faith assessment of alternative decisions available to him. This good faith test is especially
applicable when there are basic public resources or environmental values being affected by the decision. In the landmark
Scenic Hudson case, 7 the court held that the Commissioner of
the Federal Power Commission did not have within his scope
of permissible discretion the authority to disregard the consideration of prudent alternatives to a proposed action, therein a
1000 mpgawatt pump storage power plant on the Hudson
River.72 The court then stressed the necessity of developing an
administrative process (or record) which insures adequate compliance with statutory requirements.
The agency must always act upon the record made, and if that
is not sufficient, it should see the record is supplemented before
it acts. It must always preserve the elements of fair play, but it
is not fair play for it to create a injustice, instead of remedying
one, by omiting to inform itself. .... 73

The analogy is direct between the Federal Power Commission (FPC) and the BLM's mandates as the manager of public
lands for net social benefit to pursue the regulatory function of
granting rights-of-way. Considering the BLM's duty to, among
other conditions, "require location of the right-of-way along a
route that will cause the least damage,"'" it is strongly asserted
70. This principle is stated in a recent appellate decision, "When an administrative agency promulgates rules to govern its proceedings, these rules must be scrupulously observed." Pacific Molasses Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n., 356 F.2d 386, 389
(5th Cir. 1966). See also United States v. Wilbur, 427 F. 2d 947 (9th Cir. 1970) cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 954 (1970); Elmo Div. of Drive-X Co. v. Dixon, 348 F.2d 342
(D.C. Cir. 1965); United States v. Associated Merchandising Corp., 261 F. Supp. 553
(S.D.N.Y. 1966). The Supreme Court principle on which this statement is based is in
a 1957 case involving the State Department's deviation from its own rules.
"[Riegulations validly prescribed by a government administrator are binding upon
him as well as the citizen, and that this principle holds even when the administrative
action under review is discretionary in nature." Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 372
(1957). See also Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 546 (1959) (separate opinion of
Justice Frankfurter).
71. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n. 354 F.2d
608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
72. Id. at 612.
73. Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 883, 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd
342 U.S. 950 (1952), cited with approval in 354 F.2d at 621.
74. 43 U.S.C.A. §1765(b)(v) (Supp. 1978).
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that without a comprehensive assessment of all feasible alternatives, there is an abuse of secretarial discretion under the Act
in the form of acting ignorantly of certain omitted alternative
locations for the right-of-way. This contention for all comprehensive alternative analyses was greatly bolstered with the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA).71 Among other requirements of the NEPA there is an

explicit statutory requirement to "utilize a systematic interdis7
ciplinary approach"7 to identify and assess alternatives.
Soon after the passage of the NEPA, it was perceived by
many agencies that such alternative studies were to be necessary only if an environmental impact statement (EIS) was required and written. 7 Their narrow view was that the alternative requirement of section 4332(2)(E) 7' was only a repetition
of the EIS alternative section that requires all EIS's to contain
a discussion of "alternatives to the proposed action."0 However, recent decisions have explicitly distinguished the latter
alternatives discussion requirement in an EIS from the prior
more encompassing alternatives section which is applicable to
ongoing administrative activities.8 ' In the seminal case on this
issue, the Fifth Circuit divides section 4332(2)(C) into two
separate requirements, "requirements as to methodology and
writing requirements.""2
Again the analogy of the BLM's assessment of potential
alternative sites for energy development is direct and clear.
Coupling the NEPA's methodology requirements of section
4332(2)(E) with the FLPMA's above-discussed requirements,
it can be concluded that indeed the BLM must "identify and
develop methods and procedures" wherein it can fulfill the
other methodology requirement to "study, develop and de75. 42 U.S.C. §§4321-4347 (1970).
76. Id. §4332(2)(A).
77. Id. §4332(2)(E).
78. F. Anderson, The National Environmental Policy Act, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 320,338 (1974).
79. 42 U.S.C. §4332 (2)(E).
80. Id. §4332(2)(C)(iii).
81. See, e.g., Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 523 F.2d 88 (2d Cir.
1975): Inman Park Restoration, Inc. v. Urban Mass Transp. Admin., 414 F. Supp. 99
(N.D. Ga. 1975).
82. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 492 F.2d 1123, 1132 (5th
Cir. 1974).
83. 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(B).
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scribe appropriate alternatives" or sites. 8 A troublesome and
perhaps limiting aspect of analogizing these NEPA cases to an
argument for compelling the BLM's development of a comprehensive siting methodology is that, in these cases, there was an
already defined proposal or action before the agency for consideration.
A basic and critical characteristic of a timely siting methodology is that there must be a comprehensive alternative assessment in anticipation of any potential proposals and not
after a formal proposal or right-of-way application is initiated.
While the Fifth Circuit seems willing to require such assessments throughout the agency planning process, other courts
may be reluctant to so improve this assessment requirement
without the prerequisite existence of a formal proposal.
If the timing of such alternative assessment requirements
is in the latter stages of a right-of-way review and decisionmaking, the utility of the section 4332(2)(E) duty is minimal as an
argument supporting the necessity to implement a nomination
or prequalification type siting process. The Supreme Court in
the Rockfish case first faced this timing question in deciding
when a proposed rate increase for recycled materials by Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) became a proposal under
the NEPA. The court held that there is a proposal only at "the
time at which it [the agency] makes a recommendation or
report on a proposal for federal action.""8 The conclusion from
this could be that no necessity for imposing section 4332(2)(E)
requirements occurs until the agency itself creates a proposal
by some definitive recommendation or report. The question of
when activities pass from a conceptual stage into something
specific enough to be a proposed action under the NEPA was
judicially discussedin detail by Judge Wright wherein he developed a four-part test to apply to agency activities. 6
84. Id. §4332(2)(E).
85. Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. Co. v. SCRAP, 422 U.S. 289, 320 (1975).
86. Determining when to draft an impact statement [i.e., when
there is a proposed action under NEPAl . . . obviously requires a reconciliation of these competing concerns. Some balance must be struck and
several factors should be weighed in the balance. How likely is the technology to prove commercially feasible, and how soon will that occur? To
what extent is meaningful information presently available on the effects
of application . . . and of alternatives and their effects? To what extent
are irretrievable commitments being made and options precluded as the
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Judge Wright later had opportunity to apply this test to
an issue directly analogous to the siting question when the
Sierra Club petitioned the Department of Interior to consider
a whole regional energy development potential (in the Northern Great Plains area of the Powder River Basin) to be a proposed action under the NEPA. The court rejected offhandedly
the Rockfish judicial deference to agency determination of
what is an action or program. 7 In determining that the Department of Interior contemplated the circuit action, the court held
such contemplation would constitute a proposal for major federal action." Judge Wright relied heavily upon the existence of
an agency planning process which was considering energy development in the whole region in an attempt to place the potential impacts of coal development in perspective and thereby
assist "in the management of the natural and human resources
of the region." 89 Because of this land use plan's existence, the
court declared,
It is our view that when the federal government, through exercise
of its power to approve leases, mining plans, rights-of-way and
water option contracts, attempts to "control development" of a
definite region, it is engaged in a regional program constituting
major federal action within the meaning of NEPA whether it
labels its attempts a plan, a program or nothing at all.0

In determining when there is a proposed action, the
threshold is that time when, "the agency may have the opportunity to assess the environmental impact of its plans before
committing itself, even tentatively to action." 9 ' The court then
proceeded to apply the four factor SIPI test" and concluded
3
that there was a contemplated or proposed action .
On appeal, Justice Powell in a confusing seven to two madevelopment program progresses? How severe will the environmental effects be if the technology does prove commercially feasible?
Scientists Inst. for Public Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n., 481 F. 2d 1079,
1094 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
87. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 873 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
88. Id. at 874-76. See also Conservation Soc'y. of S. Vt., Inc. v. Secretary of
Transp., 362 F. Supp. 627, 636 (1973) where the court held that a highway network
which was "possible of accomplishment with legislative and federal approval over a
long-range period of time" was to be considered a proposed action.
89. 514 F.2d at 876.
90. Id. at 878.
91. Id. at 879.
92. 481 F.2d at 1079.
93. 514 F.2d at 880.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 56

jority opinion, overruled Wright's substantive determination
that there was a proposed action, endorsing in total the contrary district court's conclusions." As a part of the Supreme
Court's determination that no proposed action existed, the criteria of practical reasons was used and the fact that "there is
nothing that could be the subject of the analysis envisioned
[by the NEPA]."'' Indeed, the Court did not directly dispute
the circuit court's conclusion that a contemplated plan or program could become a proposed action,97 but only overruled
Wright's determination on the merits that such was contemplated in this case. In another statement seemingly contradictory to the rigid Rockfish holding, Justice Powell states that
the legislative history of the NEPA supports the view that, "by
requiring an impact statement Congress intended to assure
such consideration during the development of a proposal
Later, however, the court does declare that the four factor
balancing test is not within the province of the Court's review
powers under the NEPA and confusingly endorses its earlier
rigid Rockfish definition of proposal. The real confusion occurs
then, when discounting a court's power to use a balancing test,
Justice Powell himself decides to articulate balancing tests for
determining when a regional program becomes an action subject to an EIS.11 This determination the Court apparently
leaves to the "informed discretion of the responsible official."' 00
Even in the alleged affirmation of the Rockfish view of when
some agency process becomes a proposal, the Court confuses
and ignores the realities of the NEPA process by quoting
Rockfish with approval, "the moment at which an agency must
have a final statement ready 'is the time at which it makes a
recommendation or report on a proposal for federal action.' ,
There is no discussion of when the NEPA process must start
which is the real time for alternatives assessments, a fact noted
02
by Brennan and Marshall in dissent.
94. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 400 (1976).
95. Id. at 401.

96. Id.
97. Id. at 406, n. 15.
98, Id. at 409 (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 406.
100. Id. at 412.
101. Id. at 406.
102. Id. at 417.
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In sum, while it appears Kleppe places significant limitations on any claim to compel the BLM to do early siting prequalifications under the alternatives assessment requirements
of section 4332(2)(C) of the NEPA, there is still a strong potential of sustaining the claim using both the NEPA section
4332(2)(E) and the FLPMA mandates as cumulative statutory
support. While the Court in Kleppe did appear to reject any
affirmative duty being imposed on an agency to do comprehensive alternatives impact assessment until a formal recommendation or action, it did endorse the intent of the NEPA to have
such assessments occur in the preproposal stage. 0 3 Furthermore, Kleppe never dealt with section 4332(2)(E) and the duties under that section. The focus of the decision was narrowed
to only the EIS alternatives requirement of section 4332(2)(E).
G. FLPMA and NEPA
Notwithstanding the Kleppe confusions, the passage of the
FLPMA combined with the NEPA's broad duties under sections 4332(2)(B) and (E) appears to significantly bolster the
rationale of compelling the implementation of a comprehensive
siting process. A major constraint on much judicial intervention into agency discretion under only the NEPA has been the
relatively general language and policy of the Act. With the
FLPMA there is a significantly greater level of specificity directing the BLM to do certain definitive acts as a part of its
planning and decisionmaking. Specifically, there is language in
the planning section directing the BLM to begin assessing alternatives as a part of the planning process prior to any formal
proposed action. Therein, Congress directs that, "In the development of land use plans, the Secretary shall consider the relative scarcity of the [land resource] values involved and the
availability of alternative means (including recycling) and sites
for realization of those values.""'1 As argued earlier, the development of such land use plans is an integral part of the Secretary's responsibility under his rulemaking requirements.
The clear statutory duties to carry out the planning process, especially the inventory and alternatives assessments
prior to any actions on either withdrawals, rights-of-way, or
management decisions, implies that if the BLM is to satisfy
103. Id. at 406 n. 15.
104. 43 U.S.C.A. §1701(c)(6) (Supp. 1978) (emphasis added).
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these duties, then the time when the assessment of alternatives
or siting must occur is well before the actual formal applications for rights-of-way or other management decisions.
The shortcoming relative to the BLM's planning responsibilities, in the prior discussion of alternatives assessment cases
under the NEPA, is that most of these NEPA cases are in the
context of questions about writing EIS's under section
4332(2) (C) for a specifically proposed project. In order to relate
these cases and their judicial standards to the prequalification
or nomination siting process, it is necessary to identify a rationale for extending the judicial consideration requirements beyond merely the proposed action stage or EIS preparation.
The basic legal rationale for such an extension is based on
the presumption that the statutory intent of the FLPMA, especially the planning section, and the NEPA are so similar that
the judicial arguments regarding the desirability of extending
the considerations requirements into the overall planning of
agencies under the NEPA apply even more to the BLM which
is subject to both the NEPA and the FLPMA. 105 Therefore,
105. Statutory Similarities Between the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act and the National Environmental Policy Act
National Environmental
Policy Act
Section

Phraseology

Federal Land Policy and
Management Act
Section

Phraseology

42 U.S.C.
§ 4332 (2)(A)

"utilize

a systematic,
interdisciplinary approach which will insure the integrated
use of the natural and
social sciences."

43 U.S.C.A.
§ 1712 (c)(2)
(Supp. 1978)

"use a systematic interdisciplinary approach to achieve integrated consideration
of physical, biological
economic and other
sciences."

§ 4331 (b)(A)

"preserve important
historic, cultural and
natural aspects of our
national heritage."

§ 1701 (a)(8)

"protect the quality of
scientific, historical,
ecological, environmental, air and atmospheric, water resources, and archeological values."

§ 4332 (2)(F)

"weigh the . . . long
term character of environmental
problems."

§ 1712(c)(7)

"weigh long term benefits to the public
against short term
benefits."
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certain NEPA cases become even more applicable to this argument for compelling broad level alternatives assessment
throughout the agency planning.
One such early NEPA case, albeit an EIS challenge, discusses at length the necessity under the NEPA to take account
of environmental considerations continuously during the
agency's operation, whether an EIS is required or not or
whether there is a formal proposed action or not.10 A later
similar case focused on the specific issue of whether there was
actual agency consideration of environmental values in its decisionmaking and planning procedures. 07 The court's test of
compliance was application of sections 4332(2)(A), (B) and (E)
§ 4332(2)(C)
(iv)

"[consider] the relationship between short
term uses of man's environment and
the
maintenance and enhancement of long
term productivity."

§ 1712(c)(5)

"consider present and
potential uses of the
public lands."

§ 4332(2)(E), "study, develop and
describe appropriate
alternatives to recommend courses of action in any proposal
which involves unresolved conflicts concerning alternative
uses of available resources."

§ 1712(c)(6)

"consider the relative
scarcity of the values
involved and the availability of alternative
means (including recycling) and sites for
realization of those
values."

106. The congressional mandate [of section 4331(b)] is clear. Federal officials are to appraise continuously all their activities not only in
terms of strict economic or technological considerations but also with
reference to broad environmental concerns . . . . Subject only to the
limits of practicality, they are to strive constantly to improve federal
programs to preserve and enhance the environment. In other words, federal officials are required. . . to incorporate the consideration of environmental factors into the decision making process.
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 468 F.2d 1164, 1174
(6th Cir. 1972) (emphasis added). The court further noted the Congressional intent
that environmental considerations permeate the whole of agency procedures by citing
the following language of S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1969): "[NEPA
would] provide all agencies and all Federal officials with a legislative mandate and a
responsibility to consider the consequences of their actions on the environment. This
would be true of the licensing functions of independent agencies as well as the ongoing
activities of the regular federal agencies." (emphasis in original). 468 F.2d at 1175.
107. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th
Cir. 1974).
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as "directives that are intended to insure the integration of
sound environmental planning principles and methods into
normal agency procedures."'' 01 The court viewed the EIS requirement of section 4332(2)(C) as primarily documentation of
the other required activities within the overall agency planning. 10' Focusing on the specific consideration requirement
under section 4332(2)(C) of the NEPA, the court held that in
order to comply with this section, an agency must "search out,
develop and follow procedures reasonably calculated to bring
environmental factors to peer status with dollars and technology in their decision making.""'
This argument is significantly bolstered by the FLPMA's
requirements to implement a planning system and the environmental consideration requirements contained therein."' To reiterate, the planning system is intended to be the basic guidance for management of the public lands"' and the framework
for management decisions'" made by the Secretary. Explicitly
included as a management decision are exclusions of one or
more principal uses in favor of one or more other such uses."'
Rights-of-way, again, are by definition "principal or major
uses.""- In this statutory context, then, any actions which the
Secretary takes regarding a right-of-way which in fact excludes
any other major use is a decisionmaking activity with the
framework of the land use planning process mandated by the
Act. Further, there is strong argument that in order to fully
comply with the requirements of the rights-of-way process," 6
there must be some direct coordination between the grant of a
right-of-way and the planning process wherein grants are compatible with the overall land use inventory and assessments
required under the planning process.
108. Id. at 1132.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1133. See also Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex.

1973). The Council on Environmental Quality, now given power to promulgate regulations under the NEPA as a result of President Carter's Executive Order 1191 (May 24,
1977), declares the same intent of the NEPA in what are presumably to become official
regulations, "[§4332(2)(C)] requires agencies to build into their decision making
process, beginning at the earliest possible point, an appropriate and careful consideration of the environmental aspects.
... 40 C.F.R. 1500.1(a).
111. 43 U.S.C.A. §1712 (Supp. 1978).
112. Id. §1701(a)(7).
113. Id. §1712(e).
114. Id. §1712(e)(i).
115. Id. §1702(1).
116. Id. §1765. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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Congressional and administrative support for this idea of
the planning system being the basic guide for decisions is evidenced in the responses to committee inquiry by the Department of Interior in the Hearings on the FLPMA, wherein the
Department clearly indicated the policy of utilizing the land
use plans as basic prerequisites to any secretarial decisions or
commitments." 7
H. The Nominating Process
The nomination or prequalification siting process includes
two basic subprocesses or stages. The first is the macrolevel
inventory and identification of all existing and potential land
use values within a zone or area which has all the industrial
prerequisites necessary for the contemplated development. The
second more analytical subprocess which follows the inventory
is the initial balancing of the relative land related values involved wherein certain sites are excluded from further consideration for development and others are preferred for more detailed consideration and in essence nominated, or prequalified,
for development. Once the preferred sites are identified, any
utility applicants desiring to develop in the site would submit
the necessary rights-of-way applications triggering a more detailed analysis through the EIS process. An important point
here is to distinguish the initial balancing process where basic
resource value tradeoffs and conflict resolutions occur from
what would be the subsequent EIS process tradeoffs which are
more site specific and less extensive geographically. It is in this
pre-EIS stage that the truly crucial macrolevel decisions and
value judgments are made involving extensive lands and resources.
The procedural form of these specific selections are rightsof-way grants. Both of these management decisions involve
resolution of value conflicts on the part of the Secretary and the
BLM. Because of the above-cited judicial emphasis stressing
the necessity of scrutinizing any agency process which involves
environmental values, both stages of the siting balancing are
most notably subject to intense judicial review.1'1 If section
117. See Senate Hearings supra note 33 at 91-94 and testimony of Curt Berklund
at 3-4.
118. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829
(D.C. Cir. 1974), aff'd, 527 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 913
(1976).
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1712 of the FLPMA clearly extended the policies and
proceduralmandates of the NEPA into the pre-EIS or planning
stage, then similarly, the FLPMA would extend the
substantive NEPA review standards imposed by courts to the
same pre-EIS planning procedures.
Given both the inclination of the courts in following the
landmark decision of Overton Park"9 to limit the agency's discretion involved in the actual decision by looking to applicable
statutory mandates to protect the environment and the growing inclination of certain circuits to at least require equal consideration of such values even if only the NEPA is involved,
there is a strong argument that certain language of the FLPMA
is to be interpreted as direct statutory limitation upon the
scope of discretion afforded the Secretary's actual balancing
decisions within the siting process. Specifically, in the preright-of-way granting stage of the siting process, the mandates
of the planning title clearly impose significant requirements on
the BLM decisionmaking to establish a priority for certain values over others for certain identified areas.'
In two other sections of the statute, this establishment of
priorities is also given special emphasis. In the land use planning inventory, the Secretary must give priority to an inventory
of these areas of critical environmental concern (A.C.E.C.).1
Probably more important, the declaration of policy section
imposes a duty on the Secretary to promulgate rules and regulations for protection of A.C.E.C.'s. 2 2 With these reassertions
by Congress, it seems clear that the Act's intent is for actual
balancing decisions to establish a priority for these environmental values over other values when they are in conflict. Although the language on its face would seem to support such a
conclusion, it is necessary to look at this language in the con119. 401 U.S. 402.
120. "Areas of critical environmental concern" are defined as:
areas within the public lands where special management attention is
required (when such areas are developed or used or where no development
is required) to protect and prevent irreparable damage to important historic, cultural, or scenic values, fish and wildlife resources or other natural systems or processes, or to protect life and safety from natural hazards.
43 U.S.C.A. §1702(a) (Supp. 1978).
121. Id. §1701(a)(1).
122. Id. §1701(a)(11).
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text of the whole statute before such a conclusion can be generally accepted.' 3
Reiterating, these two goals are subject to guidance from
the principles of multiple use and sustained yield wherein protection of public land areas of critical environmental concerns' 4 must be reconciled with "[recognition] of the Nation's
need for domestic sources of minerals, food, timber and fiber
from the public lands.' 2 5 Initially, resolution of such a dilemma by the agency seems to be not subject to a judicial
interpretation which implies a favoring of one over the other.
However, there can possibly be such an interpretation if viewed
in the context of the mandatory compliance with the principles
of the FLPMA's definition of multiple use ' and the NEPA as
a part of the general system of environmental policy and planning.'2 Recognizing the inherent conflicts between the developmental and environmental goals, a close examination of the
language requiring protection of environmental values as opposed to recognition of development values allows for an argument that in certain so identified areas the BLM has a clearly
unqualified duty to prioritize protection of A.C.E.C.'s. The
developmental responsibility, however, can be argued to allow
the Secretary a certain amount of discretionary leeway in how
this is done.
The Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 1970 is the statutory guidance for recognition of development potentials as
specified in the FLPMA.'25 In that policy statement itself the
123. Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801). See also, Brown v. Duchesne,
13 U.S. (19 Howard) 183 (1856).
124. See supra note 120.
125. 43 U.S.C.A. §1701(a)(12) (Supp. 1978).
126. Id. §1702(c).
127. The use of the NEPA to infer intent or assist the court in interpreting other
agency statutes has been clarified by the Supreme Court in the Flint Ridge case
wherein the Court stated, referring to the Senate conference report, on the NEPA,
The purpose of the new language is to make it clear that each agency of
the Federal Government shall comply with the directives set out in
[NEPAl unless the existing laws applicable to such agency's operations
expressly prohibits or makes full compliance with one of the directives
impossible . . . and that no agency shall utilize an excessively narrow
construction of its existing statutory authorizations to avoid compliance.
115 Cong. Rec. 39703 (1969) (House Conferees).
Flint Ridge Dev. Corp. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776, 787 (1976) (emphasis
added).
128. 30 U.S.C. 21(a)(2) (1970).
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development goals are to be balanced to "assure satisfaction of
industrial security and environmental needs.' '1 9 In addition,
that same minerals policy requires the development of methods
"to lessen any adverse impact. . . upon the physical environment.' 13 Therefore, recognition is in reality a balanced recognition requiring at least equal consideration of environmental
needs. At the same time there is no coequal requirement of
balancing inherent in the A.C.E.C. protection requirements of
the FLPMA once such areas are identified. The conclusion that
there is a mandate for protection of A.C.E.C. values but only
a requirement for discretionary recognition of other values
when in conflict argues that the mandatory environmental protection will prevail over the discretionary development recognition for the A.C.E.C.'s.' 31 The most rational way to avoid a
collision is to affirmatively specify to all potential utility applicants where these prioritizations will occur and where the developmental goal of energy development will not be in conflict
with the environmental goal. This due notice to the industry,
of course, must be timely and prior to extensive investments
and commitments to sites which are likely to be in an A.C.E.C.
I. Basis on the Principles of Multiple Use
Another statutory support for protection prioritization in
the FLPMA lies in the principles of multiple use. By definition,
this guiding doctrine requires the following principles to be
applied to land management practices and decisions of the
BLM. They
(a) must "best meet the present and future needs of the
American people";
(b) must "take into account the long term needs of further generations for renewable and non-renewable resources";
(c) must not have any "permanent impairment of the
productivity of the land" and the "the quality of the environment";
(d) must "not necessarily [be] the combination of uses
that will give the greatest economic return or the greatest unit
3
output." 1
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
Id. §21(a)(4).
Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971).
43 U.S.C.A. §1702(2) (Supp. 1978).
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These criteria weigh toward protection of options for future
land resource demand over immediate returns of current demands thus being supportive of both the NEPA'3 and other
3
language guiding the planning process.'
The only cases which directly addressed the scope of discretion under the Multiple Use and Sustained Yield Act,' 35
gave broad deference to the agency in interpreting and implementing the Act. 13 In a recent appellate case, the court deferred to the expertise and discretion of the Forest Service's
determination of the best mix of land uses. However, the court
did inquire into the actual planning process used and the
weights assigned to certain values. Therein multiple use is defined by the court as management "to provide maximum benefits to the greatest number of persons possible."' 38 The significant point is that three of the four above-mentioned multiple
use principles or planning criteria (a,b, and c) were not contained in the old Multiple Use Act on which the above decision
was based. 13 This addition of new language, all stressing
greater preference for consideration of the environmental goal,
is further support for the argument for an environmental prioritization mandate existing in the FLPMA for A.C.E.C. lands.4 0
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the siting
process must insure that the A.C.E.C.'s are identified first,
then prioritized for protection, and further that the Secretary's
decisions in the pre-EIS planning stage of nominating or prequalifying zones for potential development takes into account
this prioritization. If the Secretary does not in fact show on the
administrative record how this identification of such
A.C.E.C.'s land prioritization did occur, the court review of the
nominations would likely conclude (or at least would certainly
133. 42 U.S.C. §4332 (1976).
134. 43 U.S.C.A. §1712(b) (Supp. 1978).
135. 16 U.S.C. §528 (1976).
136. In one case brought under the NEPA involving an action done under the
Multiple Use and Sustained Yield Act, the court held a District Ranger had discretion
to determine what mix of uses are appropriate for designation of a wildlife habitat.
Kisner v. Butz, 350 F. Supp. 310 (N.D. W.Va. 1972).
138. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 541 F. 2d 1292, 1304 (8th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977).
139. See generally, PLLRC REPOT 43 (170).
140. See generally, Note, Managing Federal Lands: Replacing the Multiple Use
System, 82 YALE L.J. 787 (1973); S. 507, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REc. 2137
(1976).
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allow a conclusion) that this lack in the record was grounds for
holding the decision to be arbitrary and capricious. While some
utilities may criticize the identification of these areas, the timing of the identification prior to major industrial commitments
is far superior to the uncertainties of trying to second guess the
BLM as to what in fact will be A.C.E.C.'s after a formal rightof-way application is filed. Using the A.C.E.C. identification
mandate, the BLM clearly has ample authorization, indeed
responsibility, to prequalify areas by the process of eliminating
certain areas from further consideration as viable energy development sites.
J. Support in the A. C.E.C. Definition
In looking at the statutory definition of A.C.E.C.'s, it is
explicit that the total spectrum of environmental values is to
be included, especially with the catchall phrase, "or other natural systems or processes."'' Because many of these values are
very widespread or at times even ubiquitous, the selection of a
parcel of land as an A.C.E.C. requires some threshold of relative concentration or high level of one or more of these values
in order to be designated as an A.C.E.C.; otherwise the special
character or special management defining these areas is meaningless.
The key language for determining this threshold for designation is: (a) special management attention being required, (b)
potential for irreparable damage, and, (c) the existing value
being important. If it can be shown then that these three prerequisite conditions exist for any of the values on any parcel of
land, the Secretary must designate them to be A.C.E.C.'s. To
ignore them would be challengable according to the above arguments. Because of locally unique factors, special circumstances, and generally a lack of any clear indicators for designation,
the initial determination of whether the three conditions exist
will and should be within the discretion of the Secretary and
the BLM technical staff. This assumes, of course, good faith
consideration and analysis of all affected values throughout the
identification process. The situation is somewhat analogous to
the threshold determination as to whether a proposed action
will significantly affect the human environment and require an
EIS under section 4332(2)(C) of the NEPA.
For a court to intervene into the agency's threshold deter141. 43 U.S.C.A. §1702(a) (Supp. 1978).
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mination, there should be some further statutory guidance
against which the court may review whether the determination
was arbitrary. If the court intervenes without such further
guidance, there is the problem of great administrative uncertainty about the potential future judicial reaction to agency
planning, thus creating a real dilemma in developing long term
administrative procedures. Fortunately, there are a number of
federal statutes which do (in most cases) specify standards for
determining the location of areas of importance or irreparability which require special attention, thus helping to lessen the
dilemma of such second guessing.
In other words, there is indeed "law to apply" to further
define and limit the Secretary's discretion in the decision of
designating A.C.E.C.'s. Statutes such as the Clean Air Act and
the Clean Water Act are ones with which the Secretary must
comply in the planning inventory.' The A.C.E.C. identification and designation decision as a part of this inventory must
likewise so apply the applicable standards to each land parcel
to determine whether such land has any of the the statutorily
specified values making it by definition an A.C.E.C. The specific language for each statute used as criteria for designation
must be that language which is relatively clear on its face as
to meaning and also capable of being used to spatially identify
land areas having such criteria for designation as A.C.E.C.'s.
A more detailed specification of criteria is contained in the
regulations and manuals under each of these acts which should
be included as considerations in the A.C.E.C. decision by the
BLM, especially when Congress specifies another agency to be
specially qualified and so designated as the interpreter of these
criteria. 4 3
In the prequalification stage, the BLM would review all
lands within the economic feasibility zone for the potential
large scale facility and identify any land areas or zones which
do contain any of these environmental values in the listed statutes. Once identified, however, the A.C.E.C.'s are not
necessarily eliminated from consideration for energy development. The identification only "red flags" the area and such
"red flagging" indicates the necessity of designating the zone
an A.C.E.C. under special management attention. At this
142. Id. §1712(c).
143. E.g., Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§1533, 1536 (1976).
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point, if the BLM ignores these identifications of statutorily
protected values, and proceeds in viewing the zone as subject
to only ordinary management practices, it would seem such an
ignoring is arbitrary in light of applicable "law to apply" from
the statutes listed as well as the explicit requirement to identify and specify zones where special management attention is
required. '" For example, if the Fish and Wildlife Service has
identified an area of critical habitat for a certain endangered
species, the BLM would logically be compelled to so designate
the area an A.C.E.C. The existence of any statutorily specified
environmental value will suffice to impose the necessity for
such an A.C.E.C. designation because the A.C.E.C. definition
lists the values with an "or" separation, meaning any one value
is important enough for the designation. If more than one value
exists in any zone, it should be so specified so that the later
weighing process can evaluate the cumulative environmental
value of the A.C.E.C.'s within the study area of potential sites
for the major facilities.
Once the non-A.C.E.C. zones are identified by the process
of elimination, there is the more important analysis of relative
potential adverse offsite impacts on the A.C.E.C.'s from the
non-A.C.E.C. development sites. It is at this point that the
BLM must determine whether the A.C.E.C.'s fall into one of
two categories. The first is one in which the development could
occur near the A.C.E.C. without significant adverse impact
with special management attention. The second category
would be those areas in which no development is allowed in
order to prevent irreparable damage. This is a threshold determination which is a matter requiring professional and technical
analysis. The judicial scrutiny of this particular step would
most likely be minimal except to screen against obvious abuses
or arbitrary determinations. The real decision, subject to review of a more substantial nature, is the ultimate site selection
from among alternatives identified in the elimination process.
Once certain development sites are identified as the residual areas outside the designated A.C.E.C.'s, or as acceptable
within the A.C.E.C. under special management, the EIS stage
begins wherein the relative environmental impacts are assessed
for each alternative site. If through this process it is evident
144. 43 U.S.C.A. §1702(a) (Supp. 1978).
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that one site will cause least damage to the environment,"' the
BLM would seem to be compelled to select that site for the
right-of-way grant. Otherwise, there seems to be a strong case
for claiming an arbitrary and capricious decision in choosing a
more environmentally damaging site. It must be kept in mind
here that only sites within the general economic feasibility zone
were ever considered. Therefore, the requirement in the rightsof-way section of "taking into consideration feasibility" ' , is
satisfied long before such alternatives assessments occur. Any
argument that a more environmentally damaging site should
be selected lacks any support in the section of the FLPMA
dealing with the right-of-way choice.' 47 Nowhere in the rightsof-way section is there a requirement to maximize economic
efficiency. This would be the complement to the requirement
that the grant insure that the "location of the right-of-way
[will be the one] that will cause least damage to the environment."'' As A.C.E.C.'s, only the site or corridor which causes
the least cumulative damage to all these areas and their environmental values would be acceptable as the proper right-ofway under sections 1765(a) and 1765(b).
This conclusion does not mean, however, that there will
never be any development which requires a right-of-way grant
through or in an A.C.E.C. This only means that among all the
reasonable alernative sites identified within the economic feasibility zone, the one chosen must be the one which would
cause the relatively least damage to the environment. A restriction requiring no damage must come from some other more
restrictive directive such as the Endangered Species Act'48
which imposes absolute safeguards for the protection of endangered species habitat. If there is so much land with such absolute restrictions on it that no sites remain for locating facilities
in the feasibility zone, the right-of-way review should stop and
145. Id. §1765(b)(v).
146. Id.
147. Id. §§1763-65.
148. Id. §1765(b)(v) (emphasis added).
149. 16 U.S.C. §1531 (1976). This act specifically directs that, "all other Federal
departments and agencies shall . . . insure that actions authorized, funded, or carried
out by them do not jeopardize the continued existence of such endangered species and
threatened species or result in the destruction or modification of habitat . . . which is
determined . . . to be critical." Id. §1536. See Hill v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 549 F.2d
1064, 1068-71 (6th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 98 S. Ct. 2279 (1978); National Wildlife Fed'n. v.
Coleman, 529 F.2d 359, 371-74 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976).
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an attempt should be made to identify other economically feasible zones in another acceptable area. A proper prescreening
of such zones prior to the economic feasibility zone identification should, however, identify the majority of such absolute
restrictions because of their usually notorious nature among
the agencies or reviewers of agencies.
Once the prequalification process has identified all the
A.C.E.C.'s at a macrolevel, the potential applicants for the
rights-of-way can focus on residual areas and make their own
internal evaluation of what specific sites they prefer, after
which the formal rights-of-way application can occur. It is desirable here to allow an application for multiple alternative
sites. This enables both the applicant and the BLM to evaluate
all sites without biases due to prior political or economic commitments to one site. It also allows for negotiation and settling
by stipulations conflicts between the applicant and the BLM
at a stage where such adjustments and modifications are most
feasible. Most important to the public interest, this staging of
the siting process gives much more reliable assurance that the
critical environmental values have been identified and protected prior to the development negotiation stage and irretrievable political or economic commitments.
K. Conclusion of Legal Basis
With such a comprehensive process as that proposed, the
successful implementation requires good faith commitments
by both government and the utility industry throughout the
processes leading up to the ultimate decision on a site. If there
is an administrative breakdown or inclination to abuse or ignore the process at any important formative stage, the resulting decisions will be adversely affected by increasing the potential for an arbitrary or bad faith determination. The reality of
the complexity and intertwining of federal decisionmaking illustrates further the dilemma of relying totally on litigation to
force agency implementation of complex planning procedures.
The overall reason therefore for developing a rather comprehensive and detailed legal rationale is not to encourage reliance
on a continuous legal challenge to the BLM for success, but to
identify what are the supportive arguments to begin the process of good faith compliance.
II.

SITING METHODOLOGY

By limiting this study only to siting, there is no attempt
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to discount the importance of the other aspects of energy development decisionmaking. Indeed, the presiting issues of the actual need for such development are perhaps the most important decisions. This article presumes such issues to have been
addressed in some systematic and equitable manner prior to
the actual siting decision. The siting process is based on the
concept that there will be some level of energy development
necessarily on or near public lands. Within the present institutional framework, this siting methodology can do nothing more
than identify the relatively best site or sites for a potential
development using the criteria of least cumulative environmental degradation. Once this information is developed and
arrayed for the decisionmaking entities involved, other decisional factors will come into play. However, in a legal context
the public land manager has an affirmative trust responsibility
to make decisions which will be the best in terms of protecting
the total public interest under the public trust doctrine. 50
The problem of finding the optimal solution in allocating
public resources has been a terribly frustrating issue of economic theorists for many years;' however, with proper limitations and perspective, this problem is solvable in the context
of this methodology. Generally defined, the best public welfare
decision which allocates public common goods is the one which
results in the greatest total net public benefits after deducting
the total net public costs.15 More specifically to the siting decisions, the best choice will be that which results in the least
costs to the public in terms of reduction in the total public
values on the land. The real problem for pure optimization
analysis is, of course, defining and in some manner qualifying
these vague and often debatable values.
Fortunately, the analytical economic question of what has
value can be conveniently deferred by accepting what the Congress and the judiciary have defined as values. These determi150. See Montgomery, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law: Its Application in the Judicial Review of Land Classification Decisions, 10 PuB. LAND & RESOURCES L. Dic.. 1, 16-53 (1973). See generally, Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in
Natural Resource Law: Effective JudicialIntervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 971 (1970).
151. See, e.g., Hicks, Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696
(1939); Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and InterpersonalComparisons of
Utility, Id. at 549; McGuire & Aaron, Efficiency and Equity in the Optimal Supply of
a Public Good, 51 REv. OF ECON. & STATISTICS 31-39 (1969).
152. MISHAN, COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS (1971).
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nations of value do in fact assign rights in the various land
resources to the various groups who desire to use them. The
eternal and complex issues of distributional equity and the
correct assignment of such rights are presumed to be addressed, however loosely or politically, by Congress in the legislative process. One writer endorses the idea of assuming the
inherent value or right assignments of the institutions and beginning the optimizing analysis from that point. 53 Public land
resources have a myriad of such assignments. Given the acceptance of these values as the true measures of the public welfare,
the problem becomes one of efficient maximization of these
values by the siting methodology.
This welfare efficiency in the siting decision is measured
by the cumulative level of the assigned resource values. Any
determination of what is the best site must be done in the
framework of comparative or alternative assessments to avoid
the unsolvable problem of the true optimum choice. Because
the siting decision is one of choosing between a limited set of
alternative sites, the comparatively best solution can be developed.
The siting process is one of comparative assessment to find
the relatively best site as a part of the larger energy development decision process. The analysis of the optimal is focused
on a spatial differential welfare function between sites for each
assigned welfare value. A spatial differential is necessary; otherwise, any site would be the optimum as they all would result
in the same total value level no matter where they were on the
land. Variability over our public lands is obvious. Coupled with
inherent spatial variability is the inherent differential of impacts from an energy development wherein the relative distance from the development affects the intensity of impact.' 5
The relative welfare efficiency of the decision or site chosen
then is determined by the relative level of resulting welfare
values on the land which is subsequently determined by subtracting or adding the relative degradation'55 or enhancement
153. Dorfman, The Technical Basis for Decision Making, in THE GOVERNANCE OF
COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES 5, 20 (E. Haefele, ed. 1974).

154. See Blonquist, The Effect of Electric Utility Power Plant Location on Area
Property Value 50 LAND ECONOMICS 97 (1974).
155. The degradation of any welfare value is defined herein as an externality of
the energy development. An externality occurs "whenever an output of one economic
agent appears as an imput in the consumption or production vector of another without
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of these highly variable land resource values caused by the
development. This relativity consequently depends on the location of the site in relation to the other land values; therefore,
the optimization analysis is focused on the alternative sites for
any development.
The externalities caused by energy development which are
a concern in the siting methodology can be more definitively
characterized as what one economist defines as true pollution
as distinguished from congestion externalities." 6 The relative
degree to which these pollutant costs become true externalities
in the context of the public land welfare functions depends on
the relative destruction of the welfare values. Because the destructive or polluting production outputs of an energy development will be generally the same at any alternative site, the
difference between each site's spatial relationships to the land
characteristics with assigned welfare values will be the determining factors for identifying the most efficient site. In the
vernacular of traditional welfare economics, the problem is top
"properly evaluate a. . . land use policy which results in gains
to some individuals [public users] and losses to others
...
'"1
, The siting analysis is not the proper framework for
assessing the total costs and benefits of X amount of energy
development but is simply the framework for assessing the
relative costs and benefits of each alternative.
The prequalification siting methodology has two major
stages of decision analysis. The first stage is the feasibility zone
identification and the second is the alternative sites analysis
and identification of the most efficient site. This separation of
anlaysis into a two-step process is significantly different from
most siting methodologies recently developed. The first stage
analysis involved in defining and identifying economically and
physically feasible areas for energy development is distinctly
accompanying payment." Fisher & Krutilla, Managingthe Public Lands: Assignment
of Property Rights and Valuation of Resources, in THE GOVERNANCE OF COMMON PROPERTY REsoURcEs 35, 45 (E. Haefele, ed. 1974).
156. Rothenberg, The Economics of Congestion and Pollution: An Integrated
View, 60 AM. ECON. REv. 2, 114 (1970). Rothenberg's definition is paraphrased as, "a
competing dissimilar use of the environment which alters the characteristics of the
environmental resources in a way that is in some sense destructive, and in which there
is an unidirectional flow of the costs associated with the resource exploitation." Fisher
& Krutilla, supra note 155 at 47.
157. Id. at 47.
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different from the analysis involved in the specific site selection. This macrolevel analysis uses only industrial location factors based on sometimes very crude assessments of resource
availability and regional distances between the resources and
the market or demand point. 58 At this point, the boundaries
of the zones represent only thresholds of feasiblity based on this
macrolevel analysis. There is no assessment of relative costs
over space in any refined fashion, nor, more importantly, are
there any offsite externality assessments made. The secondlevel analysis must then use these feasibility zones as the universe of alternative assessments and therein take into account
the externality-economic cost differentials based on site specific analysis. 59
Combining both levels of economic and physical feasibility
with the externalities into one integrated siting analysis makes
it impossible to array the relative economic costs against the
relative environmental costs for better informed decisionmaking. The relative economic desirability of a particular site
would then be indistinguishable from the relative environmental desirability of a site, thereby increasing the potential for
distortion of the results. Inserting such quantitative costs into
qualitative evaluations may very well cause the decisionmaker
to falsely presume the site identified to be the optimal site
regardless of public welfare considerations. This segregation in
no way implies a discounting or minimizing of the importance
of economic costs to the ultimate siting decision. However, it
does recognize the pitfalls and potential for confusion inherent
in mixing the two very different criteria.
Once a regional or cell suitability analysis has been completed, it is absolutely essential that the resulting identified
cells or zones are not presumed to be the relatively best or most
158. See, e.g., Preliminary Engineering Analysis and Discussion of Issues for the
Six Alternative IPP Power Plant Sites, prepared by the Intermountain Power Project,
Salt Lake City, Utah for presentation at the November 1, 1977 Meeting of the Utah
Interagency Task Force on Power Plant Siting. See also, INSTrrUTE OF GEOPHYSICS AND
PLANETARY PHYSICS, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT Los ANGELES, CALIF. Study of Alternative Locations of Coal-Fired Electric GeneratingPlants to Supply Energy from Western Coal to the Department of Water Resources, (Draft Summary Chapter) (May 4,
1977). (Funded jointly by the Dept. of Water Resources and the California Energy
Resources Conservation and Development Commission, Contract No. 1357027, Orson
Anderson, Principal Investigator).
159. G.W. Webb, Factors Affecting the Location of Coal Burning Steam Electric
GeneratingPlants, 19 THE PROFESSIONAL GEOGRAPHER 173 (issue 4, 1967).
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efficient locations without further analysis. This macrolevel
analysis cannot identify the best specific site in these zones. 110
The use of a two-level screening process also has a very practical advantage over a "one shot" or single integrated approach.
With early macrolevel prescreening there is elimination of
those areas which have little or no potential for development
due to economic, physical, or institutional factors. This macrolevel screening can then be used by both the land management
agency and the potential applicants to "red flag" these areas,
minimizing the investment of large amounts of time and
money in such very unlikely areas.
The following is a step-by-step specification of how the
methodology procedures are to be implemented by any user of
the process. The methodology is divided into major steps which
are chronological stages of analysis. Under each major step are
the procedures to be used to develop the data for the major step
of the process.
Step 1: FeasibilityZone Identification
The aim of this step is to develop a relatively large scale
map or series of maps delineating the available or feasible areas
for the contemplated development. This step has three substeps. The first is a purely economic resource availability analysis followed by institutional macrolevel and absolute constraint analyses. The separation is necessary here to isolate the
relatively static constraints of physical resource characteristics
from the more variable institutional constraints. Therefore,
adjustments of modifications in the institutions can be incorporated into the analysis without reevaluating the physical
suitability zones.
Step 1.1: Identification of Primary Economic Constraints
The beginning point of this analysis must have some defined potential energy development to analyze. This development will have certain key economic constraints which are related to the relative location of water and coal (if a coal-fired
160. The thing that makes cell analysis possible is vagueness or
'macro-ness'. That is, a given cell characteristic (say, water availability)
is taken to be characteristic of any potential site within a cell ....
Cell
analysis has [only] the potential for gross screening to determine those
areas not suitable for specific facilities; beyond this, site specific analysis
is mandatory.

Eberhart & Eagles, Regional Energy Facility Siting, v3 n1
MENT J. 73-74 (1976).

COASTAL ZONE MANAGE-
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plant) vis-a-vis the demand center(s). In terms of importance,
water availability usually is the most critical.'' Other significant macrolevel constraints to use in this step are firm supplies
of high-quality coal for the life of the development and developed or feasible transportation systems both for the coal to
power plant delivery and power plant to demand center transmission. The actual procedure begins with an identification of
all general areas with a sufficient water supply to sustain the
energy development requirements.'
Next, the coal supplies must be inventoried for the study
region to identify coal supplies which are of sufficient amount
to satisfy the requirements of the potential energy development. Third, Step 1.1 surveys the existing transportation system for adequate roads or railroads to move the coal from its
source. Finally, the existing transmission system is inventoried
for capacity and potential relative to the known demand
points.
Step 1.2: Delineation of Macrolevel TransportationCosts and
Identification of Unconstrained FeasibilityZones
Once the basic resource supplies are identified, a generalized transportation limitation isopleth (or equal value line) is
constructed around each supply of coal and water. Overlaid on
this isopleth map is a similar transmission limitation isopleth
from the demand centers. Because the level of information is
rather crude at this point, the specificity of the isopleths should
be rough. The results will be a map delineating all feasible
zones for energy development of the size and type being analyzed. The economic sophistication of Step 1.2 is purposely
simple to avoid becoming too site-specific prior to the public
welfare analyses. The only information sought at this point is
the absolute geographical limitations on feasibility from an
economic point of view and not an economic location optimization. The policy presumption supporting this approach is that
the potential for minimizing the overall total public welfare
requires latitude for imposing a certain amount of economic
161. According to Deasy and Gruss in their locational study of the American
Electric Power System, 49 of the 55 power plants analyzed specified water availability
to be the most critical location factor. Deasy & Gruss, Factors Influencing Distribution of Steam Electric Generating Plants, 12 Tum PROFESSIONAL GEOGRAPHER 1 (issue
3, 1960).

162. See, e.g., U.S.
IMPACT SATEMENT cl

m

DEPARTMENT OF INTEIoR, KAIPAnowrrs FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL

(Washington, D.C. 1976).
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costs on the development (up to the point of feasibility limitation if necessary). This policy presumption is further supported
by the fact that the ultimate liability for added economic costs
is the large population of electrical power consumers which can
be presumed to accept the congressional assignment of the
aforementioned welfare values for protection.
Step 1.3: Identification of A bosolute Institutional Constraints
in the UnconstrainedFeasibilityZones
Once the unconstrained feasibility zones are identified and
mapped, the macrolevel institutional constraints which are
mandatory (at that point in time of the analysis) are mapped.
These are only constraints which will (1) be reasonably certain
to remain in force for the development period of operation and
(2) allow for no variance or modification without either legislative or judicial action. Such constraints are either based on
land management jurisdiction prohibitions or imposition of
physical resource quality degradation limits or a combination
of both."' Step 1.3 analysis takes these and other absolute institutional constraints and delineates only those areas within
the Step 1.2 zones which would not be available for development as a result of these prohibitive constraints. Because of the
inability to technically specify precise "L" boundaries for
many of these constraints, these lines are only tentative at this
point in the analysis. Later adjustments can be made in situa163. An example of land management absolute prohibitions is the National Park's
general prohibition against the construction of large coal-fired power plants within the
park boundaries or allowing high voltage transmission lines unless specially authorized
by legislation. The Capital Reef National Park Enabling Act created the special right
to have a transmission corridor developed through the park as determined by the
National Park Service. 16 U.S.C. §273(d) (1971). The obvious example of a resource
quality protection prohibition is the Prevention of Significant Deterioration Standards
in the 1977 Clean Air Act which imposes an absolute threshold on the level of emissions
which can be emitted from an energy development. The Clean Air Act of 1977, 42
U.S.C. §7401 (1977). An example of a combination is the antidegradation policy of the
Clean Water Act for waters within National Parks, 33 U.S.C.A. §1251 (West Supp.
1978). The regulations state this antidegradation as follows:
Existing high quality waters which exceed those levels necessary to support propagation of fish, shellfish and wildlife and recreation in and on
the water shall be maintained and protected unless the State chooses. ..
to allow lower water quality as a result of necessary and justifiable economic or social development. In no event, however, may degradation . ..
be allowed in high quality waters which constitute an outstanding National resource . . . and waters of exceptional recreational or ecological
significance.
40 C.F.R. §130.17(e)(2) (1977).
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tions requiring more precise site-specific refinement of the
boundary by such means as air quality site modeling or intensive on site resource evaluations and inventories. By first identifying the economically and physically feasible zones, the
amount of analysis and inventory work is greatly reduced by
focusing all further analysis only on these zones.
Another type of potential constraint is the state and
local land use policies which may prohibit certain development
activities. These are to be incorporated at this point if they do
in fact satisfy the two above conditions of (1) being reasonably
certain of remaining in force and (2) not allowing any variance
or modifications without legislative or judicial action.
The residual of Step 1.2 and Step 1.3 is the actual feasibility zone to be analyzed at a site-specific level in all the remaining steps. It is at this point in time that the BLM would nominate or prequalify these areas for further study as potential
energy development areas, being careful to note that these are
only study areas and not yet definitely acceptable sites. This
can be done either by use of the management decision process
of the planning process8 4 or in combination with the corridor
identification process.' 5 At this point, there has been no formal
decision made by the BLM absolutely prohibiting any applications for energy development outside these Step 1.3 feasibility
zones. However, the strong preference to so confine such applications will result from this nomination bias by the BLM. Such
a bias is definitely supportive of this study's aim to focus the
energy industry's planning into the more acceptable zones
early in the industry's planning, to minimize the investments
in sites outside the zones which have much greater potential for
resource use conflicts, and to minimize drawn out administrative and litigative haggling.
Step 2: Public Welfare Value Inventory
This step is focused entirely upon the transfer of the legislatively assigned welfare values contained in statutes and regulations to the particular land areas which contain them. The
analytical procedure begins with the physical land inventory of
the BLM planning process and builds upon this inventory the
welfare values which are derivative from certain land charac164. 43 U.S.C.A. §1712(e) (Supp. 1978).
165. Id. §1763.
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teristics defined in the inventories. A very important distinction between this methodology and other spatial impact assessment approaches is, analogous to the segregation in Step 1, a
definite segregation of the simple inventory of values from the
actual impact assessment (Step 3). This segregation is necessary due to the significant difference between the existence of
a land value and the resulting impact on such a value from an
energy development. The correlation between the amount of
any land value existing in an area and the amount of adverse
impact is not direct and is very low for many land values;
therefore, identifying the optimal site as simply the area with
the lowest relative level of value existence is very misleading.
The analysis of efficiency or site optimality must be based
on the site which causes the least relative cumulative adverse
impacts on these existing values (i.e., pollution externalities as
defined by Rothenberg)."6 This can be determined only by analyzing the net change in the total welfare land values resulting
from adverse development externalities (i.e., pollution). The
net change on these land values is dependent upon two factors:
(1) the relative sensitivity of the value to the outputs or physical changes caused by the development, and (2) the relative
distance between the value and the development. Symbolically, this can be represented as follows: VIB represents the
relative amount of value 1 on X parcel of land in the feasilibity
zone before any development at Y, then VIA represents the
resulting level of that initial amount of value 1 after the development. If VIA< V1B, then there would be a degradation of
the value resulting from the development. This is then, by
the above definition, an externality. If VIA VIB, then there
has been no externality, even though the amount of the value
may be very high at that X location. The externality is then
XIB-VIA. VIB-VIA is a function of the above stated factors,
the relative impact sensitivity, and f(x). The distance between point X and point Y (the development site) represented
as f(dXY) where d is distance. The cumulative externality of
any site, Y= EVnB-VnA where E VnB-VnA = [f(x)f(dXY)]
VnB. f(x) is therein expressed in terms of relative reduction
of value and f(dXY) is expressed in terms of distance decay of
such sensitivities.
For example, suppose land parcel X has a high VIB. The
166. Rothenberg, supra note 156, at 114.
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relative sensitivity of this value to energy development is extreme within one mile of the site but is nonexistent at five miles
and the decay is linear. This case allows the distance decay
function to go from 1.00 at one mile or closer to 0.00 at five
miles with the linear point at any intermediate distance being
the f(x) function. The sensitivity function is simply a scalar
amount proportionate to the sensitivity in a none, low, or high
range because this methodology uses only the three scalar levels.
Step 2.1: Land Characteristics, Value Inventory, and
Identification
Step 2.1 involves use of the existing land resource inventories and any supplemental information which allows the land
planner to identify the existence and location of all land characteristics which have derivative land values. This can be done
in either of two ways, depending on the characteristic being
inventoried. One approach is to make a land grid dividing the
feasibility zone into convenient analytical cells. Then for each
cell, identify any such land characteristics which exist in the
cell. The other approach is to delineate the extent of the particular land characteristic within the zone by a boundary line. A
combination of both approaches is likely to be used depending
on the land characteristic being inventoried. For example, wetland areas containing wildlife values are fairly well known so
the delineation approach could be used. Scenic viewpoint values may be better identified by the grid system approach.
There is no relative value assignment in this step but only a
binary specification of either existence (+) or nonexistence (0)
of the value.
If there is any portion of a grid cell having any such characteristic it will be assigned a +. This presumes a theoretically
homogeneous grid at this point, but is not oversimplification
because the relative level of such value's existence will be determined in Step 2.2. Up to this point, the evaluation of
land resources has been oriented to the physical or biological
character of the land. This allows for truly ecological systems
analysis prior to the infusion of the political and economic
balancing into the methodology enabling the scientist in the
field to make the essential ecological inventories relatively unfettered by political constraints.
The philosophy of using the ecological system as the basis
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for planning has had strong supporters in recent years.'6 7 There
is, however, in Step 2.1 integration of the institutional factors
by identifying those land characteristics which express the values specified in the legislation, these values being derivatives
of these certain characteristics. Because of the focus primarily
on these institutionally important values rather than the ecologically important factors, this methodology is not what the
theorists would call a pure "ecological systems" approach.'"
This shortcoming, as the systems theorist would claim, is a
necessity in the context of the siting model being aimed at
implementation rather than theoretical purity. The siting process developed here includes only procedures that can be legally defended if challenged, or conversely, legally imposed if
not self-initiated by the agency. This condition constrains the
methodology to the use of only institutionally recognized values in the evaluation, however unecological this may seem.
Step 2.2: Relative Value Assignments
This is perhaps the most critical element in the methodology in that it contains the highest degree of deference to the
expertise of the agency for value assignments. It is in Step 2.2
that there is the highest potential for professional (or political)
bias, insufficient data, or poor correlation analysis between the
land (ecological) characteristic and the institutional value.
This methodology recognizes these potential problems and, in
an attempt to minimize them, has reduced the range of relative
value assignments which can be given to any area in the grid
to only three-low, medium, or high. One hypothesis for such
a restricted range is that any evaluation of qualitative values
is by definition subjective; therefore, the size of the range allowed for assignment of value is directly related to the potential
for distortion or bias.
Another methodology characteristic which is aimed at
minimizing the above problems is the stress upon relativity of
analysis. This methodology makes no claim to assign any absolute value to any element of the process, including the sites
themselves. Finally, the dispersion of the values into indivi167. See McHARG, DESIGN WITH NATURE (1969). See also WUENSCHER & STARRETT, LANDSCAPE COMPARTMENTALIZATION:

AN ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO LAND USE

PLANNING (1973).

168. For the first comprehensive statement of this approach, see ODUM, FUNDAMENTALS OF ECOLOGY (2d ed. 1971).
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dual cells for site-specific assessment and value assignment to
be later cumulated helps to reduce the tendency to generalize
a value's relative ranking over the total extent of its existence
in the feasibility zone. Such a generalization without the grid
cell analysis may distort the outcome by presuming the value's
relative intensity to be homogeneous over the total extent of its
range. Such homogeneity of land values is very rare indeed.
The actual procedure of this substep is as follows: Each
positive (+) cell identified in Step 2.1 is evaluated for each
value contained in the cell and assigned either a low, medium,
or high intensity. Guidelines and specific criteria for each value
will be developed and applied uniformly for all positive cells in
the feasibility zone. The important condition here is uniformity of application with whatever criteria developed. The cell
evaluation must be focused on the values specifically expressed
in that particular cell's land characteristics and deemphasize
the surrounding cell values. The idea here is to segregate the
evaluation and minimize the subjectivity as much as possible
by concentrating on the small areas individually.
Because this is a relativity evaluation, the universe of values must be specified in order to define the limits of comparison. The relative value is a direct function, in most cases, of
the size of the universe considered, due primarily to the fact
that the relative value is usually related to the relative scarcity
of like resources available to the consumer. This relationship
is especially valid when the resource's value is dependent in
some degree upon the factor of uniqueness or the existence of
extraordinary features.6 9 In order to correlate the value assignment to the legal rationale or framework supporting the siting
process, the universe chosen should correspond as closely as
possible to the management universe of the decisionmaking
entity using the process.
Step 2.3: Extraordinaryor Special Value Assignment
This step is intended to allow the analyst to adjust the
Step 2.2 value assignments because of unique or special conditions which exist and to relate the value more closely to relative
169. An excellent example of this is the variation in relative value assignment of
flatwater recreation. If the universe specified includes many existing large reservoirs
with extensive recreational values, the relative intensity of this value at the margin
will be significantly less than if the universe has few such reservoirs. KRurtLA &
FISHER, THE ECONOMICS OF NATURAL ENVIRONMENT 39-59 (1975).
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demand for the value by the interested public. The principal
special or modifying conditions to be applied here include irreversibility of the value loss and minimal intervalue substitutability between the value lost and another replacement value
(stream fishing replaced by lake fishing as opposed to a unique
stream value not being replaceable by another such value).' 70
The basic rationale for including minimal substitutability is
similar to the irreversibility theory. The substitutability assessment is based on the amount of other replacement options
to approximately satisfy the same demands where the irreversability assessment may or may not be based on the ability to
substitute other values.
Another special modifying condition is relative accessibility to the value. This modifier is strictly limited to those values
which require accessibility as a part of their manifestation as
a value. Where such physical access is not a part or is only a
portion of the prerequisite conditions for enjoying the value,
then it should not be applied, or should be discounted accordingly. In other words, the rationale for applying such a condition to the evaluation is the recognition that certain values
require access to gain any utility or welfare value from them.
Access here is defined as the ability to utilize or gain satisfaction of the land value using whatever particular combination of senses required to do so and does not necessarily require
physical proximity. With such a definition as guidance, it must
be first determined what senses are required to utilize each
value, and secondly, whether physical access to that land area
170. There is ample economic theoretical support for giving extraordinary consideration to these conditions, although admittedly controversial. Krutilla and Fisher
succinctly summarize the argument for such special consideration:
If a destructive use of environmental resources involves a welfare loss in
perpetuity, irrespective of its implications for the more basic constituents
of human welfare, a case has been made for giving different weights or
priority to the rights based on the constructive-destruction dismotion
made in the use of the environment.
Krutilla & Fisher, Managing the Public Lands, in GOVERNANCE OF COMMON PROPERTY
REsouRcEs, supra note 153, at 54. See also, Fisher, Krutilla & Cicchetti, The Economics of Environmental Preservation, 61 AM. ECON. REv. 605 (1972); Mishan, The
Postwar Literature on Externalities: An Interpretive Essay, 9 J. OF EcoN.
LIT. 1 (1971). This theory is based on the following basic assumption for public
resources wherein the costs are total social costs. "[When] a destructive use of common property resources has an irreversible effect or is remediable only at great cost or
difficulty, there is some value [added] to keeping the option that would be foreclosed
by the destructive alternative." Id.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 56

is a prerequisite to such utilization. In some cases, lack of access is required or at least positively enhances the particular
value; for example, wilderness or watershed protection where
there is too much access actually degrades the value.
These Step 2.3 special value assignments can either modify the existing Step 2.2 value assignment or be specially
noted as additional elements of the value assignment. Because
of the importance of such special conditions as irreversibility
and extreme scarcity (minimal substitutability), it is recommended that these be separately designated in this step while
accessibility should be an incorporated modifier of Step 2.2
assignments.
A separate map and statistical compilation of each value
is then done in order to allow later weighting and separate
consideration of each value. Caution must be exercised in the
use of such Step 2.3 maps and dates in order not to misconstrue
what is represented by them. This step has only identified the
inherent values and not the potential impacts upon these values from an energy development. Many environmental assessments are guilty of allowing this faulty presumption of a direct
correlation between the existence or level of a land resource
value and the potential adverse impacts upon them. The analysis must focus on the impact which, as stated above, is not
dependent only on the relative value level but more importantly on both distance from the development and relative sensitivity of the value to the various outputs of the development.
Step 3: Relative Impact Assessment
Prior to beginning Step 3, there should be initiated by a
multisite right-of-way application an identification of the best
sites from an applicant's perspective within the feasibility
zone. These sites are first ranked according to their relative
desirability to the applicants and evaluated simply from engineering and economic criteria, exclusive of the public welfare
factors. This identification would most likely be done by potential applicants who desire to have their own locational criteria
used. In terms of integrating the siting process into the BLM
comprehensive planning system, completion of all the steps up
to Step 3 would suffice as a framework for nominating areas.
No further analysis by the BLM will be required until applicants come forward with site-specific proposals which would
trigger Step 3. Such a suspension of the siting analysis is
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essential because of the variable factors of time, technology,
and economics. This would be useful also because of the minimizing of unnecessary detailed analysis. By identifying the feasibility zones and precluding other infeasible areas, the goal of
agency assertion of the public interest value protection prior to
applications will be achieved if Steps 1 and 2 are already completed. This also allows the applicants time to adjust to and
analyze the nominations within their planning system. In addition, and perhaps most important, there will be much less uncertainty among the applicant industries about the "licensability" of their developments if they stay within the feasibility
zones.
In order to allow for consideration of all reasonable alternatives, it may be necessary for the BLM by rulemaking to
require applicants to identify all specific sites they would be
willing to consider within the feasibility zone. If only one site
is selected by an applicant, the agency is still obligated to
consider all reasonable alternatives. Therefore, applicants take
a very significant risk if only one site is acceptable to them.
Once the applicant has specified proposed sites, the relative
impact analysis can begin. This is also the most logical point
to begin the formal Environmental Impact Statement for the
specific developments.'7
Step 3.1: Impact Sensitivity and Distance Functions Analysis
The analysis is done for each value identified in the zone
on a cell by cell level to again avoid oversimplification of total
areas analysis and to take into account the differentials of each
land cell and the value development distance factors. For each
cell where a value exists, the relative impact sensitivity is specified for each output from the development. This measure is
again restricted to a range of none, low, medium, or high. (An
optional more restrictive range can be used which includes
none, minimal and significant sensitivity.) The determination
of this sensitivity index then incorporates the distance decay
function of each impact sensitivity where applicable.7'
171. There would also be a programmatic Environmental Statement prepared
prior to this stage on the overall feasibility zone nomination process similar to the
national wilderness studies being conducted by the U.S. Forest Service under the
rubric RAREII.
172. This inclusion of distance decay is critical to making this methodology
more representative of the real impacts than other siting models without such a function. Such models do not take into account offsite impacts because of the built-in
presumption that use compatibility of the value is only affected by onsite use conflicts.
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The relative impact assessment is then made for each
value in each cell for each alternative site being analyzed. Symbolically, X 1 , X 2 . . .Xn represent the particular land cells
being evaluated and Y 1 , Y 2 . . .Yn represent the alternative
sites being considered. V 1 , V2 . . .Vn represent the various
resource values being considered. Xn, Yn and Vn are all static
throughout the analysis in this Step 3.1, meaning they do not
vary except as modified by the following functions. Xn and Yn
are points which are set and Vn simply denotes the existence
of a value at point Xn. The modifying functions are represented as follows:
fSn

impact sensitivity index for n output.
fdn - distance decay of impact sensitivity for n output.
fi= relative intensity of value existing in cell n where the
range of fSn = none, low, medium or high and
the range of fi= low, medium or high.

Using these functions, the relative impact of the development from production, output I, at site Y 1 for value V1 at cell
X is: I = fi(Vlx)fdi fsl (dX, Y).
Step 3.2: Cumulative Impact Assessment
The cumulative impact of I1 on V1 then is simply the
total of the impacts on all cells Xn containing V1 or efi(Vlxn)
fdl fsl (Xn to Y1 distance). Similarly, the total relative impact of development at site Y1 = 6 ln where n = all potential
adverse impacts. At this point, any special or extraordinary
factors identified in Step 2.3 (irreversibility or minimal substitutability) should be added to the impact analysis for each
applicable impact. This addition should be a specially designated job of the decision maker wherein the factor's significance will not be discounted by aggregation into the overall
cumulation equation.
Step 4: Value Weighting Options
This step must be viewed as optional and is segregated to
clearly identify the highly discretionary process of weighting
Such a presumption does not allow for the more realistic evaluation of offsite impacts
as a function of distance. In energy development, the outputs causing such impacts
are often highly mobile or offsite in nature (e.g., air emissions, up-stream water discharges or diversions). This characteristic of development externalities requiresthe use
of offsite distance decay analysis in order to adequately present the total potential
impacts of development. McHARG, DESIGN WriT NATURE 143-45 (1969), where he uses
the phrase, "degree of compatability" to denote this index.
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from the more structured and systematic value assessments in
Steps 1 through 3. These weightings are also distinguishable
from the Step 2.3 factors because these options are focused
more on special political or social influences while Step 2.3 is
derived from and dependent upon the land characteristic itself.
Any combination of these options can be applied to any
combination of values or locations; therefore, the potential
number of permutations is extremely high giving great flexibility to the methodology. This high degree of flexibility, however,
creates perhaps an undesirable degree of administrative discretion. Therefore, the use of Step 4 must carry a prerequisite of
very extensive documentation and supporting evidence. From
a legal perspective, the burden of proof should be upon the
agency to justify the use of these options rather than upon the
critic in challenging the use. Their use should be viewed as
extraordinary and justified only where special conditions exist.
Option 1
The relative values developed in Step 2 can be increased
or decreased if there is significant public support for such a
particular value modification. The public support must, however, be representative of the total public interest in that particular value. Use of Delphi or survey methods are possible
means of developing such information as well as the review and
hearing comments in the EIS process for the alternatives and
the prior feasibility zone programmatic EIS. Special care must
be exercised to insure true representation of such special public
concerns.
Option 2
This option is labeled the land use policy compatability
index. This is in response to the growing demand for better
coordination between governmental planning entities, especially between the federal and state or local levels. There are
also regulatory mandates for such coordination in both the
74
NEPA7 3 and the FLPMA.
173. Where a conflict [between the proposed action and local land
policy] or inconsistency exists, the statement should describe the extent
to which the agency has reconciled its proposed action with the plan,
policy or control, and the reasons why the agency has decided to proceed
notwithstanding the absence of full reconciliation.
See Preparation of Environmental Impact Statements: Guidelines, 40 C.F.R.
§ 1500.8(2) (1977).
174. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1712(c)(9) (Supp. 1978) requires extensive compatibility of
the BLM activities with local and state land use policies.
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If there are local land use policies which emphasize one or
more values for preservation or enhancement, these policies
can be reflected in a positive weighting of that value in Step 2.
This weighting is represented mathematically by modifying
the fi function in Step 3.1 accordingly (e.g., from low to
high). In certain special cases, the value may be negatively
weighted if the land use policies clearly indicate a discounting
of such value; however, these discounting weightings can only
occur when they are not in conflict with national policy. 7 5 For
example, in no case can a negative weighting be justified or
allowed for a value having national significance such as a wilderness ,or a wild and scenic river.
Option 3
If the value has a very short recovery time from impacts,
a discounting of the value may be exercised. If conversely, the
recovery time of a value from such impacts is extremely long
term (but not irreversible), there can be an added weighting.
This weighting is applied to the impact sensitivity function,
fsn , in Step 3 accordingly. The rationale for such a weighting
is based on the theoretical presumption of a direct correlation
between potential opportunity costs to time of value lost.
Step 5: Alternative Site Comparisons
Once the cumulation of all net impacts has been done plus
the applicable weightings for each alternative site, Step 5 becomes the interface of information and decisionmaking. Be-.
cause this is a critical transition from the insulated world of'
professional analysis to the very exposed world of decisionmaking, this step must be very structured in its presentation format
to insure that there is a minimum of misunderstanding and/or
misuse of the information developed. It is also at this stage of
the siting process where the framework of tradeoffs between
economic development costs and public welfare values must be
clearly illustrated to the decisionmakers responsible for such
balancing.
Step 5.1: Lease Cost Tradeoff Analysis
Each alternative site Yn is assigned both its current con175. "Land use pians of the Secretary ... shall be consistent with State and local
plans to the maximum extent he finds consistent with Federal law and the purposes
of this Act." Id.

POWER PLANT SITING

struction and operational economic costs for development.

This is to be broken down into components of the project (e.g.,
transmission system, water system). The quantifications of
these costs are only those added to the least cost alternative
for each component and total costs. Therefore, the least total
cost alternative is Kepresented by tT and the least component
cost likewise is EJC . The relatively greater costs or additive
costs are arrayed according to their level of departure from the
least cost figures. Similarly, the least cost public welfare site
(i.e., most optimal environmentally) is assigned both a least
total cost (ET) and a least component cost (19C). All other
alternatives are then arrayed according to their additive impacts above the optimal site and for each component.
A comprehensive arraying of all values and all component
costs for all sites will give the decisionmaker (and the reviewers
of the decisions) a clear and focused identification of the
tradeoffs involved in any siting choice. It also makes possible
component adjustments or mitigations to make certain sites
more attractive to a decisionmaker by being less polluting to a
certain critical value.
CONCLUSION

Siting of energy development in environmentally sensitive
areas is unavoidably a complex problem. Presenting an overly
simplistic solution of generalized platitudes such as the need
for balancing or one-stop licensing without a substantive discussion of the actual process is no solution at all. This relatively
detailed (although summarized) presentation hopefully does
substantively identify a way which is now legally justified and
technically practical for achieving that elusive balancing of our
own society's dichotomous and idealistic desires for both more
energy and preservation of our environmental quality.
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I. Introduction
The discussion in this paper is premised on three assumptions. First, the United States will need new technologies to
meet its increasing energy demands by the end of the century.
While the world energy demand is expected to double in a
period of twenty to thirty years,' a recent study by the U.S.
Department of Commerce indicates that the country's need for
energy will grow 1.2% per person through the end of the century, and that the economy will grow by about 2.2% per year.2
Second, this increasing demand for energy, deemed essential in
order to maintain an acceptable level of economic activity,
coupled with the oil crises of 1973-74 which gave rise to the
demand for energy security in the United States, will necessitate the exploration of all reasonably promising energy alterCopyright retained by author.
* Professor of Law and Director, International Legal Studies Program, University
of Denver.
This article is an adapted version of a study, "Selected Legal and Institutional
Issues Related to Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion (OTEC)," prepared by the author
as a consultant to the Solar Energy Research Institute (SERI), Golden, Colorado. I am
especially grateful to John Lawrence Hargrove, Director of Studies, American Society
of International Law (ASIL), for sharing with me a recent study prepared by ASIL
under an Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) contract and
entitled, "International, Legal, Political and Institutional Aspects of OTEC Demonstration and Development," and to R. C. Tefft, President, Tefft, Kelly & Motley, Inc.,
for a study prepared by his firm entitled, "Toward a Legal, Institutional and Financial
Framework for OTEC Demonstration and Commercialization." I have greatly benefited from these studies as well as from my discussions with Jan Laitos, George Morgan, and John Veigel of the Solar Energy Research Institute. However, I alone am
responsible for the contents of the paper.

1. Cited in COUNCIL
(1978).

ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, SOLAR ENERGY-PROGRESS AND

PROMISE 1

2. Reported in Den. Post, Nov. 23, 1978, at 38, col. 1.
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natives.3 According to the National Energy Plan,' these principal alternative energy sources available to the United
States-coal, nuclar power, and solar power (direct and indirect)-will be used in the years ahead. Finally, the steadily
rising cost of fossil fuel, especially coal, the likely scarcity and
increasing costs by the year 2000 of petroleum, natural gas, and
U-235, and a growing concern over their detrimental environmental effects, will make these sources uneconomical for large
scale electrical generation. Substitute sources will include
OTEC, non-U-235 nuclear, and geothermal energy.
OTEC, an unconventional energy source and a unique energy technology, is an attractive alternative for several reasons.
"lilt can provide utilities with 'baseload capability' on line 24
hours a day. It can economically generate power at a level of
250 megawatts and up, enough for a moderate-sized city. Using
a renewable resource, the sun, its 'fuel' is delivered directly to
the site in usable form without charge. It is environmentally
benign, emits no poisonous byproducts (barring the remote
contingency of a massive leak of the working fluid-probably
ammonia), and it is necessarily situated unobtrusively offshore, away from population centers. All evidence to date indicates that it has no harmful effect on ocean life; indeed, cold
water upwellings are known to be beneficial to fish populations."5
Despite these attractive features, however, established
utility companies have thus far shown little interest in pursuing technological studies and hardware demonstrations related
to OTEC. This apparent lack of serious interest stems mainly
from the perception that OTEC is an expensive, unproven, and
risky undertaking. A combination of factors, including unproven economics (based on presently noncompetitive estimated costs of OTEC-generated energy), unverified social and
environmental effects, and uncertainty as to the potential of
energy from OTEC as well as how OTEC fits into the national
energy policy is responsible for the prevailing skepticism. Also,
3. See, e.g., Nye, Jr. Nuclear Policy: Balancing Nonproliferation and Energy
STATE BULL., Oct. 1978, at 39. See also 78 DEP'T STATE BULL., Sept.
1978, at 3.
4. Energy Policy and Planning, Executive Office of the President, THE NATIONAL
ENERGY PLAN (U.S. Gov't Printing Off., April 1977).
5. Whitmore, OTEC: Electricity from the Ocean, 81 TECHNOLOGY REv., Oct. 1978,
at 58-60.

Security, 78 DEP'T
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the absence of an adequate legal and institutional framework
further clouds the picture.
It seems that the uncertainty OTEC faces on technological
and economic grounds will be dispelled by further studies and
demonstration projects which are likely to be undertaken by
the Department of Energy (DOE).' While the "engineering
challenges to be bridged demand solutions of scale rather than
of technical innovation," 7 it is estimated that "the OTEC
power plant should have an economic advantage over fossil fuel
plants and nuclear plants well before the year 2000." s
However, these economic and technological issues will not
be discussed here, nor will the financial aspects be investigated.? This study has as its primary focus those legal and
institutional aspects which will ostensibly have a significant
bearing upon the commercialization of OTEC. These issues are
broadly classified as (1) jurisdictional, (2) regulatory, and (3)
environmental. They will be discussed here in the context not
only of existing international law-both customary and treaty
law-but also of the current developments in the law and the
probable changes in it, particularly those resulting from ongoing negotiations of the Third United Nations Conference on the
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 58.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 63.
On technical, economic, and financial aspects, see generally H.

NYHART

& R.

STEIN, OCEAN THERMAL ENERGY CONVERSION

KNIGHT,

J.

(1977) [hereinafter cited as

KNIGHT, NYHART

& STEIN]; SCIENCE POLICY RESEARCH DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, SUBCOMM. ON ADVANCED ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES AND ENERGY CONSERVATION RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND DEMONSTRATION OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY, 95TH CONG. 2D SESs., ENERGY FROM THE OCEAN 25-79 (Comm. Print 1978);

E.

FRANCIS, INVESTMENT IN COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF OCEAN THERMAL ENERGY CON-

(OTEC) PLANT-SHIPS (1977) (Prepared by Johns Hopkins University Applied
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ECONOMIC FEASIBILITY AND MARKET READINESS OF EIGHT SOLAR TECHNOLOGIES: INTERIM
DRAFT REPORT 130-45 (1978) (Prepared for U.S. Dep't of Energy) [hereinafter cited as
SERI INTERIM DRAFT REP.]; R. TEFFT, R. KELLY, C. DICK, JR., & K. STEVENSON, TowARD

OTEC DEMONSTRATION AND
(1978) (Prepared for ERDA by Tefft, Kelly and Motley, Inc.)
[hereinafter cited as TEFFT, KELLY & MOTLEY, INC. STUDY]; B. WASHOM & J. NILLES,

A LEGAL, INSTITUTIONAL AND FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK FOR
COMMERCIALIZATION

INCENTIVES FOR THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF OCEAN THERMAL ENERGY CONVERSION TECH-
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(OTEC) (1977) (Prepared for RANN, Nat'l Sci. Found.); J. WrrWER, J. ALCH,
M. LEVINE, P. MEAGHER, E. PICKERING, F. SCHOOLEY, A. SLEMMONS, & T.
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I A COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF SOLAR ALTERNATIVES: IMPLICATIONS FOR
FEDERAL RD&D 95-101 (1978) (Submitted to Solar Working Group, U.S. Dep't of
Energy); and 5 SHARING THE SUN: SOLAR TECHNOLOGY IN THE SEVENTIES 392-548 (K. Boer
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Law of the Sea (LOS II).1o Several alternatives will be discussed and recommendations offered in each area in light of the
United States' interests.
This discussion will be prefaced by a short assessment of
the possible arrangements for the siting of OTEC plants, their
functions, and their potential for the United States." The most
likely configurations for OTEC plants will be: (1) an OTEC
facility operating individually as a semipermanent fixture, or
a number of plants moored in clusters of eight to ten plants
around a central collection device, and connected to shore by
a transmission cable, supplying electrical power for general
consumption to a land-based electricity grid; or (2) an open sea
OTEC facility, a plant-ship, migrating and "grazing" on the
surface, seeking the maximum thermal differential gradient
and supplying power for an energy-intensive industry at sea.
Such a facility could, for example, produce onsite ammonia to
be used for the production of fertilizers and industrial chemicals or as a hydrogen carrier for production of electricity, or
aluminum, or engage in energy-intensive commodity processing such as manganese nodules. The energy produced then
could be converted into other forms of energy, such as hydrogen, and the products produced onsite transported to shore by
vessel. Such products could also be manufactured and processed in such places as Hawaii and Puerto Rico, which are
close to some of the prospective sites of OTEC facilities.
Because of the thermal gradient needed to make OTEC
operative, tropical regions within 100 of the equator, comprising about twenty million square miles, where the surface water
is around 80*F., while the cold water 3,000 feet below is around
10. The Conference which began in Caracas in 1974 concluded its resumed seventh session on September 15, 1978 and will convene its eighth session in Geneva on
March 19, 1979. For a short report on the latest session, see 15 UN CHRONICL:,
Aug.-Sept. 1978, at 41-42. Voluminous legal literature has grown around the
Conference issues. See, e.g., various publications of the Law of the Sea Institute including the papers and proceedings of its annual conferences, and its occasional and
special papers; 1-6 NEW DIRECTIONS INTHE LAW OF THE SEA (R. Churchill, M. Nordquist,
S. Lay, K. Simmonds & J. Welch eds. 1973-77); R. DuPuy, THE LAW OF THE SEA:
CURRENT PROBLEMS (1974); S. ODA, THE LAW OF THE SEA IN OUR TIME (1977); THE LAW
OF THE SEA: ISSUES IN OCEAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (D. Walsh ed. 1977); Symposia in
volumes 6-15 of SAN DIEGo L. REV., 6 id. at 339-513 (1969); 7 id. at 371-673 (1970); 8
id. at 453-747 (1971); 9 id. at 383-751 (1972); 10 id. at 425-691 (1973); 11 id. at 535-838
(1974); 12 id. at 491-742 (1975); 13 id. at 483-778 (1976); 14 id. at 507-750 (1977); 15
id. at 357-662 (1978).
11. The assessment is based on a study of sources cited in note 9 supra.
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40'F., offer the most promising sites for OTEC facilities which
fit into configuration one discussed above. For the United
States, however, these sites are limited to the Gulf Coast, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Pacific territories. According to the
studies of the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), a thermal resource of at least 300,000 megawatts
lies just off the west coast of Florida."2 It is anticipated that the
technological developments expected from DOE's current
OTEC Research, Development and Demonstration (RD&D)
Program would allow the exploitation of this resource. Other
sudies indicate that the off-grid applications mentioned in configuration two type facilities will have a market potential of an
average of 30,000 to 40,000 megawatts during the years 2000 to
2025.1
II. JURISDICTIONAL, REGULATORY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
Regardless of the site of an OTEC facility, or its system
and configuration, ownership, operation, energy potential and
use, the move toward OTEC commercialization will be facilitated if the prevalent uncertainties regarding the issues to be
discussed in this section are removed and an adequate legal
and institutional framework is established, offering guidelines
to interested parties. The following discussion, which is designed to present a broad outline of such a framework, surveys
the current state of the law, suggests likely changes, identifies
existing ambiguities, gaps and uncertainties, and makes recommendations to remove them.
A. JurisdictionalIssues
In the United States offshore areas, questions of jurisdiction, that is, questions pertaining to the competence to prescribe and apply the governing law to peoples, events, and
activities in these areas, arise in two contexts: nationalinternational and Federal-State. In the former, activities are
governed by norms established by multilateral treaties, regional and bilateral arrangements, and customary law, supplemented by unilateral action; in the latter, by statutory law and
judicial pronouncements.
1. National-InternationalIssues
The unsettled state of the Law of the Sea is responsible for
the presence of unresolved jurisdictional issues pertaining to
12. Cited in TEFFT,
13. Cited in id.

KELLY & MOTLEY, INC. STUDY, supra

note 9, at 3.
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the installations of OTEC devices in offshore areas. The law is
still in an evolutionary state and LOS III, which adjourned its
resumed seventh session in New York on September 15, 1978
and will convene its next session in Geneva on March 19, 1979,'1
is attempting to formalize a comprehensive and generally acceptable convention dealing with all aspects of ocean space.
While differences on some key issues, such as the mining of the
deep seabed, still remain unresolved, the negotiations have
shown a remarkable consensus on most issues likely to affect
OTEC deployment and operation. Also, regional and bilateral
arrangements and unilateral state practices and claims are instrumental in changing the traditional Law of the Sea.
The basic issue pertinent to the present discussion is a
coastal state's rights in adjacent waters and on the high seas.
Under traditional international law, the inquiry has centered
on the limit of territorial waters, and additionally, since the
1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea, 5 on the extent
of contiguous zones and the outer limit of the continental shelf.
Beyond these areas, the universally applicable concept has
been freedom of the high seas.
a. OTEC Devices Under Traditional International Law
Regarding the TerritorialSea
Historically, coastal nation states have enjoyed certain
exclusive rights and privileges with respect to adjacent waters
over a narrow belt of three marine miles along their coasts,
measured from the low water mark, which constituted their
territorial waters.'" These rights are similar to those they exer14. 15 UN CHRONICLE, Aug.-Sept. 1978, at 41-42.
15. The following four conventions were concluded at the 1958 Law of the Sea
Conference in Geneva: Convention on the Continental Shelf, done at Geneva, April
29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 312 (effective June 10, 1964)
[hereinafter cited as the Continental Shelf Convention]; Convention on Fishing and
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, done at Geneva, April 29, 1958,
17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285 (effective March 20, 1966) [hereinafter cited as the Fishery Convention]; Convention on the High Seas, done at Geneva,
April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (effective Sept. 30,
1962) [hereinafter cited as the High Seas Convention]; Convention on the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done at Geneva, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S.
No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective Sept. 10, 1964) [hereinafter cited as the Territorial Sea Convention].
16. See generally arts. 1-13 of the Territorial Sea Convention; M. McDOUGAL &
W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 174-304, 446-564 (1962) [hereinafter cited
as McDoUGAL & BURKE]; Baty, The Three-Mile Limit, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 503 (1928);
Kent, The HistoricalOrigins of the Three-Mile Limit, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 537 (1954).
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cise over their internal waters and over their land masses, and
were subject only to innocent passage of foreign vessels through
these waters. 7 During the last fifty years, however, the breadth
of territorial waters has been marked by a lack of uniformity.
While the international conferences in 1930,1 1958," and
1960,0 failed to reach agreement on the limits of the territorial
sea, the 1958 conference did adopt a proposal which could be
read to measure the breadth of the territorial seas restrictively
rather than defining it in affirmative terms. Article 24(1) of the
1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone2 provides a coastal state limited jurisdiction over the
high seas contiguous to its territorial sea. This zone "may not
extend beyond twelve miles from' 22 the baseline from which the
breadth of the sea is measured.

Article 24 did not guarantee coastal states the same specified rights in the contiguous zones as they enjoy in their territorial waters;23 however, it impliedly limited the coastal state's
right to exercise those essential rights beyond the twelve-mile
limit. The Convention thus precluded a coastal state from
claiming territorial waters beyond twelve miles.
Under traditional international law, therefore, an OTEC
device deployed for research 2 or commercial purposes within
17. Arts. 14-23 of the Territorial Sea Convention.
18. See Conference for the Codification of International Law, Bases of Discussion,
League of Nations Publication C. 74. M. 39. 1929. V.
19. See United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records (7
Vols.), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13 (1958).
20. See Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Summary
Records of Plenary Meetings and of the Meetings of the Committee of the Whole,
Annexes and Final Act, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 19/8 (1960). Extensive literature exists
on the 1958 and 1960 Law of the Sea Conferences. For a most comprehensive and
thorough study of the various issues discussed in the conferences, see McDOUGAL &
BURKE. See also C. COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA (6th ed. 1967)
[hereinafter cited as COLOMBOSj; D. BowElr. THE LAW OF THE SEA (1967); Dean, The
Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: What Was Accomplished, 52 AM. J. INT'L
L. 607 (1958); Dean, The Second Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Fight
for Freedom of the Seas, 54 id. at 751 (1960); Fitzmaurice, Some Results of the Geneva
Conference on the Law of the Sea, 8 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 73 (1959); Nanda, Some Legal
Questions on the Peaceful Uses of Ocean Space, 9 VA. J. INT'L L. 343 (1969).
21. See note 15 supra.
22. Art. 24(2) of the Territorial Sea Convention.
23. This is in view of the distinction drawn between art. 24(1)(a) and 24(1)(b) of
the Convention pertaining to a coastal state's right to take preventive or punitive
measures by the infringement of its domestic regulations.
24. Historically, there has been no freedom of scientific research within the territorial sea. On marine scientific research see generally W. BURKE, SCIENrIFIC RESEARCH
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the territorial limits would be within the exclusive competence
of the coastal state, since the term "sovereignty" has been
continuously used to describe a coastal state's rights in territorial waters.2"
b. OTEC Devices Under the Emerging Law on the Territorial Sea
Although the 1958 convention failed to set a definite limit
on the breadth of the territorial waters, state practices were
fast eroding the traditional three-mile limit. A United Nations
Secretariat study in 1968 revealed that fewer than one-third of
the states reporting (30 of 92) had opted for less than six miles
while nearly half (43 of 92) opted for twelve miles or more, and
only a small number (9) were claiming more than twelve
miles .2
The current product of the LOS III negotiations is the
Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT), a massive document containing 303 articles and 7 annexes," which sets the
breadth of the territorial sea at twelve miles,28 and that of
continguous zones for similarly specified purposes as were contained in the 1958 convention at twenty-four miles. 9 Within
this adjacent maritime belt, a coastal state's sovereignty is
recognized as extending to the air space over the territorial sea
as well as to the seabed and subsoil,30 and is limited only by
the right of innocent passage.3
Although ICNT is to "serve purely as a procedural device
and [to] only provide a basis for negotiation without affecting
the right of any delegation to suggest revisions in the search for
(Occasional Paper
no. 25, Law of the Sea Institute, University of Rhode Island, June 1975); FREEDOM OF
OCEANIC RESEARCH (W. Wooster ed. 1973); Winner, Science, Sovereignty, and the Third

ARTICLES IN THE LAW OF THE SEA INFORMAL SINGLE NEGOTIATING TEXT

Law of the Sea Conference, 4 OCAN DEV. & INT'L L. 297 (1977); Wooster, Some

Implications of Ocean Research, 1 id. at 13 (1974).
25. Arts. 1 and 2 of the Territorial Sea Convention.
26. See Document prepared by U.N. Secretariat, Survey of National Legislation
Concerning the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil thereof, Underlying the
High Seas Beyond the Limits of PresentNationalJurisdiction,U.N. Doc. A/AC. 135/11
and A/AC.135/11/Add. 1 (1968).
27. U.N. Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, Informal Composite Negotiating Text from the Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP. 10 & Corr. 1-3 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as ICNT].
28. Id. art. 3.
29. Id. art. 33.
30. Id. art. 2.
31. Id. arts. 17-32.
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a consensus,"3 2 there is an almost universal consensus on the
twelve-mile limit for the territorial seas. Within this zone, the
coastal state will have almost total control over the installation
and operation of an OTEC facility, both for research and commercial use.
c. OTEC Devices on the Exclusive Economic Zone and
the Continental Shelf
33
(i) Exclusive Economic Zone
Beyond the twelve-mile territorial sea and the twentyfour-mile contiguous zone, ICNT recognizes a special area
known as the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) which extends
seaward to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baseline
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.3 ' This
zone has a special relevance for OTEC siting, because ICNT
grants the coastal state
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or
non-living, of the sea-bed and subsoil and the superjacent waters,
and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation
and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy
from the water, currents and winds25

Additionally, the coastal state's jurisdiction extends within
EEZ to "(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands,
installations and structures; (ii) marine scientific research; (iii)
the preservation of the marine environment."3 Other states
enjoy some of the traditional freedoms of the high seas in
EEZ-freedom "of navigation and overflight and of the laying
of submarine cables and pipelines, '37 but not fishing, scientific
32. U.N. Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, Informal Composite Negotiating Text-Explanatory Memorandum by the President, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP.
10/Add. 1 (1977), reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1099, 1100 (1977).
33. See generally D. JOHNSTON & E. GOLD, THE EcONOMIC ZONE IN THE LAW OF THE
SEA: SURVEY, ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF CURRENT TRENDS (Occasional Paper No. 17,
Law of the Sea Institute, University of Rhode Island, June 1973); Alexander & Hodgson, The Impact of the 200-Mile Economic Zone on the Law of the Sea, 12 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 569 (1975); Kronfol, The Exclusive Economic Zone: A Critique of Contemporary Law of the Sea, 9 J. MAR. L. & COMM. 461 (1978); Hollick, The Origins of the 200Mile Offshore Zones, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 494 (1977); Phillips, Exclusive Economic Zone
as a Concept in InternationalLaw, 26 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 585 (1977).
34. ICNT, art. 57.
35. Id. art. 56(1)(a).
36. Id. art. 56(b).
37. Id. art. 58(1).
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research, nor pollution control, which are now under the exclusive jurisdiction of coastal states.
The establishment of EEZ is perhaps the most significant
development in the Law of the Sea since President Truman's
Proclamation on the Continental Shelf in 1945,'3 which claimed
for the United States the natural resources of the seabed and
the subsoil of its continental shelf lying beyond the traditional
three-mile limit. A variety of claims for exclusive jurisdiction
by coastal states over the high seas area beyond their territorial
seas followed the Truman proclamation, the most notable initially being claims by several Latin American countries to a
200-mile territorial sea 39 and more recently by Canada to a 100mile pollution control zone.' 0
Subsequently, when LOS 1H began its deliberations, two
proposals formed the basis of what has finally emerged as
EEZ-one, a 200-mile economic zone, proposed by a majority
of African states," and the other, an exclusive "Patrimonial
Sea" with an outer limit of 200 miles and similar jurisdiction
over the natural resources up to the edge of the continental
margin, adopted at the 1972 Santo Domingo Conference by a
group of Caribbean countries.'2 Although these zones were orig38. Pres. Proc. No. 2267, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1943-48 Compilation). See generally Hollick, US. Oceans Policy: The Truman Proclamations, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 23 (1977).
39. See Agreement between Chile, Peru, and Ecuador, August 18, 1952, Declaration on the Maritime Zone, art. 3 (II), U.N. Legislative Series, Laws and Regulations
of the Regime of the Territorial Sea 723-27 (1957). See generally B. MACCHESNEY,
SITUATION, DOCUMENTS

AND COMMENTARY ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INTERNA-

TIONAL LAW OF THE SEA,

1956, at 264-94, 448, 455-56, 486-87 (1957); B.

AUGUST,

THE

CONTINENTAL SHELF: THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF THE LATIN AMERICAN STATES WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE

TO CHILE, ECUADOR AND PERU

187-203 (1960); F.

GARCIA AMADOR,

LATIN AMERICA AND THE LAW OF THE SEA (Occasional Ppaer No. 14, Law of the Sea

Institute, University of Rhode Island, July 1972). In 1966, Argentina extended its
territorial sea by a decree (Law No. 17, 094-M. 24, Buenos Aires, 29 December 1966)
promulgating that "the sovereignty of the Argentine nation shall extend over the sea
adjacent to its territory for a distance of 200 nautical miles measured from the line of
the lowest tide." U.N. General Assembly, Ad Hoc Committee to study the peaceful
uses of the sea-bed and the ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, 2d
Seas., Survey of National Legislation Concerning the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor,
and the Subsoil thereof, Underlying the High Seas Beyond the Limits of Present
National Jurisdiction7-8, U.N. Doc. A/AC.135/l1 (1968).
40. See Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act of 1970, CAN. REV. STAT. C. 2, at
3-25 (1st Supp. 1970).
41. Organizationof African Unity: Declarationon the Issues of the Law of the Sea,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/86 (1972). See also U.N. Docs. A/AC.138/79 (1972); A/CONF.
62/33 (1974).
42. The 1972 Declaration of Santo Domingo is contained in U.N. Doc.
A/AC.138/80 (1972).
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inally conceived as essentially resource-control zones, the
coastal states' powers are greatly enhanced by the grant of
"exclusive jurisdiction" to them regarding exploration and
exploitation, pollution control, and scientific research.
Although ICNT does not specifically mention coastal
states' jurisdiction over OTEC activities within EEZ, it would
be a valid conclusion that coastal states will have exclusive
competence over the deployment and regulation of OTEC installations within their EEZ for research purposes or commercial operations. Any reasonable interpretation of ICNT provisions will support this conclusion. To illustrate, article 56(a)
grants a coastal state "sovereign rights" within EEZ for "other
activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the
zone, such as the production of energy from water, currents and
winds." This would obviously include the energy produced by
an OTEC operation. Article 60 explicitly provides for a coastal
state's "exclusive right to construct and to authorize and regulate the construction, operation and use of: (a) Artificial islands; (b) Installations and structures for the purposes provided for in article 56 and other economic purposes; (c) Installations and structures which may interfere with the exercise of
the rights of the coastal State in the zone." Article 247(2) provides that "[m]arine scientific research activities in the exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf shall be conducted with the consent of the coastal State." Moreover, there
is such an overwhelming consensus among the participants at
LOS Ill on EEZ that even if the efforts to formalize a comprehensive treaty on the Law of the Sea were to fail, EEZ will in
the near future be accorded legitimacy by state practices,
transforming it into a rule of customary international law.
It appears that the coastal state's permission would be
required to install an OTEC device in its EEZ either for research purposes or commercial operation. Until now, no nation
state has adopted specific legislation addressing this issue.
However, once OTEC technology and economics are proven,
such legislative measures prescribing conditions for access to
EEZ and outlining the legal and institutional arrangements
under which a foreign entity is permitted to operate an OTEC
facility within that zone will, in all probability, be adopted by
countries wishing to attract a foreign owned/operated OTEC
facility within its EEZ. Bilateral and regional arrangements
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regarding the deployment and operation of an OTEC device
within a coastal state's EEZ would be another way of establishing conditions for the installation of OTEC devices.
(ii) Continental Shelf
Under the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental
Shelf,43 "sovereign rights" of the coastal states in the continental shelf (defined as beginning at the seaward limit of the territorial sea and continuing to the 200-meter isobath)," are restricted to "exploring it and exploiting its natural resources,""
leaving unaffected the "legal status of the superjacent waters
as high seas, or that of the airspace above those waters."" A
coastal state's consent is imperative for any scientific research
concerning the continental shelf and conducted there. 7
Thus, although theoretically an OTEC device of another
nation could be moored on a coastal state's continental shelf,
while the device itself is located on the high seas, provided it
did not interfere with the coastal state's exclusive right to exploit natural resources in that area,4" the prospects that this
would happen are unlikely without the consent of the coastal
state. A coastal state's special rights in adjacent waters with
regard to scientific research and pollution control are widely
accepted, and with the emergence of EEZ, such a possibility
without the coastal state's consent could be ruled out.
ICNT modifies the definition of the continental shelf by
providing that it extends to the outer edge of the continental
margin or to a distance of 200 miles when the outer edge of the
continental margin does not extend that far. 9 While other
ICNT provisions 50 do not substantially change the prior law,
43. See note 15 supra.
44. Art 1 of the Continental Shelf Convention. The Convention left the legal
definition of the continental shelf, a compromise formula, open-ended - up to a depth
of 200 meters, or a technologically exploitable distance.
45. Id. art. 2.
46. Id. art. 3.
47. Id. art. 5(8). Although it adds that the coastal state "shall not normally
withhold its consent" if a qualified institution makes a request, it grants the coastal
state the right "if it so desires, to participate or to be represented in the research, and
that in any event the results shall be published."
48. Based on arts. 4-5 of the Continental Shelf Convention, Knight makes this
argument in Knight, InternationalJurisdictionalIssues Involving OTEC Installations,
in KNIGHT, NYHART & STEIN supra note 9, at 45-73.
49. ICNT, art. 76.
50. Id. arts. 77-85.
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articles pertinent to OTEC siting should be noted.
Article 80 on "Artificial Islands, Installations and Structures on the Continental Shelf," provides that article 60, which
grants the exclusive right to the coastal state to construct,
authorize, and regulate construction, operation and use of such
artificial islands, installations and structures, applies mutatis
mutandis. Similarly, Article 247 adopts the consent regime for
scientific research on the continental shelf, although some of
the obstacles for conducting research in the waters above the
continental shelf have been ameliorated."'
The conclusion is inescapable that a coastal state will have
exclusive competence over the installation of any OTEC device
located over its continental shelf for research or commercial
purposes.
d. OTEC Devices on the High Seas
(i) TraditionalLaw
Under the freedom of the seas concept, every nation has
unrestricted access to the high seas, but none is permitted any
long term appropriation of any part of the high seas for its
exclusive use. 52 This principle was recently reaffirmed by the
U.S. Supreme Court.53 The practical reasons for the universal
acceptance of this principle lie in (1) the increasing use of the
ocean as an international highway for commerce during the
post-Industrial Revolution era, which coincided with the period
of Western colonialism in the 18th and 19th centuries, and (2)
the lack of effective occupation of large areas of ocean claimed
54
by major powers.
In 1958, the Geneva Convention on the High Seas codified
the essence of the freedom of the seas by providing
non-coastal states:
navigation;
fishing;
lay submarine cables and pipelines;
Freedom to fly over the high seas.

both for coastal and
1. Freedom of
2. Freedom of
3. Freedom to
4.

51. See, e.g., id. arts. 243-53.
52. Cited in CoLOMBos at 51.
53. U.S. v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1959) [Footnotes in the opinion omit-

ted].
54. See CoLoMaos at 60-61.
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These freedoms and others which are recognized by the general principles of international law shall be exercised by all states
with reasonable regard to the interests of other states in their
exercise of the freedom of the high seas."

Obviously, these freedoms-commercial navigation, military uses, fishing, laying of submarine cables and pipelines-give rise to conflicting uses of the high seas. For the
management of these conflicting uses, the standard is that of
reasonableness with regard to the interests of other users, that
is, not unreasonably interfering with their uses. The deployment of an OTEC device for research or commercial purposes
could be justified under this "reasonable use" concept. The
recent U.S. legislation authorizing the construction of deep
water ports beyond the limits of its territorial sea,5" which was
justified on this reasonable use theory,57 offers an appropriate
precedent. Since states traditionally have the primary responsibility for regulating the activities of vessels flying their flags
on the high seas, applying that analogy to OTEC devices, any
OTEC installation owned or authorized by a state on the high
seas would be under its authority and control. Similarly, under
the laws of nationality, nationals are always and everywhere
subject to the laws of their nation state51 and their activities on
an OTEC device on the high seas would be governed by the
laws of the state of their nationality.
(ii) LOS III and the Deep Seabed
Current negotiations in LOS III are still stymied on the
nature and scope of the proposed regime for deep seabed mining.59 Nevertheless, pertinent ICNT provisions which have a
55. Art. 2 of the High Seas Convention. See note 15 supra.
56. The Deepwater Port Act of 1974, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-24 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as DPA]. For legislative history and purpose see [1974] U.S. Code Cong. and
Ad. News 7529. See generally Krueger, Nordquist, & Wessely, New Technology and
InternationalLaw: The Case of Deepwater Ports, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 597 (1977); Comment, TerritorialStatus of Deepwater Ports, 15 SAN DIEoo L. REv. 603 (1978); Note,
The Regulation of Deepwater Ports, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 927 (1975).
57. See Hearings on S.1751 and S.2232 before the Special Joint Subcoinm. on
Deepwater Ports Legislationof The Senate Comm. on Commerce, Interiorand Insular
Affairs, and Public Works, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 606-19 (1973)(Statement of John
Norton Moore).
58. See generally H. VAN PANHUYS, THE ROLE OF NATIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1959); Brownlie, Relations of Nationality in Public InternationalLaw, 39 Barr.
Y.B. INT'L L. 284 (1963); McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, Nationalityand Human Rights:
The Protectionof the Individual in External Arenas, 83 YALE L. J. 900 (1974).
59. For a recent commentary, see LaQue, Different Approaches to International
Regulation of Exploitation of Deep-Ocean FerromanganeseNodules, 15 SAN DIEoO L.
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bearing on the deployment and operation of an OTEC facility
will be considered here. This discussion will be prefaced by
noting the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2749
of December 17, 1970,0 which declared, among other things,
that
1. The sea-bed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to as the
area), as well as the resources of the area, are the common heritage of mankind.
2. The area shall not be subject to appropriation by any means
by States or persons, natural or juridical, and no State shall
claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part
thereof.

ICNT attempts to give concrete shape to the "common
heritage" concept. It declares the area constituting "the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction"' (Area), and its resources to be "the
common heritage of mankind," 2 and envisages the establishment of an International Sea-Bed Authority (ISA) to organize
and control activities in the Area. No state is to claim or exercise sovereignty there and no exclusive appropriation is permissible. 3 The legal status of the waters superjacent to the Area
64
or that of the airspace above those waters are left unaffected.
While activities in the Area are defined as "all activities of
exploration for, and exploitation of, the resources of the
Area," 5 in subsequent provisions, 6 activities are construed
broadly as covering, among other subjects, those of marine
scientific research, transfer of technology, and protection of the
marine environment and human life. However, again in Article
150, activities are construed narrowly, referring only to exploration and exploitation of resources. Thus, there is considerable
ambiguity regarding ISA's control in the Area.
RLv. 477 (1978). See also Charney, The International Regime for the Deep Seabed:
Past Conflicts and Proposals for Progress,17 HARV. INT'L L. J. 1 (1976); Note, A New
Combination to Davy Jones' Locker: Melee over Marine Minerals, 9 Loy. CHi. L. J.
935 (1978).

60. G.A.Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970)
(adopted by a vote of 108 to 0, with 14 abstentions: the United States voted for its
adoption).
61. ICNT, art. 1(1).
62. Id. art. 136.

63. Id. art. 137(1).
64. Id. art. 135.

65. Id. arts. 1(3), 133(a).
66. Id. arts. 143-49.
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Resources are defined as "mineral resources in situ,"17
which are subject to ISA's licensing and regulation." Minerals
include "water, steam, hot water.""5 While it can be argued
that ISA's jurisdiction extends to "fresh water aquifers and
similiar sub-surface water sources, not the cold water lying
near the seabed that might be used by an OTEC device,""' a
broad interpretation by ISA of these provisions is quite possible, under which OTEC deployment for scientific research or
commercial purposes could be covered. 7 ' Also, despite the current provision, under which ISA has no jurisdiction over the
superjacent waters of the high seas,7" it is probable that its
jurisdiction in the near future will extend to activities in the
water column and on the surface,73 thereby affecting OTEC
operations. Such an outcome would be consistent with the
growing demands of the developing states for a strong ISA
which could give meaning to "the common heritage" concept.
Similarly, the mooring of an OTEC device on the high seas,
which would require corings and other physical investigations
of the ocean floor and the seabed, could be perceived as an
economic use of the Area, and therefore subject to ISA's jurisdiction. Additionally, ISA could assume jurisdiction, should
such mooring pose any actual or potential interference to
seabed mining activities which are to be regulated by ISA. Of
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. art. 133(b).
Id. Annex II.
Id. art. 133(c)(i).
Knight, OTEC and the Law of the Sea: The JurisdictionalProblems, in

AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL, LEGAL, POLITICAL AND INSTI-

OTEC DEMONSTRATION AND DEVELOPMENT 15 (Study prepared for
ERDA, Sept. 1978) [hereinafter cited as ASIL STUDY].
71. Knight acknowledges this possiblity: "It is therefore not only conceivable but
likely that if sufficient information were presented in international fora to indicate that
OTEC and similar energy-producing devices might be substantial sources of economic
wealth or political leverage, underdeveloped countries would move either in LOS-3
or in another forum to seek a regulatory regime governing such activities beyond the
exclusive economic zones of coastal states." Id. at 15.
72. ICNT, art. 135.
73. See, e.g., The Maltese Draft, a working paper introduced by the Delegation
of Malta in the United Nations Seabed Committee in 1971, Draft Ocean Space Treaty
- Working PaperSubmitted by Malta, in REPORT OF THE COMMITIEE ON THE PEACEFUL
TUTIONAL ASPECTS OF

USES

OF THE

SEA-BED

AND THE

OCEAN

FLOOR BEYOND

THE LIMITS

OF NATIONAL

26 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 21) 105, U.N. Doc. A/8421 (1971), which
treats "international ocean space," the area beyond clearly defined limits of national
jurisdiction, as a unitary concept, encompassing seabed, water column, and surface,
the whole constituting the "common heritage of mankind." Id. pt. IV (emphasis
added).
JURISDICTION,
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course, ISA could assert jurisdiction over marine scientific research in the Area which is to be carried out "exclusively for
peaceful purposes and for the benefit of mankind as a whole." 7 '
Consequently, it appears that under the envisaged seabed
regime, OTEC activities on the high seas could be subjected to
the jurisdiction of the proposed ISA. Perhaps two exceptions to
ISA jurisdiction are possible: (1) A coastal state might extend
its competence to an OTEC facility which lies beyond its EEZ,
but which poses an actual or potential threat to its living and
nonliving resources by adversely affecting the marine environment, or (2) if there is no accord at LOS III on a deep seabed
regime and the existing law applies under which the deployment of an OTEC facility on the high seas could be justified
under the "reasonable use" concept.
e. Recommendations
The major United States objectives which determine its
policy on national-international jurisdictional issues include
freedom of navigation and the establishment of an equitable
regime for deep seabed mining. Since energy sources in the
oceans including OTEC are of considerable significance to the
United States, U.S. negotiators at LOS III should pay close
attention to the implications of the emerging treaty on OTEC
siting and deployment in adjacent coastal waters as well as on
the high seas. The primary questions for consideration would
be: (1) Is it in the United States' interest to seek freedom of
OTEC siting and deployment in the emerging twelve-mile territorial seas and EEZ? (2) What kind of regime regarding
OTEC activities on the high seas should the United States
seek? (3) If efforts to finalize a comprehensive treaty on the
Law of the Sea fail, what kind of claims would be in the United
States' interest to assert?
Apparently, ICNT provisions regarding the extension of
coastal states' boundaries to a twelve-mile territorial zone and
a 200-mile EEZ are acceptable to the United States. Consequently, there are two policy options open to the United States
regarding these zones. One is to accept the coastal state's exclusive competence in the region, which will exclude any U.S.
OTEC siting in foreign waters within these zones and without
74. ICNT, art. 143(1).
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the coastal state's consent; and the other is to seek freedom of
OTEC activities within these zones.
There does not seem to be any chance of reversing the
widely accepted policy of exclusive coastal state competence in
the territorial waters, even if the U.S. were to vigorously seek
an exception for OTEC activities. Similarly, despite some
ambiguities regarding EEZ,75 no exceptions in favor of OTEC
activities in this zone are likely to be accepted by a majority
of nations at the current LOS III negotiations. The United
States could, perhaps, still seek such an exception if it were
found to be in its interest and could make appropriate reservations to the finalized treaty. However, in light of the recent
developments regarding a coastal state's assertion of its competence in coastal waters, especially pertaining to marine pollution and natural resources, it is unlikely that such a United
States assertion would be recognized by other states. Thus, it
is recommended that the United States accept the 200-mile
coastal state competence regarding OTEC siting and deployment. This course of action would appear to be beneficial to the
United States as well, since the U.S. has a major OTEC source
lying off the west coast of Florida within its 200-mile zone. The
recent United States extension of its fishery zone" and the
establishment of zones to enforce navigational safety rules77
and to control pollution" indicate that there would be a strong
demand in the U.S. Congress to assert such control. It is recommended that as a first desirable step, Congress enact legislation
creating a Coastal Energy Conservation and Management
Zone extending to a 200-mile limit. Under this proposed legislation, the United States will claim jurisdiction for the specific
purpose suggested by the title-energy conservation and management. The proposed legislation will be an interim measure,
seeking limited jurisdiction patterned after the DPA79 model.
The proposed Act will be superseded by the legislation required
to implement the EEZ provisions of the Law of the Sea Treaty
when it is concluded.
75. See notes 65-67 supra and the accompanying text.
76. Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90
Stat. 33, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-82 (1976).
77. 33 U.S.C. §§ 151-232 (1976), prescribe the enforcement of navigational safety
rules.
78. See Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1593-94, § 58(a)(c) (amending 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1976)).
79. See note 56 supra.
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The high seas, on the other hand, present a different set
of challenges. Since the United States will presumably have
the necessary technology and wherewithal to engage in OTEC
activities on the high seas for research as well as for commercial
purposes, perhaps the United States could seek to modify
ICNT at the next session to specifically exclude OTEC activities from the competence of ISA. However, if the current discussion in LOS III negotiations on the deep seabed regime is
any indication of what might be the regime pertaining to
OTEC activities, such prospects do not look promising. The
developing countries seek a strong ISA and probably will not
accept OTEC activities being excluded from its jurisdiction,
for they could argue that OTEC uses a resource covered under
the concept "common heritage of mankind." If a treaty does
not emerge, the United States could rely upon a reasonable use
theory to engage in OTEC activities on the high seas.
The DPA offers a model of legislation for this purpose. The
U.S. Congress specifically declared therein that nothing in the
Act "shall be construed to affect the legal status of the high
seas, the superjacent airspace, or the seabed and subsoil, including the Continental Shelf. 80 The U.S. President is authorized and requested under the Act to enter into negotiations
with the neighboring governments of Canada and Mexico to
determine "the desirability of undertaking joint studies and
investigations designed to. . .eliminate any legal and regulatory uncertainty.""' As a condition to the issuance of a license
for the ownership, construction, and operation of a deepwater
port, the Secretary of Transportation must determine that "the
deep water port will not unreasonably interfere with international navigation or other reasonable uses of the high seas, as
defined by treaty, convention, or customary international
law. 8 2 Also, the designation of safety zones is "[slubject to
recognized principles of international law," 3 and the Secretary
is required to prescribe various regulations which relate to activities involved in site evaluation and preconstruction testing
at potential deepwater locations which may interfere with au80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. § 1501(b).
Id. § 1521(2).
Id. § 1503(c)(4).
Id. § 1509(d)(1).
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thorized uses of the outer continental shelf."' Additionally, the
environmental review criteria which are to be used to evaluate
a proposed deepwater port include "the effect on alternate uses
of the oceans and navigable waters, such as scientific study,
fishing, and exploitation of other living and nonliving re86
sources."8 5 The duration of a license is limited to twenty years.
2. Federal-StateIssues Related to OTEC Devices"
In the United States' coastal waters, there still remain
unresolved questions regarding the demarcation of authority
between the Federal government and the adjacent coastal
States. Further uncertainty is likely when the United States
decides to expand its territorial seas to a twelve-mile limit and
subsequently to claim its 200-mile EEZ; the two probable prospects with or without a comprehensive Law of the Sea treaty.
The primary question is, what would be the States' rights in
the newly acquired territory?
Since Federal-State jurisdictional issues may affect the
research and demonstration phase of OTEC, as well as its advanced development phase for commercial purposes, this section will briefly describe, in an historical context, the current
law on Federal-State jurisdiction in coastal areas, which will be
followed by a discussion of the probable impacts of the United
States extension of its boundaries in the oceans on FederalState authority in the extended zones and on OTEC research
and development.
a. Current Law
The 1945 Truman Proclamation," which extended United
States' jurisdiction to its continental shelf, left unresolved the
question of Federal versus State authority over the shelf. 8'
However, in a number of cases in the following five years9° the
84. Id. § 1504(b)(2). The regulations are to be subject to recognized principles of
international law. Id. § 1509(a).
85. Id. § 1505(a)(3).
86. Id. § 1503(h).
87. For a thorough and incisive study of Federal-State issues in the U.S. coastal
waters, see M. BAL, LAW OF THE SEA: FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS AND THE EXTENSION
OF THE TE rrORIAL SEA (The Dean Rusk Center for International and Comparative
Law, University of Georgia, Monograph No. 1, 1978) [hereinafter cited as M. BALL].
88. See note 38 supra.
89. See 13 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 484 (1945).
90. See, e.g., U.S. v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950); U.S. v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707
(1950); U.S. v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 38-39 (1947).
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Supreme Court held that the Federal government had paramount rights in and full dominion over the resources in the
territorial sea. Since several States had already granted leases
for offshore oil production in the three-mile limit, these Supreme Court decisions generated strong political pressure,9 to
which the U.S. Congress responded in May 1963, by enacting
the Submerged Lands Act." This Act gave the States title and
ownership of land and resources lying beneath the water extending seaward to its three-mile limit, 3 subject, however, to
the continued U.S. authority and rights over such lands and
waters "for the purposes of navigation or flood control or the
production of power."" Under the Act, the United States expressly retained "all its navigational servitude and rights in
and powers of regulation and control of said lands and navigable waters for the constitutional purposes of commerce, navigation, national defense, and international affairs."' 5
Six years after the enactment of the statute, a Federal
district court specifically recognized the paramount power of
the United States to control such waters for the purposes of
navigation in interstate and foreign commerce.' 6 More recently,
Federal courts have confirmed that under the Act, Congress
did not surrender to the States its constitutional power to regulate foreign commerce,' 7 and have given recognition to the primacy of ongoing Federal interests in the seabed," over the superjacent waters and their resources," and surface activity in
the three-mile territorial sea.'"
In August 1953, just three months after the enactment of
91. See, e.g., E. BARTLEY, THE TmELANDS OIL CONrROVEnsy 68-74, 88 (1953); Krueger, The Development and Administrationof the Outer ContinentalShelf Lands of the
United States, 14 RocKY MTN. MiNERAL L. INST. 643, 674-77 (1968); Comment,
Jurisdiction Over the Seabed: PersistentFederal-State Conflicts, 12 URBAN L. ANN.
291 (1976).
92. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1970). For legislative history and purpose of the Act,
see [19531 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1385.
93. 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a),(b)(1970).
94. Id. § 1311(d).
95. Id. § 1314(a).
96. See Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 174 F. Supp. 500 (D. Alaska 1959).
97. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8 empowers Congress to regulate all aspects of foreign
commerce.
98. See Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910;
United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 127 (1967).
99. See, e.g., Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 283-87 (1977).
100. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 98 S. Ct. 989 (1978).
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the Submerged Lands Act, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act'0' implemented the 1945 Truman Proclamation by declaring the policy of the United States: "that the subsoil and
seabed of the outer Continental Shelf appertain to the United
States and are subject to its jurisdiction, control, and power of
disposition."'' 0 While the Act recognizes "the character as high
seas of the waters above the outer Continental Shelf," thus
leaving unaffected the right to navigation and fishing in such
waters,'03 it specifically provides that:
The Constitution and laws and civil and political jurisdiction of the United States are extended to the subsoil and seabed
of the outer Continental Shelf and to all artificial islands and
fixed structures which may be erected thereon for the purpose of
exploring for, developing, removing, and transporting resources
therefrom, to the same extent as if the outer Continental Shelf
were an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction located within a
State: Provided, however, That mineral leases on the outer Continental Shelf shall be maintained or issued only under the provisions of this subchapter. °''
To the extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent
with.

.

.Federal laws and regulations,.

. . the civil and crimi-

nal laws of each adjacent State as of August 7, 1953 are declared
to be the law of the United States for that portion of the subsoil
and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf, and artifical islands
and fixed structures erected thereon.lu

Under the Act, the Coast Guard is authorized to make and
enforce regulations "with respect to lights and other warning
devices, safety equipment, and other matters relating to the
promotion of safety of life and property on the islands and
structures" erected on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS).'"
While the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to administer
and regulate the leasing of the OCS,'10 the Secretary of the
Army is authorized to prevent obstruction to navigation which
may be caused by artifical islands and fixed structures located
on OCS.'10 The Act provides for the application of the civil and
101. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-43 (1970). For legislative history and purpose of the Act,
see [1953] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2177.

102. 43 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
103. Id.§ 1332(b).
104. Id.§ 1333(a)(1).
105. Id. § 1333(a)(2).

106. Id.§ 1333(e)(1).
107. Id.§ 1334(a)(1).
108. Id.§ 1333(f).
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criminal law of coastal States existing on the effective date of
the Act to the activities on the subsoil and seabed of OCS
including artificial islands and fixed structures erected there.1'"
In 1975 Congress amended the Act to apply current State
laws."10
These statutes did not resolve the Federal-State controversy regarding the proper authority and control for the exploration and exploitation of OCS. The States continued to claim
a stronger voice in the decisionmaking process because of the
direct impacts on the States of OCS development. In response
to a U.S. complaint against thirteen Atlantic coastal States
that they were interfering with the exclusive U.S. rights to
explore and exploit the natural resources of OCS, in 1975 the
Supreme Court decided United States v. Maine,"' in which it
reaffirmed its earlier decisions that, as attributes of its external
sovereign powers, the Federal government has "paramount
rights in the marginal seas."" 2
More recently, however, the recognition of the coastal
State's interest in activities over OCS has been evident in several new developments, including: (1) the formation of regional
OCS advisory boards with State representatives on them;" 3 (2)
the devising of a new system under which the Department of
the Interior will share with the States information regarding
lease tracts;"' and (3) the 1978 amendments to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act" 5 under which States will be given a
significant role in decisionmaking pertaining to leasing."'
Several other Federal statutes permit Federal-State participation in planning offshore activities," 7 including the Deep109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. § 1333(a)(2).
43 U.S.C.A. § 1333(2) (Supp. 1978).
420 U.S. 515 (1975).
Id. at 522-23.
The board's function is to advise the Secretary of the Interior on matters of

discretionary authority under the OCS Lands Act. See U.S.

DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR,

GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN OIL AND GAS OPERATIONS ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF

5 (1977), cited in M. BALL, supra note 87, at 42 n. 159.
114. 43 Fed. Reg. 3883 (1978) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. § 250.34); 43 Fed. Reg.
3887, 3889 (1978) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. § 252); 43 Fed. Reg. 3895 (1978) (to be
codified at 30 C.F.R. § 3301.8).
115. President Carter signed the 1978 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments on Sept. 22, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629.
116. Id. Title 1H,§ 208 (adding a new § 19), 92 Stat. 652-53.
117. See, e.g., The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 33 U.S.C. §§
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water Port Act 18 and the Coastal Zone Management Act
(CZMA)."'
Under DPA, interested States are given an advisory role
both in the formulation of regulations to carry out the purposes
of the Act, 120 and in the issuance of deepwater port licenses,'
Deepwater ports within the three-mile territorial waters of the
United States are excluded from the Federal licensing
scheme,122 "thereby leaving deepdraft harbors under the licensing authority of the States and the Corps of Engineers."' 3 A
noteworthy feature of the Federal-State sharing of authority in
DPA is that the Secretary of Transportation is not to issue a
license to own, construct, or operate a deepwater port facility
without the approval of the governor of each adjacent coastal
State, 2 1' which effectively grants the governor veto power over
the deepwater port application. 2 5 A State is to be so designated
by the Secretary when it would be directly connected by pipeline or would be located within fifteen miles of a proposed
deepwater port. 12 Also, the Secretary could designate a State
as an adjacent coastal State if he determines, pursuant to a
request by the State and the recommendation of the administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) that "there is a risk of damage to the coastal
environment of such State.*equal to or greater than the risk
posed to a State directly connected by pipeline to the proposed
deepwater port."'2
Adjacent coastal States are also given preferential rights
1251-1376 (1976), as amended by The Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217,
91 Stat. 1566; The Fishery Conservation and Management Act (FCMA), Pub. L. No.
94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (codified in several sections of 16 & 22 U.S.C., the Act provides
for the participation of States' representatives on Regional Fisheries Management
Councils (16 U.S.C. § 1852 (1976)); Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act
of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1401-34 (1976); The Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 153143 (1976); and The Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1976)).
118. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-24 (1976).
119. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (1976).
120. 33 U.S.C. § 1504(a),(b) (1976).
121. Id. § 1503(c)-(e).
122. Id. § 1502(10).
123. See 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1976).
124. 33 U.S.C. § 1500(b) (1976).
125. Id. § 1503(c)(9).
126. Id.§ 1508(a)(1).
127. Id.§ 1508(a)(2). The regulations implementing the Act are contained in 33
C.F.R. § 148 (1977).
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to deepwater port licenses under DPA. 128 As an original licensee, a State may transfer its license provided the transferee
complies with the requirements of the Act.'2 Also, the law of
the nearest adjacent coastal State-the State "whose seaward
boundaries, if extended beyond 3 miles, would encompass the
site of the deepwater port" 310-is made applicable under the
Act to licensed deepwater ports. Another notable provision is
the authorization of an adjacent coastal State to "fix reasonable fees for the use of a deepwater port facility."'' Such fees
are subject to the approval of the Secretary of Transportation
and are not to exceed economic, environmental, and adminis32
trative costs of such State.
CZMA is designed to protect coastal resources by encouraging States to manage the coastal areas.'3 Federal-State partnership is envisaged, for the Act requires that federally conducted or supported activity within or directly affecting the
coastal zone must be carried out in a manner "which is, to the
maximum extent practicable, consistent with approved state
management programs." ' 1 This "consistency" requirement is
made applicable specifically to the OCS development activity.' s "A set of Federal regulations defines terms and establishes guidelines for the approval of coastal zone management
programs." 3
CZMA Amendments of 1976 created a coastal energy impact program 37 which authorizes $800 million for the creation
of a coastal energy impact fund for loan guarantees and grants
to States which must have an approved coastal zone management program or be making satisfactory progress in developing
128. 33 U.S.C. § 1504(h)(2)(i)(2)(A) (1976).
129. Id. § 1503(f).
130. Id. § 1518(b).
131. Id. § 1504(h)(2).
132. Id.
133. See generally Hollings, Congress and Coastal Zone Management, 1 COASTAL
ZONE MANAGEMENT J. 115 (1973); Knecht, Coastal Zone Management-A Federal
Perspective, id. at 123; Zile, A Legislative PoliticalHistory of the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, id. at 235; Symposium-Implementation of the Coastal Zone
Management Act of 1972, 16 WM. & MARY L. REv. 717-822 (1975).
134. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1456(c)(1),(2) (1976).
135. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1453(4)(i), 1456(c)(3)(B) (1976).
136. See 15 C.F.R. pt. 923 (1978). For NOAA regulations implementing the consistency provisions, see 43 Fed. Reg. 10,510-33 (1978) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt.

930).
137. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(a) (1976).
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such a program.'3 Loans and loan guarantees also are authorized to aid coastal States in financing new or improved public
facilities and services needed to handle new or expanded
coastal energy activities. Additionally, grants are authorized
from the fund to help the States plan for the consequences of
increased coastal energy activities and to aid the States in
preventing or mitigating unavoidable losses of valuable envi39
ronmental and recreational resources.1
b. Federal-StateIssues in Light of LOS 1ff
When the United States extends its boundaries to a
twelve-mile territorial sea and a 200-mile EEZ, two questions
become pertinent: (1) would the State zone be extended from
three to twelve miles? and (2) if such a State expansion were
to take place, would the Federal government preempt the
States in energy matters, including OTEC? Who would be the
licensing Authority and what would be the licensing
requirements? Since the coastal State is given police power
over such islands and structures, the question arises as to
which laws would be made applicable to them. In regard to the
last question, the model provided by the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act,"10 and DPA,"' applies the law of the adjacent
coastal State. This would seem to be the desirable approach to
adopt. Thus, the law of the State where the transmission cables
go ashore will apply to the extent that it is not inconsistent
with Federal law. Other possibilities include general maritime
law or the law of the State in which the OTEC firm is incorporated.
c. Recommendations
The primary concern regarding Federal-State jurisdictional issues in adjacent coastal waters relates to an efficient
management of the 200-mile marine zone. There are arguments
in favor of either leaving the coastal States' boundaries fixed
at the three-mile limit or extending them to twelve miles. A
commentator has aptly summarized the pros and cons:
138. See id. §§ 1456(a),(c),(d), 1464(b). See generally Hildreth, The Operation
of the Federal Coastal Zone Management Act as Amended, 10 NAT. RESOURCES LAW.
211, 221-23 (1977).
139. See Hildreth, supra note 138, at 222-23.
140. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-43 (1970).
141. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-24 (1976).
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On the Federal side arguments could be advanced that the
interest of inland States and of all citizens, the history of the sea
as of national strategic importance, as well as greater naval and
administrative capacity, weigh in favor of Federal control.
On behalf of the States, it could be maintained that leaner,
more responsive agencies, closer familiarity with daily, mundane
marine-related affairs, and a diversity of local concerns render
the States the preferred government to exercise authority over an
expanded territorial sea." 2

Irrespective of who owns the extended stretch of nine
miles, what is sorely needed is a cohesive U.S. policy for a 200mile maritime zone and an efficient and strong institutional
structure to implement it. At present, several departments in
the Federal government are involved in both the formation and
the implementation of national policies in adjacent coastal
waters." 3 Instead of a piecemeal legislative effort as a U.S.
response to the demands posed by the extension of its maritime
boundaries, an imaginative Federal oceans policy should be
fashioned which will facilitate an equitable resolution of
Federal-State issues.
During the last decade, a number of studies and reports on
U.S. marine policy, including the 1969 report of the Commission on Marine Science and Resources (Stratton Commission),
and reports by the National Advisory Committee on Oceans
and Atomosphere (NACOA), have recommended the creation
of a strong, independent, policy-setting body which could effectively coordinate national ocean policies and implementing
activities."' The argument for the formation of a single policyformulating authority is that it can balance the various national interests which are often competing-national security,
national economy, international trade, and the global ecosystem. The argument against such centralization is that a specialized oceans agency would detract from important programs
based on functional activities, such as OCS gas and oil exploration, which is at present handled by the Department of the
Interior, and "should remain in Interior because of the land
142. M. BALL, supra note 87, at 23-24.
143. See id. at 54-55.
144. For a concise report on these activities, see A. WILSON, U.S. OCEAN PoucY:
COORDINATION AND CONTROL, 1 MARINE POL'Y REP., No. 6 (Center for the Study of
Marine Policy, College of Marine Studies, University of Delaware, Sept. 1978).
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development expertise of the Bureau of Land Management and
the U.S. Geological Survey." 5
In October 1977, Senate bill S.222411 was introduced "to
establish a national ocean policy and to set forth the missions
of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
[NOAA]." Asserting that U.S. ocean policy had long suffered
from disparate processes and duplication of effort, the bill
seeks to strengthen NOAA as the leading civilian ocean policy
agency responsible for coordinating national ocean policy. The
current situation is aptly summarized in a recent report by an
observer:
The important question is whether the ocean community
should settle for the problems engendered by the largely uncoordinated program activities in the marine environment, or demand Federal action to improve control of governmental policies.
No executive agency oversees all ocean programs. No Congressional committee oversees all of the great number of program
interests expressed through all the competing uses of the marine
environment. There is no major policy perspective against which
specific development options can be judged for cohesiveness.
There is no responsible body to assist the President in the formulation of immediate goals based on long-term national interest.
There exists no criterion by which international or domestic concerns can be evaluated. The ocean environment encompasses
such a vast array of important interests and considerations that
muddling through by reacting to emergent needs is not in the
best interest of the nation." '

Proposals for the creation of a strengthened policy-setting body
include the formation of a Cabinet-level Marine Affairs Council,"18 a public corporation such as COMSAT, or a public body
such as the Tennessee Valley Authority."'
Based upon a thorough appraisal and evaluation of the
current U.S. offshore policies, especially of Federal-State authority and control in a myriad of activities occurring in this
area, it is imperative that the administration of the government's oceans programs be centralized in a strong, effective,
and independent body, and that Federal-State jurisdictional
145.
146.
1978.
147.
148.
149.

See id. at 2.
Introduced in U.S. Senate on Oct. 20, 1977. Hearings were held on April 6,
A. WILSON, supra note 144, at 4.
NACOA made this recommendation in June 1977. Id. at 3.
See M. BALL, supra note 87, at 56-57.
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and regulatory issues be resolved equitably. The next section
will examine some of these issues, especially the ones relevant
in the contextof OTEC siting and development.
B. Regulatory Issues
Regulatory issues will be considered in this section in two
contexts- international and Federal-State. This examination
will be prefaced by a brief investigation of the legal status of
OTEC devices.
1. Legal Status of OTEC Devices
It is important to determine the legal status of OTEC devices because many rights and obligations of such entities and
those owning, operating, and manning them will flow from
such a determination. The conferring of legal status on OTEC
devices, whether fixed to the ocean floor or moveable either for
stationkeeping or for grazing on the high seas, will legitimize
their presence as well as their operation. The issue is two-fold:
(1) who would authorize their presence and operation by licensing them? (the analogy is that of a flag state authorizing the
use of its flag on a vessel), and (2) since traditionally a regulatory mechanism exists to regulate activities of structures designed as vessels on the oceans, would OTEC devices be considered vessels or quasi-vessels, at least for some purposes? The
question of licensing will be discussed in the next section examining international and Federal-State regulatory mechanisms.
Whether an OTEC device is considered a vessel will not be
dispositive of the complex legal issues raised by OTEC presence as a new user of the sea. There are, however, existing
international guidelines, standards, and regulations applicable
to vessels which have been established by the long standing use
of the oceans for commercial navigation. It is useful to inquire
whether the existing standards and regulations-those of
safety, design and construction, collision and navigation, communication, and labor-will apply to OTEC devices and
whether these regulations need to be modified in order to meet
OTEC needs. Otherwise, new arrangements will have to be
devised. In the national context, giving OTEC devices the sta150. See generally Nyhart, OTEC Structures as Vessels, in ASIL STUDy, supra
note 70, at 213-33. See also Nanda, The Legal Status of Surface Devices Functioning
at Sea other than Ships (Drilling Rigs, Offshore Platforms, etc.), 26 Am. J. CoMp. L.
(Supp.) 233 (1978).
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tus of vessels could confer upon them substantial economic
benefits, in view of the fact that the U.S. shipping industry is
subsidized by the United States government by means of providing mortgage guarantees, construction and operation subsidies, and tax advantages.' 51
Only during the last decade have international agreements
regulating activities on the sea broadened their reach to cover
OTEC-type structures. The 1969 Convention on Intervention
on the High Seas, dealing with oil pollution casualties, set the
stage by defining a ship as: "(a) any sea-going vessel of any
type whatsoever, and (b) any floating craft with the exception
of an installation or device engaged in the exploration of resources of the seabed and ocean floor and the subsoil
thereof."' 52 The Convention added a distinct category of
"floating craft" to that of "vessel," the term traditionally used
in such conventions. The 1972 Convention on the Prevention
51
of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter'
defined vessels to include "floating craft, whether selfpropelled or not. 151' The Convention called upon each contracting party to apply means required to implement the present
convention of all "vessels . . . and fixed or floating platforms
55
under its jurisdiction believed to be engaged in dumping."'
The 1973 Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships'56 defines ship to mean "a vessel of any type whatsoever
151. See, e.g., on ship mortgages, 46 U.S.C. §§ 911-84 (1970); subchapter XI,
"Federal Ship Mortgage Insurance," of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 46 U.S.C.
§§ 1271-80 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974), as amended by the Federal Ship Financing Act of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-507. See generally Smith, Jr., Ship Mortgages, 47 TUL. L. REV.
608 (1973). On subsidies and tax advantages, see subchapters V and VI of The Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1151-83(a) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974), as amended
by The Negotiated Shipbuilding Contracting Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-373 § § 2,3,90
Stat. 1042; Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 861(e)(1976). See generally Cook, Jr.,
Government Assistance in Financing Title XI FederalGuarantees,47 TuL. L. REV. 653
(1973); Kominers, Federal Government Aids to Merchant Shipping, id. at 691.
152. Article 11 (2), International Convention relating to Intervention on the High
Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, done Nov. 29, 1969, 26 U.S.T. 765, T.I.A.S.
No. 8068, reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 25 (1970) (entered into force May 6,
1975).
153. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes
and other Matter, done Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, T.I.A.S. No. 8165 (entered into
force August 30, 1975).
154. Id. art. I1(2).
155. Id. art. VII(1)(c).
156. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, done
Nov. 2, 1973, reprinted in 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1319 (1973).
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operating in the marine environment and includes hydrofoil
boats, air-cushion vehicles, submersibles, floating craft and
fixed or floating platforms."' 57 In addition to ships entitled to
fly the flag of the party, the Convention also applies to "ships
not entitled to fly the flag of a Party but which operate under
the authority of a Party."'' 8 Similarly, the 1976 Convention on
the International Maritime Satellite Organization' 9 defines a
ship broadly as "a vessel of any type operating in the marine
environment. It includes inter alia hydrofoil boats, air-cushion
vehicles, submersibles, floating craft and platforms not permanently moored."'' 0 It appears that the terms being used now
such as "floating craft," and "floating platforms," would include OTEC-type structures in the ocean environment. However, there are many conventions adopted under the auspices
of the International Maritime Consultative Organization
(IMCO), which do not cover OTEC-type facilities.'"' Which of
these conventions should be made applicable to OTEC will
depend upon the purpose of the convention and the probable
benefit of its application to OTEC activities-both to the research and demonstration, and the development phases-so
that OTEC commercialization is facilitated and expedited.
ICNT provisions on pollution, on the other hand, would
cover OTEC devices. Dumping is defined to include wastes or
other matter from "vessels, aircraft, platforms or other manmade structures at sea."'8 2 Theterms used are "installations
and devices,"'8 3 and "vessels, installations, structures and
157. Id. art. 2(4).
158. Id. art. 3(1).
159. Convention on the International Maritime Satellite Organization, done Sept.
3, 1976, reprinted in 15 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1051 (1976).
160. Id. art. 1(f).
161. These conventions would include: International Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea, (SOLAS Convention), signed June 17, 1960, 16 U.S.T. 185, T.I.A.S. No.
5780, 536 U.N.T.S. 27; 1974 SOLAS Convention, reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 959 (1975); International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the
Sea by Oil, opened for signature May 12, 1954, 12 U.S.T.2989, T.I.A.S. No. 4900, 327
U.N.T.S. 3, as amended by Amendments to the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, done Apr. 11, 1962, 17 U.S.T. 1523, T.I.A.S.
No. 6109, 600 U.N.T.S. 332; International Convention on Load Lines, done Apr. 5,
1966, 18 U.S.T. 1857, T.I.A.S. No. 6331, 640 U.N.T.S. 133; and International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, done Nov. 29, 1969, reprinted in 9
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 45 (1970).
162. ICNT, art. l(1)(5)(a)(i & ii).
163. Id. art. 195(3)(c & d). The provisions cover all installations and devices in
the marine environment.
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other devices," flying the flag of the mining state or of its
6 4 Therefore, regardless of the status of OTEC devices,
registry."
they would be regulated under ICNT.
2. InternationalRegulatory Mechanisms and OTEC'65
a. Current Law
It should come as no suprise that no regulatory mechanism
exists for specific application to OTEC, for as a new technology
it has yet to make its debut as a user of ocean space. Of course,
the primary purpose of providing a regulatory framework is to
reduce uncertainty and risks attendant on pursuing OTEC activities, an important consideration not only for prospective
investors, but also for eventual commercialization of OTEC.
It seems likely that in the initial stages of OTEC development for research and demonstration purposes and subsequently for commercial operation, broader guidelines and standards with built-in flexibility, rather than narrow, precise
norms will be established. Developments in another relatively
new area, transnational pollution,"" show that the important
tasks of setting and harmonizing standards and establishing
appropriate machinery for implementation, usually occur first
in regional settings6 7 and appear later in a global setting where
such need and feasibility have been clearly demonstrated. Because of unique regional situations, it is unrealistic to expect
or even pursue universality and uniformity. The Regional Seas
Program of the United Nations Environmental Program
(UNEP), 11 which has developed in the last four years and is
still developing action plans for seven regions-Mediterranean,
Gulf of Arabia, Red Sea, Gulf of Guinea, Carribbean and adjacent regions, East Asian Seas, and South Pacific-illustrates
regional efforts on environmental management.
164. Id. art. 210(2).
165. See generally Faron, International Regulatory Aspects of OTEC Development and Operation, in ASIL STUDY, supra note 70, at 86-148.
166. See generally J. BARROS & D. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
POLLUTION (1974); Nanda, The Establishment of InternationalStandardsfor Transnational Environmental Injury, 60 IOWA L. REv. 1089 (1975).
167. See generally Nanda, supra note 166, at 1101-08, 1126-27; note 168 infra;
Okidi, Toward Regional Arrangements for Regulation of Marine Pollution, 4 OCEAN
DEY.& INT'L L. 1 (1977).
168. See International Center, Industry and Environment, Executive Report No.
30, Oct. 30, 1978. UNEP has established a special Regional Seas Programme Activity
Centre at its Geneva office.
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Several existing arrangements regulating other activities
in ocean space could be construed to cover OTEC-type structures and activities on them, or with modifications, could be
made applicable to OTEC. A few examples of such arrangements relevant to OTEC follow for illustrative purposes.
The results of the last major effort to provide a framework
for activities in ocean space, the 1958 Geneva Conventions, do
provide some basis for regulating OTEC. For example, the freedoms enumerated in the High Seas Convention-navigation,
fishing, laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and overflights' 9-are not exhaustive and it could be argued that
OTEC activities do constitute a "reasonable use" of the high
seas 70 and fall within the scope of the freedoms granted under
the Convention.71 Other pertinent provisions of the Convention
include those authorizing states to lay submarine cables, pipelines and communications lines, 7 ' and those related to the
states' regulation of the ocean pollution caused by their activi73
ties.
The 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf 74 contains
prohibitions against: (1) obstruction of the laying and maintenance of submarine cables and pipelines on the continental
shelf,7 5 (2) the rights of coastal states affecting the legal status
of the superjacent waters of the high seas, 7 and (3) "any unjustifiable interference with navigation, fishing or the conservation of the living resources of the sea.' ' 77 It also provides for the
protection of "fundamental oceanographic or other scientific
17
research carried out with the intention of open publication.'
As noted earlier, however, notwithstanding the provisions of
the Convention on the Continental Shelf, the recent developments regarding extensive coastal states' claims in their offshore areas, especially the developments regarding EEZ, make
it highly unlikely that OTEC activities could be conducted on
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Art. 2 of the High Seas Convention, note 15 supra.
See notes 56-57 supra and the accompanying text.
Id.
The High Seas Convention, supra note 15, arts. 26-29.
Id. arts. 24-25.
See note 15 supra.
Id. art. 4.
Id. art. 3.
Id. art. 5(1).
Id.
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another state's continental shelf without its consent. 179
The question of who would authorize operation of OTEC
devices on the high seas is at present unsettled. Would the
current state practice on vessels, the flag state approach (which
raises a further issue of the flags of convenience), 80 be made

applicable; or, would the OTEC issue become as controversial
as is the deep seabed mining issue at present?'' It is premature
to suggest the precise nature of the conditions and arrangements for OTEC activities on the high seas, for the current
debate on the seabed mining issue and the conclusions which
are finally reached at LOS III"2 will substantially affect the
12
OTEC licensing and operations.

As noted earlier, most existing standards and regulations
affecting activities in ocean space apply primarily to vessels, a
term recently broadened to include OTEC-type structures.'"
Institutional arrangements, both in setting standards and pro-

viding mechanisms for compliance are in various stages of development. One commentator describes the current state of
affairs:
These arrangements cover areas such as safety, navigational
aids, collision avoidance, design and construction regulation,
inspection, certification, port entry, liability, communications,
and labor and crew qualification. Most of these arrangements
arise in national rather than international contexts, in most cases
because international standards have not been agreed upon, or
because nations have not been willing to subject themselves to
international authority. Some of these arrangements have been
developed into conventions, which are binding on parties; others
are still undergoing analysis by such forums as IMCO's Legal
Committee in order to match institutional arrangements to the
realities of ocean use ....

International forums have just begun

to regulate moored platforms and other relatively novel marine
technology. If OTEC devices are considered vessels, which is
likely, at least for grazing type OTECs, then the various institu179. See notes 43-51 supra and the accompanying text.
180. See generally B. BOCZEK, FLAGS
supra note 16, at 1008-1140.

OF CONVENIENCE

(1962); McDougal & Burke,

181. In addition to the series cited in note 59 supra,see generally Burton, Freedom
of the Seas: International Law Applicable to Deep Seabed Mining Claims, 29 STAN.
L. REv. 1135 (1977); Charney, Law of the Sea: Breaking the Deadlock, 55 FoR. AFF.
598 (1977), Galey, From Caracas to Geneva to New York: The InternationalSeabed
Authority as a Creator of Grants, 40CEAN DEv. & INr'L L. 171 (1977).

182. Supra note 181.
183. See notes 150-64 supra and the accompanying text.
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tional arrangements currently providing norms and rules of vessel
operation may apply or be amended to apply to OTEC development.'"

Regulations applicable to marine pollution which might have
a bearing on OTEC activities will be discussed in the next
section dealing with environmental problems.'"
b. Recommendations
It is desirable to devise a regulatory scheme which assists
OTEC commercialization by providing certainty to prospective
investors. What must be carefully avoided is overregulation or
an inflexible and cumbersome regulatory system which can be
stifling, especially for a new technology.
It is not to be expected that a new international regulatory
mechanism will be established in the near future under a convention that deals specifically with OTEC operations. Experience shows that it was only in the aftermath of the Torrey
Canyon disaster'86 that the current major conventions on marine pollution from ships were negotiated-the 1969 conventions
on civil liability 8 7 and intervention on the high seas, 88 and the
1973 convention on prevention of pollution from ships.'89 However, several existing mechanisms could be applied to OTEC
activities. To illustrate, several IMCO conventions currently
applicable to vessels might be modified and made applicable
to OTEC devices. Similarly, a functional approach is possible,
authorizing specialized U.N. agencies to bring OTEC devices
and operations under their regulatory framework: the International Energy Agency, because of OTEC's involvement with
energy production; the World Meteorological Organization
(WMO), due to OTEC's research activities; the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), if OTEC generated energy is
used for producing fertilizers or in aquaculture; and the United
Nations Environmental Program, owing to the potential environmental effects of OTEC operations. Of course, ISA could
assume jurisdiction because of its umbrella function over the
184. Faron, supra note 165, at 96-97 (footnotes omitted).
185. See notes 240-72 infra and the accompanying text.
186. See generally G. GILL, F. BECKER & T. SOrER, THE WRECK OF THE TORREY
CANYON (1967); Nanda, The "Torrey Canyon" Disaster:Some Legal Aspects, 44 DEN.
L. J. 400 (1967).
187. Supra note 161.
188. Supra note 152.
189. Supra note 156.
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proposed deep seabed regime. 10 This is possible, especially in
veiw of the "common heritage" concept,"' the probable OTEC
conflict with deep seabed mining activities,"' or the possibly
environmentally adverse effects of OTEC operations.'
It is recommended that, in addition to the prescription of
unilateral U.S. regulations dealing with issues related to licensing and registration, safety, conflicting sea uses, communications, import and export, foreign labor, insurance, liability and
compensation schemes, etc., attention be given now to the devising of imaginative bilateral and regional arrangements to
apply to situations such as the following:
1. The resolution of apparently competing interests of a
coastal state and the licensing/registry state, where a foreign
registered/licensed OTEC device is operating adjacent to a
coastal state EEZ. The coastal state's interest in preventing
harmful effects within its EEZ must be acknowledged and accommodated.
2. The use of bilateral or regional schemes under which
a combination of a state or states and private enterprises pool
their resources, technology, and know-how to enter into arrangements for research and/or commercial purposes, such as,
joint ventures to construct, operate, and own OTEC devices in
a specific geographic area. The question of such operations on
the high seas, of course, will have to be addressed separately,
perhaps requiring some sort of global arrangement. The growing experience in working with satellite communication systems might offer useful guidelines."'
3. The need for bilateral or regional consultative mechanisms which will address specific issues regarding the management of conflicting claims of ocean uses caused by OTEC presence. Fisheries arrangements 5 and existing agreements between neighbors on international waterways"' offer useful precedents.
190. ICNT arts. 154-92.
191. Id. art. 136.
192. See id. pt. XI (arts. 154-92) and Annexes II & III.
193. See id. pt. XI (arts. 193-238).
194. See generally Colino, International Cooperation between Communications
Satellite Systems: An Overview of Current Practicesand Future Prospects, 5 J. SPACE
L. 65 (1977); Frutkin, Direct Community Broadcast Projects Using Space Satellites 3
id. at 17 (1975).
195. See generally NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND TREATIES RELATING TO THE LAW OF
THE SEA 573-86 (U.N. Legislative Series 1976), U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/18.
196. See generally Nanda, supra note 166, at 1101-08.
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4. The need for dispute settlement mechanisms.
On the global level, regulations regarding OTEC siting on
the high seas might become necessary because of the possible
conflicts between competing claimants to ocean uses or between competing claimants to attractive OTEC sites (a contingency not likely to occur in the near future). Thus, mechanisms
might have to be devised to set standards and regulations concerning the licensing and operation, and allocation of OTEC
sites for settlement of disputes, and to insure the efficient and
optimal use of the oceans for OTEC development. In the long
run, it might be desirable to establish an International Energy
Resources Conservation and Management Agency, and a code
of conduct for OTEC activities.
3. Federal-StateRegulatory Mechanisms and OTEC
a. Current Law
The need for a thorough assessment of the current Federal
offshore policies and for a Federal-State relationship regarding
adjacent coastal waters has been suggested earlier.' 7 To deal
specifically with OTEC issues, it is necessary to outline a
rough approximation of how OTEC exploitation will occur in
the next twenty years. In a recent study,' 8 Tefft, Kelly, Dick,
and Stevenson postulate the following scenario for OTEC exploitation to the year 2025:
The Selected Scenario

U.S. OTEC
Megawatts on Line
1980

85
.5

90
2.5

95
5

00
10

05
50

10
100

15
150

20
200

Key Descriptors
1. Successful demonstration of economy of technology and
environmental benignity of full systems by 1985 (.5 on line in 85
is demonstration(s) facilities).
2. Federal stimulation of follow-on exploitation by
a. establishment of benevolent legal regime
b. establishment of stimulative development institution
197. See notes 142-49 supra and the accompanying text.
198. TEFvr, KELLY & MOTLEY STUDY, supra note 9.

25
250
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c. provision of substantial Federal financial incentives
3. Establishment of fostering legal, institutional, and financing framework by 1980.
4. Operations within framework to develop strategic plan
for exploitation and to assemble facilities ventures concurrently
with demonstration implementation, i.e., 1980 to 1985.
5. Continued operations within framework during 1985 to
2000 at a pace sufficient to establish perfected industrial, legal,
institutional, and financial infrastructure by 2000."'1

The authors conclude that "decisive Federal action will be
needed to carry out this scenario. The Executive Branch presently lacks the policy direction and the specific legal authority
to take actions in the depth and breadth necessary to build the
legal, institutional, and financial framework needed to underlay scenario execution. Thus, new Federal legislation is neces200
sary."
The authors offer a model of Federal legislation which
takes into account the necessary interface with international
law as well with State interests.' They propose the enactment
of an "Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion, Development, Exploitation, and Regulation Act of 1980,"21 which would establish, among other policy objectives, the following: OTEC shall
be subject to exclusive Federal regulation; while in the short
term, Federal participation in OTEC development, ownership,
and/or operation will be necessary to stimulate deployment to
meet the established energy generation goals (by the year 2000,
a minimum of 10,000 megawatts of installed electric OTEC
generation capacity usable within the United States, its territories and possessions and/or on U.S. flag vessels at sea, and
of 250,000 megawatts by the year 2025),113 a long term objective
shall be non-Federal development, ownership, and operation.
To carry out these policies, the proposed legislation contains four titles: OTEC Development Financing Association;
OTEC Inc.; Duties and Responsibilities of the Secretary of
Energy; and Legal Regime.204
199. Id.at 8.
200. Id.
201. Id.at 11-24.

202. Id.at 10.
203. Id.at 11.
204. Id.at 12.
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The authors provide a detailed institutional framework," 5
the analysis of which is beyond the scope of this paper. However, a few selected Federal-State regulatory issues will be examined here.
On the issue regarding the application of Federal versus
State laws to OTEC activities in adjacent offshore areas, it
should be noted that extensive case law has developed regarding the applicability of the pertinent Federal or State laws to
injuries suffered by workers on fixed or submersible oil-drilling
platforms or rigs. 06 Different rules have been applied to injuries
occurring on fixed platforms within the three-mile zone as opposed to those occurring beyond the three-mile limit.2117 A landmark decision was a 1969 case, Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co.,2 " in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that State
law would apply to fixed offshore platforms in preference to
general maritime law. In 1972, the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act"" was amended, allowing a concurrent application of both Federal and State laws in case of
210
an overlap.
However, until Congress enacts comprehensive Federal
legislation regarding OTEC, the guidelines on the applicable
law are provided by the Supreme Court test of uniformity versus locality or diversity:
if a case falls within an area in commerce thought to demand
a uniform national rule, state action is struck down. If the activity is one of predominantly local interest, state action is sustained. More accurately, the question is whether the state interest is outweighed by a national interest in the unhampered operation of interstate commerce."'

More recently, in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 212 the issue was
that of a conflict between Washington State's tanker law regulating oil tankers in Puget Sound,21 the Ports and Waterways
205. Supra note 201; TEFFT, KELLY & MOTLEY, INC., WORKING DRAFT, OTEC DEVELOPMENT, EXPLOITATION, AND REGULATION AcT OF 1980 (1978).
206. For discussion of these cases, see Comment, Offshore Oil Platforms and
Admiralty Law: Rodrigue in Retrospect, 49 TuL. L. REV. 65 (1975).
207. Id.

208. 395 U.S. 352 (1969).
209.
210.
(1973).
211.
212.
213.

Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1251 (1972), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1976).
See Comment, Broadened Coverage Under the LHWCA, 33 LA. L. REv. 683
California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 728 (1949).
98 S. Ct. 988 (1978).
Wash.Rev. Code Ann. § 88.16.170-190 (Supp. 1978).
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Safety Act of 1972 (PWSA),2 and the Constitution. The Supreme Court found certain safety features in the design and
equipment of tankers which were required under Washington
law to be invalid in the face of the preempting requirements set
by PWSA.1 5 The Court applied the uniformity/diversity tests
and based its decision on the need for uniformity of safety
design requirements. Applying the same test, it also struck
down another provision of Washington law, which excluded
tankers in excess of 125,000 DWT216 from Puget Sound. However, the Court upheld another provision, which required that
tankers over a certain size "take a Washington State licensed
pilot while navigating Puget Sound," 17 reasoning that this provision was more of an operating rule for local waters. 15
The issues of licensing, the law applicable to OTEC facilities in adjacent waters, and the potential environmental and
administrative burdens upon the coastal States were addressed
by DPA in the context of deepwater port facilities and have
219
been noted earlier.
b. Recommendations
Federal and State interests coincide in a number of areas
which will probably be affected by OTEC development-coastal zone management and land planning, revenue
sharing, State costs and fees, and electricity rate regulations.
The coastal States have a significant stake because of possible
conflicts with other ocean uses, adverse environmental effects,
siting of shore-based support facilities, etc. Thus, it will be in
the mutual interest of the Federal government and coastal
States that a mechanism be devised which is workable and
feasible, effective and efficient, environmentally sound, and
equitable in its reach while dealing with Federal-State interests.220 These broad policy objectives should be given effect by
a system under which:
1. The licensing and regulatory authority will be the Federal government.
214. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-27, 46 U.S.C. 391(a) (Supp. V 1975). The provision on
safety features held invalid is Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 88.16.190(2) (Supp. 1978).
215. 98 S. Ct. at 996.1000.
216. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 88.16.190(1) (Supp. 1978).
217. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 88.16.180 (Supp. 1978).
218. 98 S.Ct. at 1000-1002.
219. See notes 120-32 supra and the accompanying text.
220. See generally note 205 supra.
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2. The DOE/Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) will be the lead Federal agency to license and regulate
OTEC activities, similar to the Department of Transportation/Coast Guard's role as the lead agency for licensing deepwater port facilities under DPA.
3. OTEC facilities in offshore areas will be considered a
utility in interstate and foreign commerce and will be subject
to regulations and procedures of FERC both as to rate regulation and technical standards.
4. The Coast Guard and the Corps of Engineers will be
responsible for navigational safety and seaworthiness pertaining to OTEC facilities.
Such a scheme will accomodate Federal-State interests by
providing for:
1. a Federal/State revenue sharing scheme, especially
permitting States to recover the economic cost to them of a
federal right-of-way for transmission cables through the threemile territorial sea and also for shore-based facilities;
2. an effective Federal/State consultative mechanism;
and
3. administrative advisory boards.
C. Environmental Considerations
A recent study has outlined the following environmental
problems associated with the deployment of OTEC devices in
the ocean:
(1) the potentially toxic effect on marine life of metallic elements
eroded or corroded from heat exchangers; (2) the adverse effect
of mixing natural thermocline and salinity gradients; (3) the potentially toxic effects of working fluid seepage into the seawater
or seawater into the working fluid; (4) the ecological impacts of
concentrations of biocides (such as chlorine) used to prevent biofouling; (5) the safety of workers faced with exposure to chemicals; [and] (6) the effect on the microclimate of slightly lower
22
air and surface temperatures around the plant. '

It should, however, be noted that this inquiry into the
potentially adverse environmental impact of OTEC activities
is speculative. Nonetheless, it is certainly desirable that these
issues be addressed at this preliminary stage of OTEC development. The discussion in this section will open with a brief
221. SERI INTERIM DRAFr REP., supra note 9, at 137-39.
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outline of the domestic (Federal-State) issues, and will focus
primarily on international aspects of OTEC-related environmental issues.
1. Domestic (Federal-State)Issues
Potential environmental impacts from OTEC facilities in
coastal waters include those from construction and operation
of such facilities, cables and transmission lines, and onshore
services and support facilities. The existing U.S. legislation
relevant to OTEC activities both during its research and development phase and during the commercial phase includes the
OCS Lands Act,"' CZMA,2 3 DPA,2 4 and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).22 5 Except for NEPA, the
pertinent provisions of these statutes have already been examined in the preceding sections on jurisdiction2 and regulatory
mechansims.2" Consequently, the discussion here will be confined to NEPA and recent developments regarding the other
statutes.
NEPA requires Federal agencies to prepare records on environmental effects of and alternatives to "every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment. 2 2 8 Since Federal involvement in OTEC development is expected to be substantial, at least during the initial
stages, preparation of programmatic Environmental Impact
Statements (EISs)229 will be required during the research phase
of OTEC development. Additionally, while OTEC facilities
will be subject to site-specific EISs, because of Federal time,
money, or effort an OTEC facility received,2 "' it is possible that
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

43 U.S.C.
16 U.S.C.
33 U.S.C.
42 U.S.C.
See notes
See notes

§§ 1331-43 (1970).
§§ 1451-64 (1976).
§§ 1501-24 (1976).
§§ 4321-47 (1976).
92-141 supra and the accompanying text.
206-20 supra and the accompanying text.

228. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c). See generally R. LivoiF, A

NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE

NEPA AND ITS AFTERMATH (1976).
229. See generally Note, The Scope of the Program EIS Requirement. The Need
for a Coherent JudicialApproach, 30 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1978).
230. Actions with direct effect as well as actions with indirect effects have been
held subject to EIS requirements. Since Federal agencies are required to make a
detailed statement on "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment," the question regarding the scope of "major Federal actions"
assumes special importance. For a criticism of a broad interpretation of the term
ENVIRONMENT:
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regional EISs will also be needed, due to the cumulative effect
of a number of OTEC facilities in a region.2 '
Among other significant developments, the Coast Guard,
on December 4, 1978, proposed rules for administering an offshore oil pollution compensation fund,:

2

which will be set up

pursuant to the 1978 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act

Amendments,2 33 which President Carter signed on September
22, 1978.34 The Secretaries of Transportation and the Treasury

will administer the fund, which is expected to cover "all marine
oil pollution, including that discharged from onshore facilities
and deepwater ports.

2

35

Under the 1978 amendments,2 6 no

license for the development and production of oil or gas on OCS
will be granted unless it conforms with the requirements of
CZMA.237 Also, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)
is proposing new pollution clean up plans in which coastal
States' interests are recognized. 238 It is also worth noting that

since the total number of coastal zone management programs
stands now at thirteen-California, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Puerto
Rico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wisconsin23 -more active State participation in decisionmaking can
be anticipated.
2. InternationalAspects
In addition to the primary concern of the coastal state with
its immediate marine environment, its interests also extend to
the protection and preservation of a shared global marine environment. The latter is affected by unilateral state actions as
well as collective actions by states. Selected recent developments of states' actions that might have a bearing on OTEC
thereby requiring EISs for actions which may not be "major Federal actions," see
Friedman, The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 - The Brave New World of
EnvironmentalLegislation, 6 NAT. RESOURCEs L. 44 (1973).
231. For a discussion of regional EISs, see Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390
(1976) rev'g Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F. 2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
232. 43 Fed. Reg. 56840 (1978). See 9 ENVIRON. REP. (BNA) 1413 (1978).
233. Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629 (1978).
234. See 9 ENVIRON. REP. (BNA) 972 (1978).
235. 43 Fed. Reg. 56,840 (1978).
236. Supra note 230.
237. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (1976).
238. See 9 ENVIRON. REP. (BNA) 1416-17 (1978).
239. Id. at 1293.
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development will be noted in this section, which will conclude
with a brief comment on pertinent ICNT provisions.
a. Unilateral U.S. Actions Related to the Marine
Environment
During the recent past, the U.S. Congress has adopted
legislation with potential extraterritorial reach in the marine
environment. For example, the Clean Water Act 4 " extended
the application of Section 311 (Oil and Hazardous Substance
Liability) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act " ' to cover
activities which affect the resources of the 200-mile U.S. fisheries zone or its OCS. Earlier, the Fishery Conservation and
Management Act of 197642 extended the U.S. fishery zone to
200 miles. Other U.S. acts with potential effect on maritime
activities include the U.S. Ports and Waterway Safety Program,13 the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act
of 1972,4 the new Coast Guard Regulations concerning navigational aids,245 and the DPA.248
The debate continues as to whether NEPA applies to
major Federal actions abroad. 247 The argument for its application abroad was recently made at a Senate Subcommittee
hearing by Russell E. Train, former EPA administrator, former
CEQ chairman, and current president of the World Wildlife
Fund. He asserted that House and Senate members attending
a 1968 coloquium, which "served as a basis for NEPA," intended that the law apply beyond U.S. territorial limits, and
that President Carter reinforced that view in his 1977 environmental message.2" He added that an environmental policy
which "failed to recognize the global nature of the human environment would be shortsighted," and that the U.S. should con240. Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566, 1593-96 (1977).
241. 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1976).
242. Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (1976).
243. 33 U.S.C. 99 1221-27 (1976).
244. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1401-34 (1976).
245. See, e.g., 42 Fed. Reg. 5964, 5966 (1977).
246. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-24 (1976).
247. See generally Comment, Renewed Controversy Over the InternationalReach
of NEPA, 7 ENVT'L L. REP. 10,205 (1977); Sierra Club v. A.E.C., 4 id. at 20,685 (D.D.C.
1974); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for International Development, 6 id. at 20,121 (D.D.C. 1975); Sierra Club v. Coleman, 405 F. Supp. 53 (D.D.C.
1975), injunction continued, 421 F. Supp. 63 (D.D.C. 1976); COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT Appendix G 395
(1977).
248. See 9 ENVIRON. REP. (BNA) 304 (1978).
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sider the "significant extra-territorial envi ronmental impacts"
of its actions." ' However, with regard to the application of
NEPA to the Export-Import Bank (Eximbank), the concern of
U.S. business is that EIS requirements for Eximbank would
result in delays in getting loans and added costs to applicants,
thereby depressing the rate of U.S. exports. 5"
The controversy will be settled through an Executive
Order setting out responsibilities of Federal agencies for reviewing environmental effects of their overseas projects. Reportedly, under a proposed Executive Order, certain Federal
actions having a significant adverse effect upon the environment of nonparticipating third countries or natural resources
of global importance will be required to have abbreviated environmental reviews.2 5' Eximbank President, John L. Moore, recently explained that the proposed Executive Order would require short environmental assessments primarily for "projects"
to be financed by Eximbank.2 52 Thus, if Eximbank were to
finance the purchase of an OTEC plant for a developing state,
an assessment would be required. It may also be noted that the
Department of Energy has commissioned environmental im253
pact assessments of a small floating OTEC test facility.
Since so little is yet known about OTEC activities and
operations, environmental assessments should be conducted
during the research phase. The same applies in the commercial
phase, whether the OTEC plant is to operate in a U.S. coastal
zone, in the coastal zone of another state, or on the high seas.
b. MultilateralActions
The 1972 U.N. Conference on the Human Environment in
Stockholm 2 5 acknowledged the emerging norms of state responsibility and liability for transnational environmental damage. Under Principle 21 of the U.N. Declaration on the Human
Environment, states are responsible for insuring "that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to
249. Id.
250. Id. at 305.
251. Id. at 1049.
252. Id.
253. Noted in Stein, Environmental Aspects of OTEC Development and
Demonstration, in ASIL STUDY, supra note 70, at 154.
254. See Report of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1 (1972).
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the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction." 5' 5 Also, under Principle 22, "States
shall cooperate to develop further the international law regarding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and
other environmental damage caused by activities within the
jurisdiction or control of such States to areas beyond their jurisdiction. 2 6 Principle 7 calls upon states to "take all possible
steps to prevent pollution of the seas by substances that are
liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living resources and marine life, to damage or to interfere with other
2 57
legitimate uses of the sea.
Following the Stockholm conference, several conventions
were concluded, including the London Convention on the
Dumping of Wastes at Sea,26 the 1973 IMCO Convention on
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships,2 59 and the 1974 Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea. 20 Also, there have been substantial bilateral and multilateral efforts to conclude new conventions for the prevention of marine pollution and the conservation and management of the marine environment 2 1 which
might have some bearing on OTEC21' operations.
c. ICNT Provisions
Part XII of ICNT contains 46 Articles dealing with the
protection and preservation of the marine environment. States
are obligated to protect and preserve the marine environment,2612 to refrain from polluting the environment of other
states or areas beyond their national jurisdiction, 623 and to take
measures to prevent, reduce, and control marine pollution. 24
Among specific measures, states are to minimize the release of
toxic, harmful or noxious substances from dumping,2 5 and pol255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Supra note 153.
Supra note 156.
Reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 959 (1975).
In addition to note 168 supra, see generally 4 NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF
THE SEA, supra note 10, at 331-518; 6 id. at 456-562; Hickery, Jr., Custom and LandBased Pollutionof the High Seas, 15 SAN DIEoO L. REv. 409, 445-54 (1978); Okidi, note
167 supra.
262. ICNT art. 193.
263. See id. arts. 195(2), 238.
264. Id. art. 195(1).
265. Id. art. 195(3)(a)(iii).
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lution from vessels 2"1and "from all other installations and devices operating in the marine environment, in particular for
preventing accidents and dealing with emergencies, ensuring
the safety of operations at sea, and regulating the design, construction, equipment, operation and manning of such installations or devices. ' ' 267 In another article ICNT calls upon states
"[iun taking measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution
of the marine environment . . . not to transfer, directly or
indirectly, damage or hazards from one area to another or
transform one type of pollution into another. 2 8 States are also
to assume positive legal responsibility to cooperate in international monitoring programs, 211 and to assess the environmental
impacts of their activities on the marine environment.2 70 Article
210 deals specifically with activities in the Area:
1. International rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures shall be established ...

to prevent, reduce

and control pollution to the marine environment from activities
relating to the exploration and exploitation of the Area. Such
rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures
shall be re-examined from time to time as necessary.
2. . . . States shall establish national laws and regulations
to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from activites relating to the exploration and exploitation
of the Area undertaken by vessels, installations, structures and
other devices flying their flag or of their registry.

According to Article 236 on responsibility and liability, states
are "responsible for the fulfilment of their international obligations concerning the protection and preservation of the marine
environment [and] shall be liable in accordance with international law for damage attributable to them resulting from vio21 7
lations of these obligations. '
This chapter on the ocean's environment provides stronger
guarantees than ever before. 272 OTEC activities and operations
would certainly be covered under many of the principles and
specific provisions contained in the chapter.
266. Id. art. 195(3)(b).
267. Id. art. 195(3)(d).

268.
269.
270.
271.

Id. art. 196.
Id. art. 205.
Id. art. 207.
Id. art. 236(1).

272. For a critical appraisal of ICNT provisions on the marine environment, see

Schneider, Something Old, Something New: Some Thoughts on Grotius and the Marine Environment, 18 VA. J. INT'L L. 147 (1977).
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Im.

CONCLUSIONS

Since OTEC holds sufficient promise to warrant vigorous
research efforts on its systems and technology, 27 it is equally
important that an efficient and effective legal and institutional
framework be devised without any further delay. It is for this
reason that a major objective of this study has been to focus
on some of the most pressing aspects related to OTEC development. Accordingly, the preceding discussion addressed only
selected issues and either left untouched or barely touched
upon several issues, including the potential application of antitrust laws to OTEC activities,"' liability plans,27 utility policy
and regulation,2 76 and financial arrangements and incentives
including tax advantages 277 which might facilitate and expedite
OTEC development.
Specific recommendations made here relate to both
Federal-State and international aspects. To recapitulate, a
comprehensive ocean management system for U.S. coastal
areas is recommended, which requires comprehensive 'ocean
management legislation. In the international arena, it may not
be too early to consider the drafting of a convention which
mandates environmental impact assessments of a state's major
projects which could harm the environment of another state or
the shared global environment, and provides for consultative
mechanisms. 27 This should be followed by the drafting of an273. See section I supra.
274. OTEC operations might have implications for antitrust laws, for the large
investment needed for the construction, purchase or operations of an OTEC plant
might require the involvement of several firms and/or states. Similarly, a joint venture
may be an attractive vehicle to market OTEC technology and/or OTEC energy. For
a discussion of some of the issues raised by joint arrangement for developing new
technology or producing new products, see Baker, Antitrust as a Spur to Technical
Progress, 23 AM. U. L. REV. 547 (1974).
275. See generally Faron, supra note 165, at 107-11; Nyhart, Problems of Legal
Responsibility and Liability to Be Anticipated in OTEC Operations, in KNIGHT, NyHART & STEIN, supra note 9, at 129-64.
276. It is proposed that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, as the lead
Federal Agency, assume responsibility for formulating and implementing the needed
"utility policy" regarding OTEC.
277. See generally sources cited in note 205 supra; B. WASHOM & J. N11.1S, supra
note 9.
278. A Senate Resolution, S.49, was introduced in 1978 urging the United States
"to negotiate an international treaty requiring environmental impact assessments on
major projects that could harm the environment of another nation or the global commons. International impact statements could be filed with the . . . (UNEP)." The

288

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL.

8:239

other convention specifically dealing with OTEC activities as
well as a code of conduct. Even if these tasks appear to be
overwhelming, it is imperative that they be undertaken now.
Resolution would require states parties to the treaty to "consult with affected nations,
or with the UNEP in cases involving global commons, to minimize harmful impacts
across international boundaries." 9 ENVIRON. REP. (BNA) 539 (1978).

ASPECTS OF DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROGRAMS'

Introduction
ROBERT

C. GOODWIN, JR.*

The articles that follow represent a sampling of the legal
issues dealt with by the attorneys who work under me at the
Department of Energy (DOE). Although these issues may appear to have little in common, they are, in fact, parts of a
fascinating collection of interconnected international and
emergency preparedness legal problems in the energy area. The
issues related to information systems on the international oil
market, for example, touch both on one of the major DOE
regulatory programs, the transfer pricing program, and on the
International Energy Agency (IEA). The latter deserves special
mention since implementation of its emergency programs has
been the focus of considerable U.S. Government legal effort.
The agreement on an International Energy Program
(IEP), 2 entered into by most of the free world's major energy
consuming countries, established the International Energy
Agency, as well as a number of specific goals and programs.
The most significant of these was an emergency oil sharing
arrangement to be implemented in case of a cutoff or serious
reduction in oil supplies available to the EA group of countries. The recent difficulties in Iran, although not of a magnitude to trigger EA action to date, have served as a reminder
Copyright retained by authors.
* Assistant General Counsel for International Trade and Energy Preparedness,
U.S. Department of Energy. A.B., 1963, Fordham University; J.D., 1969, Georgetown
University Law Center.
1. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and should in no way be
takei as representing the views of the U.S. Department of Energy.
2. Done at Paris, Nov. 18, 1974, T.I.A.S. No. 8278, 27 U.S.T. 1685.
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that the purpose of the LEP is not simply to deal with politically motivated embargoes, but rather to address supply disruptions from any cause.
One of the difficult issues faced regarding the implementation of an emergency sharing system, was how to utilize the
assistance and expertise of international oil companies without
exposing them to antitrust risks. The solution, with respect to
the U.S. companies involved, was, in the first instance, the
formation of a Voluntary Agreement among those companies
under the provisions of section 708 of the Defense Production
Act, which provided antitrust immunity so long as the procedures of the statute and Agreement were followed. The first
Voluntary Agreement, which set out the permissible range of
U.S. company activities in implementing the IEP, was approved by the Attorney General on March 28, 1975. In December of that year, Congress passed the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, which contains provisions on voluntary agreements to carry out the TEP. A new Voluntary Agreement was
entered into pursuant to this authority and remains in effect.
While one of the principal legal problems in regard to the
implementation of the international emergency preparedness
programs has been in the antitrust area, implementation of
domestic emergency preparedness programs has involved considerably more technical legal issues. Specifically, the Strategic Petroleum Reserve Program has involved real estate acquisition questions, and general procurement and contract law
issues.
As the above discussion indicates, the sampling that follows is truly that-a sampling. While this collection of articles
may only provide a glance at international energy issues, we
hope that the reader will find the view interesting and informative.

International and Domestic Information
Systems On the International Oil Market
REINIER

H.J.H.

LoCK*

INTRODUCTION

The 1973 world oil crisis, generated largely by the OAPEC
oil embargo, raised anew the question of what role the United
States government should play in the international oil market.
This question has concerned U.S. policymakers ever since the
large scale entry of U.S. companies into the international oil
market in the late 1920's.1 Perhaps the most concerted effort
to assert a U.S. government presence took place during World
War II, when Harold Ickes, then Secretary of the Interior, led
unsuccessful efforts to purchase major Arabian oil concessions
from U.S. companies for a government "Petroleum Reserve
Corporation" and to build a government-owned trans-Arabia
pipeline.2

Despite this concern, the U.S. based oil companies have
conducted their international dealings in virtually a political
vacuum. The government has had little knowledge of, let alone
control over, their international negotiations and operations.
They have appeared to conduct diplomacy and "foreign policy" almost as independent states, except at certain, often critical times, when they actively sought government support for
their international initiatives. Consultation with the government, when it did take place, was often initiated by the companies, very much on their terms, and it seldom allowed the government time to act independently.
* Attorney-Adviser, Office of General Counsel, U.S. Department of Energy. B.
Com., 1964, Rhodes University, South Africa; LL.B., 1966, Rhodes University, South
Africa; B.C.L., 1969, Oxford University; LL.M., 1977, University of California (Boalt),
Berkeley.
1. See generally SAMPSON, THE SEVEN SISTERS, Ch. 4 (1975); BLAIR, THE CONTROL
OF OIL, 31 et. seq. (1976).
2. SAMPSON, supra note 1, at 94-99.
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The 1973 crisis revealed that inadequate information
would probably have rendered most government initiatives ineffective, even, if it had desired or possessed the legal mechanisms to assert its presence or influence more directly into the
negotiations between U.S. oil companies and the OPEC producing countries.
The critical need for an adequate, intelligent, governmental decisionmaking information base, irrespective of whether
the government should play a greater role in, or seek to regulate, U.S. oil companies' foreign activities, had become obvious
on both the domestic and international levels. In November
1974, most major Western industrialized nations (and Japan)
concluded, under the auspices of the OECD, the Agreement on
the International Energy Program (IEP Agreement)3 in an effort to counter the new assertion of concerted power by OPEC.
THE

IEP

AGREEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM

The IEP Agreement called for, inter alia, "a more active
role in relation to the oil industry by establishing a comprehensive international information system and permanent framework for consultation with oil companies."' The Agreement
established a two-part Information System: 5 a "General Section on the situation in the international oil market and activities of oil companies;" and the "Special Section" which is to
ensure efficient operation of the emergency preparedness measures which comprise a substantial portion of the treaty.6 Both
sections are coordinated through the Secretariat of the International Energy Agency (IEA), the organization created by the
OECD in November 1974 to implement the Agreement's provisions. Policy under the Agreement is developed by "standing
groups," consisting of representatives of nation signatories in
certain functional areas. The Standing Group on the Oil Market (SOM) is the primary functionary for the General Section.
Under the General Section, participating countries are
required to report, on a regular basis, "precise data" identified
by SOM and approved by the IEA's Management Committee,'
3. Agreement on an International Energy Program, done at Paris, November 18,
1974, T.I.A.S. No. 8278, 27 U.S.T. 1685 [hereinafter cited as IEP Agreement].
4. TEP Agreement, Preamble.
5. Id. art. 25.
6. An interesting critical analysis of the IEP Agreement, in particular its emergency preparedness provisions, is contained in Willrich and Conant, The International
Energy Agency: An Interpretationand Assessment, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 199 (1977).
7. IEP Agreement, art. 29.
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on specific subjects relating to oil companies operating within
their jurisdiction. These subjects include corporate and financial structure, crude oil production rates, stocks, acquisition
costs and prices, allocation of crude oil supplies, terms of access
to supplies, and capital investments." Most of this data is obtained by the governments from their oil companies. The identification of data required is an ongoing SOM function which
is still in relatively early development.' In pursuance of this
function, SOM is required to consult with companies to make
certain that the system is "compatible with industry operations" and to develop standards and procedures to harmonize
data reporting and ensure its confidentiality."
The data reported is used by both the IEA and participating countries to assist their national energy planning. However,
much of the data reported is treated confidentially by the IEA
and in a form that will avoid disclosures of "proprietary""
company information or information that might impair competition within the oil industry. 2 Elaborate procedures have been
adopted to avoid disclosure of proprietary company-specific
data. Most of the data is transferred to the IEA in aggregate,
noncompany-specific form: most of the data received from the
IEA by the U.S. government is classified as national security
sensitive. 3 Only certain types of data are obtained through
systematic reporting. For other types, such as terms of access
to crude supplies, company supply and demand appraisals,
industry structure, and exploration prospects, SOM has developed a system of regular, formal consultations with individual
oil companies.
Both the General Information System and the emergency
8. Id. art. 27. The list is not exhaustive, and it may be expanded by the lEA's
Governing Board. Id. art. 27(1)(j).
9. Id. art. 31.
10. Id. art. 30.
11. The term is construed quite narrowly in article 28 as being limited to such
matters as patents, trademarks, scientific processes, geological data, individual sales,
and tax returns.
12. Article 27(3) requires that participating countries report "on a nonproprietary
basis" and in a way that will "not prejudice competition" or undermine its laws
protecting competition.
13. To meet current classification standards, the data must be such that its unauthorized disclosure could cause identifiable damage to the national security. Exec.
Order No. 12,065, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,957 (1978). Most information received from IEA
could be classified as "foreign government information" which, under § 1-303 of Exec.
Order No. 12,065, is presumed to cause such identifiable damage.
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preparedness activities under the IEP Agreement rely heavily
on oil company cooperation for their successful implementation. Although almost as an afterthought in the IEP Agreement, the General Section information system and its mechanisms for consultations with companies may, ironically, prove
to be one of the more solid achievements of the Agreement.
The IEA has already developed reporting systems on the
prices and acquisition costs of crude oil imports. It also receives
data on stocks and production. Generally, reporting as to crude
prices and acquisition costs has been confined to OPEC "crude
streams," defined by oil gravity and country and usually coincident with supplier countries. Theoretically, however, Article
27 is broad enough to authorize reporting on any crude stream.
The role of SOM and other IEA organs in developing these
reporting systems could make them important instruments of
IEA policy.
U.S. GOVERNMENT REPORTING SYSTEMS
To meet the information shortcomings exposed by the 1973
crisis as well as the more specific requirements of the IEP Information System, DOE and its predecessor FEA, have developed
a group of extensive reporting systems by U.S. based oil companies on their international crude oil dealings. When suitably
linked, these reports should provide DOE with the ongoing,
comprehensive information base necessary for meaningful
analysis of the state and direction of the international oil market essential for effective policy formulation. They also will
contribute to fulfillment of IEA obligations and certain domestic statutory and regulatory requirements.
Two existing reporting systems, the Foreign Crude Oil
Cost Report," and the Transfer Pricing Report, 15 will soon be
significantly augmented by a third system, the Foreign Oil
Supply Agreement Report (FOSA).
The Foreign Crude Oil Cost Report (EIA-67) contains data
on the cost of foreign crude oil acquisitions by U.S. based companies and on the volume of exports from producing countries
to the United States. The information on crude oil costs is
provided to the IEA under Article 27 of the IEP Agreement.
The obligation is imposed upon firms who acquire 100,000 bar14. DOE Form EIA-67 (formerly FEA-P-328-Q-O),
15. DOE Form ERA-51 (formerly FEA-F-701-M-O).
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rels or more of crude oil per day from countries who are not IEA
members. Reporting is geared to the IEA's classification of
crude streams. Reports on a contract-by-contract basis can be
readily linked with the contract details provided by FOSA reports.
The FOSA Report (form EIA-27) should provide the most
significant information about foreign oil operations. Reporting
is imposed on any U.S. entity which has a right to lift for export
certain volumes 6 of crude oil in foreign countries. 7 These entities are required to report all material terms of their contracts
or agreements with foreign producer governments or entities
controlled by them, such as national oil companies. Certain
specified details are also required: prices, fees for services,
other payments to the host government, minimum and maximum lifting rights, and government imposed production limits. 8 Contracts and other related documents must be produced
if required by DOE. 9 In addition, companies are required to
notify DOE of negotiations with producer governments which
might "reasonably lead to the establishment of any supply
arrangement" covered in section 215.3.21 DOE can obtain further details through consultation with the reporting company.
Hence, some potential for an early warning system on impending negotiations is built into the FOSA regulations.
Many comments on the proposed regulation received from
potentially affected oil companies argued against a reporting
requirement and urged, instead, a continuation and augmentation of the voluntary consultations that had taken place periodically with the government. DOE concluded that such consultations would not ensure the systematic, current, and ongoing
information base necessary for well-informed policy formulation and timely decisions in the international oil supply area.
However, DOE is encouraging continuation of the voluntary
consultation process to facilitate its understanding of the international oil situation and sharpen the perceptions of both the
companies and the government.
16. 150,000 barrels per day average for a year, or a total of 55 million barrels in
less than a year, or a total of 150 million barrels over the lifetime of the agreement.
17. Final rulemaking entitled Collection of Foreign Oil Supply Agreement Information, 10 C.F.R. § 215 (1978).
18. 10 C.F.R. § 215.3 (1978).
19. 10 C.F.R. § 215.4 (1978).
20. 10 C.F.R. § 215.6 (1978).
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The central concern of most potentially affected (respondent) companies has been the protection of confidential information reported under the FOSA system. A significant portion
of the data reported will probably be either "proprietary" or
national security sensitive, or both. One approach to ensure
confidentiality would be for DOE to classify such data as meets
the standards for national security classification under Executive Order 12,065. This order limits access to persons within the
government to the classified information who are deemed
"trustworthy," i.e., possessing the requisite security clearance,
and who can establish that "access is necessary for the per'2
formance of official duties." '
Access within the government to "proprietary" information, that is, information regarded as confidential for essentially commercial-competitive reasons, could, under current
law, be limited to those persons who require such access to
fulfill their official duties.
Access may be denied to the public at large under section
552(b)(4) of the Freedom of Information Act, which exempts
"trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential" from the
Act's coverage. 2
To enhance these protections given to FOSA, DOE will
impose carefully controlled limitations on access within the
government to, and detailed procedures for the handling of,
FOSA information classified under Executive Order 12,065, or
'2 3
information which is determined to be "proprietary. :
The Transfer Pricing Report form (ERA-51) is designed to
collect information on transfer prices, those assigned to imported oil between U.S. companies and their foreign trading
affiliates, and on crude oil transactions between nonaffiliated
entities. This information is required to administer adequately
the application to refiners of DOE's Mandatory Petroleum
21. Section 4-101 of Exec. Order No. 12,065, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,957 (1978). Access
may be denied to the public at large under § 552(b)(1) of the Freedom of Information
Act, which exempts matters properly "kept secret in the interest of national defense
or foreign policy" under criteria established by an Executive order. 5 U.S.C. §
552(b)(1) (1976).
22. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1976).
23. An indication of the kinds of procedures that will be adopted with respect to
proprietary information under the Freedom of Information Act is included in a recent
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking with respect to DOE's proposed FOI regulations. 43
Fed. Reg. 40,530, at 40,536.
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Price Regulations. These requirements impose price ceilings on
certain petroleum products based on crude oil costs." Transfer
pricing information also is provided to the IEA under the IEP
Agreement.
The obligation to report is imposed on a monthly basis
upon refiners importing at least 500,000 barrels of crude, or any
crude from a foreign affiliate in that month. Although ERA-51
is limited to refiners, it does provide data similar to that gathered under EIA-67 and the FOSA system but from a somewhat
different perspective. This report, therefore, helps DOE monitor certain cost and price movements, both within the United
States and internationally, and enhances DOE's analytical
capabilities.
Between the essentially interlocking EIA-67 and FOSA
systems, and the additional information provided by ERA-51,
a substantial data base can be provided. It can be supplemented further, if necessary, by the monthly Report of Oil
Imports into the U.S. and Puerto Rico designed primarily to
facilitate implementation of the Oil Imports Program. 5 The
obligation to report details, such as volume and port of entry,
are imposed on oil companies which import crude oil, residual
fuel oil, or finished petroleum products.
The legal authority for imposition of all three major sets
of reporting requirements described above lies in section 13(b)
of the Federal Energy Administration Act (FEAA), as
amended:
All persons owning or operating facilities or business premises who are engaged in any phase of energy supply or major
energy consumption shall make available to the Administrator
such information and periodic reports, records, documents, and
other data, relating to the purposes of this chapter, including full
identification of all data and projections as to source, time and
methodology of development, as the Administrator may prescribe by regulation or order as necessary or appropriate for the
proper exercise of functions under this chapter. "
24. Mandatory Petroleum Price Regulations, 10 C.F.R. § 212 (1978). Section
212.84 prescribes standards for establishing the cost of crude oil imports in transactions
between affiliated entities. Basically, an effort is made to emulate the price such
entities would charge if they were dealing at arm's-length, § 212.84(c). DOE establishes representative arm's-length prices, compares these with the companies' reported
transfer prices, and disallows crude costs attributable to excessive transfer prices.
25. DOE Form ERA-60 (formerly FEA-P1l3-M-O) [19771 3 EN. MNGM'T (CCH)
18,413, which in 1977 consolidated and replaced three earlier reporting forms. See
42 Fed. Reg. 4,889 (1977) for the announcement of the availability of this form.
26. 11 U.S.C. § 772(b) (1976). The data gathering authority is now vested in the
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All three reporting systems patently meet the requirements that they relate to the broad purposes of the FEAA and
that they are "necessary or appropriate" to the exercise of the
Secretary's functions thereunder. For instance, the Secretary's
general functions in the execution of his authority under section 5(b) include the collection and analysis of information on
energy demand, production, and reserves, the development of
a comprehensive energy policy and energy trade policies, integrating domestic and foreign energy supply policies, promoting
stability in energy prices, and developing plans and programs
for dealing with energy production shortages.17 Furthermore,
quite specific authority for much of the information sought lies
in section 15 of the FEAA, which imposes on DOE the requirement to report annually in considerable detail on specified energy matters to Congress and the President. 8
Detailed information on the financial performance of all
U.S. based energy companies will be obtained from the energy
company financial report system (FRS) (DOE Form EIA-28),
authorized by section 13(b) of the FEAA and specifically mandated by section 205(h) of the Department of Energy Organization Act. 9 These provisions require, inter alia, that the FRS
yield information on energy company operations segregated
"by energy source and geographic area. ,30 Under this mandate,
DOE will collect data to compare foreign and domestic financial performance, sources and uses of cash, investments, relative performance, revenue, cost and profit differences, and investment in major foreign regions. Apart from specific international data, the FRS will yield a wide variety of detailed information in areas such as competition and energy supply and
development. This information could provide an important
complement to the other information systems discussed. Together they should soon provide a relatively comprehensive information base, especially if effectively linked with the IEA
system, for informed decisionmaking.
Administrator of the Energy Information Administration of DOE by virtue of section
205(c) of the Department of Energy Organization Act. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7,135(c)(Supp.
1977). The functions of the former Administrator of the FEA are now vested in the
Secretary of DOE by virtue of section 301(a) of this act. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7,151(a)(Supp.
1977).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 764(b)(1976).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 774 (1976).
29. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7,135(h)(Supp. 1977).
30. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7,135(h)(2)(C)(Supp. 1977).

Regulation of U.S. Oil Imports
ROBERT

D.R.

DE SUGNY*

INTRODUCTION

The importation of oil' into the United States is regulated
by the Department of Energy (DOE) through the Mandatory
Oil Import Program (MOIP). The MOIP was created in March
1959 by Presidential Proclamation 3279 and has undergone
substantial modifications in the intervening years.2 The purpose of the MOIP is to reduce the threat to the national security posed by the dependence by the U.S. on foreign sources of
oil, which are subject to the threat of interruption, and to foster
the development of domestic energy sources and refining capacity.'

Proclamation 3279 was issued pursuant to the authority
now embodied in section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of
1962, as amended by the Trade Act of 1974.1 Section 232(b)
provides that, upon an investigation and finding by the Secretary of the Treasury that a commodity is entering the country
"in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten
to impair the national security," the President "shall take such
action, and for such time, as he deems necessary to adjust the
imports of

. .

. [the] article and its derivatives so that . . .

imports [of the article] will not threaten to impair the national security." 5 Such an investigation and finding with re* Staff Attorney, Office of General Counsel, U.S. Department of Energy. B.A.
(Hons.), 1974, University of Maryland; J.D., 1977, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. In this article "oil" is defined to include crude oil and partially refined and
finished products, whether derived from crude oil, coal, or natural gas. Presidential
Proclamation 3279, as amended, encompasses all of these materials under the term
"crude oil, unfinished oils and finished products," each of which is further defined in
the Proclamation.
2. Pres. Proc. No. 3279, 3 C.F.R. 11 (1959-1963 Compilation), reprinted in 19
U.S.C. § 1862, at 542 (1976).
3. Id.
4. 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (1976) (corresponds to Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L.
No. 87-794, § 232, 76 Stat. 437, as amended by Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618,
§ 127(d), 88 Stat. 1993).
5. Id.§ 1862(b).
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spect to "petroleum and petroleum products" was made in
1959 and formed the basis for the quota/allocation system established by Presidential Proclamation 3279.6 In 1975, another
national security investigation was conducted and the findings
which resulted therefrom were incorporated with the prior findings in Presidential Proclamation 4341, which imposed the supplemental import fee."
SCOPE OF THE SECTION

232

AUTHORITY

Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act authorizes the
President to take "such action . . . as he deems necessary" to
adjust imports.' The authority was broadly construed by the
Supreme Court in FEA v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., which upheld
the President's authority to impose license fees.' Throughout
the decision, the Court cited with approval those portions of
the legislative history which would support the widest possible
interpretation of the President's authority, such as Senator

Millikin's statement that it included the authority "to take
whatever action he deems necessary to adjust imports . . .
[including use of] tariffs, quotas, import taxes or other methods of import restrictions."' Although the Court in Algonquin
did not explicitly address the question of the legality of the
previous quota system, it may be assumed to have been upheld, sub silentio, since the question presented was whether the
President's authority extended beyond the imposition of quantitative controls.
Although the authority to impose quotas under section 232
of the Trade Expansion Act is not susceptible to serious legal
6. Pres. Proc. No. 3279, supra note 2.
The Executive Branch has consistently taken the position that the continuing
validity of a national security investigation and finding provides a basis for subsequent
amendments to the original action without the necessity of additional investigations
being conducted. In this respect, numerous modifications to the original MOIP have
been implemented, including the substitution of a system of license fees for the
quota/allocation system in 1973, without conducting additional national security investigations. Pres. Proc. No. 4210, 11 C.F.R. 239 (1971-1975 Compilation). The Attorney General also concluded in a formal opinion issued in 1975 that, although permissible if desired, no additional national security investigation was legally required in
order for President Ford to impose supplemental fees on oil imports despite the
changes in world oil markets occurring after the OPEC oil embargo. 43 Op. Arr'y GEN.
3 (1975).
6.1 40 Fed. Reg. 3965 (1975).
7. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b) (1976).
8. FEA v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 561-71 (1975).
9. Id. at 564.
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question, a possible legal issue exists as to whether an auction
of the quota tickets, or some other form of allocation, is within
the authority of the President. However, any grant of executive
power carries an implicit authority to implement that power,
and a quota or other form of quantitative restriction cannot be
implemented without a concomitant mechanism for the distribution of the limited quantities which are allowed to be imported.' 0 Under the quota system established in 1959, the
mechanism chosen was an allocation to refiners and importers
based on amounts they historically imported; however, there is
nothing in the legislative history which would dictate such a
result or which would preclude some other distribution mechanism, such as an auction, from being adopted." Considering
that allocations based on historical volumes have several deleterious effects, including their inherent anticompetitive nature
and the enforcement difficulties they pose, there are excellent
policy reasons for the adoption of a distribution mechanism
other than an allocation system. As a consequence, an auction
of import rights would most likely be viewed as within the
realm of necessary action required to be exercised as part of the
authority conferred.
HISTORY OF THE MOIP
As previously noted, the MOIP was created in March 1959
by Proclamation 3279. It replaced a system of voluntary controls that had failed to prevent oil imports from increasing. At
that time, such imports were approximately half the price of
domestic crude oil." Initially, quota levels were established for
different products and regions of the country in accordance
with then current levels of imports. Allocations of crude oil
import licenses were granted to all refiners, regardless of
whether or not they actually imported crude oil." This system
ensured that the value of quota licenses was evenly distributed
and not received solely by coastal refiners, which would have
given them a large competitive advantage. Allocations of petroleum products, such as residual fuel oil, were granted to certain
classes of importers.
10. Id. at 559.
11. See generally 101 CONG. R&c. 5298 (1955) (remarks of Sen. Barkley); 101 CONG.
REc. 5588 (1955).
12. See generally Pres. Proc. No. 3279, supra note 2.
13. Inland refiners realized the value of the licenses by arranging exchanges of oil
with actual importers.
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The effectiveness of the quota in limiting imports ultimately proved to be its downfall. Reduced imports resulted in
greater demand for domestic production; however, once excess
capacity was utilized, additional demand induced inflationary
impacts.'" As a consequence, political pressure grew to alter the
system either to include additional persons seeking to share in
the growing monetary value of the import licenses or to increase
quota levels and thereby lower the indirect, and increasingly
controversial, subsidy to the domestic petroleum industry.
The controversy which quotas engendered led to the decision in April 1973 to issue Presidential Proclamation 4210,
which provided for the gradual replacement of quotas by a
system of licenses subject to fees which would be available to
all importers.' 5 The Proclamation established a fee of $0.21 per
barrel for crude oil and $0.63 per barrel for petroleum products.'" The difference between the two fees, $0.42, became the
effective per barrel level of protection for domestic refining
capacity. Newly constructed refining capacity also was granted
a five-year exemption from the fee on 75% of inputs, which
meant that such capacity would have a total level of protection
equaling $0.57 3 per barrel.' 7 Existing quota levels were continued in the form of fee-exempt licenses but were subject to being
decreased annually by a specified amount until their complete
elimination in 1980.1' However, the quota levels for certain
products (e.g., residual fuel oil. imported into the east coast)
had previously been set at such high levels that only a relatively small amount of such imports are currently subject to
the fee.' 9
In January 1975, President Ford imposed a supplemental
fee on all imports based on the failure of Congress to pass
legislation in response to the energy crisis in the aftermath
which followed the 1973-74 oil embargo. Presidential Proclamation 4341 provided for an initial supplemental fee of $1.00
per barrel, which was to be increased in $1.00 increments to a
maximum of $3.00 per barrel.20 The passage of the Energy Pol14. SPECIAL COMMITTEE To INVESTIGATE CRUDE OIL IMPORTS, REPORT (Mar. 6, 1959).

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Pres. Proc. No. 4210, 3 C.F.R. 239 (1971-1975 Compilation).
Id.at 243.
Id.at 245.
Id. at 248-49.
See Pres. Proc. No. 3389, 3 C.F.R. 108 (1959-1963 Compilation).
Pres. Proc. No. 4341, 3 C.F.R. 431, 433 (1971-1975 Compilation).
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icy and Conservation Act 2l in December of 1975 allowed the
President to rescind the supplemental fee in Presidential Proclamation 4412 at a time when it had only reached $2.00 per
barrel.2 2 Since that time, there have been no substantial modifications to the MOIP.
REGULATORY DEVELOPMENT

Part 213 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations
contains the regulations governing the MOIP. Under the regulations, fee-exempt licenses are annually allocated 21 within the
overall levels specified to applicants based on their inputs during a base period.2" The number of fee-exempt licenses for each
product is specified by geographical regions.2
The Proclamation and the regulations also preserve certain exemptions for "long term allocations" granted in the
1960's to provide incentives for the construction of petrochemical facilities in Puerto Rico 21 and the Virgin Islands. 2 Persons
holding long term allocations are not affected by the sliding
scale reducing fee-exempt imports, nor by any other provision
28
that could impair their rights.
Persons not qualifying for a fee-exempt allocation, or who
do not receive a sufficient allocation to cover the quantity of
oil that they currently import, must apply for licenses subject
to the $0.21 or $0.63 per barrel fee, as appropriate.2
Procedures for exceptions from Part 213 are contained in
Part 205, Subpart D. These provisions implement the authority
contained in section 5 of the Proclamation which provides that
exceptions may be granted on various grounds, including where
payment of the fees would represent an "exceptional hardship."'30 Appendix II of Subpart D contains guidelines given
particular consideration in the disposition of exception re21. Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 89 Stat. 871 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 42, 50 U.S.C.).
22. 41 Fed. Reg. 1037 (1976).
23. Oil Import Regulations, 10 C.F.R. § 213.3 (1978).
24. Id. at 213.9-11.
25. Id. at 213.12.
26. Pres. Proc. No. 3693, 3 C.F.R. 153 (1964-1965 Compilation).
27. Pres. Proc. No. 3820, 3 C.F.R. 165 (1967-1970 Compilation).
28. Pres. Proc. No. 3279(9) as amended by Pres. Proc. No. 4210, 3 C.F.R. 11 (19591963 Compilation), reprinted in 19 U.S.C. § 1862, at 546 (1976).
29. Pres. Proc. No. 3279(3)(a)(1) as currently amended by Pres. Proc. No. 4210,
sunra at 543.
30. 10 C.F.R. § 205.50 (1978).
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quests. The guidelines authorize exceptions where, for example, imposition of fees would lead to a result unintended by the
Proclamation or would seriously impair the operations of profitability of the applicant's business.3
CURRENT EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROGRAM

Since the adoption of the original program, the world oil
market and its relationship to the U.S. oil market have
changed fundamentally. The Arab oil embargo, the subsequent
several-fold increase in foreign oil prices, and the price controls
under the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973
(EPAA), as amended, 32 have completely altered the economic
positiors of persons affected by the MOI. When the license
fee program was initiated in 1973, world crude oil prices were
less than domestic prices and were expected to be roughly
aligned in the future. Those events resulted in an oil market
where a substantial portion of U.S. crude oil has been priced
at levels well below world market prices3 and arguably does not
require the additional protection afforded by the MOIP.
Although the protection offered by the MOIP is currently
overshadowed by the effects of domestic price controls, the
MOIP remains the only long term vehicle for encouraging the
construction of domestic refinery capacity and the protection
of crude oil production. Therefore, once these controls expire,
the MOIP will most likely play an increasingly important role
in the regulation of U.S. oil imports.
OTHER STATUTORY AUTHORITIES WHICH COULD BE UTILIZED

To

CONTROL OIL IMPORTS

There are several other statutory authorities under which
the President could conceivably take action to control oil imports. Section 456 of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act
(EPCA) provides that the President may implement a procedure by which "the United States may exercise the exclusive
right to import and purchase all or any part of crude oil . . .
and refined petroleum products of foreign origin for resale in
the United States. ' 4 Implementation of this authority requires
congressional approval as an Energy Action under section 551
31. Id. § 205.5, app. II.
32. Energy Petroleum Allocation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-56 (1976).
33. The value of lower-priced domestic crude oil is allocated to refiners under the
Domestic Crude Oil Allocation ("Entitlements") Program. See Mandatory Petroleum
Allocation Regulations, 10 C.F.R. § 211.67 (1978).
34. Energy Policy and Conservation Act § 456, 15 U.S.C. § 760b(a) (1976).
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of EPCA.31 Section 456 requires that the President buy and

sell without profit or loss, except for individual cases which
"result in progress toward a lower price for oil sold in international commerce.

'3

In addition, the President must find that

the use of such authority "is likely to reduce prices for imported
oils." 7 The range of action that the President could take to
limit imports under this provision is therefore quite narrow and
it has never been implemented.
Section 101 of the Defense Production Act, as amended,
provides that the President may "allocate materials . . .to

such extent as he shall deem necessary or appropriate to promote the national defense. 38 Aside from the fact that civilian
allocations must be based on historical supply patterns, there
are three major legal and practical obstacles to utilizing this
authority to control oil imports. First, "national defense" is
defined in the Act to mean military, atomic, or directly related
activity.39 It is a more difficult standard to meet than the broad
"national security" objectives which allow use of the Trade
Expansion Act authority. Second, the purpose of the Act is to
"allocate" supplies needed for national defense resulting from
shortages, not to create shortages by restricting imports.10 Finally, the authority may not be used "to control the general
distribution of any material in the civilian market" unless it is
a "scarce and critical material essential to the national defense" and defense requirements cannot otherwise be met."
Normal market conditions would not appear to meet this standard, although it would most likely be met during an oil embargo.
Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA), the President may declare a national emergency to
deal with any "unusual or extraordinary threat, which has its
source in whole or substantial part outside the United States,
to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the
United States."4 Upon the declaration of a national emer35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
(1970).
42.
(1978).

Energy Policy and Conservation Act § 551, 42 U.S.C. § 6421 (1976).
Energy Policy and Conservation Act § 456, supra note 34, at § 760b(c).
Id. at § 760b(d).
Defense Production Act of 1950 § 101, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2071(a)(2) (1970).
Defense Production Act of 1950 § 762(d), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2152(d) (1970).
See Defense Production Act of 1950 § 2, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2662 (1970).
Defense Production Act Amendments of 1953 § 3, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2071(b)
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C.A. supp. § 1701(a)

306

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 8:306

gency, IEEPA permits the President to "investigate, regulate,
direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent, or prohibit, any...
importation . . . of . . . any property in which any foreign
country or a national thereof has any interest."43 The President
is required "in every possible instance" to consult with Congress before exercising the authority and to submit a report to
Congress explaining his action." Although the emergency action is subject to several additional procedural requirements,
the only one that poses a serious constraint on the President's
authority is the right of Congress to terminate the emergency
by concurrent resolution at any time. 5 In the event of a national emergency, the authority contained in the IEEPA could,
therefore, be used in addition to the authority contained in the
Trade Expansion Act to control oil imports.

43. Id.§ 1702(a)(1)(B).
44. Id.§ 1703(a).
45. Id.§ 1706(b).

Defense Production Act Section 101(c)
PETER J. SCHAUMBERG*
INTRODUcTION

The authority of the Government to require priority performance of contracts and to allocate materials under the Defense Production Act of 1950 (DPA)' was, for many years, the
exclusive domain of national defense programs and regarded as
essential to assure timely procurement. As a result of the 197374 oil embargo, energy was elevated to a level of importance
comparable to national defense, and a need was recognized to
facilitate completion of energy programs and projects essential
to further this nation's energy independence.
In 1975, in an effort to stimulate the energy production and
development necessary to mitigate the effects of any future
embargo, Congress extended to energy programs authority previously available exclusively to national defense programs, that
is, the priority assistance provisions of the Defense Production
Act of 1950. The 1973-74 embargo underscored the need for
accelerated energy development, and since most energy projects could not avail themselves of the provisions of section
101(a) of the DPA, section 104 of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 (EPCA) added a new subsection (c) to DPA
section 101.2
DPA section 101(c) authorizes the President to require, in
certain circumstances, priority performance of contracts for
supplies of materials and equipment needed to maximize domestic energy supplies.3 The right to obtain a priority rating is
* Attorney, Office of General Counsel, U.S. Department of Energy. B.A., 1972,
Tulane University; J.D., 1975, George Washington University National Law Center.
1. Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2061-62, 2071-73, 2091-94,
2151-63, 2164-68 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
2. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2071(c)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
3. Id. DPA section 101(c) provides in part the following:
(ci Domestic energy supplies.
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the President
may, by rule or order, require the allocation of, or the priority performance under contracts or orders (other than contracts of employment)
relating to, supplies of materials and equipment in order to maximize
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available both to public and private energy programs or projects, and the Department of Energy (DOE) is designated to
play an essential role in distributing scarce materials and
equipment to deserving energy projects. However, for reasons
discussed in detail below, access to the provisions of section
101(c) have been limited, restricting DOE's role to directing
materials to essential energy programs and projects in order to
facilitate energy production and construction.
THE NEED FOR AN ADDITIONAL DPA SECTION

The terminology of the new subsection (c) is similar to that
of DPA section 101(a) enacted in 1950.1 In essence, if to do so
promotes the national defense, the President is authorized by
section 101(a) to direct a company to accept an order, and
further to mandate delivery ahead of all other nonrated commercial orders of the supplier. This authority has long been
recognized as an effective tool for assuring that defense-related
programs are not delayed by an inability to obtain deliveries
on schedule.
domestic energy supplies if he makes the findings required by paragraph
(3) of this subsection.
(3) The authority granted in this subsection may not be used to
require priority performance of contracts or orders, or to control the distribution of any supplies of materials and equipment in the marketplace,
unless the President finds that(A) such supplies are scarce, critical, and essential to maintain or
further (i) exploration, production, refining, transportation, or (ii)
the conservation of energy supplies, or (iii) for the construction and
maintenance of energy facilities; and
(B) maintenance or furtherance of exploration, production, refining, transportation, or conservation of energy supplies or the construction and maintenance of energy facilities cannot reasonably
be accomplished without exercising the authority specified in paragraph (1) of this subsection.
(4) During any period when the authority conferred by this subsection is being exercised, the President shall take such action as may be
appropriate to assure that such authority is being exercised in a manner
which assures the coordinated administration of such authority with any
priorities or allocations established under subsection (a) of this section
and in effect during the same period.
4. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2071(a) (1970) provides that:
The President is authorized (1) to require that performance under contracts or orders (other than contracts of employment) which he deems
necessary or appropriate to promote the nationaldefense shall take priority over performance under any other contract or order, and, for the
purpose of assuring such priority, to require acceptance and performance
of such contracts or orders in preference to other contracts or orders by
any person he finds to be capable of their performance, and (2) to allocate
materials and facilities in such manner, upon such conditions, and to
such extent as he shall deem necessary or appropriate to promote the
national defense. (Emphasis added.)
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The national defense requirement of section 101(a), however, limits its usefulness for energy programs. The term
"national defense" is defined in section 702(d) of the DPA as
"programs for military and atomic energy production or construction, military assistance to any foreign nation, stockpiling, space, and directly related activity." 5 This definition excludes from the scope of section 101(a) most energy programs
other than atomic energy programs, which often rely upon DPA
section 101(a) for procurement, although use of DPA section
101(a) authority was extended on a limited basis to the builders
of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System and presumably would be
available to an energy program which had a demonstrable national defense nexus.
The vast majority of energy projects, however, are not national defense-related, and the 1973-74 energy supply interruption underscored the need for expeditious development of energy resources, unhindered by nonenergy programs competing
for scarce energy development-related resources. Congress responded by enacting the new section 101(c), extending priorities assistance to energy programs, whether governmental or
nongovernmental, for purposes of materials and equipment
procurement.
PREREQUISITES TO THE USE OF SECTION

101(c)

Section 101(c) priorities are not available for all energy
projects. Congress legislated certain explicit prerequisites to
the availability of priorities for energy programs so as not to
interfere unduly with the national defense priorities under section 101(a). Since, for the first time, DPA section 101 priorities
are available to nongovernmental projects, DOE exercises a
critical control function in determining which energy programs
or projects are entitled to priorities assistance.
The President is authorized to exercise the authority to
require allocation of, or priority performance of contracts relating to, supplies of materials and equipment to maximize domestic energy supplies only if findings are made by the President that:
(A) such supplies are scarce, critical, and essential to maintain or further (i) exploration, production, refining, transportation, or (ii) the conservation of energy supplies, or (iii) for the
construction and maintenance of energy facilities; and
5. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2152(d) (1970).
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(B) maintenance or furtherance of exploration, production,
refining, transportation, or conservation of energy supplies or the
construction and maintenance of energy facilities cannot reasonably be accomplished without exercising the authority specificed
in [section 101(c)(1)].1

As a result of a series of delegations and redelegations of
the President's responsibilities in Executive Order 11,912, as
amended,7 the following must occur before a rating under DPA
section 101(c) may be authorized:
(1) DOE must determine that the proposed use of the authority will maximize domestic energy supplies.8
(2) DOE must find that the specific supplies in issue are
critical and essential' to maintain or further exploration, production, refining, transportation, or the conservation of energy supplies, or for the construction or maintenance of energy facilities.
(3) Thereafter, the Department of Commerce must find that:
(a)

such supplies are scarce; and

(b) maintenance or furtherance of the purposes described in two (2) above cannot reasonably be accomplished
without use of the DPA authority.

A "critical and essential" finding made by DOE will be
based primarily upon evidence that the required items are in
the "critical path" of the energy project. However, the scarcity
finding to be made by the Department of Commerce turns on
6. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2071(c)(3)(A) (Supp. V 1975).
7. Exec. Order No. 11,912, 41 Fed. Reg. 15,825 (1976), as amended by Exec. Order
No. 12,038, 43 Fed. Reg. 4,957 (1978).
8. Congress provided no guidance in the statute or the legislative history of EPCA
as to what was meant by the phrase "maximize domestic energy supplies." However,
the factors to be considered by DOE in determining whether a program or project
maximizes domestic energy supplies are listed in the DOE regulations, 43 Fed. Reg.
6,209, at 6,213 (1978) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. § 216.4), and include, but are not
limited to: (1) quantity of energy involved; (2) benefits of timely energy program
furtherance or project completion; (3) socioeconomic impact; (4) the need for the end
product for which the materials and equipment are allegedly required; and (5) established national energy policies.
9. The statute and legislation lists again provide no insight into what was meant
by the terms "critical" and "essential." The factors DOE will consider in determining
the critical and essential nature of needed materials and equipment are listed in the
DOE regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 6,209, at 6,213 (1978) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. §
216.4), and include, but are not limited to: (1) availability and utility of substitute
materials or equipment; (2) impact of the unavailability of the specific supplies of
materials and equipment on the furtherance or timely completion of the approved
energy program or project.
10. The only available guidance as to what factors the Department of Commerce
will consider in making the scarcity and need to use the system findings is in proposed
regulations 42 Fed. Reg. 43,038 (1977).
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different criteria: The applicant must be able to demonstrate
that there is a shortage of the necessary materials or equipment
and that attempts to obtain them in normal commercial channels, even at a premium price, were unsuccessful. This finding
is indispensable, since section 101(c) of the DPA cannot be
used merely to obtain a better price. As stated in section
101(c)(3)(B), there must be a need to use the DPA system in
order to accomplish the program's purpose, that is, no alternative means of satisfying current needs is available. Furthermore, it must be commercially possible for a contractor to provide the desired item within the time limits deemed necessary
by the applicant. A DPA priority obviously cannot shorten the
time physically needed to fabricate equipment.
USE OF SECTION 101(c)
Once the appropriate findings are made by DOE and the
Department of Commerce, the priority rating is issued. With
the rating, a purchaser may go to its supplier, and the order
must be placed ahead of other nonrated commercial orders
according to the terms of the priority rating. DOE regulations"
provide that use of the rating is governed by the same Department of Commerce regulations as a defense rating under section 101(a).12 Congress preferred to integrate the defense and
energy priorities systems, thereby avoiding parallel systems
with competing claims and competing justifications for distributing scarce resources. 3 If a defense and energy program are
competing for the same limited resources, the Commerce Department would act as arbiter and determine which program
is entitled to the highest priority.
Since the enactment of DPA section 101(c), DOE has received six applications for priorities assistance, 4 of which three
were withdrawn before an opportunity for full consideration
was given. Of the three applications processed, the U.S. Army
11. 43 Fed. Reg. 6,209, at 6,213-14 (1978) (to be codified in 10 C.F.R. § 216.5).
12. 32A C.F.R. pt. 621 (1977) of the Defense Management System Regulation 1
relates to priorities for certain controlled materials such as copper, brass, nickel, etc.
32A C.F.R. pt. 651 (1977) of the Defense Priorities System Regulation 1 relates to all
other priorities.
13. 121 CONG. REc. S5,364 (daily ed. April 7, 1975) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire).
50 U.S.C. app. § 2071(c)(4), supra note 4, requires that priorities and allocations under
subsection (a) be coordinated with those under subsection (c).
14. This includes applications received by the Federal Energy Administration,
which was responsible for DPA section 101(c) before DOE's organization in October
1977.

312

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 8:306

Corps of Engineers received priority authorization in two separate instances for circuit breakers for hydroelectric projects.
The third request was by a Federal government agency for a
priority to expedite delivery of a computer system needed for
quantitative analysis to support energy legislation. This application was rejected by DOE as legally insufficient in meeting
the tests required by DPA section 101(c) for maximization of
domestic energy supplies.
Although both sections 101(a) and (c) authorize the granting of priorities for essential needs, there are significant differences in the scope of the priorities which can be issued. Section
101(a), by its terms, could be utilized to obtain a priority on
any national defense-related contract, except contracts of employment, including, among other items: equipment, services,"
petroleum, gas, electric power, transportation, as well as contracts for materials and facilities.
Section 101(c) was intended to be more restrictive in its
scope. In addition to the prerequisites discussed above that the
needed items must be scarce, critical, and essential to production, conservation, construction, etc., section 101(c) is limited
by its terms to "materials and equipment,"' 6 which would include such items as pumps, valves, hardware, pipe, etc.' 7 It
would appear that items such as transportation, facilities, and
electric power are beyond the scope of section 101(c).'1
The availability of section 101(c) for energy programs outside of the United States is limited both by the terms of the
statute and the regulations. Priorities only are available to
maximize "domestic" energy supplies.'" In addition, DPS Regulation 1, section 23(a), restricts the scope of the DPA by pro15. Basic Rules of the Defense Priorities System (DPS Reg. 1), 32A C.F.R. pt. 651,
§ 13 (1977).
16. "Materials" are defined in section 702(b) of the DPA, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2152(b)
(1970), as including "raw materials, articles, commodities, products, supplies, components, technical information, and processes."
17. A question exists as to whether a priority could be obtained under section
101(c) for certain "services." Section 101(c) also does not specifically mention services,
although the Department of Commerce has read services into that section. See 32A
C.F.R. pt. 621, § 13 (1977).
18. 43 Fed. Reg. 6,209, at 6,210 (1978). The exclusion of energy sources from
section 101(c) priorities is reasonable since, if these items were covered, the Department of Commerce would have the authority to allocate energy, and conflicts could
arise between DOE allocation regulations promulgated pursuant to authorities other
than the DPA and the DPA directives issued by the Department of Commerce.
19. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2071(c)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
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viding that: "All regulations and orders of BDC [Bureau of
Domestic Commerce], unless specifically stated otherwise in
such regulations and orders, shall apply to transactions in any
state, territory, or possession of the United States and the Dis''
trict of Columbia. 2
These restrictions seemingly would not prevent a domestic
firm from seeking priorities assistance for materials to construct a facility on foreign territory so long as the ultimate
benefit is to maximize United States energy supplies.
CONCLUSION

The effectiveness of DOE in directing scarce materials to
essential energy projects is, of course, limited by the number
of applications for priorities assistance. As noted above, since
the enactment of the EPCA in December 1975, DOE has received fewer than ten applications for priorities assistance
under DPA section 101(c). Perhaps this is a result of there
being no shortages of materials and equipment needed for energy programs. It is also possible, however, that the extensive
applications, requirements, and findings have discouraged potential applicants from resorting to priorities assistance under
DPA section 101(c).
It would be more likely, however, that a lack of general
familiarity by the energy industry with DPA section 101(c) has
resulted in its limited use: priorities assistance always had
been the exclusive domain of the defense industry, with recipients of Government defense contracts being the primary beneficiaries. However, given the recent emphasis on energy development and the resourcefulness of private industry, requests
for priority assistance may begin to proliferate, expanding
DOE's role in allocating scarce resources to essential energy
programs.
20. 32A C.F.R. pt. 651, § 23(a) (1977).

Crude Oil Price Controls: Their Purpose and
Impact*
JOHN KRAFT**
MARK RODEKOHR***
I.

INTRODUCTION

Crude oil price controls are a part of the great body of
federal and state regulations which govern the activities of the
petroleum industry. Price controls are a rather recent addition
to four decades of petroleum industry regulations, which generally have fit into one of the following classifications: market
demand prorationing plans, oil import quotas, allocation programs, and price controls. The market demand prorationing
plan and oil import programs were designed to raise crude oil
prices above their competitive levels, thus stabilizing prices
and transferring funds from consumers to producers. Crude oil
and product price regulations have the opposite effect; i.e.,
they are designed to keep prices below world levels and transfer
income from producers to consumers.
The current regulations prevent owners of lower cost oil
with fixed production costs from seeking the world price of
crude oil as established by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Under this scheme, controls prevent crude oil and petroleum product prices from reflecting the
OPEC price of crude. This lower-than-market domestic price
of petroleum encourages demand, reduces domestic production, and increases imports of foreign crude as the marginal
source of supply to satisfy domestic demand, and thus increases the United States' dependence on an uncertain supply
of crude oil. The evidence suggests that these regulations, coupled with environmental restrictions, create a negative impact
on the supply of petroleum in the United States.' Prorationing
plans have diverted investment toward development drilling,
The views expressed herein are those the authors and should not be taken as
representing the views of either of their employers.
* * Program Manager for Public Policy and Regulation, National Science Foundation. B.S., 1966, St. Bonaventure University; M.A., 1970, University of Pittsburgh;
Ph.D., 1971, University of Pittsburgh.
* ** Economist, U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration.
B.S., 1970, University of Delaware; M.A., 1972, University of Colorado; Ph.D., 1974,
University of Colorado.
1. See, e.g., D. Born & M. RUSSEL, U.S. ENERGY PoLicy 4 (1975).
*
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away from exploration in highly risky but potentially more
productive petroleum regions or basins. Together, prorationing
and import controls have discouraged necessary investment in
domestic refining capacity. Prorationing, by restricting production, has limited the refiners' sources of domestic feedstocks, and import limitations have restricted the refiners' ability to substitute foreign for domestic feedstocks. Likewise, import quotas have reduced competition and efficiency in domestic production, since import quotas are set so that they cannot
replace domestic production, a situation which has allowed
U.S. producers to exercise effective monopoly power through
complete control of both domestic and foreign supplies. Without an import quota, the ability of prorationing to restrict output and allow crude oil prices to rise above their competitive
levels would be neutralized by the substitution of imported
crude for domestic production.
Price controls on petroleum tend to weaken any incentive
by the industry to respond to increased demand for products.
Regulated natural gas markets have discouraged producers
from exploring for new fields in the face of declining gas reserves. Since natural gas and petroleum are joint products,
price controls on both have contributed to their declining reserve positions.
Under any energy program, the average price of domestic
crude oil is regulated to be lower than the price of imported
crude oil, and as such, the average refiner acquisition cost for
domestic crude oil is considerably below that of imported
crude. Under each of the Nixon, Ford, and Carter energy programs, phased decontrol of domestic crude oil prices has been
deemed preferable to immediate decontrol. Since the domestic
production of crude oil is no longer sufficient to meet domestic
demand, the marginal barrel of crude oil needed to satisfy this
increased demand must come from foreign sources.
From the standpoint of market efficiency, regulations are
usually considered harmful in that they reduce production,
distort market mechanisms, and fail to account for the interaction of supply and demand. For equity reasons, however, regulations are often necessary to protect consumers, assign costs
to externalities, and preserve national security. This paper will
discuss the efficiency aspects of crude oil regulations and their
consequent impacts on price, domestic production, market distortions, and imports. The study will be divided into three
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parts: Pre-Embargo Controls, Post-Embargo Controls, and an
Economic Analysis of Controls.
II.

PRE-EMBARGO CONTROLS
demonstrated by MacAvoy 2 and Mead,3

As
the crude oil
segment of the petroleum industry has been subject to government regulation since the 1930's, though the purpose of the
regulations has changed dramatically over the years. Current
regulations are designed to restrain prices and transfer industry
rents4 from the producers of crude oil to the consumers of petroleum products. On the other hand, the earliest regulations
transferred funds from the consumers to the producers by restricting supply and thereby stabilizing prices at higher than
open market levels.
A. Domestic ProrationingSchemes
In the 1930's, the major petroleum-producing states joined
together to develop a system of prorationing under which any
given producer was allowed to produce only a percentage of the
maximum efficient rate of recovery from a given reservoir.' In
1935 the major producing states executed the Interstate Oil
Compact to Conserve Oil and Gas. The prorationing plans
encouraged in the compact were designed to prevent overinvestment in oil wells and overproduction from any given reservoir, with state agencies setting the allowable rates of production. Many states have continued to employ alternative forms
of these maximum efficient recovery (MER) plans over the last
four decades, and while no single plan has ever worked flawlessly, MER's have helped to limit the wasteful production and
wild price fluctuations which characterized the early 1930's.
Obviously, the prorationing plans fixed prices and eliminated competition among producers. If permissible production
rates were established at too low a level, refiners would com2. FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION REGULATION (P. MacAvoy ed. 1977)
[hereinafter cited as MacAvoy].
3. W. Mead, Petroleum: An Unregulated Industry? ENERGY SUPPLY AND GovERNMRNT POLICY 130-160 (R. Kalter & W. Vogely eds. 1976) [hereinafter cited as
Mead].
4. Rents may be defined as unrealized gains to the owner of a scarce commodity
which is fixed in quantity, whose market value has increased since the owner's procurement.
5. There have been a number of different prorationing plans. The rationale behind
each type is explained in Mead, supra note 3, at 132-48.
6. The U.S. Congress by joint resolution gave its consent to the compact. See J.
Res. of Aug. 27, 1935, Ch. 781, 49 Stat. 939 (1935).
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plain that they were unable to obtain crude at the current
price; the state agency would then either increase the production percentages or raise the price of crude. Production in excess of state-established limits for interstate shipment was prohibited by the Connally Hot Oil Act of 1935.1 This state of
affairs was not changed notably by peacetime legislation for
the next twenty-five years.
B. Oil Import Controls
When low cost foreign crude oil threatened prorationing
plans, and thereby the price of domestic crude oil, the President (at the urging of congressmen whose districts were being
affected) established the Mandatory Oil Import Program
(MOIP) of 1959.8 This program set volumetric limits on the
amount of crude oil and related products which could be imported. While the regulations and operation of MOIP underwent several changes, the effect was to insulate the price of
domestic crude oil from lower world prices. Under this program
the quantities of imported oil were rigidly fixed, and the marginal barrel of crude oil necessary to satisfy domestic demand
was supplied from domestic petroleum sources.
Declining domestic production of crude oil since 1970, coupled with increased demand, has caused the allowable rate of
production under the MER plans to be fixed at 100% by the
appropriate state commissions. With full production now permitted, there no longer exists any excess production capacity
in the domestic petroleum industry; producers may now provide as much as is profitable to satisfy domestic demand.
Effective May 1, 1973, President Nixon eliminated
MOIP's volumetric limits on oil imports.' The removal of the
quota system exposed a severe shortage of domestic refinery
capacity. Refineries which would have been constructed in the
United States were built abroad instead, since the quota system had restricted entry into the United States of foreign crude
7. 15 U.S.C. § 715 (1976).
8. Pres. Proc. No. 3279, 3 C.F.R. 11 (1959-1963 Compilation), reprinted in 19
U.S.C. § 1862 (1976), and in 73 Stat. c25 (1959). For a detailed account of the history
and politics of the mandatory oil import program from 1959-1973, see Mead, supra
note 3, at 148-54.
9. Pres. Proc. No. 4210, 3 C.F.R. 239 (1971-1975 Compilation), reprinted in 87
Stat. 1187 (1973). License fees, however, continued to be charged on imported oil: $0.21
per barrel of crude, and $0.63 per barrel of product.
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oil supplies. In 1973 domestic U.S. refiners were operating at
almost 100% of capacity.
C. Price Controls
The United States' first major peacetime experience with
petroleum price controls occurred with the Nixon Administration's announcement of a ninety-day wage-price freeze (Phase
One) on August 15, 1971.10 The current crude oil price regulations of the Department of Energy are an extension of the regulations originally promulgated under Phase One. While the
program affected petroleum products as well as crude petroleum, the discussion here will focus only on crude oil aspects
of price controls.
Prior to the summer of 1971, there had been gasoline price
wars among the major brand gasoline dealers. Markets, however, stabilized prior to the establishment of controls, and at
the initiation of the price freeze, gasoline prices charged by oil
company retail outlets were at normal or near-normal levels.
The integrated petroleum companies enjoyed some flexibility
under the freeze. Traditionally, major petroleum companies
had provided bulk purchasers of gasoline and refined products
with discounts below the posted prices. As the discount contracts expired, the suppliers refused to renew them at the discounted level and insisted on selling their petroleum only at the
full posted price. Thus, despite the freeze, these companies in
effect were able to raise their prices. This practice placed a
squeeze on the profits of independent marketers whose products were subject to the freeze but whose inputs were now
purchased at nondiscounted prices. These price distortions
continued into the second stage of the Nixon wage-price program.
Phase Two lasted from November 15, 1971 to January 11,
1973. " Ceiling prices which had been set during the Phase One
freeze became base prices for Phase Two. Under Term Limit
Pricing (TLP) arrangements, companies were allowed to increase prices of their products for a specified period of time,
10. Exec. Order No. 11,615, 3 C.F.R. 602 (1971-1975 Compilation), 12 U.S.C. §
1904 n (1976). A detailed account of the regulations and the impact of controls during
the Nixon Administration's Economic Stabilization Program is presented in W. Johnson, The Impact of Price Controls on the Oil Industry: How to Worsen an Energy
Crisis, in ENERGY: THE POLICY ISSUES 100-109 (G. Eppen ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited
as Johnson].
11. The first announcement of a change in the structure of controls came in Exec.
Order 11,627, 3 C.F.R. 621 (1971-1975 Compilation).
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provided the weighted-average price increases were consistent
with specific cost passthrough and profit margin rules set by
the newly established Price Commission. Companies were allowed to spread price increases in any manner across products
subject to TLP, but were severely limited in adjusting relative
prices for products excluded from TLP arrangements. In the
petroleum industry, three-fourths of the refinery yield was excluded. For example, crude oil prices were excluded from TLP
agreements if the crude was resold by refineries, while first-sale
prices of crude oil were included in TLP arrangements.
During 1972 and continuing into 1973, shortages of crude
oil and some refined products began to appear. For example,
the controls prohibited price increases on gasoline and number
two home heating oil above their August 1971 price levels.
However, during the summer months, gasoline prices were at
relatively high levels compared to heating oil prices. Since the
refiners believed that heating oil prices would not be allowed
to follow their seasonal pattern and rise during the winter, they
had no incentive to increase their output of heating oil when
the winter months arrived, and shortages began to occur.
Phase Three 2 was the government's response to these and
similar problems; it was to have provided industry with greater
flexibility in conducting business, within fixed price guidelines.
Business was to comply on a voluntary basis with standards for
cost increases contained in the Phase Three regulations; the
Price Commission was abolished and the Cost of Living Council was called upon to monitor compliance with the new standards. As Phase Three began, the combined factors of pent-up
demand pressure for petroleum products, decreasing domestic
crude production, and a worldwide shortage of crude oil resulted in sharp increases in the price of crude oil and products.
On March 8, 1973, however, the Cost of Living Council issued
Special Rule Number One, 3 which reimposed mandatory controls on the twenty-three major companies in the petroleum
industry,' and produced an unfortunate set of incentives which
contributed to the shortage of crude in the United States. First,
the rule restricted the ability of the majors to raise prices above
12. See Exec. Order No. 11,695, 3 C.F.R. 741 (1971-1975 Compilation).
13. 38 Fed. Reg. 6284 (1973).
14. These companies had individual sales in excess of $230 million, and in the
aggregate conducted 45% of the industry's sales.
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specified percentages, and prohibited them from increasing
prices if their profits were over specific base period profit margin levels. Since the largest companies owned and operated
profitable holdings, their profits exceeded the base period levels, and thus they were prohibited from passing on higher foreign crude oil costs to their customers. At the same time the
rule enabled smaller refiners to bid up the price of crude oil.
Since the higher price of foreign crude could not be passed on
by the majors, the smaller refineries succeeded in diverting
crude from the majors. A second negative byproduct of Special
Rule Number One arose from the fact that the major U.S.
producers with foreign operations faced a reduction in profits
on refined products if the crude was sold in the United States
and they were at the profit margin constraint. By selling this
crude oil abroad rather than shipping it to the United States,
the majors were able to maximize profits, since foreign sales
were unaffected by the Phase Three rules. This circumstance
further aggravated the shortage of crude oil in the United
States and placed more pressure on crude oil prices, exacerbating crude shortages to domestic refiners. A crude oil allocation
program eventually was enacted 5 to alleviate the crude shortages created by Special Rule Number One.
Phase 31/2 froze all petroleum prices from June 13, 1973
to August 12, 1973.16 During this period even the increased
prices of imported crude oil could not be passed through to
consumers in the form of higher product prices. Since imported
crude oil prices were rising, this rule effectively stopped all
crude purchases by refiners and eventually produced severe
petroleum product shortages in the fall of 1973.
Phase Four took effect on August 13, 1973, and continued
until December 1973 when all petroleum price controls were
transferred to the Federal Energy Office from the Cost of Living Council. 7 The new regulations benefited immensely from
the failings of Phases Two and Three, with their reliance on
controlling only the major companies: now the pricing of petro15. Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973 (EPAA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 751760h (1976), discussed infra.
16. Announced by President Nixon in Exec. Order No. 11,723, 3 C.F.R. 774 (19711975 Compilation).
17. Phase Four regulations were originally set forth in 38 Fed. Reg. 19,462-86
(1973) (proposed), and amended in 38 Fed. Reg. 21,592-613 (1973). Provisions relevant
to crude oil appear at 38 Fed. Reg. 19,481-83 (1973).
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leum and its products by all parts of the industry would be
covered. A two-tiered pricing system was established which
differentiated between controlled "old" oil and uncontrolled
"new" oil. While designed to stabilize the price of crude produced from existing properties, it also provided an incentive to
producers to seek out higher cost production from new properties, or to use enhanced recovery techniques to increase production from existing properties. 8 "Old" oil was defined as oil
produced from a given property in an amount equal to or less
than the amount produced in the same month of 1972 by that
property. It was subject to price controls fixed at the May 15,
1973 price of crude oil from the given field, plus thirty-five
cents per barrel. The lower tier thus had the effect of preventing the industry from accruing rents on existing properties.
Uncontrolled "new" oil was defined as production from new
wells on properties not operative in 1972, or production from
1972 properties in excess of 1972 production levels. "Stripper"
oil, from wells producing less than ten barrels per day, was not
subject to controls. In addition, for each new barrel of crude oil
produced on an existing property, a barrel of old oil would be
released from lower tier controls. This "released" oil was free
of controls and was used as an inducement for producers to
increase production above 1972 levels on existing properties.
New and released oil were free to seek the uncontrolled import
price level. Thus, the two-tiered system was designed to increase domestic crude oil production by raising the crude oil
price at the margin for each new barrel of oil, while allowing
the average price for new and old oil to determine refinery
product prices.
Although the two-tiered system did encourage new exploration and development, it created problems for refineries.
Since each refiner did not have access to the same proportions
of controlled and uncontrolled crude oil, the system produced
significant differentials between refiners in ultimate product
prices. Retail gasoline prices in the same city often differed by
as much as twelve cents per gallon." The self-sufficient refinery
purchaser had to charge oil into the refinery at the controlled
18. Enhanced recovery techniques are methods of recovering additional energy
from a reservoir by fluid or chemical injections. The oil generated by fluid injections
is called "secondary" oil, while the result of chemical injections is called "tertiary" oil.
19. Johnson, supra note 10, at 110.
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price, and the low controlled prices then had to be carried
through into low product prices. This procedure placed the
uncontrolled crude purchaser at a disadvantage in the product
market, since higher price crude imports were charged into the
refinery at the higher import price and yielded higher priced
refined products. The two-tiered system thus discouraged investment in expansion of refinery capacity.
III. POST-EMBARGO CONTROLS
The Yom Kippur War of October 1973 resulted in an embargo on the sale of crude oil to the United States by the OPEC
nations. With the threat of a severe shortage of crude oil supplies, the stage was set for implementation of a crude oil allocation procedure designed to avert the harshest effects to consumers of the impending crude shortage.
A. Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act
The Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act (EPAA) became
effective on November 27, 1973 and provided for the mandatory
and equitable allocation of crude oil among the nation's refiners on a quarterly basis. 20 Under a buy/sell agreement, refiners
having a higher percentage of crude oil supplies than the national average (in relation to their refining capacity) were required to resell their crude to refineries with below normal
crude availability. Under the allocation scheme, the Federal
Energy Office (FEO) took over administration of the EPAA
from the Cost of Living Council in December 1973. The effect
of the EPAA was to penalize those companies with preestablished crude supplies and to weaken the market function by
2
placing FEO in control of crude allocation. '
During the period of the embargo (October 1973 through
April 1974), the regulations established under the EPAA remained unchanged. With the end of the embargo in the spring
of 1974, legislation was signed establishing the Federal Energy
Administration (FEA),2 which was given authority to administer the regulations established and formerly administered by
FEO. The only major changes made in the regulations by FEA
in the remainder of 1974 were modifications of the buy/sell
program and creation of a crude oil entitlements program. The
20.
21.
voked),
22.

15 U.S.C. §§ 751-760h (1976).
See Mandatory Allocation Regulations amending 10 C.F.R. §§ 200-202 (re205 (added), 210-212 (added), reprinted in 39 Fed. Reg. 1924-1961 (1974).
Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. §§ 761-787 (1976).
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original buy/sell program had caused two major problems: (1)
the requirement of crude oil sharing among majors had forced
needless transfers of supplies between majors experiencing
mere short term imbalances, increasing unnecessary bureaucratic costs; and (2) disincentives to purchase imported crude
oil, as discussed above. The buy/sell program was modified
on May 14, 1974, to limit the sellers of crude oil to the fifteen
largest refiners, and the buyers to the smaller refiners.2 Some
imported oil disincentives were also addressed.
B. Entitlements Program
In November 1974 the EPAA was supplemented by a
crude oil entitlements program designed to equalize crude oil
costs varying among refiners as a result of the two-tiered price
control system.24 Under the program, refiners having crude oil
in excess of the national average were required to purchase
entitlements from refiners having less than the national average. The purpose of the program was to correct inequities created by the earlier price control and allocation procedures; one
intended effect was the creation of a bias favoring smaller refiners. Large OPEC price increases in late 1973 had produced a
tremendous gap between upper and lower tier oil prices. Depending on the mix of old, new, and imported oil available to
the refineries, the average price of imports available had continued to vary considerably. Refineries with more old oil than
the national average were forced to purchase entitlements in
order to use their excess lower tier oil, while those having less
than the average low-cost crude could sell their entitlements.
Small refiners were given additional entitlements as a subsidy
to help them compete with the majors; these entitlements either could be sold or used to acquire crude oil at a cost below
the majors' acquisition cost.2 The small refiner bias effectively
raised the cost of crude oil to large refiners, whose costs were
obviously key determinants of the final price of refined products. In addition, the bias encouraged the use of smaller, less
efficient refineries.
23. Amendments to 10 C.F.R. §§ 211.61-211.68, 211.71, 212.88 (revoked), 212.94
reprinted in 39 Fed. Reg. 17,288-93 (1974).
24. Amendments to 10 C.F.R. §§ 211.66, 211.67, 212.131, reprintedin 39 Fed. Reg.
42,246-50 (1974).

25. See generally MacAvoy, supra note 2, at 12.
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C. The Energy Policy and Conservation Act and the Energy
Conservation and ProductionAct
Current crude oil controls operate under laws passed in
December 1975 and August 1976. The Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) of 1975 provided for the phasing-out of
price regulations on crude oil over a forty-month time period.26
The plan established a fixed national average price for all crude
oil, which the Federal Energy Administration was given power
to adjust by up to 10% per year. Initially, the average price was
set at $7.66 per barrel, which was the share-weighted average
price of old oil at $5.25 per barrel and upper tier oil at $11.28
per barrel. The upper tier included new oil, released oil, and
stripper oil; a third tier not included in the composite existed
for uncontrolled imported oil, which sold for approximately
$13.25 per barrel. Following passage of EPCA, revisions were
made in existing crude regulations to conform to EPCA, including elimination of the released oil category and introduction of a mechanism whereby the base period production level
for a given field was placed on a declining basis to correspond
with the historical decline rate for each field.Y In addition, the
lease definition was modified to treat new reservoirs developed
on old leases as new property, thereby making them available
for upper tier rather than lower tier prices."8
The Energy Conservation and Production Act (ECPA) of
1976, modified EPCA by exempting stripper oil from upper tier
controls.2 9 However, stripper oil supplies were still to be included in the calculation of the upper tier price, which prevented the exemption of stripper oil from having an effect on
the share-weighted average price of crude oil remaining controlled. Tertiary oil supplies were exempted from controls and
allowed to sell at the world oil price, but were not included in
the average price.
Current crude oil controls focus on elimination of rents to
owners of lower cost old petroleum, unlike the rules in the preembargo period, which were aimed at holding down prices and
26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6422 (1976).
27. FEA began assuming a decline rate of 8% as an average for all fields, based
on analysis of a number of sites.
28. Amendments to 10 C.F.R. §§ 212.72, 212.75, reprintedin 41 Fed. Reg. 36,17285 (1976).
29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6892 (1976).
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forcing producers and refiners to absorb increasing costs. The
current control system prevents domestic crude oil from reflecting the OPEC price of crude oil. However, any intended
benefits of the program are not without costs to the industry
and the taxpayer. 0 For the industry there are compliance and
administrative costs, interference with distribution patterns,
and uncertainty as to the direction of future regulation. The
taxpayers bear the costs of increased regulation via higher
prices and reduced efficiency. The various programs discourage
refinery expansion, continue to be biased in favor of less than
optimal refinery utilization, and cause higher marketing costs.
The present controls program is exceedingly complex and difficult to enforce.' Summary comments from other studies illustrate these points.
MacAvoy concluded that the costs of today's crude oil regulations outweigh their benefits: current market conditions
show adequate world supplies of crude and do not warrant
continuation of product pricing and allocation regulations. He
estimated that the petroleum industry pays reporting and
administrative costs for compliance as high as $570 million
annually, while the administrative costs of the program maintained by FEA could be costing the taxpayers $47 million per
year.32 In addition, controls could produce longrun inefficiencies by encouraging refineries of less than optimal size (small
refiner bias), and inefficiency in the distribution of products.
In analyzing the effects of crude oil controls, Cox and
Wright reached similar conclusions. While they found that the
entitlements program did equalize refiner crude costs, it had
the additional effect of artificially reducing the market price of
products and increasing product demand in the absence of an
appropriate supply response. Further, the EPAA and EPCA
policies increased United States dependence on foreign
sources, since the entitlements program provided a subsidy to
imported crude oil. 33
30. For a detailed discussion of the costs to industry and taxpayers of compliance
and enforcement of petroleum regulations, see MacAvoy, supra note 2, at 39-89.
31. For a discussion of procedural problems with the current regulatory program,
see MacAvoy, supra note 2, at 91-138.
32. Id,at 143.
33. Cox & Wright, The Effects of Crude Oil Price Controls, Entitlements and
Taxes on Refined Product Prices and Energy Independence, 54 LAND ECON. 1-15 (Feb.
1978).
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Morici's analysis concluded that the benefits of price regulations to petroleum consumers and refiners were outweighed
by the costs to crude oil producers and the loss of efficiency in
production.3 The cost of transferring windfall profits from
crude producers to product consumers and refiners yields a
negative net welfare gain. Consumers obviously benefit from
lower product prices and higher consumption levels as long as
refineries pass on their lower crude costs, which have not been
fully dissipated by higher refinery costs. However, Morici concluded that this regulated system has the effect of subsidizing
crude oil imports and reallocating domestic resources to less
efficient users.
IV. AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CONTROLS
This analysis first will employ a simple static supply and
demand model to examine the impact of EPCA-type price controls on consumers, producers, and the international oil markets. Assuming that oil supplies are not perfectly inelastic,"
which is consistent with both theoretical analysis and empirical work, Figure One illustrates the impacts of EPCA-type
price controls on oil demand and supply."
Figure 1
Static Representation of Crude Oil
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In the case of producers subject to price controls, the upper
tier price will equal the marginal cost of production, a figure
normally used 'by producers to compute the profit-maximizing
production rate. Given a positively sloped supply curve, production will be lower under price controls than in the absence
of price controls. This production loss equals B minus A on the
supply function. However, the dynamic solution discussed in
the next section may yield far different results.
Because of the exclusion of enhanced recovery techniques
in the EPCA, the upper tier price controls are more likely to
retard exploration and development of new oil properties than
they are to deter investment in enhanced recovery. The new
regulations regarding stripper well pricing may induce some
suppliers with relatively low producing properties to retard production for a period of time in order to receive stripper well
classification and therefore maximize profits in the long run.
These types of exceptions in the current regulations tend to
alter the simple static analysis presented supra; they are, however, relatively small when compared to overall production
magnitudes.
The impact on oil demand is straightforward when using
the static model illustrated in Figure One. Since consumers
base their consumption decisions on the average oil price, their
oil demand will be greater than the level implied by the world
oil price. In this figure, demand increases by the amount B'
minus A'. However, there is an additional impact on the demand curve caused by the crude oil price regulations, which
alter the shape of the demand curve, making it relatively more
inelastic above the average price than would be the case otherwise. This is due to the fact that if world oil prices increase by
1%for example, the average price to the consumer increases by
somewhat less than 1%, because of the weighting of domestic
and imported oil. Therefore, the demand curve becomes relatively more inelastic above the average price than the simple
static model would suggest. To summarize in hard figures, the
current EPCA price controls impose a wealth transfer from
producers to consumers which Montgomery estimates will
amount to approximately $2 billion by 1985.11
that controls have reduced total, average, and marginal crude oil costs, and therefore,
product prices.
37. W. D. Montgomery, The Transition to Uncontrolled Crude Oil Prices (unpub-
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Price controls also have a diversified effect on the international oil market. The effect on imports is the sum of the production supply effect and demand response of (B-A) + (B'-A')
in Figure One, which translates into a direct additional demand for OPEC oil. This is further illustrated in Figure Two,
where the demand for OPEC oil is shown with and without
price controls (curves A and B, respectively). As already demonstrated, price controls tend to make the demand curve for oil
more inelastic above the average price, as shown by curve A in
Figure Two. This effect is also relevant when examining the
supply curve for OPEC oil, where a 1%change in the world oil
price will cause less than a 1% change in the average price
facing customers. This effect would clearly impact the profit
maximizing price that OPEC would set; however, the static
model will not indicate in what direction OPEC would adjust
its prices to maximize profits.
Figure 2
The Demand for OPEC Oil
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lished paper presented at the National Bureau of Economic Research, Conference on
Public Regulation, Washington, D.C., Dec. 11, 1977).
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Another possible international consequence of price controls is that they might tend to create demand competition
among the oil-consuming nations, causing more rapid depletion of the world's supply of crude. Since price controls in the
United States tend to increase imports, OPEC must deplete its
resources faster than it might otherwise, in order to meet this
demand.3 This action would effectively leave less oil available
to other consuming countries in later years, which might create
an incentive for them to impose their own price controls in
competition with the United States in order to maintain their
share of consumption. The result, other factors remaining constant, would be a more rapid depletion of reserves.
For any finite resource the timing of extraction is critical
to the producer, since it represents one of the most important
variables in the profit maximization calculation. Therefore, a
dynamic analysis model must focus on the timing of extraction
and on price expectations. To the present, there have been no
theoretical analyses of the behavior of the petroleum industry
under imposed price paths, particularly when these paths are
highly uncertain. A few possible solutions to the dynamic problem can be suggested, but these should not be construed as
definitive or exhaustive of the possibilities.
If the controlled price is held constant in real terms, assuming prices are known with certainty, initial production
would be lower than could be expected absent controls. However, total production continues to increase over time, as depicted in Figure Three by the areas under triangles OAA' and
OBB'. We assume that the areas under both production curves
OAA' and OBB' are equal, implying identical total reserves
under either production curve. However, it is highly likely that
total reserves would be lower in the controlled price situation,
since the level of recoverable reserves is also a direct function
of price. Therefore, the most likely case is that curve OCC'
would be the more accurate representation of production in the
absence of price controls.
Montgomery has shown also that if controlled prices are
38. This assumes that OPEC has excess supply production capacity, which is
presently the case. However, if this capacity disappears, the excess demand would
serve to raise the world oil price for all consuming nations. At that point the U.S.
effectively would be paying for its price controls through foreign exchange differentials
and other macroeconomic occurrences.
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increasing so that the difference between the world price and
controlled prices is greater than the real rate of interest, resources will be depleted sooner than under the controlled situation, as shown in the second chart of Figure Three. " Again, it
is reasonable to assume that the total level of reserves is a
function of the level of the controlled price. Since the controlled
price remains below the market price, the dotted line EE'
would be the most likely solution if price controls were lifted.
It is important to note that FF' could well lie below the market
price solution in most years since this line is determined by the
price/recoverable reserve relationship. Thus, the final solution
to the dynamic problem is even more uncertain.
Figure 341
A Dynamic Representation of
Oil Production
Production Paths When Market and Controlled Prices are
Constant
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39. Montgomery, note 37 supra.
40. Taken from id., with the exception of the dotted lines depicting the impact of
price on available reserves.

332

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 8:315

Figure 3, Cont'd
Production Paths With Rising Market Prices
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Since the life of a particular field usually runs between
twenty and thirty years, price expectations are crucial in determining the extraction rate. In the previous analysis, it was
assumed that these price paths were known with certainty.
However, one of the major impacts of price controls, especially
in recent years, has been to add uncertainty to the determination of the controlled price. The regulations outlined earlier
have changed dramatically in just the last five years, and there
is no reason for producers to expect any more certainty in the
regulatory environment in the future. This instability is imposed on top of the uncertainty introduced by OPEC in their
price-setting decisions. The combination of these factors could
alter the analysis presented drastically. For example, if producers expected controls to be removed some time far in the future, and at the same time expect OPEC to raise prices rapidly,
the profit-maximizing solution might be to withhold current
production. While apparently this is not presently taking
place, it is not difficult to conceive its occurrence in the future.
Figure Four suggests how this uncertainty would alter any expected extraction path (a solid line) with a probability distribution (dotted lines) drawn about this line.
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Figure 4
Production When the Controlled Price is Uncertain
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The international implications of the dynamic analysis are
somewhat similar to those of the static model presented above.
The demand reaction to price controls in the dynamic and
static solutions would be identical, however, the dynamic
production decisions would tend to alter the position of OPEC.
As long as slack OPEC production capacity exists, the dynamic
solution would force the excess-capacity members of OPEC to
alter their production in response to the extraction rates of the
non-OPEC producers, in order to maintain the world oil price
at the level they desire. If the spare OPEC production capacity
disappeared, the dynamic production decisions of the nonOPEC producers would directly affect the world oil price and,
therefore, add an additional variable in the profit-maximizing
decisions of both the non-OPEC producers and of OPEC itself.
Thus, controls can be seen not only to influence domestic decisions, but to impose significant costs on international markets.

Multinational Firms and the Development of
the Iranian Oil Industry*
KARIM PAKRAVAN**
Between late 1973 and early 1974, the foreign oil industry was
subjected to revolutionary economic changes. Crude oil pricing
decisions, traditionally initiated by the international oil companies, were taken over by the OPEC' members. . . . The OPEC
2
members quadrupled the price of crude oil, and the OAPEC
members cut back production and put an embargo on shipments
to the United States for political purposes. These actions set in
motion radical changes in national energy policies, in international balance of payments, and in the role of multinational oil
companies. The age of inexpensive oil and of market determination of petroleum prices and outputs had passed.'

The effects of the revolutionary decisions initiated by the
oil producing countries in the early 1970's upon the OPEC
members themselves were scarcely less profound than those
felt by the oil consuming world. The hitherto exploited producing countries suddenly found in their hands not only a potentially destructive weapon in terms of joint pricing and producing decisions, but also opportunities to restructure their relationships with the multinational oil firms. 4 Iran took advantage
of this opportunity, replacing the Iranian Consortium Agreement' with a long term supply contract that brought all oil
operations in Iran under the direct control of the Iranian government through its agent, the NIOC. This agreement, in con* Editor's note: The reader will note that this article was written prior to the
occurrence of the events which have recently transpired in Iran.
** Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, Free University of Iran.
M.S., 1972, London School of Economics; Ph.D., Econ., 1976, University of Chicago.
1. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
2. Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries.
3. N. JACOBY, MULTINATIONAL OIL 301 (1974).
4. A multinational firm is one owning producing assets in at least two countries,
and, in the case of the "Majors" (British Petroleum, Exxon, Shell, Gulf, Texaco,
Mobil, Socal), many more than two countries.
5. Under the terms of the consortium agreement, the seven "Majors" participated
in predetermined percentages: British Petroleum (40%), Royal Dutch Shell (14%), the
five U. S. Majors (7% each), eleven independent oil companies, known as IRICON
(5%), and the Companies Franqaises des Ptroles (CFP) (6%) in exploration and production of all petroleum within the consortium area (100,000 square kilometers). The
Iranian royalty was fixed at 12.5% of total revenue, and in addition, shared equally in
net profits. The effect of the consortium in financial terms was enormous: an immediate tripling of Iran's per barrel revenue (from twenty-five to eighty cents per barrel).
6. National Iranian Oil Company. Under the supply contracts presently in effect,
the NIOC sells petroleum to the consortium at a posted price per barrel, usually
including a minor discount to the multinationals with whom Iran formerly dealt on a
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junction with the joint venture contract,7 (used primarily with
independent oil companies), and the newer service contracts,'
gives Iran unprecedented control over the production and sale
of its oil? However, Iran, just as all OPEC members, does not
concession basis. The discount is partly used by the consortium to make loans to NIOC
to cover its capital outlays. NIOC is presently renegotiating this purchase agreement
because of its dissatisfaction with the consortium's performance, especially concerning
the "minimum offtake program," whereby the consortium agreed to purchase a minimum amount every year.
7. Under the typical joint venture contract, the government acts in its sovereign
capacity and as a partner in the venture. The joint venture pays taxes to the sovereign
based upon a predetermined percentage of revenue (usually 50%). The government
then, as a partner, again takes some 50% of the remaining profit with a result that the
percentage of profit is 75%-25% in favor of the producing country.
8. The service contract is coming into increasing use throughout the world, but
as yet there is no information available on the net benefits accruing under it to the
host government. Under a service contract, the producing country bears the economic
risk of discovery and owns all production assets. The multinational firm supplies the
technical and managerial expertise of discovery, refining, and marketing for a fee,
usually a percentage of the profit.
9. In a comparative analysis (using these variables: financial return to producing
countries, national sovereignty, and conservation), it seems from available data that
the joint venture regime is more favorable to the producing country than the concession
regime, which was so widely used in the period from 1954-1973, principally in the
consortium agreement.
While, as the following table suggests, the concession regime is slightly more
favorable in terms of financial return,
Table 1
Per barrel disposable Revenue Received
by Iran (cents per barrel)
Producer
Consortium
SIRIP
IPAC
IMINICO
LAPCO
NIOC

1968
80
22
40
18
140

1969
83
22
33
24
29
200

1970
123
22
29
31
52
174

1971
133
25
51
39
89
182

1972
164
28
75
66
100
200

1973
860-960
24
88
106
144
348

1974
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
1336

the difference decreases as the price of oil increases. F. FESHARAKI, THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE IRANIAN OIL INDUSTRY (1976).
However, in terms of conservation, the joint venture regime appears clearly superior. Conservation may be defined as lower production and/or investment in order to
maintain or increase capacity. Two indices that are useful in presenting the relative
conservation efforts of the two regimes are the cumulative drilling-production ratio
(CDPR) and the ultimate reserves-cumulative production ratio (URCPR). Generally,
a higher CDPR will mean a greater effort in maintaining or increasing capacity, while
a lower URCPR will mean a greater effort in conserving the resource through lower
production. Although these indices have not been adjusted for any qualitative differences in the oil bearing fields, considering the fact that every oil region included
belongs to the same oil basin, these indices do retain explanatory power.
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yet possess the technical knowledge necessary to properly conduct all phases of oil production, from upstream to downstream
activities.10 The multinationals, on the other hand, possess a
Table 2
Cumulative Drilling-Production
Ratio
(Meter/thousand cu. m)

Consortium*
SIRIP
IPAC

1960-73

1973-76

.57
9.7
3.32

.92
2.08
3.24

Computed on the basis of NIOC annual reports 1960-76.
*OSCO after 1973.
This table indicates a better performance for the two joint ventures considered
than for the consortium, even bearing in mind the superior quality of the consortium
oil fields.
Table 3
Cumulative Production-Reserves Ratio

Consortium
IPAC
SIRIP
LAPCO

Cumulative
Production
(million)
bbls

Ultimate
Proven
Reserves
(million)
bbls

28084
299
126
484

80850
2457
2113
1500

Cumulative
Production
Ultimate
Reserves
Ratio
.34
.12
.60
.32

Based on a field compilation. Data reported in 1976.
The figure for LAPCO is lowered by the fact that it does not include ultimate reserves for Bahrain field, for which no data is available.
Table three indicates a better performance for IPAC and SIRIP than the consortium and LAPCO in terms of a slower depletion of oil reserves.
Conservation is here considered of primary importance because effective resource
management is essential to increase the life of the exhaustible oil supply, and thereby
increase the transition phase from a world economy based on exhaustible fossil fuels
to one based upon an inexhaustible source of energy, such as solar or geothermal
energy. Such a lengthened transition phase is essential to help prevent the disastrous
effects on the world economy that can be expected if the fossil fuels are too rapidly
depleted.
10. Upstream activities consist of exploratory and development activities, such as
geological and geophysical search activities, drilling of exploratory and development
wells, and arranging the technical infrastructure. Midstream activities include the
transportation of oil by pipeline and/or tanker ships. Downstream activities consist of
refining and marketing.
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virtual monopoly over this technical and managerial knowhow. As such technology cannot practically be developed over
the short run, Iran will continue to be dependent upon the
multinationals to properly exploit its oil reserves. This necessitates a discussion of the proper role for the multinational oil
firm in Iran on terms that will maximize the benefits to the
producing country. In this connection, the following fields may
be identified in which foreign operator assistance will continue
to be necessary over the short run: provision of technology in
upstream, midstream, and downstream operations, and the
provision of capital. In what follows, each will be analyzed in
turn.
I. PROVISION OF TECHNOLOGY
Given that foreign oil firms (and this includes independent
as well as multinational oil firms) have a virtual monopoly on
the technology of upstream, midstream, and downstream operations, as well as the fact that the development of such technology is a long and costly process, the solution for Iran would
seem to include the purchase of technical services from foreign
firms while simultaneously developing its own technology. The
development of technology does not mean the importing or
even building of, for example, drilling platforms, but furthering
research and development that can expand on the existing
Iranian technological base. Engaging in this course of action
would require the creation of a general policy of fostering research and development through various incentives, especially
incentives for private industry. This program in the long run
will decrease reliance on foreign operators at all stages of the
extraction process. This, in turn, will allow Iran to maximize
the benefits from the exploitation of Iranian oil."' However, in
the short run, the multinational oil firm will continue to play
a large role in the various processes of developing the Iranian
oil reserves. This role can be better understood by examining
each step in the development process.
A. Upstream Operations
In the initial stage of geological and geothermal explora11. See Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 17), U.N. Doc. A/5344 (1962). This resolution recognized that
complete and permanent sovereignity over all natural resources rests with the people
of the state in which such resources lie. This of course recognizes Iran's right to exploit
its vast petroleum reserves for its own benefit.
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tion, the crucial factor is the availability of trained personnel.
The NIOC can therefore immediately take over all such activities, and simply procure the necessary human expertise.
The next step in the exploratory process is the drilling of
exploratory and development wells. This does require sophisticated technology unavailable on a large scale. The international drilling industry is highly competitive and, therefore,
quite cost efficient. This invites, on at least a short and medium run basis, the purchase from the foreign operators of such
services until the Iranian domestic drilling industry reaches a
level of technological sophistication that will allow it to compete with foreign operations.
B. Midstream Operations
In the transportation of oil in pipelines, the construction
12. There is also significant evidence that prior to the drastic OPEC pricing decisions of 1973, the oil industry as a whole had begun to enter an era of freer competition.
(See, e.g., N. JACOsY, MULTINATIONAL OIL 299 (1974), for a view that crude oil prices
had become essentially market-determined rather than supplier-announced, in the
major consuming nations in the period from 1957-1973.) This can be seen from a
presentation of the changes in the concentration of the foreign oil in industry in the
period for 1953 to 1972:
Table 4
Summary of Changes in Concentration of the Foreign Oil Industry
By Division, 1953 and 1972
1953

Division
of the
Industry
Area of Operation
Proven Reserves
Production
Refining Capacity
Tanker Capacity
Product Marketing

1972

"Seven
Largest"
Companies
Combined
(Percent)

All Other
Companies
Combined
(Percent)

64
92
78
73
29
72

36
8
13
27
71
28

"Seven
Largest"
Companies
Combined
(Percent)
24
67
71
49
19
54

All Other
Companies
Combined
(Percent)
76
33
29
51
81
46

Id.
However, the tendency of the foreign suppliers to control supply through a mechanism known as the Aggregated Programmed Quantity Agreement between the members of the Iran Consortium (that is, the seven Majors), as well as the tight control of
marketing outlets by the majors may make such competition more illusory than real.
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of the pipeline can be taken over in the long run by the domestic industry. However, until it becomes large enough to undertake such enormous projects, such construction projects will
have to be contracted out to foreign construction firms. The
actual naval transfer of petroleum is entirely another matter.
The oil tanker business is becoming increasingly risky. Large
fluctuations in tanker rates in the past year have been very
burdensome both to shipbuilders and tanker fleet owners.
There is, of course, the further risk of pollution of the marine
environment by tankers. Given the strong competition in the
international oil tanker business, as well as the enormous capital expenditures necessary to build a fleet, a more prudent
policy would be to simply purchase necessary tanker services.
C. Downstream Operations
These operations, consisting of refining and marketing,
require the greatest amounts of technical, financial, and managerial expertise. It is this facet of the oil development process
that seems to be the most dependent upon foreign oil operatives. This supplies the foreign multinational oil firm offering
such expertise a powerful lever in negotiating with producing
countries. In this area, then, special emphasis in developing a
domestic industry would seem to offer great benefits to Iran.
This must be viewed in terms of development in the long run,
as the tremendous financial and intellectual efforts required
preclude short term development. Viable alternatives in the
refining industry would seem to be (in additon to a gradual
development of Iranian refineries), the purchase, in joint venture contracts, of refining services abroad, or simply to allow
the crude oil to be refined abroad by the foreign multinationals,
as is presently the case.
Marketing presents a more formidable challenge. Although by 1977, NIOC was exporting (marketing) directly
1,165 TBD,'3 this was mostly to Eastern Bloc and Third World
Countries.14 However, the traditional control of marketing and
distribution by the Majors in the Western consuming countries
has thus far prevented the development of large scale market13. Thousand barrels daily.
14. For instance, NIOC recently entered into joint ventures for refineries in both
India and South Africa, as well as concluding barter deals with Brazil (oil for industrial
and agricultural goods involving approximately one billion U.S. dollars) and various
Comecon countries.
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ing activities in such countries. It would appear to be a very
risky and costly undertaking to attempt to preempt a share of
this potentially vast market for Iranian oil. This is true not only
due to the risks inherent in such an enterprise, but also because
of the vast distribution structure that would have to be set up
and staffed. While certainly possible and promising in the long
run, in the immediate future, the multinational oil firm will
continue to play the key role in the refining and marketing of
crude oil.

II.

PROVISION OF CAPITAL

The oil industry is capital intensive. This is true not only
because of the tremendous amount of assets necessary to conduct even the most modest of operations, but also because the
oil industry is entering an irreversibly increasing cost phase.'"
While Iranian oil revenues are high,'8 they are largely earmarked for domestic economic development. Thus, most of the
required capital for further resource development must be provided by the international petroleum industry. The incentives
necessary to attract the vast amounts of capital required can
be included in the joint venture and long term supply contracts.
III. CONCLUSION
In the wake of the revolutionary economic changes
wrought by the OPEC cartel action of 1973, oil producing countries as a whole are beginning to redefine their relationships
15. This is caused by the increasing difficulty of locating and extracting a scarce
resource in an industry where the lowest cost oil fields (such as the one exploited by
the Iran Consortium) are all but gone. The search for oil thus must lead to more
offshore drilling and similar costly operations. Of course, world inflation also serves to
increase cost. The following table graphically demonstrates the rapidly increasing
investment per daily barrel, which is an index of the average cost of investment in
capacity for the period 1972-1976.
Table 5
Investment per daily barrel
US $/daily barrel
World
Middle East

1973
275
40

1974
415
46

1975
447
52

1976
548
94

16. Oil revenues for the OPEC countries in 1974 as a result of the pricing decisions
were an additional $60 billion due the OPEC countries from the consuming nations,
N. JACOBY, supra note 12, at 302 (1974).
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with the multinational oil firms, who formerly controlled not
only production, but pricing decisions as well. However, despite the new found control of production and pricing by oil
producing countries, the very nature of the industry, (one requiring very sophisticated technical, financial, and managerial
expertise) mandates a continued active role in the Middle East
industry by the multinational oil firms possessing the necessary expertise.
Iran, over the long run, must work to maximize the benefits derivable from its vast oil reserves by developing its own
technology, especially in the areas of upstream research and
discovery and downstream marketing. This will require a vast
national effort concentrating on expanding and enriching the
existing Iranian base to include the necessary technical, managerial, and investment know-how needed to make Iran a full
participant in the Middle East oil industry.

Nuclear Power Plant Siting: A Comparative
Analysis of Public Interaction in the Siting
Process in France and the United States
STEVEN

A.

CHRISTENSEN*

The world is rapidly depleting its energy reserves. When
oil prices skyrocketed in November of 1973, as a result of the
Arab oil embargo, alternative sources of energy were ardently
sought. The oil embargo brought to the attention of millions
what environmental groups have been telling us for
years-natural resources are a finite commodity which we are
expending at such a dangerously rapid rate, that if alternative
energy sources are not developed immediately our present economic lifestyle may be short-lived.
The embargo poignantly reminded the United States and
other industrialized nations of the degree to which they depend
on foreign energy resources. This prompted President Nixon to
implement new energy programs, demanding, among other
things, that Americans conserve energy in order to help reduce
our dependence on foreign oil.'
In recognition of the world's need for alternative energy
sources, this paper will examine several nuclear power plant
siting questions with a special focus on public concerns in both
France and the United States.
Dr. Dixie Lee Ray, the former chairperson of the United
States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), stated in a speech
to the European Nuclear Society that most opposition to nuclear power stems from fear.' This fear is a combination of both
the known and unknown effects of the widespread use of nuclear power. From sickness and death caused by unseen radiation to fear of a major nuclear accident, the public is becoming
acutely aware of the perils of the nuclear age. The public fear
* B.A., 1975, Brigham Young University; J.D. candidate, 1979, University of
Denver College of Law.
1. See Statement by the President Announcing a Series of Actions to Deal with
the Energy Crisis, 9 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 867 (June 29, 1973). See also President's
Message to Congress, 119 CONG. REC. 12889 (1973).
2. A. LovINs & J. PRICE, NON-NUCLEAR FUTURES: THE CASE FOR AN ETHICAL ENERGY
STRATEGY xvii (1975) [hereinafter cited as A. LovrNs].
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of nuclear power must be balanced against the needs of an
industrial world for alternative energy sources.3

I.

NUCLEAR POWER IN FRANCE

A.

History of Atomic Energy in France
France's first encounter with atomic energy started in the
laboratories of Henri Becquerel and Fr6dric and Irene JoliotCurie in 1934 with the discovery of artificial radioactivity.' In
1945, following World War II, there was official state recognition of the potentially peaceful uses of atomic energy.' Since
October 1945, when Charles de Gaulle established the French
Atomic Energy Commission,' successive French governments
have followed a consistent energy program with two fundamental goals: (1) to provide energy at a minimal cost; and (2) to
limit French dependence on foreign energy sources.' At the
close of World War II, the French government nationalized the
majority of the fundamental industries, including Electricit6
de France (EDF), which established a governmental monopoly
over energy-related production.' The employment of nuclear
reactors for major public and commercial use thus remains
under governmental control and precludes nongovernmental
ownership of nuclear facilities.'
EDF's initial nuclear energy project was the development
of a natural uranium graphite-gas line of reactors. 0 In the
1960's, France realized that the graphite-gas line of reactors
was outdated and thus decided to employ the American
3. Ralph Lapp, an environmental consultant to the Senate Public Works Committee, said that "the issue centers upon the nagging question about probability of a major
nuclear accident. . . and. . . a modem industrial society demands power. . . . This
means that sites will have to be found for these plants and there will have to be a
balancing of risk and reward." D. BEHRMAN, SOLAR ENERGY: THE AWAKENING SCIENCE
10 (1976).
4. L. SCHEINMAN, ATOMIC ENERGY POLICY IN FRANCE UNDER THE FOURTH REPUBLIC
3 (1965) [hereinafter cited as L. SCHEINMAN].
5. Id. at 6.
6. Ordonnance 45-2563 of 18 Oct. 1945, [1945] J.O. 7065.
7. Dlrr, L'tnergie Nuclgaire en France 4, ELECTRICIT9 DE FRANCE (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Drr].
8. Loi 46-628 (Apr. 8, 1946) [1946] J.O. 2951.
9. See Grzybowski & Dobishinski, Property and Tort in Nuclear Law Today, 10
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 446 (1977).
10. Dfirr, supra note 7, at 5. This type of reactor was chosen because, during the
postwar period, France did not want to become dependent on foreign nations for her
development and the fuel needed for this type of reactor was readily available in
France. Id. at 4-5.
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Pressurized-Water-Reactor (PWR)." Export possibilities in the
early seventies were a crucial factor in this decision. 2 Then,
shortly after the 1973 oil embargo, the French government decided to accelerate its nuclear energy program. In order to bring
the French nuclear industry under exclusive government control, the Commissariat & 'Energie Atomique (CEA) was authorized to buy back a portion of Westinghouse's interest in
3
Franatom.
B. Structure of the CEA
After the nationalization of her primary industries,
France's desire to become one of the leading postwar powers led
President de Gaulle to form, under the Atomic Energy Commission, the Commissariat a 1'1 nergie Atomique." The CEA,
a scientific establishment vested with a civil personality and a
somewhat unique administrative and financial autonomy, was
placed under the control of the President of the Provisional
Government.' 5 Its main purpose, according to the enabling ordinance, was to research the practical applications of atomic
energy." The organization was subsequently modified, and now
the CEA is under the direct authority and control of the Prime
Minister.' 7 Beneath the Prime Minister are: (1) the Administrator-General who acts as both the administrative
director of the CEA, and as the official spokesman and delegate
of the French Government;' 8 and (2) the High-Commissioner
who controls the scientific and technical aspects of the
agency.9
C. France and Euratom
Late in 1957, the European Atomic Energy Community
(Euratom) was created upon the signing of the Treaty of
Rome. 1 The Euratom Treaty created an international commis11. Id. at 8-9.
12. Id. at 11. Franatom obtained the requisite licenses from Westinghouse for
PWR construction and Sogerca was licensed by General Electric for production of
Boiling-Water-Reactors (BWR).
13. Id. at 12.
14. Ordonnance 45-2563 of 18 Oct. 1945, art. 1, [1945] J.O. 7065.
15. Id. The administrative functions of a traditional French public institution are
delegated to one of the government ministers in the executive branch. See also, L.
SCHEINMAN, supra note 4, at 9.
16. Ordonnance 45-2563 of 18 Oct. 1945, [1945] J.O. 7065.
17. L. SCHEINMAN, supra note 4, at 11.
18. Ordonnance 45-2563 of 18 Oct. 1945, art. 2, [19451 J.O. 7065.
19. Id. at art. 3. See generally, 2 AsPECTS DU Daorr DE L'CNERGIEATOMIQUE 68 (H.
Puget ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as H. Puget].
20. Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, 119581 298
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sion which was to supersede national legislation in this area in
order to maximize the management and exploitation of nuclear
energy and materials in Europe. In spite of conflicting political
and institutional ideologies, the Six generally agreed that Euratom should be vested with: (1) the right to stock fissionable
materials; (2) the power to create and manage common institutions;" (3) the coordination of research and planning; and
(4) the right to open the market for nuclear materials and
equipment. 22
Euratom threatened France's desire to remain a major
postwar power. French atomic development was far superior to
that of its potential partners, and France feared a loss of control over her vital resources.2 It was not until France was assured that she alone would have control over her atomic 2military rights that she assented to the Euratom Agreement. 1
D. French Legislation in the Nuclear Field
1. Base Installations
Government intervention and regulation of the nuclear
energy industry are a direct result of the potential public hazards of nuclear materials. The French Government, by means
of Dkcret 63-1228 of December 11, 1963 (Decree of 1963), speci-25
fies legislative requirements for "basic nuclear installations.
The legislation establishes strict conditions which a base nubefore proper authorization for
clear installation must satisfy
26
construction can be granted.
2. The Decision Processes
The owner-operator of a nuclear facility must submit a
U.N.T.S. 169. The treaty was signed by the original "Six" nations of the EEC: France,
Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
21. Id. at art. 86. Under the Euratom Treaty, the Community became the legal
owner of all special nuclear materials produced by the member nations. See also,
Smith, The European Atomic Energy Community: The Limits of Supernationalism,
1 CAL. W. L. REv. 33 (1970). The control and management of these institutions rests
on the degree of commitment from the individual countries. The Euratom Treaty
sanctions the inspection and control of nuclear facilities as a safety measure against
the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Id. at 37.
22. [1958] 298 U.N.T.S. 169.
23. L. SCHEINMAN, supra note 4, at 144-45.
24. Id. at 166.
25. Ddcret 63-1228 of Dec. 11, 1963, [1963] J.O. 11092, modified in part on March
27, 1973. These regulations place the more important installations, from planning
through functioning, under diverse controls. See Bourgeois, Nuclear InstallationSafety
18, ELECTcicrrg DE FRANcE (1978) [hereinafter cited as Bourgeois].
26. Id. at art. 3.
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series of safety reports to the various administrative offices in
charge of granting construction permits before a license to operate can be granted. The first of these reports is the preliminary report, which is submitted to the Minister of Industry,
and enumerates the safety measures to be taken by the owneroperator.2 7 Next, the provisional report is submitted to the
Inter-Ministerial Committee for Basic Nuclear Installations
(CIINB) which predicts the performance of the unit as a whole
and of its various safeguard components.2 Then the final report
is submitted to the CIINB after all tests have been completed,
and specifies the actual measured performance of the unit."
An independent agency is required to examine the proposed safety standards to guard against the possible bias of
reports submitted by owner-operators, and to determine the
advisability of granting a license.3 The proposal must then be
reviewed and approved by several government officials before
the Prime Minister finally authorizes the nuclear installation. 3
A draft proposal is passed, in the following order, from the
Institute for Health, Physics, and Nuclear Safety, 32 to the
Standing Groups,3 to the Minister of Health, to the Minister
of Industry, to the CIINB, and to the Ministers in charge 34of
that particular type of nuclear installation for final review.
The request for authorization to build a nuclear installa27. Bourgeois, supra note 25, at 35. The preliminary reports generally include the
proposed actions of the owner-operators concerning general safety principles, main
technical safety options, design studies, and a preliminary safety study.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. The safety reports are sent to a Standing Group of experts who review the
material and then make a proposal, for or against the facility, to the Central Service
for Nuclear Installation Safety.
31. Id. at 39.
32. Id. at 36. This administrative body was formed in November 1976, by a joint
order from the Minister of Industry and Research and the Minister of Economy and
Finance. The institute's primary function is to perform studies, research, and works
on physics and nuclear safety. It must also assist and advise the Ministers on CEA
matters.
33. Id. at 37. The Standing Groups are divided into three catagories: the first
group is in charge of nuclear reactors, the second group is in charge of particle accelerator safety, and the third group is in charge of other nuclear installations (such as
reprocessing plants). The Standing Group in charge of a particular institution will
evaluate and combine the safety reports submitted by the Institute for Health, Physics, and Nuclear Safety. The experts will add any technical specifications which they
deem necessary, and the owner-operator must comply with these specifications.
34. Id. at 39.
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tion3 must contain: (1) the characteristics of the installation;

(2) a descriptive notice of the geographic region and the reason
for the site choice; (3) potential environmental effects; (4) proposed control of the nuclear materials; and (5) security precautions.3" Before the administrative functions are complete, the
views of
public must be given an opportunity to express their
3
installation.
the
of
location
the
of
and
the project
E. Environmental Protection
Article 1 of the law of July 10, 1976, requires that an impact study on the environment and the region surrounding the
proposed site be made each time an operating license is considered.3 The purpose of the impact study is to systematically
determine the effects of a nuclear facility on the environment,
as well as on the local population. 3' It is the responsibility of
the owner-operator applicant, public or private, to conduct all
necessary impact studies.' 0
Once the impact study is completed, a hearing is held to
familiarize the public with the new installation and to receive
feedback from interested citizens." Hopefully, public scrutiny
will insure an objective, high quality, impact study. Publicity
for the hearing must be paid by the applicant, while the
breadth of publicity is determined by the regional prefect. 2
35. See Decree of March 27, 1973, arts. 3 and 6 bis.
36. DILIGATION G9NI9MALE A L'19NERGIE, L'tNERGIE NUCLEAIRE: LE PROJET SUPERPitiMiX A CREYS-MALVILLE 27 (1977) [hereinafter cited as DOLOGATION GiNgRALE k
L'tNERGIE].

37. Id. See also D~cret 63-1228, art. 8, (Dec. 11, 1963) [19631 J.O. 11093. Under
the provisions of article 8, the Commission must answer, within three months, an
inquiry into the licensing of a particular installation. The article mandates that the
purpose of the prescriptions is to avert all public danger and inconvenience.
38. Loi 76-629 (July 10, 1976) [19761 J.O. 4203, modified by Dkcret 77-1141 (Oct.
12, 1977) [1977] J.O. 4948.
39. DLcret 77-1141, arts. 1 & 2, (Oct. 12, 1977) [1977] J.0. 4948. The impact
study should report the initial condition of the site, including agriculture, forests,
marine life, and so forth. The study should also include probable effects on the environment and population if a nuclear facility is to be located on the site.
40. D~cret 77-1131, art. 3, clause 4 (Sept. 21, 1977) [1977] J.0. 4849.
41. Id. at art. 5. When the applicant's dossier is complete, the prefect of the region
reviews the findings, and if all requisites have been met, he will order a public hearing.
42. Id. at art. 6. Public notices must be posted in all communities and areas which
will be affected by the facility. Eight days before the hearing adequate notice must be
given in the local or regional newspapers and, if the prefect deems it necessary, he may
require the sponsor to employ other means of communication.
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The impact study and public hearings are designed to include
the public in the decisionmaking process at an early stage, so
information about fundamental issues, particularly environmental quality and public protection, must be available to all
interested parties. The public recommendations are included
in the licensing proposal.
F. Safety Concerns
According to the Decree of 1963, those installations which
cause inconvenience or endanger the public are placed under
the surveillance of administrative authorities.4 3 These facilities
are divided into three classes according to the gravity of potential danger or inconvenience inherent in their exploitation."
Although atomic research and the construction of reactors and
laboratories are under the direction and control of the CEA,
France has public organizations, outside the control of the
CEA, such as les Amis de la Terre (Friends of the Earth), which
perform an important function in the nuclear industry. These
organizations usually act under either the loi du 19 d~cembre
1917 (the Law of 1917) which regulates dangerous establishments, or under the Decree of 1963 which controls potential
public hazards."
Under French regulatory law, only the operator of a nuclear installation may receive a construction permit. When all
other necessary licenses have been obtained, the operator becomes responsible for the safety of the installation." Minimum
safety standards are established by the Minister of Industry,
Trades, and Crafts." This ministry controls the Central Service
for the Safety of Nuclear Installations (SCSIN), a group of
experts who study the technical problems associated with cre8
ating, servicing, and shutting down nuclear facilities.
Article 11 of the Decree of 1963 requires two types of inspectors at all primary nuclear installations." The first kind
43. H. Puget, supra note 19, at 22.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 23.
46. Torquat, L 'Organisationdes Pouvoirs en Francedans le Domaine de la Surete
Nuclaire 4, ELECrRICIT9 DE FRANCE (1978) [hereinafter cited as Torquat[.
47. Id. at 5.
48. DELEGATION GiNgRALE A L'ENERGIE, supra note 36, at 27. SCSIN is concerned
with the licensing of the facility, and with the general preparation and enforcement of
technical specifications concerning the safety of the installation.
49. Dcret 63-1228, art. 11, (Dec. 11, 1963) [1963] J.O. 11093.
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of inspector falls under the purview of the Law of 1917, and is
charged with the regulation of primary nuclear installations.'"
Inspectors of the second type are agents of the Service Central
de Protection contre les Rayonnements Ionisants (SCPRI).
Their function is to monitor the radioactive pollutants and to
control the effect of pollutants outside of the installation, with
special emphasis on protection of the public health and
safety. 5'
The public is further protected by the D~cret 75-713 du 4
aoat, 1975 (Decree of 1975) which establishes an InterMinisterial Commission for Nuclear Security.2 This commission is responsible for protecting persons and their property
against nuisances and dangers from the creation, functioning,
or shutdown of nuclear facilities. 53 France employs "barrier
analysis" in its safety study of reactors. Barrier analysis entails
a study of the reactor once it has been completed, and can be
used on any reactor-type. 4 This independent approach stresses
safety precautions which must be taken to prevent accidents,
and defers until the end of the analysis the review of the reactor's emergency devices. 55
G. Liability and Damages
The owner-operator of a nuclear facility is responsible for
the safety aspects of its operations, and is absolutely liable for
any damages caused by a nuclear reactor, as set forth by the
1960 Paris Convention. 5 The maximum liability of the operator is 50 million francs per accident, regardless of the number
of facilities on that site.57 The French Government is liable for
amounts not covered by the operator's insurance, up to a maxi50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Ddcret 75-713 (Aug. 4, 1975) [1975] J.O. 8116.
53. Id.
54. Bourgeois, supra note 25, at 27.
55. Id. Each reactor has 3-4 tight barriers: (1) the cladding; (2) the primary
system boundary; (3) the primary; and (4) secondary containment barriers. Each
barrier is analyzed for: (1) normal operating conditions; (2) normal transients (startups, power raising, load variations); and (3) accident transients. Id. at 28-29.
56. Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, July 29,
1960, art. 3, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 1082 (1961). Although article 3 indicates that the
operator is absolutely liable, article 9 states that if the damage is caused by unforeseeable civil conflicts, civil war, or catastrophic disasters, the operator will not be held
accountable.
57. Loi 68-943, art. 4 (Oct. 30, 1968) [1968] J.O. 10195.
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mum of 600 million francs."6 However, the government is liable
only after the operator has paid the full 50 million franc minimum deductible.
Anxiety about potential nuclear hazards, accompanied by
the construction and operation of the world's largest commercial breeder reactor, the Super-Phdnix, has caused concern in
the environs of Creys-Malville where the facility is located.59
The Super-Phdnix is a joint energy program, controlled by the
French Government and operated by the Centrale Nuclkaire
Europkened Neutrons Rapides, S.A. (NERSA) organization."0
In full operation, the Super-Ph6nix will produce 1200 megawatts of electricity from its first five tons of plutonium. This
large amount of plutonium explains the overwhelming public
interest in the Super-Phenix installation.6" The project was initiated in January of 1973, after which public meetings and
debates were organized between antinuclear groups, environmentalists, agricultural concerns, and the proponents of the
project.2 Once the debates and studies were finished, the project was approved and work commenced in the spring of 1977.63
H. Public Action in Nuclear Power Plant Siting
Recent surveys in France indicate that since 1974, when
over three-fourths of the population was in favor of nuclear
energy, the number of nuclear proponents has plunged by
58. Id. at art. 5. See also Brussels Supplementary Convention, 2 INT'L LEGAL
685 (1963). Under the Brussels agreement, the signatories indicated a willingness to contribute to a maximum recovery of $120 million, but only after the individual insurance and the home state have contributed their shares.
59. Residents of the area have stated that they do not want to be the guinea pigs
for the world's first operational breeder reactor. They feel that there are simply too
many unknown factors, and no one knows exactly what may happen. L'ExPREss, Aug.
8, 1977, at 28.
60. Centrale Nucldaire Europ~enne A Neutrons Rapides, S.A. This group was
formed and controlled by France (EDF) which held a 51% interest. France was joined
by Italy (ENEL) with 33%, Germany (RWE) with 16%, and small interests are owned
by Belgium, Holland, and Great Britain. DfLtGATiON GgNtRALE A L'ENERGIE, supra
note 36, at 19.
61. L'EXPRESS, April 17, 1978, at 78. The opponents of the Super-Phdnix are quick
to point out that it only takes six kilos of plutonium to create an atomic bomb. Five
tons of plutonium, which is one of the most toxic and enduring radioactive elements
known to man, presents the danger of an explosion never before paralleled. There are
also dangers ranging from the possibility of small leakages of radioactive effulgents to
the possibility of terrorist attacks. Id.
62. DiLAGATION GiNtRALE A L'i'NERGIE, supra note 36, at 42.
63. Dirr, supra note 7, at 15.
MATERIALS
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about twenty-five percent." Antinuclear forces, especially the
ecology groups, are a major reason for this decline. In the municipal elections of 1977, for example, the ecology groups created so much friction that the campaign focused almost entirely on ecological issues.15
The results of these elections show that ecology groups,
such as les Amis de la Terre and les Groupes Scientifiques pour
I'Information sur I'EnergieNuct~aire, are becoming a significant power in the political arena. 6 Not only have elections been
won or lost because of the "green vote," but the pressure they
exert has also created new legislation which allows for the protection of the environment as well as providing the legal means
by which these groups can exercise their rights.67
A renewed vigor was witnessed by these antinuclear factions when the French Government reemphasized its atomic
energy programs and proposed to build at least forty conventional nuclear plants and one breeder reactor at CreysMalville.18 Demonstrations in France against atomic power
plants have been relatively peaceful. However, during the protest against the Super-Ph6nix in the summer of 1977, violence
marred the demonstration." The demonstration at CreysMalville had been planned for several months and nonviolence
was stressed so successfully that many local politicians agreed
to participate. 0 Ren6 Jannin, the prefect of the department in
which Creys-Malville is located, stated afterward, "we made
several tactical errors." Sufficient safety precautions were not
taken. 7 Although German demonstrators have been more
prone to violence, demonstrators now come from all over Europe and violence appears to have increased.72
The majority of participants at the Creys-Malville demonstration belonged to environmental groups and were not inter64. Sweet, The Opposition to Nuclear Power in Europe, BULL. ATOM. Sci. 41, 44
(Dec. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Sweet].
65. Sansen, Le Mouvement Ecologique Franqais, 2 Rov. GONORALE NUCLEAIRE 3
(1977).
66. Id.
67. See generally D{cret 77-760 (July 7, 1977) [19771 J.O. 3663.
68. TIME, Aug. 15, 1977, at 31.
69. L'ExPRESS, Aug. 8, 1977, at 23, 25.
70. Id. at 25.
71. Id.
72. Sweet, supra note 64, at 43.
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ested in a violent demonstration. However, as the date of the
protest approached, there were many who came solely for a
violent demonstration against the "system." These dissenters
were able to persuade the pacifists that their previous attempts
to stop or change nuclear policy had been entirely futile and
that the time had come for more forceful measures in these
matters. 73
The concern of both individuals and interest groups in
nuclear power and the protection of the environment has
caused the Government to delineate the necessary steps for
increased public participation.7 ' The Government has also indicated a desire to have more individuals participate in matters that will directly affect their life or lifestyle.
I. Conclusion
Although the French Government recognizes the utility of
nuclear energy and the possibilities it presents for the future
through breeder reactors, other "new energies" are ardently
being explored.75 The National Center for Scientific Research,
for example, is one of the world's leading government institutions in the development of solar energy.7" As the public and
government become more aware of the problems in this area,
new legislative measures are created to promote equitable solutions.
Since France has negligible oil reserves, very little coal,
and no other visible energy possibilities at present, it appears
that the development of nuclear energy is inevitable. The extent to which demonstrations and public attitudes are able to
change French legislation, and/or stop further development of
nuclear power, appears limited. Whether or not a scientific
breakthrough will allow France to switch completely to solar,
wind, or other "new energies" can be seen only in the future.
Presently, France is aware that without nuclear power massive
73. L'EXPRESS, Aug. 8, 1977, at 28.
74. Dcret 77-760, art. 6-8, (July 7, 1977) [1977] J.O. 3663. See also Circulaire of
Jan. 10, 1977, [1977] JO. _.
75. As of May 1978, nuclear energy provided 12% of France's electricity. France's
1985 nuclear energy goal has been set at 20%. Le Monde, May 2, 1978.
76. DAL.GATION AUX 9NERGItE

N OUVELLES, SOLAR ENERGY FROM FRANCE 22 (1977).

France has a solar furnace at Odeillo-Font-Romeu which is fed by sixty-three flat
mirrors and can reach a temperature of 3,800"°C. There are also several apartment
buildings around France, sponsored by CNRS, which are entirely heated by solar
energy.
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amounts of foreign energy must be purchased. Given the
French spirit of independence, it is doubtful that France would
ever subject herself to the manipulations of energy-producing
nations if French controlled nuclear power were available.
II. NUCLEAR ENERGY IN THE UNITED STATES
A. History
Shortly after World War II, the United States created the
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and monopolized the nuclear energy field through the passage of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1946.17 This act was soon replaced by the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 which substantially limited the governmental monopoly of the nuclear field."8 Although the 1954 Act invited
more participation from private sectors, the nuclear energy
field was slow to develop, due initially to the low cost of alternative energy sources.
Change came with the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974,
which abolished the AEC and divided its duties between the
newly formed Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the
Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) .7
Regulation and supervision of the construction, maintenance,
licensing, and operation of nuclear power facilities within the
United States was delegated directly to the NRC. The NRC
has divided the licensing process into two steps: (1) a construction permit for the proposed nuclear reactor;80 and (2) a license
to operate the facility after the reports have been filed and the
surveys taken." ERDA's functions are to coordinate Federal
77. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 755 (1946) [codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 20112296 (1976)].
78. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 921 (1954) [codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2011-2296 (1976)]. Prior to the 1954 Act, private ownership, manufacture, or operation of a nuclear facility was prohibited, as the entire field was under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Federal Government. The passage of the 1954 Act invited public
participation in the nuclear field. However, the government retained absolute control
over nuclear fuels which were to be leased from the government. (This is set forth in
42 U.S.C. § 2061 (1978) which provides that the Commission shall be the exclusive
owner of all production facilities except: (1) those dealing with research and development, which do not make enough fuel for atomic weapons; and (2) those licensed by
the Commission pursuant to §§ 2133-2134 of the Act.)
79. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5801 (1976).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a) (1976). Construction permits are granted only after all
relevant siting criteria, environmental impact statements, and public notices of hearing requirements have been met. See also 10 C.F.R. § 50.34(b) (1978).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a) (1976).
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activities relating to research and development of various energy sources.
B. Preemption
Numerous cases have arisen disputing the NRC's apparent exclusive control over the licensing process, in effect, preempting a state's action on matters within its own domain .1
The preemption doctrine, which was first enunciated in
Gibbons v. Odgen,8 3 allows Federal regulations to take exclusive precedence over similar state regulations, with the exception of state regulations that pose no direct conflict, or those
which Congress has not unequivocally declared preempted by
Federal legislation.
Although the preemption doctrine has survived many
years of Supreme Court rulings, it has not been adequately
defined. Individual courts have maintained the power to construe state regulatory statutes according to the particular facts
of the case,84 and it was not until Northern States Power Co.
5 that the question of preemption in the atomic
v. Minnesota"
energy area was decided.
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 gave the Federal government exclusive jurisdiction and control over the regulation of
all radiation-related hazards in the nuclear field. These joint
judicial and administrative rulings had the effect of totally
preempting the state government from making any independent judgments on health and safety issues." Then, in 1959,
an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 created a
major provision which granted authority to each state to regulate the nonradiation hazards within its own territory. The
amendment provided that, "nothing in this action shall be
construed to affect the authority of any state or local agency
to regulate activities for purposes other than protection against
radiation.""7 This allowed states to participate more meaning82. Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971). See
generally Yates, Preemption Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954: Permissible State
Regulation of Nuclear Facilities Location, Transportation of Radioactive Materials
and Radioactive Waste Disposal, 11 TULSA L. J. 397 (1976).
83. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) (1824).
84. See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1974).
85. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971).
86. Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of
Environmental Protection, 377 A.2d 915, 928 (1977).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1976). In order to participate in a formal determination
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fully in the siting process of nuclear facilities, and thus negated
complete domination by Federal agencies.
Judge Van Oosterhout, in his dissenting opinion in
Northern States, spoke out strongly against the notion of Federal preemption in this area. 8 He noted that there had been no
apparent congressional intent to preempt this field; otherwise,
Congress would have stated it explicitly in statutes or in their
hearings on nuclear energy.89
C. Environmental Aspects of the Licensing and Siting
Process
The NRC is not solely responsible for the licensing and
siting process at the Federal level. In the often-cited case of
Claverts Cliffs Coordinating Commission v. United States
Atomic Energy Commission," the requisite duties of the licensing process, as set forth in the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA), are analyzed in detail.9 1 Calverts Cliffs pointed
out that NEPA was created to establish "environmental protection as an integral part of the AEC's basic mandate. . and
it must itself take the initiative of considering environmental
values at every distinctive and comprehensive stage of the process beyond the staff's evaluation and recommendation."' 9
However, as broad as this construction may appear, it did not
93
give an unlimited grant of power to NEPA.
of a nuclear facility siting, the state representative must request a formal hearing
before the Licensing Board as an interested party under 10 C.F.R. § 2.714 (1978).
88. 447 F.2d 1143, 1155 (8th Cir. 1971). "The Supreme Court has uniformly recognized the legislative intent of the state in its laws designed to protect the health and
safety of its citizens and has refused to find federal-preemption over state health and
safety laws, absent a clear and unmistakeable showing of an intent on the part of
Congress to preempt." Id.
89. Id. at 1157. "There is nothing in the statutes which expresses a clear Congressional intent to prohibit the states from taking additional steps deemed necessary to
control air, water and pollution. . . .The language of a statute controls over the
legislative history, which is often ambigious. Congress was aware of the problem and
could have solved it readily by incorporating appropriate language in the Act. It refused to do so." Id.
90. Calverts Cliffs Coordinating Comm'n v. United States Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
91. Id. at 1112. Under this section, NEPA is not permitted, but rather is compelled, to take environmental values into consideration.
92. Id. at 1119.
93. [19771 NUCLEAR REc.. REP. (CCH)
30,172.02. NEPA does not require an
unbalanced weighting of the environmental issues over other factors, such as economic,
or health and safety advantages. The purpose of NEPA is to insure that the agencies
give appropriate consideration to the environmental factors in the decision process, but
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Recent decisions have taken the approach of Judge Van
Oosterhout in granting more power to the states and to local
environmental groups while curtailing NRC's "exclusive" powers. An example in this shift of control can be seen in the recent
Clean Air Act, which transferred the authority to regulate the
radioactive effluents from nuclear power installations from
NRC to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)."
Under the new Act, emission limitations may be enforced
by citizen groups as well as by state and local governments.
The Act permits the state to adopt air quality standards which
are more stringent than those imposed by the Federal government. This includes control over radioactive pollutants, and
thus overrules that aspect of the Northern States decision. The
Clean Air Act also requires the EPA to determine, by August
7, 1979, whether the emission of radioactive pollutants at the
various sites will endanger public health. If the EPA determination is affirmative, the radioactive pollutants will continue
to be under EPA control pursuant to the Clean Air Act.95
D. Present Siting and Licensing Requirements
1. Application Process
A license to construct or operate a nuclear facility is considered only upon completion of the application form. This
application must be presented at a public hearing before the
AEC, and section 189(a) of the Atomic Energy Act requires
that a Notice of Hearing on Application for Construction Permits be printed in the Federal Register thirty days prior to the
hearing. The application must also include safety assessments
and a description of the site, an evaluation of the design and
of the performance of the structures," and, finally, a safety
analysis report. 7
the environmental protection aspect was not established as the exclusive goal.
94. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401 (1978). It should be
noted that the NRC maintained the responsibility for prescribing limits, and implementing and enforcing the EPA's radiation standArds.
95. Id. Before EPA lists the source of the pollutant, it must first consult with the
NRC and, no later than six months after the listing, the two agencies must agree to
procedures which will minimize a duplication of their efforts with regard to the regulation of the polluting emmissions.
96. 10 C.F.R. § 50.34(a)(1) (1978). Such assessments shall contain an analysis and
evaluation of the major structures, systems, and components of the facility.
97. Id. at (b). The safety analysis report must include information which describes
the facility, and which presents a safety analysis of the structure, systems, compo-
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2. Review Process
First of all, the NRC staff scrutinizes the health, safety,
and environmental aspects of the application, and then drafts
an environmental impact statement. Public comments must
accompany both the application and environmental impact
statement to insure increased public participation." Next, the
Advisory Commission on Reactor Safety (ACRS) must examine the design of each plant to eliminate possible safety hazards. After the ACRS report is submitted to the Commission,
a public hearing is scheduled. Thirty days notice is required,
and must be printed in the Federal Register. 9
To increase public involvement and improve community
relations, the Commission has permitted intervenors into the
licensing process on the following grounds: (1) if they can show
an independent injury or, basically, if they can meet judicial
standing requirements;. (2) if they live in the immediate vicinity of the proposed facility; or (3) if the Commission feels that
they can significantly contribute to the licensing process.' 4
The nuclear installation siting process is one of the most
time consuming aspects of the nuclear development program.
In an effort to speed up this process, Appendix Q to 10 C.F.R.
50 was passed in 1977 to grant the right to request an early site
review to any individual or group.""1 However, these reviews are
subject to public interest considerations and are not conclusive
until all vital information has been confirmed. "2 Further, the
application for early site approval, if accompanied by a construction permit, will only be effective for a five-year period,
with an additional one-year extension when good cause is
shown.103
nents, and the facility as a whole. All current information must be included, such as
results of environmental studies, meteorological monitoring programs, etc.
98. 10 C.F.R. § 51.26 (1978).
99. 10 C.F.R. § 50.58 (1978).
100. The Atomic Energy Act does not mandate public hearings. However, such
participation at an early stage can generate confidence in the Commission, and potentially will cut down the amount of time necessary for subsequent public hearings which
may be required by law.
101. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,882 (1977).
102. Id.
103. Id. This new provision will allow any person, state, or other entity to request
a review of the site suitability issues. However, there will be no issuance of a partial
decision concerning the site unless the request for review is made during the construction permit proceedings. Id. at 22,887.
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As in France, hearings are conducted by nuclear siting
experts because of the technical nature of the issues involved. 0
However, interested individuals may participate in these hearings by filing a petition to intervene pursuant to 10 C.F.R.
section 2.714 (1978).105
3. Specific Siting Criteria
Public involvement in the energy field has two major
objectives: (1) to make certain that the facilities are as safe as
possible; and (2) to place the facility in someone else's vicinity,
if at all possible. The possibility of a major nuclear accident,
coupled with the probability of serious problems caused by
radioactive pollution and waste control, makes the correct siting of a nuclear installation imperative. To aid in the location
of facility sites, the NRC has come up with several evaluation
considerations. 0 8
The major factors to be considered are population dens0
1
ity,' meteorological conditions of the site environs, the intended use of the reactor, the unique qualities of the particular
units, and geological configurations.'"" When more than one
reactor is proposed for a nuclear power center, assessments
should also include:
A regional evaluation of natural resources, including land, air,
and water resources, available for use in connection with nuclear
energy sites; estimates of future electrical power requirements
*

.

. economic impact at each nuclear energy site; and considera-

tion of any other relevant factors, including but not limited to
population distribution, proximity to electric load centers and to
other elements of the fuel cycle ....
1,

These NRC siting criteria are flexible and were not intended
104. 42 U.S.C. § 2239 (1976).
105. 10 C.F.R. § 2.714 (1978). The petitioner must specifically identify those
aspects of the application to which he is opposed, and must indicate his interest in
the proceedings and the basis for his contention in a petition.
106. 10 C.F.R. § 100.10 (1978).
107. Id. at § 110.3(b). Population density includes the exclusion areas and low
population zones. The exclusion area, as defined in section 100.3, is that area immediately surrounding the reactor in which the licensee has authority to determine all
activities, including the exclusion of personnel and property. The low population zone
immediately surrounds the exclusion area, and its limited population allows appropriate protective measures to be taken on its behalf in the event of a serious accident.
108. 10 C.F.R. § 100 app. A (1978). Important considerations in this area are the
probability of earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, and tsunami which could
result in a failure of the facility's functions.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 5847 (1976).
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to be the final word in all situations. For instance, theoretically
there can be no minimum or maximum size for an acceptable
exclusion area, characteristics of the specific area will determine how large or small the exclusion area should be. However,
the area must be large enough so that an individual located on
its boundary would not, in the event of a postulated accident,
receive a radiation dose in excess of the safe minimum as established by the NRC." 0
E. Liability Aspects of Nuclear Power Station Siting
Human safety has been the primary reason for establishing
a large exclusion area, but the potential liability for numerous
types of possible accidents has also been a prime consideration.
In fact, it was the basic reason for the slow development of
private nuclear enterprise in the United States. Given the potential liability for a nuclear mishap, it was apparent that if
Federal protection or subsidies were not provided, the public
sector might never get involved in the nuclear energy industry.
Thus, Congress passed the Price-Anderson Act of 1957," 1 which
placed a ceiling on the amount of damages that could be recovered in any one incident.
The AEC now demands proof that the operator possesses,
and will maintain, adequate financial protection as set forth by
the Commission."' The Commission may also require that the
applicant waive any immunity from public liability conferred
by Federal or state laws." 3 Before 1975, liability was limited to
$560 million. As in France, the operator of a nuclear facility in
the United States must carry enough insurance to cover potential operational liabilities. However, in the U.S., coverage must
also extend to third party liability."' Under section (c) of 42
110. 10 C.F.R. § 100.11(a)(1) (1978). The exclusion area must be of such a size
that an individual located at any point on its boundary would not receive, for two hours
immediately following the onset of the fission .product release, a total radiation dose
to the whole body in excess of 25 rem. Note 2 explains that 25 rem is the amount NCRP
recommendations allow for a harmless, accidental, or emergency exposure to radiation
workers.
111. Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976).
112. Id. at (a). The Commission will determine the minimum amount of liability
insurance needed by the applicant by taking into consideration: (1) the cost and terms
of private insurance; (2) the type, size, and location of the proposed facility; and (3)
the nature and purpose of the licensed activity. Currently, the applicant must acquire
insurance coverage up to $60 million for any individual accident.
113. Id.
114. Id. at (b), (c).
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U.S.C. 2210 (1976) the Government will indemnify, up to $500
million, those licensees whose license requires less than $560
million coverage."'
F. Nuclear Waste and Safeguards
Another precondition of licensing is that the builder or
licensee must determine the maximum foreseeable accident,
and prove that sufficient safety precautions have been taken to
guard against it."' In spite of safeguards, there is always the
possibility of a serious accident." 7 Waste disposal is one of the
greatest safety hazards associated with a nuclear powered
installation, since radioactive waste generated from the facility
must be carefully handled and isolated for prolonged periods
of time."18 Unfortunately, isolation is an expensive and imperfect way to control waste." 9 Waste control must be well
planned, for as the court iterated in the Natural Resource
Defense Council case, "Once a series of reactors is operating,
it is too late to consider whether the waste they generate should
115. One of the reasons the Government is still subsidizing the nuclear industry
is that, currently, private insurance will only cover a little over $100 million worth of
liability. Until private insurance is available to substantially protect the public, the
Government will continue to subsidize those portions not covered. See 42 U.S.C. §
2210(b), (c) (1976).
116. D. INGLIS, NUCLEAR ENERGY-ITS PHYSICS AND ITs SOCIAL CHALLENGE 115
(1973). The NRC recently shut down a nuclear facility in Idaho in order to determine
if the safety precautions taken would, in fact, function properly. Wall St. J., Dec. 12,
1978, at 1, col. 1.
117. A. LOVINS, supra note 2, at 104. This may be demonstrated by the Browns
Ferry incident, in which a technician, while searching for air leaks with a candle,
caused a 7 1/4-hour cable tray fire under the control room. The emergency core cooling
systems (ECCS) failed to function properly, and the only thing that prevented a core
melt was manual control of pumps and valves which were not intended as safety
functions. Another example of potential hazards is illustrated by an incident which
occurred in Idaho when three inexperienced army personnel tried to move a sticky
control rod in an "abnormal" way by hand. The three men were instantly killed by a
burst of radiation, and more than a week passed before shielded clean-up workers were
able to enter the building to remove the bodies. Id. at 116.
118. Id. at 140-41. There is a general two-step method of dealing with spent fuel
rods. The first step is to store them under water atthe facility site until the short-lived
components of radioactivity die off. Next, they are placed in special heavy caskets
designed to absorb radiation and minimize the chances of leakage while being transported either to fuel reprocessing plants or to underground storage areas.
119. National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The decision to license nuclear
reactors, which generate large amounts of toxic wastes and which require a special
isolation from the public and the environment for several centuries, is "a paradigm of
irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which must receive detailed
analysis under § 102(2)(C)(v) of NEPA" as found in 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c)(v).
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have been produced.' ' 2 This decision is particularly significant

because it finds that the NEPA regulations require consideration of the environmental effects of nuclear waste during the
initial stages of the licensing process. Additionally, the NRC
must consider the environmental aspects of the reprocessing of
nuclear waste before granting a construction permit. 2'
G. U.S. Public Interaction in the Siting Process
1. Case History of the Seabrook, New Hampshire Site
The Seabrook nuclear facility site was chosen from nineteen possible New Hampshire locations in mid-1973. From the
outset, there has been opposition to the Seabrook facility, generated principally from the Clamshell Alliance and Friends of
the Earth. The NRC waited two years for final approval of the
Seabrook site as a result of the environmentalist opposition.
In response to recent attempts to change the site, the NRC
has stated that, "the test to be employed in assessing whether
or not a proposed site is to be rejected in favor of another site
is whether an alternative site is obviously superior to the site
already approved.'

22

Thus, it is apparent that a change will be

made only under unusual circumstances brought about by
time, environmental oversights, or other factors which would
make an alternative site superior.
In 1977, the Clamshell Alliance staged a successful demonstration against the Seabrook site. The demonstration was
planned well in advance, and nonviolence was emphasized.
Volunteers were trained in the methods of nonviolent resistance and were to instruct small groups at the demonstration.'23
The protest culminated with the peaceful occupation of the
Seabrook site by over 1400 demonstrators. The resistance train120. 547 F.2d 633, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
121. Id. at 641. Environmental groups find this case significant because, "absent
effective generic proceedings to consider these issues, they must be dealt with in
individual licensing proceedings." This will give the opponents of nuclear power at
least one more chance to slow down, or temporarily stop, reactor construction.
122. [1977] 2 NUCLEAR REG.. REP. (CCH)
30,216.8. At least two significant
realities of the NEPA process support the use of the standard of obvious superiority:
(1) the inherent imprecision of cost/benefit analysis; and (2) the probability that more
adverse information has been developed respecting the closely examined site than any
alternative site.
123. TIME, May 16, 1977, at 59. The reason for increased participation in mass
protests was best summarized by a spokesmen for the Clamshell Alliance, "We feel
Seabrook in particular and nuclear power plants in general are life and death issues,
we are acting in self-defense."
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ing was so successful that it took police several hours to remove
the majority of the demonstrators."' Then in June 1978, after
negotiations with state officials, the Seabrook demonstration
site was transformed into an "energy fair" attended by 20,000
persons. 25 The Seabrook incidents have signaled a new phase
2
of mass public protest against nuclear power.
In 1976, public protest in the German town of Whyl forced
authorities to close that site and halt all construction of the
nuclear power plant. 27 One reason that these demonstrations
have gained such magnitude and attendance is that people are
becoming more frightened of nuclear facilities. Public fear
slows down the construction and licensing of these facilities,
thus increasing cost. In addition, every concession and every
added safeguard become a minimum demand for future facilities. It is no wonder that concessions to public demands are
made reluctantly.
2. Facilities
The NRC licensing board is aware that the public desires
to participate in the siting process, but given the technicality
of the issues and the delay caused by public intervention, the
licensing commission would like to limit public involvement.
Since the NRC is an administrative body, it is able to focus on
future events and political consequences instead of being encumbered by precedent. 28 This makes intervention all the
more appealing since an individual who successfully argues his
position may halt an entire project. As stated previously, an
individual may intervene if he can show a potential harm, has
standing, or lives in the vicinity of the project. He must not
124. NEWSWEEK, May 23, 1977, at 25. The "en masse" protests may have very
serious effects on nuclear facility siting. As a purely economic factor, the Seabrook
seige is an excellent example. While the demonstrators, held in the New Hampshire
National Guard armories, were awaiting trial, it cost the state more than $50,000 per
day to care for them.
125. N.Y. Times, June 25, 1978, at A18, col. 1. See also id. June 26, 1978, at A14,
col. 2.
126. NEWSWEEK, supra note 124, at 25.
127. Id.
128. The administrative process is not an entirely independent proceeding. Judicial adjudication reviewing administrative functions were divided into three basic
groups in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971): (1) the court
must first delineate the scope of the agency's authority, and then closely examine the
facts to determine if the agency acted within its authority; (2) the decision made by
the agency must not be arbitrary nor an abuse of discretion; and (3) the court must
determine whether the agency adequately followed necessary procedural requirements.
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only show how his interest will be affected, but must also specifically detail the problem he wishes to remedy.
An intervenor may petition for an amendment to any administrative regulation, for the passage of a new rule, or for the
appeal of rules through the Administrative Procedure Act'2 or
through 10 C.F.R. section 2.805(b) (1978). However, the petition must reflect "meaningful participation," not merely a
delay tactic. This is ensured, in part, by the NRC requirement
of proper standing.
There is ample justification for allowing public participation in the licensing process of nuclear facilities. Proponents of
nuclear energy argue that intervention lengthens the construction time and thus increases the cost of facilities. On the other
hand, opposition to nuclear energy is intense, and those who
are denied an outlet for their objections will delay projects by
various methods of demonstration, judicial intervention, and
administrative slowdowns. In reality, significant participation
by intervenors would ameliorate the entire process; issues
would be identified more readily and accurately; and the power
to influence an NRC decision would reduce unnecessary delay,
thereby saving time and money.
H. Public Interaction in Siting
The use of nuclear power is an emotional, frequently debated issue. Violence and increased attendance at mass protests necessitate a constructive program of public participation. The program should serve a twofold purpose: (1) to permit
the public to participate in and contribute to the licensing
process; and (2) to disclose all information, and to identify and
resolve major issues at the preconstruction stage of development. 10
Notice of nuclear license and site hearings is available only
to those who habitually read the Federal Register. This is an
unrealistic and ineffective way to give notice: supplemental
notices are necessary. As set forth in International Harvester
129. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1976). See also Bain, Informal Rulemaking: Quest of
Nuclear Licensing Reform, 55 DEN. L. J. 177 (1978).
130. The public is reluctant to accept the findings of the NRC or the public utility
operators of nuclear facilities on the safeworthiness of an installation. The NRC, public
utilities, and intervenors must make full disclosures in the initial proceedings if the
system is to improve.
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Co. v. Ruckleshaus, I adequate notice requires that the public
be informed of the proposed regulations. In addition, all issues
must be delineated, and descriptions of critical experiments
must be included in the notice.
The public must be given complete, timely, and prominent notice. Since states have become more involved in nuclear
siting and regulation, they should shoulder the responsibility
of insuring adequate public notice concerning facilities within
their own jurisdiction. Local newspapers and the electronic
media could be used effectively to advertise the hearings.
III.

CONCLUSIONS

The nuclear power question cannot be left to the exclusive
control of governments. Groups and individuals in many countries have demonstrated a genuine concern for their safety, as
well as a desire to effectively participate in the licensing process. Public concern is evidenced in the legislative and electoral
processes of most nuclear powers. 3 '
Nuclear energy is a controversial issue which will receive
even more attention in the future. It is thus important that at
least two objectives be met in the near future: (1) the public
must be allowed to participate more effectively in the licensing
process; and (2) alternative sources of energy must be developed.
Public participation in France and the United States has
increased. Unfortunately, there are many problems yet to be
resolved. For instance, the United States could follow France's
example by expanding and diversifying public hearing notices,
and France could allow more direct public participation in the
licensing process. In both the United States and France, public
relations need improvement. Since the public is skeptical of
nuclear energy, proponents should take the offensive rather
than the defensive: the public needs to be informed of the
safety features and successes of existing nuclear programs. In131. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
132. Sweet, supra note 64, at 41. The anti-nuclear sentiment was so strong in
Sweden that it culminated in victory for those politicians who espoused anti-nuclear
views.
In Austria, the anti-nuclear movement has been so successful that the 700mw
Zwentendorf nuclear facility, which was completed at a cost of $650 million, and which
is now standing idle, was rejected by Austrian voters in a national referendum. Rocky
Mountain News, Nov. 6, 1978, at 3, col. 2.
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formation must be more widely disseminated and must be
more readily available to the public in a form that is neither
too technical nor too simplistic.
France, the United States, and the world need more than
energy conservation and an alternative energy program in the
near future: that conclusion is inescapable. A complete withdrawal from nuclear energy, even if commercially viable, would
be impractical and unrealistic. We must therefore use the resources available to us, and make the best of a difficult situation.

